

Defining Citizenship in Archaic Greece

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Alain Duplouy
& Roger W. Brock

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OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

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Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom

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First Edition published in 2018

Impression: 1

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Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue,
New York, NY 10016, United States of America

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017951885

ISBN 978-0-19-881719-2

ebook ISBN 978-0-19-254923-5

Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

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Acknowledgements

The chapters making up this volume were initially delivered as papers during two conferences on Greek archaic citizenship held at the University of Leeds in 2009 and at the Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne in 2010. Thanks to lively and lasting discussions between the participants, they have been reworked for publication over the past few years. To this core series was added the essay presented by Maurizio Giangiulio, as well as a historiographic introduction and a conclusion by the editors. We are very grateful to all the authors, who contributed to the success of these two events and transformed the discussions into fascinating chapters.

The whole book has been too long in the making. As editors, we are mainly responsible for the regrettable delays in putting the chapters together or having various non-English written papers translated as soon as would have been desirable. We can only apologize to our contributors for the delays, which have obliged them to revise the papers—sometimes up to ten times—and continuously update the references. We thank them for their enduring patience and support.

Various institutions have supported this long-term project, starting with the British Academy, which initially granted a visiting scholarship in 2009 at the University of Leeds to one of us and supported the cost of the first conference. The second conference, held in Paris, was made possible thanks to the ‘special joint project’ of the Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme (Paris) and the British Academy, with additional funds coming from the Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and the UMR 7041 (Archéologies et sciences de l’Antiquité).

Our thanks also go to Charlotte Loveridge and Georgina Leighton, our editors at Oxford University Press, and to our copy-editor Monica Kendall, as well as to the three anonymous reviewers for early comments on preliminary versions of the papers and a revised version of the whole book.

AD and RB

May 2017

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List of Abbreviations

In general abbreviations follow *OCD*⁴; note in particular:

<i>BNP</i>	Cancik H. and Schneider H. (2002–10) (eds) <i>Brill's New Pauly. Encyclopaedia of the Ancient World</i> (Leiden–Boston)
<i>CAH</i>	<i>The Cambridge Ancient History</i> (Cambridge)
<i>DNP</i>	Cancik H. and Schneider H. (1996–2012) (eds) <i>Der Neue Pauly. Enzyklopädie der Antike</i> , 23 vols (Stuttgart–Weimar)
<i>EAH</i>	Bagnall R., Brodersen K., Champion C., Erskine A., and Huebner S. (2012) (eds) <i>Encyclopedia of Ancient History</i> (Oxford–Malden)
<i>FGrHist</i>	Jacoby F. (1923–58) <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> (Leiden)
McCabe Miletos	McCabe, D.F. (1984) <i>Miletos inscriptions. Text and list</i> . (Princeton) = PHI CD 6
ML	Meiggs R. and Lewis D. (1988) <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century bc. Revised edition</i> (Oxford)
<i>Nomima</i>	Van Effenterre H. and Ruzé F. (1994–5) <i>Nomima. Recueil d'inscriptions politiques et juridiques de l'archaïsme grec</i> . I. <i>Cités et institutions</i> . II. <i>Droit et société</i> (Rome–Paris)
<i>OCD</i> ³	Hornblower S. and Spawforth A. (1996) (eds) <i>The Oxford Classical Dictionary</i> (Oxford)
<i>OCD</i> ⁴	Hornblower S., Spawforth A., and Eidinow E. (2012) (eds) <i>The Oxford Classical Dictionary</i> (Oxford)
<i>RE</i>	Wissowa G. et al. (1893–1978) (eds) <i>Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft</i> , 49 vols (Stuttgart–Munich).
<i>RO</i>	Rhodes P.J. and Osborne R. (2003) <i>Greek Historical Inscriptions: 404–323 bc</i> (Oxford)

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Pathways to Archaic Citizenship

Alain Duploux

Citizenship is a major feature of contemporary national and international politics. It is also a legacy of ancient Greece. The concept of membership of a community appeared in Greece some three millennia ago as a participation in the social and political life of small-scale communities, but it is only towards the end of the fourth century BC that Aristotle offered the first explicit statement concerning it. Although widely accepted by historians of ancient Greece, the Aristotelian definition remains deeply rooted in the philosophical and political thought of the classical period, and probably fails to account accurately for the previous centuries and the dynamics of the emergent cities. Focusing on archaic Greece—intended here as the whole pre-classical era from the collapse of the Mycenaean palaces—our collective enquiry aims at exploring new routes to archaic citizenship.

Referring to the main primary sources, this introductory chapter explores some of the pathways that have been taken by historians and archaeologists over the last century in investigating Greek citizenship. It does not claim to be exhaustive and rather aims at echoing more extensive reviews.¹ Through selected topics—the Aristotelian model, law and institutions, economy, terminology, and material culture—this first chapter offers an overview of milestone studies, with a focus on French literature (not always accessible to English-speaking scholars) and its distinctive approaches, notably the ‘anthropologie historique’ of the so-called ‘École de Paris’. Several of the themes raised here will be discussed again in the following chapters, sometimes with diverging opinions. One of the purposes of the volume

is precisely to exemplify the diversity of approaches to archaic Greece and to the Greek city, trying to keep away from the hidden dangers of a monolithic conception of archaic citizenship. As Oswyn Murray warns us, ‘the more coherent a picture of any aspect of society, the more false it is likely to be’.² There are many ways to think about archaic Greece, and the book is meant to mirror this variety of attitudes.

One of the first steps to consider in this survey—and probably one of the key issues in matters of archaic citizenship—is the relation between the city (*polis*) and the citizen (*politēs*). In 1970 the French structural linguist Émile Benveniste insisted on the existence of two opposite linguistic models of the ancient city, using the words that denote it as points of entry to understand and compare Greek and Roman citizen institutions.³ If the Latin word *civis* produced *civitas*, the word *politēs* is conversely a derivative of the word *polis*. To put it another way, whereas in Latin only a gathering of citizens engenders a *civitas*, in the structure of the Greek language—as well as in English or in French—there is no citizen without a city. This linguistic derivation has often supported the view that early Greek cities were theoretical entities, ‘cities of reason’ according to Oswyn Murray or Jean-Pierre Vernant.⁴ Their foundation is regularly attributed to an *oikistēs* (such as Phalantos for Tarentum) or a hero (such as Theseus for Athens) and they evolved thanks to various lawgivers or prominent individuals. Whether known or unknown to us, these founding fathers are considered as the creators of a political, juridical, social, institutional, economical, and religious core structure framing the ancient *polis*, therefore allowing *politai* to construct their citizen identity in relation to it. In this sense, citizenship is often conceived as a mere by-product of the process of state formation, that is, essentially as a ‘membership’ of a previously defined political entity. Accordingly, historians explain that, even if the *polis* already existed in archaic Greece, there were not yet *politai*. The issue of archaic citizenship is then reduced to a discussion about the city itself and its genesis. As Philip Manville briefly put it, ‘the quest for the origin of the community will necessarily provide clues about membership in it’.⁵

However, as Benveniste warned us, a linguistic derivation is not necessarily to be (mis)interpreted as an historical process. Vocabulary is itself a construction and words should be conceived primarily as a discourse on key institutions. Hence, the linguistic connection between *polis* and *politēs* was only the way Greeks tended to conceive the relation between a city and its citizens, but not necessarily the way it arose and evolved.

Other historians, indeed, explain that the *polis* was primarily a community of citizens: ‘men make the city’ (ἄνδρες γὰρ πόλις), wrote

Thucydides (7.77.7) following Alcaeus (*fr.* 112.10, 426), resolutely setting the stage of community making through the actions of individuals. Instead of ‘membership’, which introduces a view from the top, citizenship could thus be described as a kind of ‘participation’—which is, incidentally, the very meaning of the word (*metechein*) used by Aristotle in defining it. When Alcaeus (*fr.* 130) portrays with tremendous bitterness his exile in contrast to a previous life as a citizen, he alludes to attending the assembly and the council, but also to political strife (*stasis*) between fellow citizens, tightly embedding the interactions between individuals at the core of the *polis*. In commenting on these famous verses Carmine Ampolo laid great stress on assessing citizens as ‘azionisti della *polis*’. The reference to financial shareholding was deliberately made, as Ampolo extended the citizen participation to all socio-economic fields. Besides attending the deliberative institutions of the *polis*, the exercise of citizenship covers all the areas of collective activities (cults and rituals, public organizations and their imagined identities), as well as land holdings, shares in the profits of mines, etc. As Ampolo summed up, ‘i cittadini non solo partecipano alla vita politica (pochi o molti dipendeva dal tipo di regime), ma alla vita civica in generale in tutti i suoi aspetti, in contesti che implicano una partecipazione agli utili, ai benefici’.⁶ When considering citizenship as a ‘participation’ in the community, the issue about archaic citizenship therefore turns to exploring the various fields—political, economic, and social—in which individuals could be involved in the process of making and maintaining a *polis*.

Whether the contributors to this volume decide to consider citizenship as a ‘membership’ or as a ‘participation’, what is at stake is ultimately the nature of archaic cities, which also rests on historiographical choices.

1. The Aristotelian Model

Defining citizenship is a problem that was explicitly stated for the first time by Aristotle in the *Politics*. He answered it in a theoretical way by emphasizing the functions and role of the citizen in the political and judicial institutions of the city-state.⁷

Before turning to a discussion of the various forms of constitution in Greek cities, with his well-known sixfold classification (kingship, tyranny, oligarchy, aristocracy, democracy, and *politeia*), Aristotle first inquires into the nature of the citizen. The first chapters of Book 3 (1274b–1278b) are thus devoted to a definition of citizenship. Who is entitled to the name of citizen? He first notes the great diversity of

actual conceptions in different cities: ‘often somebody who would be a citizen in a democracy is not a citizen under an oligarchy’ (1275a3–5). He then discards various inadequate criteria, such as the place of domicile or the right to participate in a judicial system, and disqualifies several borderline cases—which might have been current in his time—such as honorary citizens, under-age young men, the elderly discharged from military obligations, or disenfranchised and exiled citizens. As a theoretician, Aristotle is mainly looking for a definition of citizenship that would be universal despite the great political diversity among Greek states. As he puts it, he seeks to define the citizen in an absolute sense (πολίτης δ’ ἀπλῶς, 1275a19). According to Aristotle, this pure and simple citizen is to be defined as ‘a man who shares in the administration of justice and in the holding of office’ (μετέχειν κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς, 1275a23). Among the *archai* he includes the offices with fixed terms, whether or not they can be held several times, as well as the offices without limit of tenure, such as juryman in courts and member of the assembly. Accordingly, he asserts that citizens are those who participate in this manner (τίθεμεν δὴ πολίτας τοὺς οὕτω μετέχοντας, 1275a32–3).

Having stated this extremely abstract but supposedly universal definition, Aristotle then engages in a subtler discussion on historical and political variability. Since he is going to define various forms of regime, he admits that the kind of citizenship corresponding to each form of constitution will necessarily be different. He also acknowledges that his definition especially applies to democracies, but does not suit other forms of government as well. The first definition has thus to be corrected to account for those regimes in which deliberative and judicial duties are assigned to restricted boards or designated magistrates, and not to the whole body of citizens such as a popular assembly. Amending his original definition, Aristotle eventually states that a citizen is ‘the one who has the right to participate in deliberative or judicial office’ (ἐξουσία κοινωνεῖν ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς καὶ κριτικῆς, 1275b18–19), even if he does not continuously exercise these offices as he would in a democracy.

He then discusses transmission of citizenship and the durability of the city. If the citizen body is usually equated with a ‘descent group’, citizenship being normally limited to the children of citizens on both sides—although he later (1278a27–34) discusses less restrictive rules—there were other alternatives of enfranchisement, such as special magistrates entitled to be citizen-makers. More practically still, since descent from a citizen father or a citizen mother does not apply to the first inhabitants or founders of a city, whoever practises citizenship in the way previously stated is a citizen. Concerning the enrolment of new citizens by lawgivers or powerful politicians, the question can

arise whether they received their citizenship wrongly or rightly. Since the validity of the definition acknowledging the power of the ruling citizens is not affected by having the officials governing rightly or not, even persons wrongly admitted to citizenship are nevertheless to be considered as such. Aristotle further introduces the debate over the identity of and relationships between the (provisional) rulers and the (timeless) state. With time passing and parameters changing (population, size, ethnicity) would a city indeed always be the same city? This is a difficult question, which has no simple answer according to the philosopher. However, stressing as he does politics and constitutional matters, he asserts that when the form of the government has been altered (διαφερούσης τῆς πολιτείας, 1276b3) the state is no longer the same.

Aristotle then goes on to define the value (*aretē*) of a good citizen, as distinct from the value of a good man. Of course, in Aristotelian thought, the value of a citizen is related to the constitution of the state. And since there are various forms of constitution, there is not a single form of citizen goodness, while being a good man is an absolute quality. It is even possible to be a good citizen without being a good man, and it is not necessary that all the citizens in a state be good men. Aristotle introduces here a distinction between two sorts of citizen, the ruler (*archōn*) and the ruled (*archomenos*), only the former having to be a good man. If a good ruler knows how to exercise his authority, the good citizen must also learn to obey, that is, to be ruled. There are thus two ways to have a share in politics or two moments in politics, *archein* and *archesthai*, to rule and to be ruled. The value of a good citizen consists in his ability to rule and be ruled alternately. This means that the ruler should also learn by being ruled: it is impossible to become a good ruler without having been a subject. Conversely, the good citizen should be able to rule, which might be an issue if he lacks the virtue of a good man.

Before turning to the discussion of the various forms of constitution, Aristotle supplements his thinking on citizenship by taking an actual example of the relationship between these two levels of citizenship. Can workers be counted as citizens? Since artisans are not capable of governing because of their lack of virtue, should they be considered as citizens? According to Aristotle, in ancient times craftsmen were regularly excluded from the citizen body and so the best-ordered *polis* should not enfranchise any of them. If workers or craftsmen are citizens, the citizen's virtue, as previously defined, would not be valid for every citizen, but only for those who are released from menial occupations. Depending on the kind of constitution, artisans will therefore be counted in or excluded from citizenship. In aristocracies, since honours are bestowed according to

merit and dignity, no one living a life of manual labour can have a share in citizenship, whereas in oligarchies, in which admission to office is based on property assessments, rich artisans can be citizens. However, according to Aristotle, if workers are enfranchised, they can be nothing else than ruled citizens or subjects (*archomenoi politai*).

In sum, if there are various kinds of citizens, according to Aristotle, a ‘citizen in the fullest sense’ is the one ‘who shares in the offices’ (μάλιστα πολίτης ὁ μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν, 1278a36). The man who, notwithstanding his citizen status, does not have a share in the honours of the *polis*—that is, the ruled citizen, as opposed to the ruler—is like a metic (ὥσπερ μέτοικος γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ τῶν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχων, 1278a38). Of course, this thinly disguised criticism of contemporary Athenian democracy makes clear how restricted the pure citizen is intended to be in the Aristotelian model.

Having synthetically recorded Aristotle’s approach to citizenship, we must also recall the political and intellectual context in which it was formulated. As Josiah Ober seminally described it,⁸ after the collapse of the brief oligarchy of 403, elite Athenian critics of popular rule set themselves the arduous task of explaining what was wrong with the power of the people and of inventing alternative visions of (mostly) non-democratic political societies. After Ps.-Xenophon’s pamphlet, Plato’s writings and Isocrates’ speeches, Aristotle’s political philosophy still sought to formulate practical internal amelioration of existing regimes, as well as to influence the political organization of future Greek cities in the hope of building the best imaginable *politeia*. In his task, Aristotle often embraces the model of a moderate democracy, but also promotes various strikingly aristocratic ideas and features, as well as taking a radically critical stance towards democracy as it was currently practised. Not surprisingly, the Aristotelian definition of citizenship has the tone of this wider political perspective.

2. The Legal and Institutional Approach

Since Aristotle is the only ancient author to offer a clear-cut definition of citizenship in ancient Greek cities, his thought has long been the starting point of any reflection on the nature of citizenship—and, of course, on the ancient Greek *polis*, since ‘a state is a collection of citizens’, ἡ γὰρ πόλις πολίτων τι πλῆθός ἐστιν (*Pol.* 3.1274b41). Given how embedded the Aristotelian citizen is in the discussion of the various forms of constitution, his definition of citizenship has been at the core of a long tradition of political and legal studies, beginning

with the German historians of the late nineteenth century and their *Griechische Staatskunde* and ending with the *Copenhagen Polis Centre* and its *Inventory of archaic and classical poleis*.

Following the model of Theodor Mommsen's *Römisches Staatsrecht* (1871–88), German historians of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries engaged in a legal and institutional description of Greek states. Deploring the fact that, even for classical Athens, sources are not as numerous and explicit as the corpus of Roman law, they carried on Aristotle's theoretical inquiry. According to his own words, Emil Szántó claimed to be the first since Aristotle to propose a comprehensive and systematic study of Greek constitutions in his *Griechische Bürgerrecht* (1892). Because the city is described as the sum of all the citizens, Szántó set at the core of his inquiry on the Greek state an investigation of the citizen: 'Wer also die Frage gelöst hat: Was ist der Bürger? der hat für die griechischen Demokratie auch die Frage gelöst: Was ist der Staat.'⁹ Following the ancient master, he further developed the question of political authority (*archē*) by collating the rich collection of inscriptions from the entire Greek world on various legal matters related to civic rights, particularly enfranchisement, *isopoliteia*, and *sympoliteia*. Of major importance were also the two volumes of *Griechische Staatskunde* in the *Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft*: Georg Busolt offered a general description of Greek states, followed by Heinrich Swoboda's study on Sparta, the Cretan cities, and Athens.¹⁰ They were mainly interested in the conditions of citizenship enrolment and by the exercise of deliberative, legislative, and judicial authority that constitutes the exclusive privilege of citizens. They discussed transmission of citizenship and ways of enfranchisement, as well as the various institutions of the *polis* (assembly, council, and courts) and their oligarchic or popular recruitment. Through a theoretical account derived from ancient political thought and exemplified by numerous case studies emerges the idea of a continuous development from early states to democratic *poleis*, where archaic cities are mainly characterized by a much more reduced number of full citizens than democratic states.

This Mommsenian tradition, which gave rise to numerous studies during the past century, combines two approaches to Greek citizenship that can be analytically distinguished: the first explores the citizen status and its legal privileges in contrast to various non-citizen statuses, the second analyses the evolution of political institutions among Greek cities and produces a constitutional account of Greek history.

Greek citizenship has regularly been thought to embody an overall legal status associated with various rights and duties: the right to

attend the assembly (and sometimes to speak and vote), to hold public offices, to take part in the civic religion, to have full access to justice and serve as juror in courts, to buy and own land, but also to defend the community during wars and pay taxes. In this sense, its legal boundaries were also drawn in opposition to various groups of non-citizens. Classical Athenian law for instance distinguishes *politai* from foreigners (*xenoi*), resident aliens (*metoikoi*), and slaves (*douloi*). As Virginia Hunter puts it, ‘Resident aliens and Athenian citizens were each a juridically defined group with privileges, on the one hand, and disabilities, on the other, enshrined in law. These two social groups together with a class of slaves represent the three “orders” of Athenian society.’¹¹ With such a tightly defined and regulated status, the citizen body appears as a closed social order. Apart from some individuals (freedmen or foreigners) who were exceptionally granted citizenship for their civic commitment,¹² being a citizen in an ancient Greek city was an exclusive privilege. As a legal status, citizenship was protected by inherited rights. Its transmission was restricted to *ius sanguinis*, so that the citizen body normally formed a ‘descent group’: only sons of a citizen father (and sometimes both of a citizen father and of a citizen mother) were admitted to the citizen body.¹³ There was therefore a kind of civic blood, and lacking it, it was nearly impossible to cross the barrier to citizenship. For the privileged people who enjoyed this status, its transmission was expected and (nearly) automatic, even if ritually controlled through various social and legal institutions. In Athens again, young males of citizen parentage on both sides were registered on the rolls of their demes at the age of eighteen, provided that they complied with the strict rules for Athenian citizenship. After the successful co-optation by their fellow demesmen and the approval by the council, their names were inscribed in a register kept by the deme, the *lēxiarchikon grammateion*. The affiliation to a sub-unit of the city (such as the demes or the phratries) was a necessary and sufficient condition of membership of the city. As Philip Manville concludes, ‘Athenian citizenship in its various legal aspects can be described as a formally instituted status group.’¹⁴

Most of these studies are related to classical Athens and it is indeed much more difficult to trace back these rules and principles into archaic Greek cities. In their anthology of political and legal inscriptions of archaic Greece (*Nomima*), Henri Van Effenterre and Françoise Ruzé collected the few inscriptions pertaining to citizen status from the entire Greek world. Apart from a few late seventh-century fragments of Gortynian regulation, most of them are late archaic texts—between 530 and 450, with a majority around 500—that throw no light on earlier legal conceptions of citizenship. There is indeed no link between these late archaic inscriptions, covering a

timespan of no more than eighty years, and the so-called age of the lawgivers (Lycurgus of Sparta, Solon of Athens, Zaleucus of Locri, Charondas of Catania, etc.) of the seventh and early sixth centuries. Moreover, in the epigraphic sources, there is no factual description of a citizen status stating every right and duty of their holders, but only allusions to privileges that are usually denied to non-members of the citizen community or granted to newly enfranchised citizens. As various recent studies tend to show, Greek archaic laws did not have the normative function of Roman rules and regulations, as often assumed by the earlier German *Griechische Staatskunde*, but were usually enacted or written with the pragmatic aim of settling disputes or negotiating positions between members of the community.¹⁵ As Van Effenterre and Ruzé explain, the citizen identity in archaic Greece was primarily defined in contrast to other statuses. Membership of a Greek *polis* involved very different features from one city to another (place of residence, means of living, personal attachment, or services rendered to the community, etc.), but most often citizens initially appear in opposition to foreigners (*xenoi*) of all kinds, whether travellers, traders, beggars, craftsmen, friends, intruders, refugees, or assailants. According to the few known late archaic regulations, individuals or small groups could be integrated or reintegrated into the citizen community with (some of) the attendant privileges: tax exemption (*ateleia*), property holding or land allotment, legal protection against enslavement or property confiscation (*asyleia*), access to public offices, enrolment in a men's club (Cretan *andreion*), or participation in civic rituals. 'Ainsi, ce dont le citoyen d'origine bénéficie par nature, et que l'étranger naturalisé acquiert, c'est la double sécurité des personnes et des biens,' comments Ruzé.¹⁶ She further adds, 'le pouvoir délibératif est consubstantiel à la citoyenneté; il est le droit propre au citoyen, le minimum de ce qui lui est reconnu: ayant éliminé tout autre critère de citoyenneté, Aristote s'en tient à celui-là'.¹⁷ It is therefore supposed that the evolution of citizenship closely follows the development of deliberative boards and the change in forms of government. Aristotle's questioning on the citizen does introduce, indeed, an investigation of the various political regimes and their evolution.

Aristotle's political thought is well known: if rulers rule for the common interest, constitutions are necessarily good; if they rule for their own interest, constitutions are deviations (*Pol.* 3.1279a–b). The 'correct' (*orthai*) forms of government are those which have the welfare of the governed at heart, whereas those who aim only at the rulers' good are 'deviations' (*parekbaseis*). Adding to this principle the usual criterion of the number of rulers, Aristotle defines six forms of government, which constitute the core of the whole of ancient and

modern political thought, from Dicaearchus and Polybius to Victor Ehrenberg and Mogens Hansen. Kingship, aristocracy, and ‘citizen-constitution’ (*politeia*) belong to the good regimes, and the ‘deviations’ are tyranny, oligarchy, and radical democracy. This political taxonomy was developed alongside a historical conception, producing an institutional account of the past. According to ancient political thought, each kind of government was assigned to a specific period. In the remotest past, in the time of heroes and of foundation of cities, kingship was the regular form of government. With time, there were more men equal in virtue so that aristocracy succeeded to kingship after a revolution. Soon people got more and more interested in money and neglected the common wealth; rulers became oligarchs. Those regimes evolved to tyranny when one of the rulers, searching support from the masses, monopolized the head of the state. But when people got tired of an autocratic rule, a revolution marked the transition to democracy. Monarchy, aristocracy, oligarchy, and tyranny were thus classified as typical systems of the archaic period, and democracy was thought to be characteristic of the classical period. The general principle—supported by Aristotle’s teleological tendencies—is that of a constant widening of the number of rulers, but also of the worsening of the government towards its negative variant.¹⁸

The Aristotelian constitutional frame has of course direct consequences for the definition of archaic citizenship. As stated by Gustave Glotz, the major difference between these forms of government lies primarily in the distribution of power between institutions, not in the nature of the institutions themselves: in aristocracies and oligarchies, political authority belongs to the council and its members, whereas in democracies it lies in the hands of the assembly and an enlarged citizen body.¹⁹ By definition, in archaic *poleis*, citizens fully performing the political privileges inherent to their status were thus very few. In this sense, any modern political definition of archaic citizenship follows, often closely, considerations of an archaic social order, in which aristocrats and noblemen, usually associated with wealthy landowners, were supposed to rule archaic cities. In a way, archaic citizenship is reduced to a matter of social access to political institutions.

This institutional approach to the Greek city—as well as to citizenship—has been revived recently thanks to the wide audience of Mogens H. Hansen’s masterly and prolific work.²⁰ Assembling an inventory of all known Greek *poleis* in the archaic and classical periods, Hansen carried out an extensive analysis of the ancient concept and realities. One of the essential characteristics of the whole work of the *Copenhagen Polis Centre* is to favour an institutional

definition of the Greek city-state, which is primarily conceived as a political community. According to Hansen, ‘the *polis* was a highly-institutionalised community, and at the core of the *polis* were the political institutions where the *politai* met and isolated themselves from women, foreigners and slaves. Political activity was a fundamental aspect of the community, and, as a polity, the *polis* is best seen as a very deliberately planned and highly rational form of political organisation.’²¹ This conception was explicitly set against a holistic—that is, French or Durkheimian²²—view of the *polis*, in which religion and cults are considered as important aspects of community life and accepted as structural features in the process of state formation. According to Hansen, however, there is a clear-cut distinction between the *polis* sphere and a religious sphere that was not institutionally organized. The core features of a city-state therefore lie in its political institutions, which offer a sound basis for the definition of a citizen’s activity and status. As Hansen clearly writes it, ‘the very heart of the *polis* concept was the citizen body understood as the participants in the city’s political institutions’ and therefore ‘a citizen is defined as a person (*politēs*) who takes a part in the running of a *polis* by exercising his political rights’. More precisely, ‘in the ancient Greek city-state culture “citizenship” was what it has become again in the modern world: a person’s juridically defined, inherited, membership of a state, in virtue of which that citizen enjoys a number of political, social and economic privileges in that state which a non-citizen living in the state is deprived of or can enjoy only to a limited extent’.²³ Aristotle is very frequently quoted in Hansen’s work and is supposed to offer a viable definition of citizenship for both classical and archaic *poleis*, often making the *Inventory of archaic and classical poleis* a mere revival of nineteenth-century *Griechische Staatskunde*.

Numerous scholars have been happy to accept Aristotle’s political model as a guide to delineate Greek citizenship, even back into the archaic period. Unfortunately, since Greek history is often reduced to changes in forms of government, such an approach to citizenship usually avoids any historical discussion of the citizen status. Being defined as a primarily legal status, *politeia* is meant to be a timeless and static concept, unchanged throughout centuries except for minor revisions of various statutory details. Insofar as a distinction is considered between the archaic and the classical period, archaic citizenship is most often described as an incomplete or restricted status.

One of the major difficulties in writing archaic history is probably to construct a vision of archaic Greece independent of classical history. As a kind of (unconscious) commitment to Hegelian teleology, indeed, historians often tend to regard archaic *poleis* as a form of

unaccomplished or primitive classical city. Archaic citizenship is therefore compared to an ideal stage of *politeia* that would be the political and judicial status defined by classical thought, as the late nineteenth-century tradition and more recent scholarship have accepted it. If a legal and institutional definition of the citizens' duty conveniently fits the political structure and mechanisms of many classical democracies, as well perhaps as some early Hellenistic *poleis*, it does not always fit archaic realities and concepts so precisely. But since many archaic cities were not as strictly institutionalized as classical Athens, archaic citizenship has been regularly qualified as 'incomplete' or 'elementary'.

To quote Philip Manville, Athenian citizenship was 'a mere glimmer in the age of Drakon, born under Solon, nurtured by tyrants, and given full form by Cleisthenes'.²⁴ Addressing the origins of citizenship in ancient Athens, Manville introduces his work with a quotation of Demosthenes' *Against Neaira* and first details all major aspects of citizenship in classical political thought and practice. But what did it mean before the age of democracy? To understand the origins of membership of the city-state, Manville investigates the origins of the *polis* itself and the stages through which it passed before it became the classical form of state in Pericles' days. Defining citizenship here becomes a by-product of the reflection on the *polis* itself, in agreement with Benveniste's linguistic model. In search of a definition of the emergent *polis*, he immediately considers Aristotle's *Politics*, adopting the constitutional model that has the Athenian city successively passing through monarchy (Theseus), oligarchy (from Draco to Solon), tyranny (Peisistratus), and democracy (Cleisthenes). According to Manville and his Aristotelian framework, earlier stages of Athenian history were mainly characterized by a decentralized social mosaic, in which the diversity of affiliations to local villages and regional corporations long prevented the emergence of a common self-conscious unity among the Attic population. The gradual consolidation of citizenship in archaic Athens therefore appears as the results of enduring centralizing trends. A fully developed citizenship eventually emerged with the creation by Cleisthenes of a uniform system of membership of the city-state thanks to a new pattern of local demes. Besides discussion of ancient sources that chronicle a series of changes in institutions and citizen affiliations, much of the inspiration of Manville's study explicitly derives from the work of neo-evolutionist anthropology, which sets a standard of evolutionary patterns to the development of primitive states.²⁵ In this sense, archaic citizenship appears as a primitive stage on the way to a more complete and formal political status of citizen, namely membership of the classical and democratic city. It is however important to note that,

even if neo-evolutionism has inspired various works on archaic Greece in recent years,²⁶ it has also been increasingly subject to criticism in the field of anthropology. Scholars notably insist on its inadequacy for the study of evolutions over small timescales: if ever sustainable as an interpretive model, it only applies to long-term diachronic perspectives, such as a millennium, but certainly not to the few decades of Athenian constitutional history from Draco to Cleisthenes.²⁷

Such a teleological approach to archaic history also undermines Christian Meier's idea of the late emergence of a 'true citizenship' through the institutional and cultural revolution of Cleisthenes.²⁸ According to the German historian, the 'true citizen' emerged when the 'political' became established as a separate political order, split off from the social order and set over against it, with state institutions that were divorced from society. This happened during the classical age, especially in the democracy of Athens, when the rights and freedom of every citizen were constitutionally secured. According to Meier, when broad sections of the citizenry assumed a political role thanks to the Cleisthenic reforms, the citizens finally met as citizens, saw themselves as citizens, and relied on one another as citizens. This formal citizen status is presented as the final stage of a natural evolution, but archaic history is somehow abridged as if it were a mere movement towards democracy.

In their masterwork *Nomima*, Henri Van Effenterre and Françoise Ruzé coined the concept of pre-*politeia* to describe the content of archaic citizenship. The word *politeia* itself first appears with the meaning of 'citizenship' in classical sources. Herodotus (9.34.1) uses it to qualify the status requested by Teisamenos from the Lacedaimonians, and it is by far the most common meaning attested all over the Greek world in hundreds of late classical and Hellenistic decrees granting citizenship.²⁹ According to Van Effenterre and Ruzé and in agreement with Benveniste's linguistic model, if there were cities in most parts of the Greek world, there were not yet citizens; the concept of citizenship was not yet outlined: 'Ce que nous appelons pré-*politeia* n'est aucunement un statut précis qui aurait précédé la citoyenneté classique. C'est, sur un siècle et demi, du VII^e au V^e siècle, la confluence d'efforts dispersés qui permettent de dégager peu à peu le rapport fondamental entre l'homme et la cité.'³⁰ Until the fifth century there was no formal legal status of citizen. To say it in a less subtle way, there was no classical citizenship before the classical period!

In a major study on the growing role of associations in the making of the Athenian *polis* (also synthesized in this volume, [chapter 5](#)), Paulin Ismard recently pursued Manville's insight about centralizing

trends in citizen connections with the manifold social groups of the archaic and classical city. Ismard lays great stress on the active role played by associations—in the broadest sense, including phratries, *genē*, *orgeōnes*, *thiasoi*, etc.—in the shaping of Athenian citizen identity. He also insists on its gradual transformation from Solon to Cleisthenes and Pericles. For the whole of the sixth century, integration into citizenship passed through membership of one or several of the numerous associations existing inside the Athenian community. The same is true for late sixth- and early fifth-century Cretan cities: various inscriptions let us know that individuals were granted citizenship through the intermediary of a specific community of the city. This process of affiliation with the archaic city characterized what Ismard calls ‘une citoyenneté encore largement inachevée’, made up of elementary rights, ‘qui n’a pas encore de lieu propre bien établi ni de contenu institutionnel stable, révélant le manque d’intégration politique de la cité du VI^e siècle’.³¹ By contrast, the Cleisthenic reorganization of the demes brought a new and unique system of civic affiliation. The integration of all citizens in the deme and phratry structures set a common standard for the equal distribution of political rights and legal protection. This new civic framework of the late sixth century created the conditions for a new definition of citizenship, which would still have to wait for the Periclean law of 451/450.

It is obvious that archaic and classical citizenships were different in both theory and practice, although the latter could have retained some components of the former. Is it, however, historically sound and indeed useful to speak of an ‘incomplete’ archaic citizenship? In this sense, archaic citizenship is defined in contrast to another model, supposed to be more complete, by pinpointing its deficiencies, not by stressing its peculiarities. Is it really what we need?

As John Davies warns us, this disparaging attitude towards ‘archaic’ Greece is a typical trap: as often, terminology and periodization mislead more than they help.³² More radically, speaking of an ‘incomplete’ archaic citizenship complies with a teleological perspective and eventually sounds like a value judgement on an ‘early’ or ‘primitive’ city, both trends that should normally be avoided in the writing of ‘archaic’ history. Rather than considering that every reform of the citizen status was a step further on the way to a formal classical *politeia* intended as a final stage (at least before the Hellenistic era and the alleged decline of citizenship), we should perhaps acknowledge that the development of archaic social institutions into classical models was unpredictable. As Josine Blok puts it, ‘the differences between the *polis*-structures in the early seventh and in the late fourth centuries are such that any relationship between the former and the

latter cannot be explained with recourse to an underlying institutional continuity. Instead, the “rise of the *polis*” should be approached as an open process, which at some points might have yielded quite different results than the ones so well-known from fifth and especially fourth century sources.’³³ Historians should neither be judges, evaluating the archaic period in terms of classical models, nor seers, considering the future to explain the past. There is no doubt that citizenship was an evolving concept, but there is no profit or historical achievement in speaking of an ‘incomplete’ status for archaic Greece, nor in asserting the non-existence of citizens in archaic *poleis*.

Besides the so-called elementary content of archaic citizenship, another fundamental question is that of the ‘extent’ of political rights: who had citizenship in archaic Greece? and what sort of citizenship? Even if a political and legal status in some way equivalent to the classical formal citizenship ever existed in archaic Greece—a status that historians usually name ‘full citizenship’—its social extension is regularly supposed to have been very restricted. Once again, Aristotle offers a philosophical explanation of this model. As we saw, according to him, there are two sorts of citizens, the ruler (*archōn*) and the ruled (*archomenos*). In a democracy, citizens are alternately one and the other, but in other forms of government, all deliberative and judicial offices are in the hands of a few individuals while most of the citizens never actually have a share in the honours of the *polis* and are therefore in a position of permanent inferiority. Since archaic cities were usually not considered as democracies, most archaic citizens could not be considered, therefore, as citizens in the fullest sense.

The Aristotelian conception formed the basis of a sharp distinction in modern historiography between two levels of citizenship. The widely accepted notion of ‘full citizenship’ (*Vollbürgerschaft*) has been traditionally applied to archaic history in order to describe the political rights of almighty aristocrats in contrast to the nearly institutional and judicial incapacity of ‘underprivileged citizens’ of the *dēmos*. This distinction between two sorts of citizens in archaic Greece holds a central place in all *Griechische Staatskunde* of the early twentieth century, but finds also an echo in numerous recent studies on archaic Greece, particularly (but not only) on Spartan society.³⁴ Among others, Mogens Hansen has reasserted it in various studies: ‘in relation to the structure and function of the state [...] citizens fall into two opposed groups: rulers and ruled, the first being identified with the government and the second with the subjects’.³⁵ According to this model, only full citizens possessed unrestricted rule in the state. Besides women who never achieved a complete citizen status and young men who were not yet full citizens, the citizens of lesser rights were limited in their political status by social or financial restrictions.

They could be admitted to the assembly, as the *thêtes* in the Athens of Solon, but were not expected to speak (or even to vote) and were excluded from all political or judicial offices.³⁶ As Françoise Ruzé puts it, 'l'expression de la citoyenneté totale, à l'époque archaïque, se fait volontiers par la mention de l'égalité de droits avec les magistrats',³⁷ thus assuming an identification between archaic full citizens and the Aristotelian ruling citizens. In many places, manual workers—when not excluded from citizenship—were likewise limited in their rights. In a historical perspective, with the extension of democratic government more citizens were supposed to enjoy full citizen rights: as Georg Busolt wrote, 'Die Verbreitung des minderechtigten Bürgertums wurde immer weiter eingeschränkt, je ausgedehntere Geltung das demokratische Prinzip erlangte.'³⁸ Since democracy was the rule of the whole people, all citizens were full citizens in democratic cities. It was also the only form of government in which potential citizens equated so closely to actual citizens. In a certain sense, archaic history in its progress to democracy could thus be summarized as a continuous effort to grant full citizenship to all the citizens of a *polis*. As Claude Mossé once wrote, archaic Greece saw 'l'élargissement du corps civique, ou plus justement, du corps politique', that is, the extension of full citizenship to former underprivileged citizens.³⁹

Like the theorization of an incomplete citizenship, such a distinction between two sorts of citizens is merely an alternative to the conventional idea that archaic citizenship was mainly incomplete or unachieved. In twentieth-century historiography this distinction was also meant to anchor on a legal basis the alleged genetic inequalities between the *dēmos* and the nobility of the *genē* that was supposed to rule archaic cities: aristocrats were presented as full citizens and people from the *dēmos* as second-class or underprivileged citizens. Yet, a number of studies have long demonstrated that the construction of hierarchies in archaic and classical societies was in no way related to any legal or gentilician criteria.⁴⁰ Likewise, the distinction between two levels of archaic citizenship is first and foremost the product of a political thought and practice deeply rooted in fourth-century Athenian politics that has been anachronistically applied to earlier times.⁴¹ The idea of two levels of citizenship arose in the rich political thought following the two Athenian oligarchic revolutions of the late fifth century, which also gave rise to the Aristotelian model. Rather than promoting an overthrow of the democratic order and the restriction of the citizen body to five or three thousand citizens, some moderate reformers or oligarchic sympathizers, such as Isocrates, urged the re-establishment of an ancestral democracy (*patrios politeiai*) associated with the name of Solon, in which the wealthy rule the city

alone but under scrutiny by the *dēmos*. Focusing on the ways in which democracy could be moderated, Isocrates points the way to a distinction, which was to appear in Aristotelian thought, between two sorts of citizens, *archontes* and *archomenoi politai*: on the one hand those who take part in the allotment of political offices, and on the other hand those who are always ruled. Elaborated by fourth-century political thinkers, such a distinction is probably not the most accurate model to account for the historical and political facts of previous centuries, even when it refers to an alleged ancestral constitution in pre-classical cities. There are actually no positive signs of a clear-cut step between two legally defined levels of citizenship. As Benedetto Bravo once demonstrated, ‘nessuno dei testi dell’età arcaica, né di quello posteriori, relative a quell’età, né, del resto, alcuno dei testi riguardanti le *poleis* dell’età classica o ellenistica, mi sembra attestare l’esistenza di un concetto in qualche modo analogo a quello romano di *cives sine suffragio*’, concluding that ‘all’interno di questo gruppo [the *dēmos* as a political body] esisteva una gradazione dei diritti politici, varia a seconda delle *poleis* e dei tempi; ma la nozione di “cittadino” non ammetteva alcuna gradazione: o si era cittadini, o non lo si era, assolutamente’.⁴² To be a citizen or not to be a citizen, that was the only question, with no gradation in the answer.

The excessive emphasis on legal and institutional matters has produced models that supposedly apply to all periods, from archaic to classical times, and all cities. Unfortunately, the results of this theoretical effort have generated anachronistic definitions of archaic citizenship, as well as an unjustified distinction between two sorts of citizen. More cautiously, recent scholarship has become increasingly sceptical of legal categories, even when applied to statuses of the classical and democratic city.⁴³ In order to reassess the value of historical variability over the centuries, beyond any legal, political, or philosophical approach, scholars need to look for a genuinely archaic definition of citizenship or at least forge new models stemming from archaic realities. Wealth and the power of wealth are a good theme to start with.

3. The Power of Wealth

If social status has often been related to the economic debate, and notably to the way status interacts with wealth,⁴⁴ citizen rights cannot as easily be linked to the nature of economic activity in archaic Greece. Except for a few facts, inferences are often drawn from logical or theoretical assumptions, rather than from unambiguous sources.

There has been a protracted debate over the nature of the ancient economy. Was archaic Greece a world of subsistence farmers ruled by a landed elite with no interest in making money or was it dominated by farmer-traders producing a large proportion of their crops to sell abroad at the most favourable rate? Was the economy of archaic Greece heavily dependent on trade or was it based on self-sufficiency, limiting exchanges to reciprocity and gift-giving? Considering the relative scarcity of the written sources and the equivocal evidence offered by the archaeological material, the debate between ‘primitivists’ and ‘modernists’—or more specifically between ‘substantivists’ and ‘formalists’—depends ultimately on how archaic Greece is imagined. This is not the place to detail once again the so-called ‘Bücher-Meyer Controversy’ or its development through twentieth-century historiography, the so-called ‘New Orthodoxy’ of Finley and his followers.⁴⁵ Suffice it to say that in recent decades, in a post-Finley era, scholars have tended to adopt a less theoretical and more contextual approach to the ancient economy, going back to the analysis of ancient texts and inscriptions. Following Anthony Snodgrass, they also rely more and more on archaeology to increase the amount of quantitative and qualitative information.⁴⁶

Ancient sources particularly insisted on what is probably the sole unequivocal link between economy and citizen status: everywhere in Greece citizens were deeply attached to their lands. The link between landed property and citizen status is nowhere more obvious than in moments of forced exile: in 546, ‘while they prepared to sail to Cyrrus, more than half [of the Phocaeans] were overcome with longing and pitiful sorrow for the city and the life of their land, and they broke their oath and sailed back to Phocaea’ (Hdt. 1.165.3) and in 431 ‘deep was the trouble and discontent [of the Athenians] at abandoning their houses and the hereditary temples of the ancient constitution, and at having to change their habits of life and to bid farewell to what each regarded as his native city’ (Thuc. 2.16.2). To acquire and own land and houses (*enktēsis gēs kai oikias*) was indeed, as explicitly mentioned in various classical texts and inscriptions, a citizen privilege. As attested from the end of the fifth century, this privilege could also be granted to foreigners. But it always remained an exception and a great favour of the city to its benefactors, a fact that clearly reinforces the connection within all the citizen domains. As Jan Pečírka stated it for Athens, ‘the services rendered by persons granted *enktēsis* took the form of help given to Athenians abroad, as well as services to Athens in the diplomatic, financial, military, supply, cultural, health (a doctor in IG II² 373) and political spheres’.⁴⁷ Such a link with the fatherland and its fruits is also emphasized in the Athenian ephebic oath, quoted by Lycurgus (1.77)

and recorded in a famous fourth-century inscription found in 1932 at Acharnae: ephebes swore on various deities and on 'wheat, barley, vines, olive-trees, fig-trees'. As has been regularly suggested, the text may be a reliable copy of an archaic civic oath despite the non-existence of the institutional *ephēbeia* before the fourth century.⁴⁸ In classical Athens landowning was undoubtedly at the core of a citizen's self-definition and identification.

Similar ties between landowners and citizens might be claimed for archaic Greece. As emphasized by Henri Van Effenterre and Françoise Ruzé, such a privilege was mentioned or alluded to in a few (late) archaic inscriptions.⁴⁹ In the early fifth century, the whole city of Gortyn awarded Dionysios various citizen privileges in acknowledgement of his bravery in war and his benevolence; notably, he received 'a house in Avlon inside the fortress and a plot outside of the [...] land' (φοικίαν ἐν Ἀφλῶνι ἔνδος πύργου καὶ φοικόπεδον ἔκσοι γᾶν κ[—]) (*Nomima* I, no. 8). At the same time a Gortynian law alludes to fields in Keskora and Pala allocated by the *polis* to be planted (τὰν ἐ[ν] Κησκόροι καὶ τὰν ἐμ Πάλαι πυταλιὰν ἔδοκαν ἁ πόλις πυτεῦσαι) (*Nomima* I, no. 47). Around 475 in Elis Deucalion is granted a piece of land in Pisa among other privileges making him a citizen equal to various officials of the Khaladrians (τὰν γᾶν ἔχεν τὰν ἐν Πίσσῳ) (*Nomima* I, no. 21). The Pappadakis bronze plaque (*Nomima* I, no. 44) of the last quarter of the sixth century, said to come from the area of Naupaktos and dealing with a settlement in the western end of Ozolian Locris, probably alludes to the distribution or allotment (ἀνδαιθμός) of an area called 'the plain of Hylia and Liskaria' which had already been divided up into uncultivated (or set aside?) (ἀπότομα) and public (δημόσια) fields. Despite doubts on the precise meaning of various terms, this archaic law written *boustrophedon* establishes a secure link between settlers and public land. Fragments of an archaic civic oath sworn by young Drerians for the defence of the territory (τᾶς χώρας τᾶς ἡμᾶς τᾶς ἀμφιμαχόμεθα) might also be preserved on a pillar of the late third century (*Nomima* I, no. 48). Lastly, landowning was undoubtedly a key factor in the Solonian property classes, not only because the name of the top class (*pentakosiomedimnoi*) unquestionably implies the possession of agricultural produce, but also because the Solonian census was reportedly assessed in terms of annual income in grain for all four classes (although it might also have been a later invention). As Lin Foxhall writes, 'membership of the elite group which constituted the state was synonymous with the land-holding group'.⁵⁰ As well as a means of maintaining one's family, landowning was also a means to assert one's citizen status in archaic Greece. In sum, in a society in which wealth was primarily land-based, landowning was an

inescapable sign of citizenship, not to say a right to citizenship.

Is it possible to substantiate this on the ground? In the last four decades, archaeology has produced ample evidence for regular division of both rural and urban territory, mainly (but not exclusively) in Greek settlements abroad, in the Western Mediterranean and the Black Sea.⁵¹ Division into lots and urban planning are sometimes attested as early as the late seventh century. They have been long accepted as the sign of an early political consciousness, probably linked to some notion of citizenship as a right to a share of the citizen territory in town as well as in the countryside. According to David Asheri, urban and rural land division is unmistakably revealing of egalitarian structures because it physically marks on the ground the ‘rules of formal equality’ (*isomoiria*).⁵² Mapping citizen equality onto the archaic landscape, however, is perhaps not to be associated automatically with democratic ideals or their possible precursors in archaic Greece—one might think of Ian Morris’ ‘strong principle of equality’, although he does not specifically allude to land division in his model of a ‘middling ideology’.⁵³ As Michel Gras and Henri Tréziny note about the urban grid of Megara Hyblaea, ‘Dans une société archaïque, aristocratique, fondée sur des solidarités et des hiérarchies entre des groupes et à l’intérieur de ces groupes, la définition de lots individuels égaux peut sembler paradoxale. Il est probable que ces lots sont en fait regroupés en entités plus vastes, en “groupes de lots” qui reflètent une réalité sociale.’⁵⁴ Symbolically much more meaningful than the allotment of unequal properties, another way to mark on the ground the patently unequal society of archaic Greece might indeed have been to allot unequally equal pieces of land! It is therefore questionable whether the fifth-century grid of Metapontum was linked, as initially proposed by Joseph Carter, to a political revolution in which tyranny was overthrown and a democracy established.⁵⁵ Moreover, recent archaeological researches have revealed that the division lines in the landscape of the *chōra* of Metapontum, a much debated subject for decades, were not necessarily related to land allotment, as has been repeatedly asserted, but were actually related—more pragmatically—to geomorphological facts and drainage techniques of rural lands.⁵⁶ The numerous parallel Metapontine ditches reflect, first of all, local terrain morphology and drainage problems, rather than a centrally planned political land-division system. In sum, even if a landed approach to citizenship definition is consistent with the idea of a predominantly agricultural character of the economy and society of archaic Greece, regular land division does not actually say much about property principles or enfranchisement.

The relation between landowning and citizenship has often been

described as exclusive. Convinced that land was the most important part of the ancient economy, Moses Finley elaborated a core link between agriculture and citizen status by stressing the juridical contrast between citizens and non-citizens. 'For the study of the Greek economy', wrote Finley,⁵⁷ 'the distinction of the most far-reaching significance [...] was between the citizen and the non-citizen, because it was a universal rule—I know of no exception—that the ownership of land was an exclusive prerogative of citizens.' The citizen status consequently erected a 'wall between the land and liquid capital' that was 'an impediment in the economy'. Beyond an ideological bias towards a primitivist approach to the ancient economy, Finley firmly justified the unbreakable link between citizen status and landowning, presenting it as 'the product of a juridically defined and enforced social hierarchy'. Finley devoted much of his thought to arguing that the ancient economy was a dimension of (legal) status relations rather than a separate sphere of life. Since the nature of economic activity was essentially determined by juridical and political situations, he disqualified citizens from any economic agency beyond the possession of land and the practice of agriculture. In a way, Finley's approach to economic activity was only a by-product of a legal approach to citizenship, which postulates a sharp distinction between citizens and non-citizens.

Besides a strictly primitivist approach, the real issue is to decide whether or not archaic citizenship was restricted solely to landowners. Was there a qualification for citizenship related to an assessable landowning, therefore prohibiting the landless from being citizens in archaic Greece? There are few clear-cut cases and, although the exclusion of the landless seems archaic (or archaistic) in its intent, these are mainly documented by classical authors. According to Aristotle (*Pol.* 2.1271a35–7 and 2.1272a15), Spartans whose landholdings were unable to produce the required monthly contributions to the common messes risked losing their citizenship. On the other hand, when, after the fall of the Thirty and the restoration of the Athenian democracy in 403, one Phormisios proposed that only landowners should have the franchise—a measure which, according to Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Lys.* 32–3), would have excluded up to five thousand citizens—the assembly rejected the proposal and consequently refused to limit citizenship to landowners. Was it too conservative or too revolutionary for the Athenian democrats? The only certain conclusion is that in classical Athens the possession of landed property was obviously not a prerequisite for citizenship, although some critics of democracy might have been tempted by the idea. There is no such agreement for archaic Athens.

For example, what kind of citizenship was enjoyed by the *thētes* of

the fourth Solonian class, who were admitted to membership of the assembly and law courts but excluded from all public offices (*Ath. Pol.* 7.3)? If the author of the *Constitution of the Athenians* granted them less than a 200-*medimnoi* income in farm products—which might imply that some of them, at least, were small landowners—there have been doubts on the historicity of such an economic evaluation, and cases have been made in favour of a later rationalization if not invention.⁵⁸ Similarly, could we ascertain that the *hektēmoroi* were enfranchised? Although under permanent threat of enslavement for non-repayment of their debts according to the law of obligations of pre-Solonian time, they were nevertheless free tenants, as it seems, who cultivated other men's land in exchange for one-sixth (or five-sixths?) of the harvest (*Ath. Pol.* 2.2; *Plut. Sol.* 13.4–6). Accordingly, they formed a class of dependent peasants bound to work the fields of the landowners, but it is unknown if this economic divide could be equated with a citizen distinction. Both *hektēmoroi* and *thētes* have been repeatedly assimilated to underprivileged citizens. However, as already discussed, such an idea of a partial citizenship, conceptualized by fourth-century political thought and elaborated by nineteenth-century German historiography, might be irrelevant to a genuinely archaic citizen concept. Adopting a critical approach to fourth-century historiography and towards an actual group of *hektēmoroi*, Tadashi Ito has indeed argued in favour of an invention related to the usual fourth-century interest rates, equivalent to one-sixth of the total loan, which would have been projected back into pre-Solonian Athens.⁵⁹ Similarly, considering the general aporia of previous interpretations, Misha Meier has most recently argued for a complete reappraisal of the Athenian *hektēmoroi*. Considering that they are inconsistent with any plausible picture of pre-Solonian Athens, he postulates an error of fourth-century writers, who would have concatenated into a single expression the two words κτήμα and ὄροι possibly attested in the *scripta continua* reading of a few Solonian verses that are now missing. Although such sophisticated explanations are usually unsatisfactory, Meier maintains 'daß in Athen zu keinem Zeitpunkt eine gesellschaftliche Gruppe mit der Bezeichnung "Hektemoroi" existiert hat' and concludes 'Bei den Hektemoroi handelt es sich demnach—so die These—keineswegs um eine Gruppe unterprivilegierter athenischer Bauern oder Schuldner, sondern um eine versehentliche Erfindung.'⁶⁰ Whatever the exact meaning of both *thētes* and *hektēmoroi*, their relation to citizen status is far from clear and no definitive case has been made that poor landless men could be enfranchised in archaic Athens. Does this mean that having a share in citizenship was strictly entangled with landownership from the start?

Rejecting the idea of a legal gradation within the citizen status,

Benedetto Bravo offered another interesting case study with the Syracusan *gamoroi*. Usually defined as a landed nobility or as an aristocratic subgroup within the whole citizen body, the Syracusan *gamoroi* are typically assimilated to full citizens as opposed to underprivileged Syracusan groups.⁶¹ According to Bravo, in early fifth-century Syracuse the *gamoroi*, as descending from the first colonists, were the only citizens. They formed the whole—although restricted—citizen body, which excluded both slaves and a large majority of free non-citizens. The latter were in no way underprivileged citizens excluded from various political or judicial rights, but men to whom citizenship was purely and simply denied, assimilating them to mere foreign residents.⁶² If a general rule has to be postulated for archaic Greece, Bravo proposes to rule out dependent peasants completely from any citizen status, instead of granting them an anachronistic underprivileged legal status shaped by fourth-century political thought.⁶³ In most—although probably not all—archaic cities dependent peasants in his view formed the majority of the non-privileged (i.e. non-citizen) component of a city's population. These people, standing between citizens and slaves within the social spectrum, were free peasants lacking or having not enough land property to buy the hoplite panoply. To earn their living, they had to sell their own labour to rich landowners. Taking advantage of Aristotle's own inconsistency, Bravo in particular argues that the Athenian *thētes* were in such a condition.

To take care of one's land and to safely transfer it to one's heirs was undoubtedly a security against the loss of citizen status over time. Despite the general rule of inalienability of land, this barrier was permeable: besides the possibility of purchase of real estates, already mentioned in Hesiod (*Op.* 341), the recurring division of inherited land over the generations and the consequent impoverishment of successive landowners would have made easier the various processes of property confiscation by creditors. In sum, if the close link between the ownership of land and citizen status did not necessarily preclude the landless from enjoying citizenship in democratic Athens, it could have been the case in earlier Greek societies in which wealth was primarily land-based.

However, since 'money makes the man' according to Alcaeus (*fr.* 360 Voigt), it is worth considering how the economic dimension of citizen status could also possibly extend to other fields of economic activity. This is the topic of another long-standing controversy, both modern and ancient, on the relationship between the sources of incomes on the one hand and civic, political, and juridical rights on the other.

A citizen disqualification for manual workers—except for farmers—

is indeed deeply rooted in ancient political thought. In a Socratic dialogue, Xenophon has Socrates saying ‘in some states, especially those reputed to be warlike, no citizen is allowed to exercise any handicraft at all’ (*Oec.* 4.3). In his ideal state, Plato (*Leg.* 8.848A) would set apart craftsmen, foreigners, and resident aliens from citizens and slaves. More radically, Aristotle recommends excluding all those who work for a living from membership in his ideal city or any real city, and he forbids his citizens from doing such work. Having no practice of virtue (see above, section 1, for the Aristotelian discussion on the value of a good man) craftsmen are belittled as ‘*banausoi*’ (the ‘vulgar’) and naturally excluded from citizenship or at least from those capable of governing (the rulers, *archontes politai*), that is, from all public offices if not from the assembly. If workers are to be enfranchised, they can be nothing else than ruled citizens (*archomenoi politai*). In arguing thus, Aristotle sets forward various examples of aristocratic cities: ‘At Thebes there was a law that no one who had not kept out of trade for the last ten years might be admitted to office’ (*Pol.* 3.1278a25–6), while in Thessaly ‘no artisan or farmer or any other such person may intrude’ into the agora used for the meeting of the assembly (*Pol.* 7.1331a32–5).

This ancient political prejudice against manual workers was further developed by modern historians and notably by a ‘substantivist’ approach to the ancient economy. It is well known that, besides the ongoing primitivist–modernist controversy, Max Weber contributed to diverting the economic debate by insisting on an essential distinction that characterized the long-term history of the whole Western world: ‘The political situation of the medieval townsman determined his path, which was that of a *homo oeconomicus*, whereas in Antiquity the *polis* preserved during its heyday its character as the technically most advanced military association: the ancient townsman was a *homo politicus*.’⁶⁴ Since man was by nature, according to Aristotle (*Pol.* 1.1253a3), a ‘political animal’ (*politikon zōon*), a creature meant to live a political life, the Greeks did not devote their lives to making money. Such an economic bias promoted by ancient political thought was accepted by Weber. Greeks were not supposed to be primarily driven by economic gain, whereas modern capitalism is built on that core principle. Johannes Hasebroek further elaborated this distinction between the ancient *homo politicus* and the modern *homo oeconomicus*, progressively leading—with Karl Polanyi and Moses I. Finley—to a ‘substantivist’ approach to the ancient economy.⁶⁵ In ancient Greece the economy was therefore ‘embedded’ in society: not only was there a close relationship between economy and status, but economic activity was conditioned by the status of economic players too. No traders, merchants, or craftsmen could ever be accepted as ‘true’

citizens. Conversely, no citizen could be involved in a purportedly demeaning or vile activity such as trade and industry, which were expelled beyond the realm of the city. According to Hasebroek, trading activity and manufacture were mainly in the hands of foreigners, whereas the citizens were above all landowners. In short, the economy was status-driven: traders and craftsmen could only originate from the lowest social, political, and economic plane.

The ‘substantivist’ approach to the ancient economy therefore insisted on socially embedded economic exchanges, supposedly more appropriate to a citizen condition. Finley himself contributed to minimizing the role of the market in ancient Greece, insisting on non-mercantile modes of economic exchange. Gift-giving and reciprocity were key concepts of Polanyi’s analysis of primitive economy that Finley set at the core of his thought as early as 1954 with the *World of Odysseus*. In an extensive subsequent literature, reciprocity was recognized as a major tool in social agency, not only in the Homeric world but also in archaic and classical cities, allowing people to be ranked among their peers or even within the whole spectrum of society.⁶⁶ Although it has never been properly identified as a criterion of citizenship or as a prerogative of citizens alone, gift-giving (and the whole set of reciprocity behaviours) became a major reason in classical and Hellenistic Greece for publicly honouring foreigners or even granting them citizen rights. In early fourth-century Athens the former slave Pasion, the famous bank and factory owner, was granted citizen rights, and notably the *gēs enktēsis*. The favour was not related to the huge assets (more than 60 talents) he accumulated during his lifetime nor to his vigorous entrepreneurial activity, but ‘on account of services to the state’ (διὰ τὰς εὐεργεσίας τὰς εἰς τὴν πόλιν) and notably for the gift (*epidosis*) of a thousand shields to the city.⁶⁷ The same might be said for other rich and liberal metics such as Lysias’ father (though never granted citizenship) or Phormion, who initiated his career as Pasion’s bought slave. Beyond the grant of the honorary title of *euergetēs*, which implied various commitments between ‘partners’, classical and Hellenistic Greek *poleis* could indeed honour foreign benefactors and their descendants with formal citizenship. In short, *euergesia* as part of a pattern of reciprocity was by nature an expected behaviour of candidates for enfranchisement. In archaic Greece too, as Nick Fisher demonstrates in this volume ([chapter 8](#)), various cities granted citizen rights to foreign award-winning athletes who became a credit to their new homeland.

Despite the ancient and ‘substantivist’ prejudice against trade or handicraft, many traders or craftsmen were in fact enfranchised in ancient Greek cities. Bridging the gap between theoretical approaches to the ancient economy and the analysis of sources leading to

establishing facts, Alain Bresson contributed to the challenge to Finley's 'New Orthodoxy' and the assumption that Greek *poleis* took little interest in commerce.⁶⁸ Although accepting the basic idea that all kinds of economic exchanges are embedded in social life, Bresson forges the contrasting idea of a 'merchant city' and brings back into favour for ancient Greece the concept of a market economy. Focusing on *prosodoi*, he attempts to locate the main purpose of the ancient economy in the idea of managing revenues and expenditures, in both private and public life. In reviewing his work, Edward Harris notes: 'Br. traces the role of the ancient state in the economy back to the *Iliad*: the original form of the economy was to raid for plunder and distribute the booty to soldiers. This practice did not die out with the development of the *polis* but remained firmly in place: war for profit remained a central feature of the *polis*' and 'when there was no booty from war, the *polis* might distribute profits gained from mines or other public revenues'. In sum, 'To be a citizen was to belong to a club that paid dividends'—'un club distribuant des dividendes'.⁶⁹ According to Bresson, the role of a city's economy was to create profits and to distribute them among the members of the club or to make use of them to pay for community expenses (army, festivals, public and religious architecture, etc.). In contrast to a primitivist view, Bresson shows how Greek cities could play a part in regulating the economy by setting 'official' wholesale prices on the grain market or controlling retail prices. He demonstrates how cities, while securing a steady supply of imports by concluding treaties with foreign *poleis* or kings, also promoted exports. Cities founded their much sought-after *autarkeia* not on self-sufficiency but on regulating imports and exports. In short, Bresson demonstrates that the Greek *poleis* had no aversion to commerce and took an active interest in regulating trade. Right from the archaic period cities also favoured a culture of competition among elites that could benefit the whole community. He shows, for instance, how rich merchants were members of the elite or acted as officials in public institutions. Ancient citizens might definitely be traders.

This is perfectly clear for classical Athens. Arguing against the idea of a democracy primarily made by and for leisured landlord citizens, Saber Mansouri stresses how deeply the 'working class' of classical Athens was similarly embedded in politics and active citizenship.⁷⁰ Part of the citizenry in fourth-century Athens consisted of shopkeepers, merchants, and small craftsmen, whose involvement in politics was no small business at all. Although the (trade) agora was not an institutional place for decision-making, public debates and political strife initiated within the assembly or the citizen courts went on openly in perfumers', butchers', barbers', shoemakers', or tanners' shops, spreading the news, establishing or destroying men's

reputations and bringing about changes in public opinion. Well beyond the usual examples of Nicias, Cleon, Demosthenes, or Apollodoros, many citizens or even officials of classical Athens, while involved in public life or in the service of the state, were also owners of small factories and workshops or even hired out slaves to the lessees of the mines. Mansouri's book reminds us that history is more complicated—and certainly more interesting for a historian of archaic citizenship—than the moral ideal of a few ancient philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle or the economic irrationality of 'substantivists'. If there is considerable prosopographical evidence within the Attic orators and the *Inscriptiones Graecae* to offer a well-documented and balanced account of the relationship between citizenship and economy in classical Athens, there are not as many sources for archaic Greece. At least, pre-classical authors were not (necessarily) as biased against manual work as Plato and Aristotle.⁷¹ Advising his brother to farm his land, Hesiod claimed: 'Work is no disgrace: it is idleness which is a disgrace. But if you work, the idle will soon envy you as you grow rich, for fame and renown attend on wealth' (*Op.* 311–13). Hesiod's *Work and Days* as a whole is indeed an exhortation to 'toil at toil after toil' (382). And beyond farming, other activities were acceptable as well for the poet, even trading overseas as his father did (*Op.* 633–40).

Maritime trade was precisely the topic of a famous controversy between Alfonso Mele and Benedetto Bravo.⁷² Although both had in common Hasebroek's and Polanyi's theoretical framework, they disagreed on the nature and details of overseas trading activity. Mele distinguishes between two consecutive types of archaic trade, *prēxis* and *emporīē*. The former was an occupation among many of the landed elite; it was a non-specialized seasonal trading activity set in connection with fieldwork and embedded in a context of aristocratic guest-friendship deeply rooted in the Homeric world. The latter, which began during the seventh and sixth centuries, was a profit-oriented commerce in the hands of professional traders that was accordingly much less socially acceptable. Impoverished aristocrats or *kakoi* of one kind and another who engaged in such a specialized activity eventually formed a new middle class primarily driven by wealth. According to Bravo, on the contrary, those who travelled the seas to sell and buy abroad agricultural surplus and manufactured goods were mainly men who stood in a relation of belonging or personal dependence to the rich landowners. They were slaves or dependants of the nobles. Some of these traders, such as the Aeginetan Sostratos or the Samian Colaioi, might even be impoverished nobles tempted by the spirit of adventure or constrained by poverty. In short, despite taking the risk of resurrecting the commercial aristocracies and merchant middle classes popularized by nineteenth-century

modernizers, Bravo and Mele agree on what is at stake here: contrary to the position of Hasebroek who excessively assigned all trade to foreigners, there is no doubt that in archaic Greece, citizens, more or less propertied, were actually involved directly or indirectly in maritime trade. Furthermore, they also concur in the idea that a trader's social status was in no way primarily defined—even if it was subsequently corrupted—by his economic activity, a reservation that is of course attributable to a Finleyan conception of the relation between trade and politics in ancient Greece.

However, as has been argued subsequently, in spite of a reputedly base activity, a trader such as the Samian Colaïos could perfectly well be praised thanks to related achievements such as paying a tithe on his huge profit, dedicating a magnificent offering to the gods, or favouring public interstate policy through private connections.⁷³ Many scholars therefore agree, as John-Paul Wilson states, in rejecting Finley's belief in 'a status-driven economy, where decisions were taken not on economic criteria, but on how they would affect the social/political standing of the decision-maker'.⁷⁴ As shown by various late archaic documents (including the three lead letters from Berezan, Olbia, and Emporio, as well as the famous Pech-Maho lead), archaic trade was much more sophisticated than used to be thought, implying well-organized and wealthy businessmen, highly involved in their agents' activities and keeping detailed records of their transactions. Although there is now no doubt on their economic and social standing, the ultimate proof of their citizen status is still lacking. However, the likely author of the Pech-Maho document, probably a business contract, was a certain Ἡρωνοῖος, a name or rather a letter-sequence that might be better understood, according to John Chadwick,⁷⁵ as Ἡρὼν ὁ Ἴτιος. If we accept the otherwise unattested Ἴτιος as a variant of the usual ethnic Ἰήτης, this Heron could be a citizen of Ios. Whatever the actual political status of this man, the debate at least shows that scholars are now less reluctant than ever to accept a citizen qualification for archaic traders or other manual workers. Without excluding politics from the debate on trade and industry, recent critics of Finley's orthodoxy simply acknowledge the fact that in archaic Greece the citizen elites sometimes got their hands dirty with investments in trade, lending, and handicrafts.

If modern approaches to the ancient economy have long been flawed by fourth-century prejudices against manual workers, scholars are also rediscovering archaic poetry with a different outlook. According to Hans van Wees, 'archaic poetry leaves no doubt that a powerful acquisitive drive, rather than a struggle for mere self-sufficiency, shaped the archaic economy'.⁷⁶ As we know, throughout the archaic period and across the whole social spectrum, individuals

were engaged, for the sake of forging or consolidating one's status, in an escalating competitive display of wealth through the consumption of imported commodities and a series of money- and time-consuming performances that I called 'modes de reconnaissance sociale' in a study on how elites were defined in archaic Greece.⁷⁷ There is no doubt that this struggle for social standing boosted the economy of the archaic world. In every single field of economic activity, whatever their political or social status, individuals tried hard to get wealthier. Competition for wealth was simply pervasive. Despite noble principles of generosity and redistribution that indeed governed numerous demeanours in archaic Greece, Alcaeus' lament 'money makes the man' (*fr.* 360) does not imply at all that the archaic world as a whole rejected profit making. On the contrary, increasing one's property was a by-product of competition for status, as well most probably as a driving force behind social and political aspirations in archaic cities. 'Get rich or die trying' might have been quite a usual motto for enterprising people, especially if this wealth enabled them to acquire the hoplite equipment.

In sum, if landowning was certainly an obvious sign of citizen status in archaic Greece, an ultimate criterion of enfranchisement might be simply wealth, whatever its origin, landed, industrial, or commercial. In contrast to the conservative political thought of classical authors, debarring traders or craftsmen from citizenship might ultimately look like an anomaly rather than the common rule. In archaic Greece, propertied men were undoubtedly citizens—and citizens were normally propertied men.

Often defined as a 'club of warriors', the Greek *polis* long maintained a strict association between military service and citizenship. Even if political rights were regularly allocated on the basis of property qualifications, enlistment in the citizen army may have been a major criterion for enfranchisement in archaic Greece. According to Aristotle's reconstruction of the past, 'the earliest form of constitution among the Greeks after the kingships consisted of those who were actually soldiers, the original form consisting of the cavalry [...] but as the states grew and the wearers of heavy armour (τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὀπλοις) had become stronger, more persons came to have a part in the government' (*Pol.* 4.1297b16–24). Listing the various social components of a state, Aristotle notes: 'it is clear that the heavy-armed soldiery (τό ὀπλιτικόν) at any rate must be a part of the state' (*Pol.* 4.1291a32–3). As the author of the *Constitution of the Athenians* (4.2) records for the time of Draco, 'citizenship had already been bestowed on those who provided themselves with arms (τοῖς ὀπλα παρεχομένοις)'. The expression *hopla parechesthai* appears as early as the late sixth century. It is used in the earliest Athenian decree to

survive, related to the status and obligations of the Athenian cleruchs living on Salamis, where it appears that the cleruchs must provide their own arms to the value of thirty drachmas (*IG I³ 1.9*). Even though the constitution of Draco has long been challenged as a forgery emanating from the oligarchy of 411, the idea of including among citizens those able to provide their own arms might have been archaic in tone. As a member of the city, the citizen must contribute, as a duty and an honour, to the defence of the community. Archaic poetry is full of exhortations to die for the fatherland (Tyrtaeus, Callinus, etc.) and among the earliest occurrences of the word *politai*, in the *Iliad*, some of them refer to the troops (*Il.* 2.806, 15.558). Contributing to the defence of the *polis* by enlistment in the citizen army meant having enough personal resources to acquire the hoplite panoply. Military obligations were thus inevitably linked to an economic capacity, excluding less well-off men from being a citizen-soldier, but not necessarily forbidding them to contribute to the defence of the state. According to Aristotle, indeed, oligarchic constitutions usually hold that ‘the poor are allowed not to own arms (*hopla*), but the well-to-do are liable to a fine if they have not got them’ (*Pol.* 4.1297a30–2). What does that mean? If it was a duty of the propertied men to contribute to the citizen army, the poor were not formally excluded from enlistment. They were allowed to own weapons, and would have done so if they were able to afford hoplite arms and armour, so that the criterion for enrolment in the ‘club of warriors’ was ultimately economic.⁷⁸

The link between war and society and, more specifically, between war and economy has been at the core of recent literature on warfare in Antiquity.⁷⁹ As the main source of income, land property is firmly associated once again with the discharge of military obligations. The strict homology between warfare and landowning is indeed well established in ancient thought—according to Aristotle (*Pol.* 4.1291a30–1), ‘it often happens for the same men to be both hoplites and farmers’—and in modern historiography. Using the Homeric metaphor of weaving, Michel Gras and Henri Tréziny further associate ‘rangées de lot’ and ‘rangées d’hoplites’ in the construction of the *polis* of Megara Hyblaea through its city plan: ‘à la hiérarchisation des éléments constitutifs de l’armée répond une hiérarchisation des espaces de la cité. L’hoplite dans son armure tient son rang comme le citoyen dans son lot’ and further ‘Il y a donc entre la cité et la phalange, une relation structurelle forte’ making it archaeologically detectable in the *polis* territory.⁸⁰ The case is also obvious for Sparta. Young Spartans were educated according to a military organization and their adult social life continued to be organized in mess-groups clearly related to military units. The Spartans were supposed to

contribute to the organization of the common mess and, according to Aristotle (*Pol.* 2.1271a35–7; 1272a13–15), those who were unable to pay this tax ceased to belong to the ‘club’. To ensure access to public messes, Spartans developed various institutions (such as the attribution of a *klēros*) and subjected entire populations (such as the Messenian helots) to provide a minimum land income to all citizens. Despite its peculiarities, however, the Spartan system was not fundamentally different from those of other Greek states. Property qualifications have also been recurrently interpreted as military structures, therefore defining the citizen-soldier in terms of agricultural production. To be specific, the four census-classes (*telē*) reportedly created by Solon in early sixth-century Athens (*Ath. Pol.* 7.2–4, Arist. *Pol.* 2.1274a18–21, Plut. *Sol.* 18.1–2) have long received a military explanation.⁸¹ Although preferring a quantitative assessment of their farming capacity in the definition of the Solonian *hippeis* (an annual harvest of 300 *medimnoi* of barley), the author of the *Constitution of the Athenians* (7.4) already reports another explanation, the ability to breed a horse, which has been judged as a clear indication of the military origin of the Athenian ‘equestrian class’. Similarly, *zeugitai* have been usually regarded as soldiers metaphorically ‘yoked’ together in the ranks of the hoplite phalanx, rather than—more literally—those who owned a pair of oxen under the yoke (*zeugos*).

If farmers must have regularly sold their products on the market to obtain the cash needed to buy military equipment, landowning might not have been an exclusive prerequisite for the inclusion in the citizen army of archaic *poleis*. As long as auto-equipment was the rule (*hopla parechesthai*), there were probably other means to acquire the financial capacity to buy hoplite arms and armour. According to Benedetto Bravo, ‘naturalmente, nelle *poleis* arcaiche, la stragrande maggioranza dei πολῖται erano proprietari di terra coltivabile [...] è probabile che in molte *poleis* anche i proprietari di prospere botteghe artigianali, essendo in grado di andare in guerra come opliti, godessero dei diritti civili’.⁸² If classical armies included—though not all as hoplites—large numbers of resident aliens, serfs, and slaves with no right to own land, *poleis* had no intention of granting them citizen rights.⁸³ Hence Hans van Wees could write: ‘the experience of warfare thus did not in itself politicize social groups—but those who were politically active never failed to cite this experience in justification of their claims to power’.⁸⁴ This might not adequately apply, however, to archaic Greece, a time of elaboration and maturation of the citizen community. There was certainly, for example, an interest in military manpower in the large-scale forced population movements seemingly initiated by Sicilian tyrants and this undoubtedly had major impacts

on the concept and granting of citizenship within Sicilian cities: according to Kathryn Lomas, Sicilian tyrants did not develop ‘the very strong bonds between population, land and citizenship which was characteristic of the core areas of the Greek world’.⁸⁵ Only the classical obsession with landowning to the exclusion of other honourable—i.e. citizen-compatible—economic activities seems to be an obstacle to the acceptance of a more economically open conception of citizenship, which conversely might have been more widely accepted in archaic Greece.

One wonders then if, in contrast to the status-driven economy once theorized by Moses Finley, archaic Greece might not have developed and promoted a kind of economy-driven citizenship or, at least, a form of citizenship partly elaborated on an economic capacity? In order to be a citizen and to be accepted as a citizen by other members of the community, one had to give proof of a sufficient financial capacity, notably by acquiring—no matter how—the required hoplite equipment to contribute to the protection of the citizen community. Unlike classical democratic Athens, which needed a large number of *thētes* serving as rowers in the navy, poor citizens had definitely no place in archaic cities...as long as they were unable to afford the arms and armour of the citizen-hoplite. Despite many possible social or political obstacles, the power of wealth was undoubtedly overwhelming.

4. The Terminological Approach

Beyond law, institutions, and economy, there are other ways to define archaic citizenship. Throughout the archaic and classical sources, the words denoting citizens may offer glimpses into the content of citizenship, while their changing use can provide clues about its evolution. There is a long tradition of research on the history of political terminology up to the recent formulation of the so-called *lex Hafniensis de Civitate* by Mogens H. Hansen on the meaning of the word *polis*.⁸⁶ Beyond the mere process of decision-making, numerous studies try to articulate the wide spectrum of meanings covered by ancient vocabulary, progressively leading scholars to assert a more sophisticated image of citizen societies. Through terminology an attempt can thus be made to analyse the concepts that the Greeks used to describe citizenship and its evolving content.

As Françoise Ruzé sets it, ‘une première approche du citoyen en ses origines passe par la terminologie qu’emploient les textes archaïques’.⁸⁷ Initially, collective terms such as *laoi* and ethnics like

Ithakesians or Trojans show that in early times citizens were deeply embedded in the community. In Homer ‘les *laoi* constitueraient déjà ce que l’on pourrait appeler un “corps civique”: l’ensemble des hommes libres de la communauté, tous groupes confondus et quelque [*sic*] soit leur niveau social, à l’exclusion du chef’, writes Ruzé, whereas *dēmos* refers to ‘l’ensemble de la population libre à l’exclusion du cercle des dirigeants’.⁸⁸ According to Ruzé, the individual citizen only emerges with *astos* and *politēs*, two terms that stem from the words denoting the town or the city, *astu* and *polis*, which however were long deprived of any significant political content. In Homer *politai* sometimes applies to military troops (*Il.* 2.806), but more generally to the inhabitants of a town (*Il.* 15.558; *Od.* 7.131). By following the use and meaning of these words in archaic poetry and inscriptions, Ruzé proposes to identify the creation of an ‘active citizenship’ (or full citizenship) as a three-step process: first, a self-consciousness of belonging to a group that is distinct from foreigners; second, the acknowledgement of individual rights and guarantees within the community; and third, an enrichment of the content of citizenship that went with a gradual regulation of the enlargement of the citizen body. The terminological distinction between insiders and outsiders seems indeed to be at the core of an early definition of the citizen community. Hesiod (*Op.* 225) mentions *xeinoi kai endēmoi*, strangers and men of the land, as the two groups of people subject to the law. In archaic inscriptions, as well as in late sixth- and fifth-century poets, the formula *astoi kai xenoι* refers to all the men living on a territory, the earliest example being the epitaph of Tettikos (*IG* I³ 1194bis, c.575–550): [εἴτε ἀστός] τις ἀνὴρ εἴτε χσένος ἄλοθεν ἐλθόν. Residence thus appears to be an essential feature of early citizenship terminology. But if the expression φαστία δίκαια [ἐν τῷ ἀγ]ορᾷ probably applies to some sort of (unspecified) citizen rights in late seventh-century Gortyn (*Nomima* I, no. 1), the word *politēs* and its Cretan antonym *allopoliatas* do not appear in epigraphy before the end of the sixth century. Meanwhile late archaic inscriptions clarify the content of this citizenship by mentioning various social and legal privileges. At this point lexicology meets Ruzé’s legal approach, as previously described (see above, section 2).

Josine Blok has recently offered a slightly different treatment of the ‘words used to designate the people who made up the *polis*’, without a compulsory reference to the possession of political rights.⁸⁹ Three sets of words were used to designate ‘citizens’: *politai*, *astoi*, and *ethnika*. *Politēs* in the singular does not occur in our texts until the last quarter of the fifth century, whereas the plural was equivalent in archaic texts to ‘fellow-inhabitants of a city’ without any obvious politico-legal overtones. Like *politai*, the more current *astoi* occurs almost exclusively in the plural until the second half of the fifth century and

essentially pictures the inhabitants as a group, not as a sum of individuals. During the whole archaic period a citizen is indeed conceptualized as ‘being related to other people or belonging to a group’, not as ‘being entitled to do’ or ‘having specific qualities’, such as individual rights and duties. More clearly than Ruzé, she insists on the fact that the emphasis on the individual citizen is therefore not an archaic phenomenon, but only a classical evolution, probably a consequence of Pericles’ citizenship law. From a terminological perspective, archaic citizenship therefore appears to be a matter of collective identity, much more than a question of individual status as the legal approach has long promoted it.

Josine Blok also draws two significant conclusions that entail a radical shift from previous scholarly literature. First, from epic to the middle of the fifth century, no ‘relation between the words used for “citizen” and the enjoyment of any political or other rights could be found’ in any of the archaic references. Political decision-making in the strict sense was only one element of citizen life, and the overriding emphasis of the *Copenhagen Polis Centre* on the political nature of the *polis* embodied in institutions certainly does not exhaust the content of citizenship in archaic and early classical cities. The process of political, legal, and institutional formalization in the meaning of these words is actually a classical—if not an Aristotelian—phenomenon. Discussing the use and abuse of Aristotle, she shows that even in the mind of the Athenians of the classical period *archē* and *krisis* were simply not what citizenship was about. Aristotle actually provides a fundamental break with earlier conceptions and historical experiences. In a statement that has never been so explicitly formulated, Blok notes: ‘Aristotle’s definitions of citizenship, created in accordance with his political theory and logic, cannot be used as a yardstick to measure Greek citizenship backwards into its earlier history.’ Instead, both archaic and classical words and texts often insist on religious matters. According to Blok, membership of the community is therefore normally defined in ancient Greek *poleis* by regulating who is to participate in sacrifice and on what conditions, in other words who will be a member of the covenant between the community and the gods, as captured in the formula *meteinaí* or *metechein tōn hierōn kai tōn hosiōn*.⁹⁰ The second conclusion derives from the predominantly non-political sense of archaic and classical words and contexts referring to citizenship. Whereas previous literature is convinced that archaic citizenship is a male-only status, considering woman and citizen as two incompatible categories, Blok shows that the occurrences of citizen words in epic poetry and classical texts apply to both men and women, whether jointly or separately. If the context makes clear in various cases that only men were meant, the plural

politai sometimes refers specifically to women. In Homer women were usually included in the use of the word *politai* and sometimes especially designated by the plural: fetching water at the springhouse, as referred to in *Od.* 7.131 and 17.206, was specifically a woman's task in the Greek world. Whereas women were excluded from political affairs, it seems that their involvement in festivals was sufficient to allow them to be accepted as citizens, at least in the current vocabulary of classical Athenian authors. Despite the Aristotelian theorization, which had been repeatedly reproduced by modern historians, their inclusion in the citizen body was a reality for most Athenians of the classical period. By focusing on the political and legal aspects of citizenship Aristotle simply dismissed women from citizenship matters. Rather than revising or supplementing Aristotle, the whole historiography on ancient citizenship has preferred to negate women's inclusion in the citizen body, and *a fortiori* in archaic cities. A linguistic and semantic investigation, as conducted by Blok, inevitably allows to women a place in citizenship matters. This terminological fact is also supported by the strong connection between citizenship and public cults, in which women fulfil numerous and irreplaceable functions. Male and female members of the community had thus far more in common than is usually assumed. If men had exclusive control over political and judicial matters, women's involvement in cults (alone or in association with men) was deeply rooted in the structure and life of the *polis*. Undeniably, in recent studies, defining archaic citizenship has become an issue related to men and women alike.

Beyond the words generically denoting the members of the *polis*, personal names can also allude to various characteristics of a citizen status. Onomastics are not only a matter of collecting all personal names occurring in Greek literature, inscriptions, papyri, coins, vases, and other objects: as an integral part of language, personal names are also a key to the understanding of numerous aspects of the ancient Greek city-state culture. From the *Wörterbuch der griechischen Eigennamen* of W. Pape, first published in 1842 and then revised and augmented by G.E. Benseler, to the ongoing *Lexicon of Greek Personal Names* compiled in Oxford since 1972, the historical value and significance of personal names have been widely documented in various fields of classical scholarship.⁹¹ Politics is one of them: there are (male) names such as Protagoras (First in the assembly), Anaxagoras (Lord of the assembly), Peisistratos (the One who convinces the army), Leiodes (the One who is pleasing to the *laos*), Leiokritos (Chosen by the *laos*), etc. More specifically, Friedrich Bechtel once distinguished a category of 'names related to society' (*der Name knüpft an das Verhältnis zur Gesellschaft an*): beyond a general

conception of society with its related qualities (respectability, benevolence, etc.) and besides affiliation to a family, he pinpointed names alluding to a special position in society (*Lebensstellung*), particularly those using a 'technical expression' related to a constitutional rank (*staatsrechtliche Stellung*) or to an occupation (*Beruf*).⁹² The various domains here listed by Bechtel—institutions, army, navy, cults and religious associations, trade, arts, and sports—outline an extensive conception of ancient society, even if he does not specify the realm of the *polis*. There is no doubt that, considering the wide range of categories related to personal names and the holistic nature of the *polis*, onomastics can also be a key to the definition of citizenship, its evolving nature over time and varying content in space.

5. The Value of Material Culture

Undoubtedly material culture is a much more practical, immediate, and unmediated testimony for archaic Greece than the Aristotelian model. It can provide a very promising source of information on archaic history, politics, economy, and therefore citizenship, insofar as a direct link between material culture and citizenship can be established. During the last thirty years, archaeology and art history have been at the core of new theories that have provided a whole new insight into archaic citizenship. To a sceptical mind, material culture will remain unreliable and only a matter of interpretation. For archaeologists and art historians, however, it is a serious matter whose potential goes far beyond a mere taxonomy of forms and styles. Although sometimes disregarded as indemonstrable, new ideas deriving from the study of material culture can also give birth to new reflection on written sources: enlightened by archaeology, scholars can also return to texts with a more open mind.

Even if they have access to a whole new documentation, much larger than the meagre corpus of archaic texts, archaeologists are not always free from classical and textual models. There is, indeed, the strong temptation to assume that material culture naturally and smoothly fits into the historical framework delineated by ancient authors, who were supposedly better aware of archaic matters than contemporary scholars. In an essay published in 1984 dealing with Aristotle and the rise of the Greek *polis*, Nicolas Coldstream aimed at verifying Aristotle's theory on the formation of the *polis* by comparing it with archaeological discoveries. Stressing the fact that, by Aristotle's time, the *polis* had not yet taken root in many parts of Greece

(especially in the backward regions of north-western Greece, cf. Thuc. 1.5–6), he accepts Aristotle's scheme on the genesis of the Greek *polis* and indeed praises his methodology: 'With such examples before his eyes, Aristotle could reconstruct the antecedents of the *polis* in the more progressive parts of the Greek world; just as today a social anthropologist, showing far greater boldness than Aristotle, may study the ways of primitive societies still existing in Africa and the Pacific islands, in the hope of throwing some light thereby on an early stage of an ancient civilisation.'⁹³ According to Coldstream, archaeologists could thus use Aristotle as an anthropologist of the ancient *polis* in order to read the material culture of early Greece, stressing how far, for example, 'the archaeological record is consistent with Aristotle's village theory'.⁹⁴ Unfortunately, this idea has often been applied uncritically to archaeological discoveries. For example, Nota Kourou recently associated the transformation of the small, mountainous Tenian community of Xobourgo into the main settlement of an archaic *polis* with the markedly Aristotelian idea of 'a shift from familial to communal cult'.⁹⁵ I fear, however, that Aristotle's account of early Greece lacks any empirical basis and mainly rests on a philosophical construct.

State formation is nevertheless at the core of archaeological studies. As with other approaches to archaic citizenship, the birth of citizenship, defined as a membership of an emergent city-state, is often studied through the notion of the rise of the Greek *polis*. In his very stimulating and influential book *Burial and Ancient Society* (1987) Ian Morris proposed to investigate the birth of the *polis* through burial customs. According to Morris, since the citizen body is coextensive with the state itself—the citizens being the *polis*—the archaeological record should also reveal the genesis of the citizen status. From the early Dark Age to the mid-eighth century, 'formal burial' (i.e. an archaeologically visible tomb) was in many places restricted to a small group of privileged people. A major change occurred in the structure of funerary practices around 750, with a wide extension of the right to a 'formal burial'. According to Morris, this change corresponds to the invention of the idea of the *polis* and the attendant appearance of citizenship. Referring to the sociology of Vilfredo Pareto, Morris defines citizenship as 'the ideal form of relationship within the groups formerly separated as *agathoi* and *kakoi*', *agathoi* being those always represented in the archaeological record and *kakoi* those sometimes excluded.⁹⁶ As Morris puts it, 'formal burial within spatially defined cemeteries was considered a primary symbol of the social group monopolising full membership of the community, through lineal descent from the dead'.⁹⁷ In early cities a 'formal burial' was granted to all citizens, whereas non-citizens were excluded from such ritual.

Both proposals, archaeologically invisible disposal for parts of the population and the link between formal burial and full membership of the community, were controversial ideas that often provoked opposition to Morris' thesis. Thirty years later they nevertheless remain the only viable hypothesis to deal with some of the major changes in the funerary archaeological record of the eighth century throughout Greece. The widening of the burial group within the general population and the attendant transformation of the political structure of the whole community are necessary aspects of any historical explanation of the sharp increase in the number of burials during that period. A mere demographic increase of the population, as formerly promoted by Anthony Snodgrass,⁹⁸ cannot account for all aspects of this great transformation. Not to mention that a 3.1 per cent rate of annual growth of the population of Athens and Attica, as the drastic increase of grave numbers during the eighth century (MG II–LG II) would imply, is unlikely in any pre-modern society without improved sanitary conditions, developed health care, or intensified agriculture.

If there is undeniably a kernel of truth in Morris' theory and therefore a link between early citizenship and burial customs, this specific approach to the archaic Greek *polis* is certainly not without critics. By focusing exclusively on the funerary field, Morris simply forgot other essential aspects of community life, particularly cult activity. Early Iron Age Greece saw the emergence of a great diversity of local, regional, or interregional cults, which contributed to the definition of communities. This widespread phenomenon went together with the creation of specific categories of votive objects, such as bronze tripod cauldrons, and a transfer of goods from necropoleis to sanctuaries, two components of the same archaeological trend that prevents us from analysing burials separately from cults. This major objection led François de Polignac to propose an alternative model of early Greek *polis* formation.⁹⁹ His approach, strongly influenced by French anthropological structuralism, favours a holistic view of the *polis* where religion and politics are intimately intertwined. As Oswyn Murray metaphorically describes it, referring to a long national tradition going back to Fustel de Coulanges, 'the French *polis* is a form of Holy Communion', whereas the German *polis* 'can only be described in a handbook of constitutional law'.¹⁰⁰ Arguing against a strictly institutional approach to the Greek city, Polignac defines the emerging *polis* as 'a social entity founded upon a network of relations between the various members of a territorial community'.¹⁰¹ More precisely, by focusing on the function of the sanctuary in the society, he adds his own contribution to assimilating the Greek city-state to the 'formal expression of a religious cohesion'. There is of course a fundamental

difference between the Weberian 'city as institution' of Mogens H. Hansen and the Durkheimian 'city as society' of François de Polignac, inevitably leading to two radically diverging conceptions of archaic citizenship. According to Polignac, the geographical placing of sanctuaries played a major part in establishing the concept of the city-state in Geometric Greece. Many rural cults were meeting points for the neighbouring communities, offering many occasions for exchanging goods and for sharing commensality between participants in festivals, sacrifices, and ritual dinners. These sanctuaries, whether large rural sanctuaries on the edge of the plain or small cult-places in mountainous or coastal areas, were at the centre of a regional or local network of settlements and appeared as focal points in the process of social and political mediation. Through cult activity, groups living in geographical proximity were progressively united into a single community, establishing a territorial solidarity among members of a new social and political entity. According to Polignac, 'the constitution of the *polis* is to be conceived not only in terms of access to the *archai* and participation in political citizenship, but also as the gathering of different groups into a single effective body by allowing them all access to the same cults, assembling them around a number of common sanctuaries, and granting all of them the privilege of taking part in certain rituals: in short, the *polis* has to be considered also in terms of a religious citizenship'.¹⁰² Beyond the establishment of sovereignty within a given territory, the contemporary blossoming of heroic cults towards the end of the Geometric period shows how these communities also acquired self-awareness of themselves by assuming a sacred link with the past. Heroes were considered as common ancestors and strengthened the social cohesion of the whole community. Because they affected the entire social body, extra-urban sanctuaries and cults of heroes created the city's religious space and helped define a common identity beyond any distinction in rank, sex, place, or means of living. 'Participation in religious rituals guaranteed a mutual recognition of statuses and set the seal upon membership of the society, thereby defining an early form of citizenship,' concludes Polignac.¹⁰³ In this sense cults and their attendant rites of social integration should also be highly valued in the shaping of an early Greek citizenship.¹⁰⁴

The same French anthropological tradition, often known (at least abroad) as the 'École de Paris', has produced other significant results in the field of citizen behaviours and their representations in visual arts. Two topics are of particular interest, the symposium and hunting, both of which had a major social role in the archaic period. Both behaviours are usually considered as typical expressions of an aristocratic lifestyle, but their political connotation and their

implication in the definition of archaic citizenship should not be dismissed.

The introduction of the oriental habit of reclining on couches instead of sitting on chairs at the end of the Geometric period was a major transformation in Greek commensality. According to Jean-Marie Dentzer,¹⁰⁵ the oriental significance of the reclining banquet passed into the Greek world: as an attribute of Near Eastern royal decorum, the symposium remained in archaic Greece an essentially aristocratic practice, designed to distinguish between the elite and the commoners, both in everyday life and in the visual code of social representations. With Oswyn Murray, the symposium gained an anthropological dimension as a 'functional group' having a social role to play in archaic societies.¹⁰⁶ If the Homeric symposium was mainly an association of elite warriors (considered as an example of Heinrich Schurtz's *Männerbund*), it became in the archaic city the refuge of a leisure class. According to Murray, the archaic symposium belongs to the life and private domain of the archaic elite, where aristocrats met among peers and enjoyed the refinement of wine-drinking parties with the performance of poetry, music, and sexuality, both heterosexual and homosexual. Symposia not only reflect the taste and inclinations of the aristocracy, they enabled the aristocrats to distinguish themselves from the rest of the *polis*. More significantly, on a civic level, the symposium became 'a form of political organisation in response to the emergent city-state, designated to perpetuate aristocratic control of the state against the *dēmos*, a small group working against the community'.¹⁰⁷ Leslie Kurke and Ian Morris have further elaborated this aristocratic interpretation on an ideological level, assuming that the archaic Greek symposium served as the site for an anti-*polis* ideology.¹⁰⁸ Accordingly, there should be no positive relation between the practice of the symposium and the definition of archaic citizenship.

However, François Lissarrague and Pauline Schmitt-Pantel have contributed to establishing a more balanced view. Looking at Greek vases both as an historian and as an anthropologist in the tradition of *La cité des images*,¹⁰⁹ François Lissarrague has devoted numerous studies to visual representations of the symposium on archaic and classical pottery.¹¹⁰ Whether by analogy or through the use of alterity, Greek images tend to figure the world of the symposium as a microcosm of the *polis*, as a representation of what it should be or what it should not be. Elaborating on Lissarrague, Pauline Schmitt-Pantel insisted on the political dimension of the symposium: banquets are a perfect example of collective activity that has an immediate connection with the political sphere of the *polis*. According to her, 'in the aristocratic Greek city of the archaic period, participation in a set

of collective activities is the sign of belonging to the group of citizens, without of course being the only requirement for membership'. If the symposium remains the privilege of a small minority in archaic Greece, banqueting also contributes to the construction of the citizen space, as the cases of the Cretan and Spartan *syssitia* make clear, where access to the common meal is both a sign and a criterion of citizenship. Both Cretan cities and Lyncurgan Sparta institutionalized the aristocratic symposium because it entails an essentially political nature, still reflected for example in the opening section of Plato's *Laws*: 'in a symposium the procedures and conventions are those of political life'. As seen by Schmitt-Pantel, banqueting was definitely an activity of the archaic citizen: beyond the religious aspect of the symposium, 'access to the shared experience and the equal distribution identifies the man who benefits from it and makes him an equal member of the social group, indeed of the civic group, the *polis*' or, more synthetically, 'to have a share in citizenship is to share in a banquet'.¹¹¹ In short, although concurring on the aristocratic origin of the banquet, the two models of Murray and Schmitt-Pantel diverge on the ideological involvement of archaic elites in politics and the purpose of their collective gatherings. Instead of casting the symposium as an anti-*polis* association, the 'École de Paris' assimilates symposiasts to avatars of citizens.

Aiming at combining the aristocratic and the civic aspects of the symposium into a unified model, Marek Węcowski recently shed new light on the subject.¹¹² Although he confusingly keeps the word 'aristocracy'—too heavily biased by ancient Greek political thought and a century of modern scholarship¹¹³—he gives to it a radically different meaning, based on the sixteenth- to eighteenth-century Polish and Lithuanian aristocracy (locally and idiosyncratically named *szlachta*), whose composition and behaviours are close to the notions of 'elite' and 'modes de reconnaissance sociale' that I promoted in my own studies.¹¹⁴ In line with the idea that social status was fluid and contested in early Greece, Węcowski nevertheless argues that the symposium allowed for the resolution of the resulting tensions thanks to an emphasis on equality and turn-taking. The circulation of cups, of speech, of turns in drinking games reflects the egalitarian *ethos* that made the symposium, serving to integrate upwardly mobile farmers within the warrior elite, but also enforcing equality among the group of drinkers and within the citizen community.

In Greek images as in Near Eastern art, the representation of hunting has usually been interpreted as the depiction of a noble activity. 'Happy is he who has dear boys, horse of uncloven hoof, hunting dogs, and a friend in foreign parts,' sang Solon (*fr.* 23 West). Hunting is thus normally associated with the behaviour of an

aristocratic leisure class, while its depiction in texts and art is supposed to represent aristocratic ideas of masculinity and adulthood.¹¹⁵ However, hunting also plays a major part in the practices associated with the origins of ephebic activities. As Pierre Vidal-Naquet demonstrated in *The Black Hunter*, hunting belongs to the ‘practices of “apprenticeship”, whose object was to introduce young men to their future roles as citizens and heads of families—that is, as full members of the community’.¹¹⁶ Hunters are young men on the threshold of adult life and hunting in the borderlands of Greek cities (*eschatiai*) defending the frontier area was an essential step in the military training that was the privilege of citizens. Adapting Vidal-Naquet’s anthropological approach to the study of images, Alain Schnapp shows how the representation of hunting was associated in archaic and classical visual arts with a specific group, which is not an elite group but an age group.¹¹⁷ In Homer, heroes never hunt to demonstrate the exclusivity or nobility of their lifestyle; they hunt to survive in hostile conditions or to protect flocks and their own life. In the world of cities hunting becomes part of the training for citizens. Unlike Near Eastern reliefs or late classical wall paintings (such as the frieze of Tomb II in Vergina), sixth- and fifth-century Corinthian and Athenian vase-painters always depict hunters as young beardless men, clearly alluding to the world of the *ephēbeia*. By tightly connecting hunting and *eros*, images also reinforce the strong educational content of this apprenticeship period in the life of a young man. Homosexual pederasty links an *erastēs* and an *eromenos*, that is, an adult citizen and a citizen-to-be. In archaic Greek images, whether referring to myths or to everyday life, hunters are definitely young people learning their role as citizens.

To conclude this section on collective behaviours and their representation in visual arts, let me again quote Pauline Schmitt-Pantel: ‘in archaic societies collective activities like banquets, hunting, and educational apprenticeships are part of the conception of citizenship. They are not only the way to bring citizens together, to introduce them to one another, and to create ties which are not simply those of the neighbourhood or of kinships, they are also part of a whole set of forms of conduct which makes it possible to distinguish between citizen and non-citizen.’¹¹⁸ Rejecting the oriental models, Greek painters were able to relocate the visual representations of hunting and banqueting in a brand new world, that of the archaic *polis*. By giving new values to these exclusive behaviours they contributed to the definition of an undoubtedly original form of citizenship. In interpreting visual arts, historians and art historians are more and more inclined to link images and citizenship, whether by strengthening the connections between the depiction of human figures

and citizens or by establishing an immediate relationship between a specific style and a precise citizen identity.

Elaborating on a suggestion made by Bruno d'Agostino, the Italian School of Archaeology in Athens (*Scuola Archeologica Italiana di Atene*) organized a conference in order to discuss a possible link between the development of a figured imagery and the dawn of the Greek city.¹¹⁹ As is well known, figured images are much less frequent after the collapse of the Mycenaean palatial system, even if twelfth-century (LH III C) pieces are known, such as the spectacular warrior vase from the acropolis of Mycenae or the more humble figured fragment recently exposed in the new excavations of Lefkandi-Xeropolis.¹²⁰ With the exception of Early Iron Age Crete (early tenth-century krater from Thronos Kephala and ninth-century Knossian Protogeometric B¹²¹) and Euboea (the famous late tenth-century Lefkandi centaur), in most of the Greek mainland a figured repertoire did not reappear before the late Geometric period. The so-called 'Greek Renaissance' of the eighth century therefore also embraces the rebirth of figured images in visual arts. Luca Cerchiali's and Francis Croissant's contributions are certainly two of the most stimulating papers in the volume. Although he is mainly concerned with the birth of the Etruscan city-state, Cerchiali explains how the creation of an Etruscan figured imagery contributed to the redefinition of the elite role in the ruling of the new urban communities of archaic Etruria.¹²² In this process Greek images were used as a tool of integration, offering models of a political society ranked by age, gender and social functions. In particular, he shows how images of board game players became a sign of citizenship in the Etruscan iconographic code. In archaic Greece, indeed, the draughtboard was often conceived of as a metaphor of the city and the pieces (*peṣsoi*) of the citizens, the civic symbolism being inherent already in the names and structure of some of these games (incidentally, one of them was named *polis*). As Leslie Kurke expresses it, 'for (some) Greeks of the archaic and classical periods, playing *peṣsoi* taught the player how to be a citizen in the *polis*'.¹²³ Besides Exekias' famous amphora depicting Ajax and Achilles throwing dice on a board the iconographic type of the board game-playing heroes was actually very popular in archaic Greece. It sheds some light on 'emic' conceptions of citizens and *polis*, light years away from any legal or institutional approaches. In a very different field, Francis Croissant demonstrates how a figured imagery and a new distinctive Parian style were purposely created in the context of a public funeral that clearly reveals the existence of a citizen community in late Geometric Paros.¹²⁴ He draws attention to two Geometric amphorae discovered in a multiple burial resulting from a single deposition in the last quarter of the eighth century of at least 150 young men. This

burial, probably related to some defeat (or victory?) on the battlefield against a neighbouring city (Naxos?), appears as an early form of *dēmosion sēma*, nearly 250 years before the institution of the Athenian *patrios nomos*. Even if only two of the 150 funeral urns deposited in the *polyandrion* were decorated with a figured imagery (and more precisely with battle scenes), they received no special treatment in the collective tomb itself. Yet, if they reveal some individual pretension to social prestige, they are also part of a new figured style emerging in late Geometric Parian pottery production. Those two amphorae indeed fit into a series of vases that stylistically express a clear-cut Parian identity as early as the late eighth century. Artistically, both the birth of images and the definition of a distinctive style make conspicuous the dawn of the Parian state.

Anticipating Josine Blok's statement—based on terminology (see above, section 4)—on the prominence of collective identity in defining archaic citizenship, Francis Croissant's work is also a milestone in making styles in archaic arts and crafts a key feature in defining citizen identities among the Greek world. The initial statement and theorization go back to Ernst Langlotz's seminal book on archaic 'schools of sculptors' (*Bildhauerschulen*), whose nature and course can often be likened to those of Italian Renaissance schools of painting. Contrary to the idea of a predominantly personal style for every single artist or to that of a general chronological evolution, he demonstrated how archaic sculptures, bronze figurines, and terracottas could actually fit into various 'schools' and how their style could be assimilated to a specific citizen identity: 'Die Einschätzung des Künstlers ist begründet in der Bindung und Sammlung aller Kräfte in dem Brennpunkt des hellenischen Lebens: dem Staate.'¹²⁵ Cataloguing hundreds of plastic works known to his time he proposed an ambitious taxonomy of archaic styles. If numerous studies in theoretical archaeology and ethnology discuss the meaning of styles in various societies,¹²⁶ past or present, they usually disregard Greek art as irrelevant to a social approach to material culture and never mention Langlotz's essay; conversely, they cannot offer ready-made models for the historical peculiarity of the archaic Greek world. However, the link postulated in 1927 by Langlotz between *school*, *style*, and *city* has been widely confirmed by later discoveries and specified by more recent studies applying his methodology to other classes of materials: Geometric bronze figurines and pottery, as well as archaic bronzes and terracottas.¹²⁷ Of course, the vocabulary formerly used by Langlotz, often referring to 'race' or 'blood', is now old-fashioned and duly subject to criticism. It is now commonplace to talk of 'cultural identity' instead and to consider that culture and specifically visual arts belong to the realm of the *polis*.¹²⁸ More precisely, according to

Claude Rolley, on an individual level, artists and craftsmen were citizens, conscious of their citizen status and deliberately expressing it through the style of their creations.¹²⁹ Even if peculiarities have been specified for various areas (particularly for the Western colonies¹³⁰) and if artistic identity has to be adapted to the rules of social agency and travelling workshops,¹³¹ a close connection between style and citizen identity may still be accepted. Some scholars have nevertheless denied such a political link between material culture and the mosaic of Greek cities, preferring the loose concept of 'regional style' (usually known in German literature as *Landschaftsstil* and opposed to *Zeitstil*) that would be common to several artistic centres without distinct identities.¹³² By emphasizing the notion of 'region', scholars disconnect art from politics to the benefit of geography alone. As Francis Croissant writes, 'considérer que les Cyclades, par exemple, constituent une "région" peut paraître tout naturel, mais il serait vain de chercher à définir clairement une identité "cycladique", que ce soit à partir des céramiques du VII^e siècle ou des sculptures du VI^e'.¹³³ In such wide cultural areas, archaic arts and crafts normally present a variety of styles with distinct characteristics and radical oppositions, whose birthplace may be identified.

Emphasizing the need to set early Greek art and material culture in its cultural and social context, Ian Morris developed, some fifteen years ago, a globalizing model made of two antithetical ideologies: the middling and the elitist.¹³⁴ The middling tradition goes back to Hesiod, for whom privileges, restraint, and moderation were the keys to a good life. Such an ideal is 'defined against the specters of the desperate poor and the greedy, hubristic rich' and forms the core of a 'citizen ideology' that would last until the fourth century at least. The rival ideology, the elitist tradition, begins with Homer. It regulates the world of the aristocracy as 'one of delicacy, elaborate manners, sweet perfumes, and wealth' with 'strong Eastern influences'. Morris uses archaic poetry to show how central the 'East' was for both elite and middling poets, who either praised or disdained oriental models and influences. Since 'there was no way to transcend the *polis* in the middling tradition', the 'art of citizenship' would thus be assimilated to rejecting Orientalizing art and values beyond the realm of the *polis* and confining it to the interstices of the *polis* world, at interstate games, in ritualized foreign friendship, behind the doors of the aristocratic symposium, or in sanctuaries located outside the political space of the city-state. The well-known shift in the deposition of valuables from graves to sanctuaries in eighth-century central Greece could indeed be interpreted both as a success for the emerging citizen community, removing them from other social contexts, and as an attempt by the elite to bring such forms of 'antisocial behaviours' back

into the heart of the *polis*. Exploring how Orientalizing art was used, Morris assimilates the Orientalizing movement to ‘a class phenomenon’ and identifies different regional patterns of responses, arguing that the social transformation was most intense in central Greece, although it affected other areas as well: ‘The meaning of Orientalizing art must have been very different in Crete from those in the Aegean. In central Greece, the use of Orientalizing art created an oppositional group alienated from, but claiming to stand above, the world of the cities. In Crete it spoke of continuity.’

Such a discrepancy between these two regions has been further elaborated by Thomas Brisart, who sought to combine Morris’ dichotomic model with my own work on archaic elites. Defining what he calls a ‘citizen art’, Brisart shows how Orientalizing objects were used in archaic cities as formal tools regulating the dynamics between the elite and the rest of the population: ‘Pour être plus précis, ils étaient utilisés dans le cadre d’institutions étroitement liées à l’émergence de la citoyenneté à laquelle on assiste à la même époque.’¹³⁵ Following Morris in proposing two models of *polis* formation, he relates them closely to two different uses of Orientalizing art in society, but disagrees with him on the nature of archaic aristocracies and avoids reproducing a notion I deconstructed. In central Greece or ‘agonistic cities’ the elite was deeply embedded into the new citizen body and used Orientalizing artefacts as strategies of distinction (referring to my own ‘modes de reconnaissance sociale’) within the process of a never-ending social competition between citizens. In Crete, on the contrary, citizens and the elite being one and the same social body, Orientalizing art was extended to all the citizens and used as a means of reinforcing the cohesion of the citizen body and of marking the gap between that elite and the rest of the population. As Brisart concludes, ‘L’art orientalisant constituait, en Crète, un vocabulaire visuel propre à la cité, un art exclusivement réservé aux citoyens. Il servait ainsi, au même titre que les autres institutions civiques, à assurer la cohérence de la citoyenneté mais aussi à établir une césure entre celle-ci et le reste de la société.’¹³⁶ Orientalizing art was also a citizen art.

Defining archaic citizenship is not only the task of historians. Archaeologists and art historians too can take the discussion a step further thanks to the awareness of the very strong and active role of material culture in shaping social and political identities. The importance of human agency in the mediation of local identities and social statuses has been acknowledged—see Alfred Gell’s seminal book *Art and Agency*¹³⁷—and offers the possibility of ascribing to material culture, intended as a ‘total social fact’, a sound historical value. It could also force historians to reconsider in new ways classical

6. New Pathways to Archaic Citizenship

Defining archaic citizenship is of course a way to think about the archaic *polis*. Its image has considerably changed in the last decades as different approaches progressively evolve and eventually converge.¹³⁸ Having reviewed major patterns of citizenship definition in most of twentieth-century historiography—although with no claim to be exhaustive and while developing, admittedly, a personal approach to the question—it is easy to acknowledge both the advances made in a century of scholarly research on archaic Greece and the many different schools of thought that are still debating the very nature of archaic citizenship. If the Aristotelian model has long been applied to all Greek cities regardless of chronological issues, more and more historians are now challenging Aristotle's theoretical definition and are looking for other ways of conceiving citizenship and community. The greatest difficulty is certainly to reformulate in a completely different manner both the questions and the answers to achieve new sorts of definitions of citizenship.

Recent studies, indeed, have produced new pathways to archaic citizenship that are significantly different from the juridical and institutional approach of late nineteenth-century *Griechische Staatskunde*, with the notable exception of the *Copenhagen Polis Centre*. As Adele Scafuro puts it, 'the description of a study as "constitutionalist" or as "focused on institutions" nowadays commonly insinuates narrowness' and 'many of the questions that are now being asked about citizenship are different from those asked sixty years ago'.¹³⁹ By analogy with economic historiography, I would say that an old 'formalist' attitude towards archaic citizenship, observing it through the eyes and with the concepts of a classical scholar such as Aristotle, has now often been replaced with a 'substantivist' approach, more respectful of the peculiarities of archaic societies and the diversity of ancient documents, from texts to material culture. The archaic city is no longer considered by specialists as a kind of primitive or unachieved classical *polis*. At least, we might hope so.

This volume aims to contribute to this trend and to the growing emphasis on diversity. The essays collected here have not been tailored, however, to endorse any view. In the following pages, each contributor brings his or her own (national) background and develops a particular approach to archaic citizenship through specific fields of enquiry. John Davies ([chapter 2](#)) addresses the difficult question of

state formation in Early Iron Age Greece by investigating the ‘operative forces’. Josine Blok ([chapter 3](#)) distinguishes between the foundational role of cult, the formative role of descent, and the structuring role of law in shaping a genuinely archaic form of citizenship. Addressing the role of warfare in defining the citizen status, especially in Solonian Athens, Hans van Wees ([chapter 4](#)) argues for the existence of very strict military obligations in archaic cities. Paulin Ismard ([chapter 5](#)) shows how important the associations of archaic Athens were in mediating a citizen affiliation to the *polis*, ultimately revising the meaning of the Cleisthenic reform. Similarly, Marcello Lupi ([chapter 6](#)) argues that the Spartan civic subdivisions were used to ensure a rational organization of the citizen body, defining the respective roles played by membership of civic subdivisions and participation in collective practices in the construction of Spartan citizenship during the archaic period. Bringing forward the case of Sparta, Paul Cartledge ([chapter 7](#)) lays bridges between ancient and modern citizenship theory. Nick Fisher ([chapter 8](#)) emphasizes the strong civic nature of athletics from the sixth century on, which led various cities to offer enfranchisement to foreign victorious athletes. James Whitley ([chapter 9](#)) reviews all the literary, epigraphic, and archaeological evidence pertaining to the *andreion* in Cretan cities and stresses the peculiar patterns of Cretan citizenship. As both editor and contributor to this volume, I propose to evaluate archaic citizenship as a performance, rather than as an assigned status enshrined in legal criteria, stressing the significant role of horse-breeding and luxury behaviours in various archaic cities ([chapter 10](#)). And finally, before the concluding remarks of Roger Brock ([chapter 12](#)), Maurizio Giangulio ([chapter 11](#)) discusses the so-called fixed-number oligarchies, which he prefers to assimilate to citizen bodies that adopted a highly symbolic name and shape, rejecting the usual distinction between a ruling elite with full political rights and a mass of underprivileged people.

How helpful is this diversity of approaches and opinions in defining archaic citizenship? Is it necessary to make more complex an issue that was already settled through the Aristotelian model? As Umberto Eco once wrote in *Foucault’s Pendulum*, ‘for every complex problem there’s a simple solution, and it’s wrong’. Defining archaic citizenship certainly implies venturing off the beaten track. So, yes, far from diluting the subject, this diversity of—supplementing and/or conflicting—approaches is both sound and necessary.

If there are multiple ways of exploring archaic citizenship, it should be stressed that conditions were very different too from one city to another in archaic Greece. First, being a citizen in Sparta, Gortyn, or Chalcis was not the same experience as enjoying citizen status in

Athens, Samos, or Sybaris. Second, the Early Iron Age communities discussed by John Davies did not have the same contingencies as late sixth- or early fifth-century *poleis* discussed by many other contributors. And third, there might also have been diverging notions of citizenship among the members of the same archaic *polis*. As Josine Blok writes for classical Athens, ‘Es gab in Athen, so meine These, einfach verschiedene Auffassungen vom Bürgerstatus.’¹⁴⁰

In sum, there are both various modern approaches to archaic citizenship and various existing models in archaic Greece. It is the hope of this volume of collected essays to express this diversity. To fully understand citizenship in archaic Greece we perhaps ought, eventually, not to choose between various conflicting definitions, but rather to combine the different perspectives in a single historical attempt. As both editors hope, the whole volume should be more than the mere sum of its parts.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The main part of this chapter was written in 2011 thanks to a Fulbright visiting scholarship at the University of California, Los Angeles. My warmest thanks go to Sarah Morris and John Papadopoulos, who were invaluable hosts, particularly in the darkest days of this American experience. The chapter was further elaborated over the years thanks to the generous comments of Roger Brock and Hans van Wees. Although such a broad topic encompasses countless conflicting views and critical nuances, references in footnotes are deliberately restricted.

¹ E.g. Reinau 1981; Walter 1993; Scafuro 1994; Davies 2004; Cecchet and Busetto 2017. Of course, the specific literature on the Greek city is also related to the notion of citizenship; cf. e.g. Gawantka 1985; Sakellariou 1989; Vlassopoulos 2007; Ma 2016.

² Murray 1990b, 4.

³ Benveniste 1970; cf. Duplouy 2006b.

⁴ Murray 1990b; Vernant 1982.

⁵ Manville 1990, 35. See also Davies 1996a and this volume (chapter 2).

⁶ Ampolo 1996, 322.

⁷ See the classic studies by Mossé 1967b; Lévy 1980; Johnson 1984. More recently, Osborne 2011, 88–91; Blok 2017.

⁸ Ober 1998, 290–351.

⁹ Szántó 1892, 5.

¹⁰ Busolt 1920; Swoboda 1926.

¹¹ Hunter 2000, 1. See also Fisher 2006.

¹² For Athens, see Osborne 1981–3.

¹³ Davies 1977.

¹⁴ Manville 1990, 13.

- 15 Hölkeskamp 1999, 262–9; 2005.
- 16 Van Effenterre and Ruzé 1994; Ruzé 1997, 354; 2003b, 169–70.
- 17 Ruzé 1997, 405–6.
- 18 For more details, see e.g. Duploux 2005.
- 19 Glotz 1928, 94. This conception is still present in more recent French historiography, see for example Mossé 1984a.
- 20 Hansen and Nielsen 2004; more synthetically, Hansen 2003.
- 21 Hansen 2003, 264 (no. 25).
- 22 Cf. Murray 1990b. See also Polignac's response to Hansen's approach (Polignac 1995b).
- 23 Hansen 2006, 110–12.
- 24 Manville 1990, 209.
- 25 On neo-evolutionist anthropology, Johnson and Earle 1987 [2000].
- 26 For example, Edwards 2004 and my review in AC 75 (2006), 522–3.
- 27 Yoffee 1993; McIntosh 1999.
- 28 Meier 1990.
- 29 Bordes 1982, 49–107.
- 30 Van Effenterre and Ruzé 1994, 25–8.
- 31 Ismard 2010, 43, 77–8. See also Ismard this volume, chapter 5.
- 32 Davies 2009, 3–4.
- 33 Blok 2005, 8. See also Blok 2004, 9–10, challenging the paradigm of institutional evolution, which searches for political institutions in elementary form at earlier stages of the *polis*. A similar perspective is adopted by Davies this volume (chapter 2).
- 34 Busolt 1920, § 48 (*Die Oligarchie des Adels und die der Begüterten*); Swoboda 1926, §§ 70–2 (*Der Staat der Lakedaimonier: Die Rechtsstellung der verschiedenen Bevölkerungsklassen*); Glotz 1928, 78; Ehrenberg 1969, 41–3; Welwei 1998, 93–110; Pomeroy et al. 2004, 70.
- 35 Hansen 1994; 2002b; 2003, 265 (no. 30); 2006, 107–9 ('full citizens are only a part of all adult citizens').
- 36 As stated by Raafaub 2006a, 423.
- 37 Ruzé 1997, 205 n. 9 referring to *Nomima* I, nos. 21 and 22.
- 38 Busolt 1920, 221.
- 39 Mossé 1967a, 8.
- 40 From Bourriot 1976 to Duploux 2006a.
- 41 Mossé 1967b, 21; 1979b; 1984b; Duploux 2011.
- 42 Bravo 1996 (quotation, 536).
- 43 E.g. Manville 1994; Connor 1994, 40–1.
- 44 See Duploux 2002 for a general review of the literature. The title of this section obviously refers to Davies 1981.
- 45 For a review of economic literature and particularly Finley's influential work, see Morris 1999a.
- 46 On the importance of material culture in research today, see e.g. Morris 2007; Dietler 2007; Osborne 2007.
- 47 Pečírka 1966, 148–9. See also Gauthier 1976, 223–5. More recently Hennig 1994, esp. 305–36.
- 48 Siewert 1977.
- 49 Van Effenterre and Ruzé 1994, 168–9.
- 50 Foxhall 1997 (quotation, 129); see also, in general, Zurbach 2017.
- 51 Boyd and Jameson 1981; Di Vita 1990; Müller 2010, 125–51.
- 52 Asheri 1966, esp. 13–16; 1975.
- 53 Morris 1996. See below (section 5) for further discussion.
- 54 Gras, Tréziny, and Broise 2004, 546.

- 55 Carter 1990.
- 56 Carter 2006; Carter and Prieto 2011.
- 57 Finley 1999, 48. Also see Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1972, 111–12.
- 58 Mossé 1979a; Raaflaub 2006a; Duploux 2014.
- 59 Ito 2004.
- 60 Meier 2012 (quotation, 29).
- 61 Boerner 1910. Still described as a ‘ruling aristocracy’ by Gehrke 1998 and Lomas 2013.
- 62 Bravo 1992.
- 63 Bravo 1996.
- 64 Weber 1978, 1354. See also Humphreys 1978b.
- 65 Hasebroek 1928; 1931. On Karl Polanyi, Humphreys 1978a; Clancier et al. 2005.
- 66 See especially Veyne 1976; Finley 1983, 24–49; Gauthier 1985.
- 67 Dem. 45.85; 59.2; cf. Davies 1971, 427–35 (no. 11672).
- 68 Bresson 2000; cf. Harris 2001.
- 69 Bresson 2000, 250.
- 70 Mansouri 2010.
- 71 Descat 1986.
- 72 Bravo 1974; 1977; 1984. Mele 1979; 1986. On that controversy, Cartledge 1983, esp. 7–10; Reed 2003, 62–74.
- 73 On Colaïos’ achievements, see Duploux, Mariaud, and Polignac 2011, 300–3.
- 74 Wilson 1997–8 (quotation, 32).
- 75 Chadwick 1990, esp. 166.
- 76 van Wees 2009 (quotation, 450).
- 77 Duploux 2006a. See also Fisher and van Wees 2015b.
- 78 Note the mistranslation of these lines by H. Rackham in the Loeb edition (1932)—‘the poor are not allowed to possess arms’—as often pinpointed by van Wees (2001, 59 and n. 73; 2002, 62; 2006b, 371–2 and n. 81; this volume (chapter 4, section 1)).
- 79 Garland 1989; Rich and Shipley 1993; Cartledge 1996c; van Wees 2007.
- 80 Gras, Tréziny, and Broise 2004, 563. See also the case of Thessaly treated by Helly 1995.
- 81 Since Cichorius 1894. See now Whitehead 1981; de Ste. Croix 2004a; Raaflaub 2006a. On the military assignments of the so-called ‘Solonian classes’, see also van Wees this volume (chapter 4).
- 82 Bravo 1996, 537.
- 83 See Hunt 1998.
- 84 van Wees 2007, 298.
- 85 On this topic, see most recently Lomas 2006 (quotation, 115).
- 86 Welskopf 1981; Reinau 1981; Bordes 1982; Raaflaub 1985; Lévy 1985; Hansen 2000b; Osborne 2011, 92–102; Blok 2017, 146–86.
- 87 Ruzé 2003b (quotation, 166).
- 88 Ruzé 1997, 70. A slightly different view is exposed by Werlings 2010, with *laos* as ‘un groupe d’hommes sous l’autorité d’un chef’ (51–64) and *dēmos* as ‘les habitants d’un territoire’ (65–88).
- 89 Blok 2004; 2005; 2017, 146–86.
- 90 See further Blok 2011 and this volume (chapter 3).
- 91 See for example Matthews and Hornblower 2000.
- 92 Bechtel 1917, 509–19.
- 93 Coldstream 1984, 8.
- 94 Coldstream 1984, 15.
- 95 Kourou 2008 (quotation, 84).

- ⁹⁶ Morris 1987, 176–7.
- ⁹⁷ Morris 1987, 9.
- ⁹⁸ Snodgrass 1977, 11–12; 1980, 22–4. And then, acknowledging Morris’ observation, Snodgrass 1991, 16–17; 1993, 31–2.
- ⁹⁹ Polignac 1995a. See Polignac 1994 and 1996. For critics of Polignac’s model, especially in the anglophone scholarship, see Irad Malkin’s review in *JHS* 107 (1987), 227–8, as well as Hall 1995, and various papers in Alcock and Osborne 1994.
- ¹⁰⁰ Murray 1990b, 3. On the multiple historical approaches to the *polis*, see also Azoulay and Ismard 2007.
- ¹⁰¹ Polignac 1995a, 78.
- ¹⁰² Polignac 1995a, 124–5.
- ¹⁰³ Polignac 1995a, 153. See also, following Josine Blok’s studies, van den Eijnde 2010, 28 (‘A citizen is someone who has access to the shared set of rituals and symbols connected with that tier of identity that has the most political salience’) and Wijma 2014.
- ¹⁰⁴ See my own development of the topic in Duploux 2012a.
- ¹⁰⁵ Dentzer 1982, esp. 429–52 (Le banquet et l’idéal aristocratique).
- ¹⁰⁶ Murray 1983a; 1983b; 1983c; 1990c; 1993a, 207–13.
- ¹⁰⁷ Murray 1983b, 266.
- ¹⁰⁸ Kurke 1999a; Morris 2000, 183. See also the critiques of Hammer 2004 and Kistler 2004.
- ¹⁰⁹ Bérard et al. 1984.
- ¹¹⁰ Lissarrague 1987; 1999.
- ¹¹¹ Schmitt-Pantel 1990a, 201. See also Schmitt-Pantel and Schnapp 1982; Schmitt-Pantel 1990b; 1992.
- ¹¹² Węcowski 2014.
- ¹¹³ See now Fisher and van Wees 2015b.
- ¹¹⁴ Duploux 2006a. See above, section 3.
- ¹¹⁵ Recently, Barringer 2001.
- ¹¹⁶ Vidal-Naquet 1986 (quotation, 106).
- ¹¹⁷ Schnapp 1979a; 1979b; 1997.
- ¹¹⁸ Schmitt-Pantel 1990b, 210.
- ¹¹⁹ d’Agostino 2008.
- ¹²⁰ Lemos 2008, 181.
- ¹²¹ D’Agata 2008, 221; 2012. For Knossian Protogeometric B (PGB), see Coldstream, Eiring, and Forster 2001, 66.
- ¹²² Cerchiai 2008.
- ¹²³ See Kurke 1999b (quotation, 260). See also Vernant 1988, 437 n. 123; Hansen 2002a. Some of these games also link back to the symposium, see Brock 2013, 93 and n. 91.
- ¹²⁴ Croissant 2008a; 2008b.
- ¹²⁵ Langlotz 1927, 7. Unfortunately ignored by Osborne 2011, 108–111 in his discussion of civic identity in archaic sculpture, misinterpreting the chronological groups of Richter 1970.
- ¹²⁶ See for example Wiessner 1983; Conkey and Hastorf 1990; David and Kramer 2001, 168–224.
- ¹²⁷ Herrmann 1964; Rolley 1983, esp. 131–2; Coldstream 1983; Croissant 1983.
- ¹²⁸ See Boardman 1995.
- ¹²⁹ Rolley 1983–4.
- ¹³⁰ Croissant 1992 coined the notion of ‘*éclectisme inventif*’ to qualify Greek colonial styles, which has been regularly applied thence.
- ¹³¹ Viviers 2002; Duploux 2006a, 217–49; 2006b; 2006c.

¹³² Snodgrass 1999; Whitley 2001, 231–3 following the division into four macro-regions proposed by Morris 1998.

¹³³ Croissant 2007 (quotation, 30).

¹³⁴ Initially presented in Morris 1996 and 1997 (quotation from 11, 12, 16, 42). For later developments and critiques of the model, see Duploux this volume (chapter 10).

¹³⁵ Brisart 2011 (quotation, 316).

¹³⁶ Brisart 2011, 322.

¹³⁷ Gell 1998. For a case study on ancient Greece, see Whitley 2006b.

¹³⁸ Davies 2009.

¹³⁹ Scafuro 1994, 3–4.

¹⁴⁰ Blok 2004, 1.

2

State Formation in Early Iron Age Greece

The Operative Forces

John K. Davies

In memoriam

† Nicolas Coldstream

The title of this chapter promises far more than it can deliver, but is not on that account wholly misleading. My purpose is to perform an experiment: namely, to approach the subject of this volume in unorthodox terms, on the premise that those terms might serve as a unifying framework within which all the various current discourses on the subject—mainly archaeological, of course, but also historical, literary, and linguistic—might be comfortably accommodated. Its unorthodoxy is threefold. First, it repudiates the assumption which has pervaded much of modern scholarship that the principal objective of enquiry should be to explain ‘the rise of the Greek *polis*’, and insists instead that the ‘rise’ of all the various post-Mycenaean polities that had emerged in Greek-language space by c.600 BC is equally worthy of analysis. Secondly, it asserts that the processes at work were by no means peculiar to that space (they are just rather better documented there), and that whatever interpretative language is devised should be so formulated as to be applicable much more widely throughout the Iron Age Mediterranean (and, I dare say, beyond). Thirdly, it attempts, however tentatively, to straddle the extremely tricky academic boundaries which separate Classical World studies from the social

sciences, especially sociology and political science, and also separate scholarship on the Greek Late Bronze Age (LBA)—which is inevitably mostly archaeological—from scholarship on the Early Iron Age (EIA) and the archaic period: doing so in the very strong conviction that on the one hand students of such studies are not well served by an academic tradition which has focused *imprimis* on Aristotle's *Politics*, but on the other that historians have to recognize the need for explicit model-building. Instead, section 2 of the chapter offers an analysis formulated historically, that is, in diachronic terms, but does so by using six forms of generative social energy as its principal analytic tools and attempting not to narrate but to model¹ the development of post-Mycenaean Greece by reconstructing the trajectory which each of those forms instigated. The approach is therefore incomplete, in that it would require a third section, tracing in detail the interaction through time of those six trajectories, to complete the analysis: but section 3 would be a book in itself.

1. Towards A Generative Model

1.1 After Runciman

Some years ago, in two incisive but sadly under-cited papers, the British sociologist W.G. Runciman offered a theoretical synoptic analysis of the processes defined by the title of the present chapter.² The first is the most pertinent. In it he assumed 'that there are four necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the emergence of a state from non-state or stateless forms of social organization: specialization of governmental roles; centralization of enforceable authority; permanence, or at least more than ephemeral stability, of structure; and emancipation from real or fictive kinship as the basis of relations between the occupants of governmental roles and those whom they govern' (1982, 351). He distinguished between 'semistates' and 'protostates', using both anthropological evidence and the contrast between Homer's portrait of Ithaca and Tacitus' portrait of Germany in order to show that 'the quasi-governmental roles by which semistates are structured carry no inherent potential for progress in the direction of statehood as defined above. In a protostate, by contrast, they do' (1982, 353). As a non-circular criterion for identifying such potential, he posited the possibility that governmental structures might be stable enough for one set of incumbents to be replaced by another 'without bringing about

regression to semi-statehood or anarchy' (1982, 356), illustrating its application by tracing the changing uses of the terms *aisymnetes*, *basileus*, and *demiourgos* and the emergence of the role of *proxenos*. There follows in his exposition a second major set of assumptions, namely (a) that there are only three forms of power 'on which the roles constitutive of statehood can be based' (1982, 361), viz. the economic (i.e. control of the sources and distribution of wealth), the social (i.e. the attribution of honour or prestige), and the political (i.e. command of the means of coercion), and (b) that any transition to statehood depends upon their combination and mutual reinforcement. In the particular case of archaic Greece, that transition is seen as a product of various necessary conditions—population growth, relative stability and concentration of settlement, and the emergence of a sense of political identity—and its emergence is traced via the intensification of land-use, the construction of temples as a measure of the capacity of communities to muster the necessary resources, and the growth in military power made available to rulers by improvements in weaponry and tactics. The transition is further traced via distinctions between *ethnos* and *polis*, and between offensive and defensive proto-statehood, in order to re-emphasize that no one single monocausal explanation is adequate: what mattered was the accumulation of the three separate but mutually reinforcing kinds of power.

Runciman's second paper is only superficially less relevant. It extends the application of his theory of power to the developed *polis*, defining a *polis* for this purpose as a citizen-state which (a) has a monopoly of internal coercion and is therefore juridically autonomous, and (b) is organized socially in terms of a distinction between citizens who monopolize power and non-citizens whose labour is controlled by citizens (1990, 348). Runciman saw the Greek *polis* as 'a paradigm case of a mode of the distribution of power on which environmental pressure has the effect of generating maladaptive responses' (1990, 355), emphasizing that the contrast with Rome and Venice, two states which conspicuously did adapt their institutions successfully, shows that the Greek failure was not intrinsic to the *Staatsform* but was contingent upon the fact that all Greek *poleis* without exception, even oligarchies, were 'far too democratic' (1990, 364), their ideology being strongly populist.

Though aspects of its argument will be addressed below, Runciman's diptych remains a valuable starting-point. By approaching what is probably the most intractable problem of classical Greek history not in conventional autonomous historical-archaeological terms but in terms of an allied discipline which permits—indeed enjoins—a comparative perspective, it provides a much-needed

stimulus to view the subject from the outside. However, scholarship has inevitably moved on: perhaps nowhere more, indeed, in the study of ‘classical antiquity’ than on this very topic,³ for at least seven new currents of research need to be brought to bear. Prime among them must be the Copenhagen Polis Project, for though its main focus was on the later archaic and classical Greek *polis* rather than on its Dark Age origins, the published scholarship which it has stimulated covers an immense field and has provided, in the *Inventory*, a one-stop tool of reference which both implicitly and explicitly addresses many of the issues that are intrinsic to this chapter. Second, and largely unrelated to the first, is the expansion of the material record for the entire periods conventionally termed ‘sub-Mycenaean’, ‘Dark Age’, and ‘archaic’. Not only does it increasingly show, especially the scale of new evidence from Northern Greece, such regional and other variations as to render generalizations precarious (Morgan 2003; Archibald 2013), but it also makes ‘Dark Age’ itself a less appropriate term for the Early Iron Age of Greece (Dickinson 2006, 1–7) while casting new light on ‘Geometric Greece’ too and thereby renewing the argument about the duration, nature, and extent of post-Mycenaean disruption and depopulation. Thirdly and less helpfully, while the epigraphical record remains tenuous and geographically unrepresentative, the literary source-material in prose (Herodotus, the Ephoran tradition, and Plutarch) is revealing itself to have been shaped in ways which render its witness even more deeply unreliable than was realized a generation ago. Fourth has been a reassessment both of the nature and reliability of the evidence for population growth in Early Iron Age Greece⁴ and of the wider historical implications of the demographic behaviour of ancient populations.⁵ A new emphasis on the study of various styles of land-use as complex interlocking systems operating at both a micro-regional level and at longer distances is a fifth component, itself complemented by a greater willingness to view the Mediterranean and its riverain populations as a single macro-region with comparable institutions.⁶ Sixth, and more specifically within the Greek-language zone, not only have the processes and terminology of Greek overseas expansion become contentious⁷ but also the Greek word *polis* has itself again become problematic, not this time because of the way in which its meanings changed in Greek texts⁸ but because its use in modern historiography to denote a specific form of polity has encountered sceptical scrutiny.⁹ Lastly but fundamentally, a comparably sceptical challenge is currently being mounted to theories of state formation which date from the 1960s.¹⁰ Other interpretative trends are noticed below.

Such developments would by themselves justify revisiting

Runciman's analysis. Even as it stood, however, it left four questions open. The first is sociological: given the clear evidence of intra- and inter-community conflict which runs through the entire corpus of literary evidence and ought therefore to be factored into any model of institutional development (at least as a contingency), which forms of conflict theory and/or of social integration is it most appropriate to apply to this EIA context of secondary¹¹ state formation? The second is historical: is a general model of state formation adequate to explain why the outcomes of the process within the Greek-language zone took the fragmented and peculiar forms which they did? And if not, what modifications are required? The third is historical-geographical: what difference does it make to such a model if considerations of space, landscape, and settlement are introduced? The fourth is both sociological and historical, for Runciman's sketch focused more on the channels through which the processes of power accretion and state formation would (have to) run than on the specific forms of energy which generated the flow into those channels: how therefore are those forms to be identified?

1.2 Towards a Wider Spectrum of 'Statehood'

This may therefore be a good moment to start again, however tentatively. What follows here keeps these four theoretical questions live but in the background, while paying due regard to the specific historical milieu of the Greek EIA. It will change Runciman's metaphor, using 'force' and 'energy' rather than 'power' in order to accommodate a greater range of influences of different kinds (some wholly impersonal). Even more radically, it will specifically *not* assume that the outcome of the process of state formation in that milieu was the formation of *poleis*, still less that 'citizenship' was an unproblematic development. Two considerations underlie that caution. First, the influences and operative dynamics of the processes which converged to engender the archaic-classical *polis* or *Kleinstaat* were not unique, isolated, or specific to Greece. On the contrary, systems which showed comparable characteristics continued to flourish in the Levant and emerged in the EIA in Etruria, Lazio, Campania, and North Africa.¹² Hence no model framed in purely Greek terms has adequate explanatory force. Secondly, the processes which moulded personal and political relationships within Greek space between (say) 1000 and 650 BC did indeed yield a more or less stable outcome, but one which was much less uniform than was once assumed. On the contrary, the type of state commonly termed *polis*

emerged from a matrix of processes which interacted within a culture which also generated at least three other types of state—monarchies, the so-called *ethnē*, and the temple-state. These other types (which are simply practical labels for clusters of examples that are located along a continuous spectrum, not separate species¹³) are belatedly attracting the scholarly attention that they deserve, for it is clear that they are just as much, and just as important, products of post-Mycenaean Greece as was the institution of the *polis* round which much (indeed far too much) subsequent political theory coagulated. Again, no model which consciously or unconsciously focuses wholly or mainly on the *polis* and cannot generate these other forms of polity with equal facility has adequate explanatory force: it would be, as it were, Newtonian in its applicability, whereas both politically and geographically a more inclusive (or relativistic) generative model is required.

That requirement poses a problem. If the entity whose emergence is to be explained cannot be identified as the *polis* without descending into circularity, what should the unit of discourse be instead? The absence of any known overarching political authority for EIA Greece precludes one possibility, while ‘tribes’ and ‘chiefdoms’ have proved to be such ethereal and self-contradictory concepts that their explanatory value is nil.¹⁴ At the other extreme, the individual household is too small, unstable, and unviable on its own to be taken as the basic building block in the way Aristotle did in *Politics* I. The practical minimum requirement is for a unit which (a) is biologically large enough to be self-perpetuating without genetic disaster and (b) is economically stable enough within the then current parameters of technology to survive indefinitely in a given landscape. In terms of the specific Greek landscape and of the EIA, that implies a sedentary population and a pattern of settlement, requirements which are in any case virtually necessary preconditions for any process of sustained state formation. We therefore need to think in terms of a model which has as its basic unit a settled agro-pastoral-fishing community (not necessarily nucleated) and an absolute minimum adult population of (say) about fifty.¹⁵ If such entities can be identified, we can postulate a landscape occupied, at any level of density, by a population of such unicellular settlements, each of which initially has equal functional status (even if not equal size) at Level I of a hierarchy of settlement. We can then begin to envisage how the impact of environmental variables generates a range of developments.

Such a scenario is no simplistic demographic abstraction, for it reflects the reality of a world of agro-pastoral villages, each with its hinterland of productive territory and some with extra resources or craft specializations.¹⁶ That world has long been open to indirect

scrutiny via the literary and epigraphical testimonia which report such primary settlements. Obvious examples are the settlements which eventually became the ‘demes’ of Attica, Chalcis, Eretria, and elsewhere,¹⁷ or the ‘villages’ (*komai*) of Elis/Pisatis,¹⁸ or the perioikic communities of Laconia.¹⁹ Direct scrutiny is harder, requiring survey and excavation. However, though such units are often difficult to identify physically when later incorporated into larger nucleated entities (see below, section 2.2), and though few which remained villages have been excavated as thoroughly as Vitsa in Epeiros²⁰ or Lefkandi/Xeropolis in Euboea,²¹ enough are already visible²² to provide a tangible correlate to written evidence and thus to provide a firm basis for the argument. What is more, the luck of survival has presented the historian of post-Mycenaean Greece with two early literary portraits of such a unit. That one is fictional, the other fictionalized, is more advantage than handicap, since it prevents us from rooting our model too firmly in a particular landscape. Between them they provide a starting-point.

1.3 Two Literary Portraits

The first is the portrait of the Phaiakian settlement at Scherie²³ which the *Odyssey* presents. This community, ‘the *dēmos* and *polis* of Phaiakian men’, was an overseas settlement, the result of a migration undertaken to escape pillage. Its leader Nausithoos ‘drove a wall round the *polis*, built houses, made temples of gods, and divided the fields’ (6.1–10). Physically, the settlement had a high tower round the *polis*, a harbour each side of it with a narrow entrance, and an agora built up with quarried stone round a sanctuary of Poseidon (6.262–5). The first use of the agora to be cited is as an area used for the maintenance of their ships’ tackle (6.266–9), but it later becomes both a space for a general assembly (8.4–7 and 11–18) and the venue for athletic contests (8.109–10 and 120 ff.) and for dancing (8.258–63 and 370–80). Other installations include a grove of Athene with a spring and a meadow (6.291–2) and the ruler’s *temenos* (‘assigned portion’) and market-garden, all located within shouting distance of the *polis* (6.291–4 and 321–2, with a glowing description of the garden’s fertility in an ekphrasis at 7.112–32). No extra-urban installations or residences are mentioned, though it would be unwise to build too much on that silence.

The ruler Alkinoos, son of Nausithoos, is the central figure. True, he is not isolated, for he has a council of twelve distinguished *basilēes*, to which the noble Phaiakians are represented as being able to

summon him (6.53–5; 8.390–1). Furthermore, there are nine umpire-judges, specifically termed *dēmioi*, whose task it was to organize the contests and dances (8.258–60), and an unspecified number of ‘leaders and rulers’ (*hēgētores* and *medontes*) who are mentioned repeatedly but have only one specific task or power attributed to them, that of making a sacrifice to Poseidon on Odysseus’ departure (13.186–7). All the same, Alkinoos is the only man to be termed *basileus* (7.141; 8.469; 13.62) or equivalent (8.380; 9.2 and 378; 11.355; 13.38) on his own, and ‘the power and force’ resides unquestionably with him. He claims as much himself (11.347–53), as does his daughter for him (6.195–6) and as a distinguished elder Echeneos acknowledges (11.342–6). His speech to the assembly (8.26–45) is a proclamation of what is to happen, not a motion for debate. Besides his *temenos*, he had received a woman as a gift of honour (7.10–11), though there is no suggestion of sexual relations with anyone other than his niece-wife Arete (7.54–68). No other house is like his (6.295–303; a detailed description at 7.86–97 and 100–11): it is the venue where the ‘leaders and rulers’ gather and feast (7.98–9) before going home for the night (7.229), the repasts being at his expense (8.38–42), and where the blind bard Demodocos performs (*passim*). His power is also fiscal, for he can both instruct his counsellors to make gifts to Odysseus and expect to recoup the expense by making a collection among the *dēmos* (13.7–15).

This portrait might not be good evidence.²⁴ Scherie is a Never-Never Land, where Alkinoos is grandson of Poseidon (7.54–63), where Poseidon can nonetheless turn a ship full of men into stone within sight of port (13.159–64), and where the community is ‘une société idéale et impossible’. That is true, but it must be so represented in order to exemplify the basic message of the whole poem, Odysseus’ choice of the human—and therefore mortal—world over an immortal existence which would also be non-human.²⁵ The portrait still has value, partly because (as is universally acknowledged, whatever the date of its final formulation) it clearly reflects the experience of overseas expansion and state formation as it grew in intensity from the ninth, and especially the eighth century BC onwards. *Polis*, as consistently in Homer, denotes ‘walled settlement’, not ‘political entity’: the three basic components of governance (ruler, council, and assembly) are all depicted even if the balance among them is heavily weighted towards the ruler and even if tensions between and within them, inescapable in real life, are unmentioned: the notion of officials who are of the *dēmos* (*dēmioi*) is present: and the absence of any externally located overarching authority both allows and compels the creation of a spatial, fiscal, and governmental (but not yet ‘civic’) order from within the community itself.²⁶

The second portrayal, that offered by Hesiod²⁷ of his home village Ascra in Boiotia (629–40), can be sketched more briefly, since the order which he depicts or advocates is largely domestic and agrarian, needing no detailed notice here. He describes Ascra pejoratively as a *kōmē*,²⁸ using a non-Homeric word, and ‘government’ as such appears only in the agora as the place of quarrels (29–30) and of lawsuits adjudicated by bribe-eating *basilēes* (38–9; 221–2; 250–1; 263–4), though a more distant ruler, Amphidamas of Chalcis, gets a better press (654–7). *Polis* is here used differently, as the general term for a human community (189; 227; 269), but again it is not ‘civic’: men are ‘native’ (*endēmos*) or ‘stranger/guest’ (*xeinos*) (225), not citizens; the key relationship is with a neighbour (23; 343–51; 400; 701); non-agrarian occupations are bard, beggar, ‘maker’ (*tektōn*), potter (25–6), blacksmith (493), and carpenter (807); and the community itself (*laoi* 243, *dēmos* 261) weathers the tribulations inflicted by man or god as best it can. Apart from *eranos*-feasts (722–3) the other human relationships which Hesiod envisages are with brother (37 and *passim*), wife (695 ff.; 799), and farmhands, whether slave *dmōes* (441; 502; 559–73; 587; 776) or hired by the year (602).

Together, these two portrayals, both reflecting (but abstracted from) eighth-century life, offer us a working model of a primary community of the Greek EIA. The fact that we lack vignettes of comparable detail until the later fifth century precludes us from constructing a narrative of development, but other evidence does permit the construction of a model which attempts to account for the emergence and crystallization of the various forms of polity noted above. It envisages a landscape populated by an indefinite number of such primary communities, whose movement through time is subject to the variegated impact of a number of forces, each functioning as a personal or impersonal agency affecting the community’s environment and stimulating a range of reactive and adaptive behaviour.

It has proved impossible to identify the ‘working parts’ of such a model without enlarging the number of such forces very significantly beyond the limited gamut which is offered in much of the literature. Indeed, provisionally it seems that six kinds of ‘force’ or ‘energy’ come into question. They are: (a) that exerted by the exceptional individual; (b) that exerted by population; (c) that exerted by the natural environment; (d) that exerted by ideas of the supernatural; (e) that exerted by the availability of convertible resources; and (f) that exerted by memory, imagination, and a sense of identity. Thus formulated, such forces may seem heterogeneous, even incommensurable. Not so, for they all comprise ways in which the behaviour of persons and communities was visibly influenced, so that in some diachronic form of Riemann space they have to be deemed to

be commensurable. What follows here will attempt to characterize the potential of the impact of each, of necessity in brief and general terms in order to acknowledge that the matrix of interaction among them will have varied through time for each region or each community and does not admit of a single generalized meta-narrative: it is (to change the metaphor) a list of the contents of the store-cupboard, not a recipe-book. Throughout, account will need to be taken of the ways in which such pressures and influences might affect the balance of power within the triangle ruler/elders/assembly which, though submerged in Hesiod, is clearly visible in Homer's Scherie. Though to model the general trajectory via a two-dimensional matrix would clearly be much too schematic, it would be a structurally correct first approximation.

2. The Operative Forces

2.1 The Exceptional Individual

To begin with, the exceptional individual and his charismatic potential needs no defence.²⁹ As kings, tyrants, leaders of expeditions, commanders by land and sea, athletes, lawgivers or politicians, Alkinoos's real-life counterparts bestrode the Greek world, whether as latter-day Homeric hero, champion of the dispossessed, or craftsman of public policy,³⁰ and dominate our surviving Greek biographical and historiographical tradition from Stesimbrotos and Theopompos to Polybios and Plutarch. Though that tradition is over-subject to a generic tendency towards awarding praise and censure and is much less cognizant of other kinds of power than it should have been, that tradition rightly leaves us in no doubt that individuals could and did wield immense power in their face-to-face societies and that military and other forms of prowess clothed force with legitimacy.³¹

Yet such power could very easily be disruptive, for Greek communities of all periods found it very hard to control or to institutionalize it. Just as Hesiod's *Works and Days* shows us unscrupulous and grasping *basilēes*, or as our very first extant public document inscribed on stone, from mid-seventh-century Crete, reveals a small community trying to ensure a rotation of power in its chief magistracy by decreeing that 'when a man has been *kosmos*, the same man shall not be *kosmos* again for ten years',³² so too fifth-century Athens found itself locked into a sequence of constitutional innovations, ranging from ostracism to selection by lot, in order to

control its governing class,³³ while Sparta spent a century trying to control rogue kings. The greatest danger came from individuals who combined the command of significant wealth with military or athletic prestige. For some such, ambition to gain power, even as tyrant, and ambition to gain prestige via victories in contests at what became the Panhellenic Games all too often went hand in hand: in a classic illustrative text, Alcibiades of Athens is presented as making the connection virtually explicit.³⁴

One way of harnessing (and thereby neutralizing) such prestige-power was to encapsulate the individual within the systems of the polity, as Athens did by making Panhellenic victors honorary magistrates via entitlement to participate in meals at the common table in the Prytaneion³⁵ or by channelling into publicly displayed dedications in a designated context the prestige gained by success when bearing the costs and executive responsibility for supporting teams in competitive musical, theatrical, or athletic display at festivals.³⁶ A second expedient was to spread prestige more widely and more uniformly. Recognition of the war-dead as quasi-heroes through public memorials and rituals of commemoration stretched at the extreme to encompass all who fought the Persians, but the limits of practicality were more realistically represented by the ritualization of battle and by the creation of elite brigades. The mid-sixth-century Battle of the Champions between 300 Spartans and 300 Argives (Hdt. 1.82) is perhaps the most notable example, 300 thereafter becoming a repeated symbolic figure.³⁷

A third expedient, equally ambivalent in its consequences, was to encapsulate an individual's 'power and force' within the polity on a more long-term and formalized basis, by retaining, accepting, creating, or recreating some form of monarchy. Admittedly, such anodyne phrases hardly do justice to the ferocious reality which literary tradition reports of many tyrant regimes, but the prevalence of such regimes, and in some cases their longevity, has to reflect a widespread structural appropriateness as much as it reflects the brute force of individual power and ambition. Especially was that true for the more or less hereditary monarchic systems which, once planted, went on to survive and flourish in certain areas of Greece. It is not chance that the most secure and long-lasting among such systems were those where competent military leadership had to be reliably in place at all times, either because the need to defend the beneficial ownership of fertile land against invasion was continuous (as in Macedonia and Epeiros) or was serious though spasmodic (as in Sicily, Cyprus, or Cyrenaica), or because the control of an intrinsically hostile subject population might demand instant mobilization (as with Sparta's control of parts of Laconia and later of Messenia). If Thessaly,

with what became its nucleated and semi-urbanized settlement pattern, local autonomy, and intermittent monarchy selected from among a few hyper-wealthy landowner lineages, offers a halfway house between full monarchic systems and the so-called *polis*,³⁸ it thereby serves to highlight the inescapable and complex interactions among these various forms of power and already to indicate that it is neither necessary nor helpful to regard monarchy and tyranny as separate forms of state, alien from the mainstream ‘republican’ *polis*.

Other expedients, such as formalizing the three components ruler/council/people or submerging the ruler’s individual power within a networked collective of lineages, were also widely deployed. That is merely to restate the obvious, that forces which are here being analysed and modelled separately for the sake of clarity will have interacted in a particular way at any one historical juncture to yield a place- and time-specific outcome. Less obvious, but utterly fundamental alike for the history of Greece and for the argument of this volume, was the cumulative effect of such pressures: namely, to erode the ‘power and force’ of the single individual and to compel communities to develop alternative systems. Much of what follows here has to be seen within that framework.

2.2 Population

To model the effects of the force of population is a more complex matter, since of its three aspects—numbers, role, and cohesion—the first cannot be woven into a structure of purposive action except at the elementary level of choices made by fertile sexual partners. Nor can it be quantified, though estimates of at least c.200,000 for the best-documented region and period, classical Attica, are of the right magnitude,³⁹ provide a point of comparison for earlier periods and for less densely populated regions, and make clear that the vector direction to be built into the model is one of increase. Equally, though there has been much debate about the rate of increase from the imputed low point of the Dark Age, the bare fact of substantial though unevenly distributed growth is unquestionable, perhaps with an especially rapid rise in the second half of the eighth century⁴⁰ and probably reaching if not exceeding the basic carrying capacity of the land by the time of the Greek–Persian Wars.⁴¹ Though detailed questions of fertility and mortality can be left aside here, the third variable, migration, has to be part of the model. Only a qualitative sketch is possible, because while signs of forced or voluntary immigration during the formative periods are scanty,⁴² internal

colonization, occupying and establishing settlements on previously empty or uncultivated land, was clearly a major movement if the indications of surface survey can be trusted.⁴³ Equally major, of course, was population movement overseas, whether systematically organized or otherwise, from the eighth century onwards into areas of hitherto non-Greek cultures.

Such movements, together with whatever role population increase played in generating them, had effects of two kinds. The first was to increase, alike in numbers, size, and density, the distribution of primary settlements both within Old Greece and in widely scattered parts of the Mediterranean littoral. The second was to intensify the pressure on communities and leaders to manage the consequences. Expedients took various forms. One, prominent in legend if not in fact, was forcibly to expel a segment of the community's population and expect it to fend for itself elsewhere.⁴⁴ Regrettably, our fullest portrait of such a proceeding, Herodotus' narrative of the foundation by men of Thera in the south Aegean of what became the polity of Cyrene in North Africa, is a complex literary construct which cannot be taken at face value, though it must have a historical kernel.⁴⁵ A second expedient was to systematize procedures for dealing with conflicts in communities over the ownership and exploitation of an increasingly crowded landscape, a need reflected in some early legal texts.⁴⁶ A third expedient was to render the control of an increasing population more effective by transforming the primary (single-cell) community into a multi-cell second-order community. This could be done in various ways, whether by reinstitutionalizing the old hereditary but apparently non-local human groups which later Greek called 'tribes' (*phylai*) as segments, or by using the Indo-European term for 'brother' (which Greek alone had lost, for unknown reasons) to create 'brotherhoods' (*phratriai*) (a process which one Homeric passage portrays as an innovation),⁴⁷ or by recognizing villages such as Hesiod's Ascrea as segments of a broader entity, or by devising wholly new and artificial groups.⁴⁸

However, the combined pressure of population increase and need for social control were also in part responsible for a fourth, and probably the most important single innovation of the entire EIA period, namely the spread of nucleated settlements, with or without walls. (Other inputs into the process are noted in section 2.5 below.) The process was multifarious.⁴⁹ Within Greece⁵⁰ itself major nucleated sites of the late Mycenaean period were still visible, some of which were reused; new post-Mycenaean walled settlements emerged at various sites; while Homer's portrait of the settlement on Scherie corresponds closely to what can be seen or inferred on the ground in many sites of the Greek or Phoenician diaspora. However, two further

examples show that nucleation did not entail fortification. The first is Gortyn in Crete, where c.700 a ring of settlements about the Mesara plain was abandoned in favour of a central but long unused lowland site.⁵¹ Here, the assumption has been that only a move to a single central place and the adoption of a system of (in effect) continual mobilization via platoons formalized as dining-clubs (*andreia*) could assure the effective control and exploitation of a subordinated population. With the second example, that of Sparta, that assumption becomes certainty. Here four closely adjacent villages, later supplemented by a fifth primary settlement (Amyclai) some 10 km to the south, became the residential base for a substantial body of men (tradition says 9,000) whose (unverifiable) myth of origin portrays them as immigrants. Though their control of Laconia and later of most of Messenia ultimately involved a wholesale regimentation of society, as at Gortyn residence within close call, and brigading in clearly identified segments, were at least as essential in enforcing that control as was the training and military prowess of the individual.

However, it was conflicts *between* communities which were both the most disruptive and the most constructive. Straightforward conquest could be followed by destruction and the expulsion of populations, as with Argos' annihilation of Asine c.720, but could equally yield the reduction of the defeated party to subordinate or subject status, as with Sparta's conquests in Laconia and Messenia. Alternatively, the various communities in a landscape could exploit such sense of common identity as they may have had in order to create a wider, second-order community to act as a conflict-resolution mechanism. Some such development must underlie the structure of the inland portion of the Aitolian *koinon* when it first becomes visible in the 420s, with its various scattered peoples grouped into *mere* ('parts', 'segments').⁵² Similarly, the national mythology of Attica claimed (whatever the reality may have been) that its unification derived from a voluntary act on the part of its twelve *poleis*. Politically and geographically, EIA Greece conformed to the general rule that population increase generates settlement hierarchies and central places.

So much for the consequences of numbers: role and cohesion mattered too. Central to the entire trajectory of Greek political development was an entrenched expectation that in any community the free adult males could physically come together in a periodic assembly and should have some say in decision-making.⁵³ Such occasions might be rare: in Macedonia, for example, they barely extended beyond capital cases and the validation of a king,⁵⁴ while nonetheless representing a second-order community which itself encompassed a number of primary communities, *poleis* or

otherwise.⁵⁵ Moreover, such occasions might be ‘passive’, as with the assembly called by Alkinoos, or ‘consultative’, as with the many assemblies described in the *Iliad*, while still being real instruments. Elsewhere, however, they might be accorded formal though shared power, as specified in the formulation transmitted (we do not know how) from (mid-seventh-century?) Sparta and preserved by Plutarch, which enjoins ‘Having founded a sanctuary of Zeus S<k>ullanios and of Athena S<k>ullania, having tribed the tribes and obeyed the *obai*, having established thirty (as) Gerousia with the *archagetai*, to hold Apella from time to time between Babux and Knakion, thus to consult and adjourn, and to agora of people {victory and power}’.⁵⁶ At the extreme, as at Athens and elsewhere, such assemblies might become the core entity of government. The real and insoluble problem would prove to be that of reconciling the spatial and demographic expansion of a community with the retention of the traditional non-selective assembly of the free men. As will be argued below (section 2.6), issues of identity merely rendered the problem even more intractable.

2.3 The Environment

Space and demography are also aspects of a third ‘force’, that of the environment, which shaped Greek state formation in three major ways.⁵⁷ The first is terrain. Though Greece has its share of fertile plains and river valleys, the sea or the mountains are never far away and combine to create innumerable mini-environments. The same was true for the areas occupied by the Greek diaspora in Italy and Sicily. Even Boiotia, with its two juxtaposed basins, or Thessaly with its postglacial moraine, are less isotropic than they seem on a modern map, while much of what is now the lower Macedonian plain is the result of post-classical alluviation. Many even of the Aegean islands comprise a ring of micro-plains round a mountain core and lend themselves more to habitation by a number of separate primary communities than to a unitary polity.

The inescapable rhythms of the human life cycle are a second aspect, for Greek conditions of hygiene, medicine, diet, and warfare, combined with the need to maximize parturitions in order to maintain a population, yielded a life expectancy at birth of less than thirty and made the nuclear family an even more intrinsically unstable component of society than it now is.⁵⁸ Two basic strategies attempted to redress such instability. One was for lineages to coagulate in larger, cult-centred or commensal groups which offered support and fellowship at turning-points of individuals’ lives as well as providing

the human resources for marriages and adoptions. Attested (mostly in inscriptions) under very various names from c.600 BC onwards, such groups were the obvious units to undergo manipulation when communities found themselves increasingly under pressure to organize and mobilize their populations, above all for warfare but also for honouring the gods at festivals by singing and dancing. The second strategy complemented the first, by deeming—perhaps sometimes justly, mostly imaginatively—such groups to be brotherhoods whose members were the descendants of a god, a hero, or a distant mortal ancestor. Though the orderly inheritance of property (and of women as its transmitters) was their main other practical function, the legends which they fostered or invented provided bards and artists all over Greece with the ingredients for weaving together, as imputed descent groups, communities that may have been scattered across a landscape. Imaginary though they were, such groups came to define the Greek concept of a human community, large or small, and thereby to create a clear (though manipulable) boundary between those who shared in the descent and those who did not.

The equally inescapable efforts required to extract a living from widely differing landscapes and seascapes were a third environmental influence on state formation. Their importance as a component of the overall model derives not so much from the technologies involved (though see section [2.5](#) below), or even from the moral emphasis on work which shapes Hesiod's *Works and Days*, as from the seasonal, annual, or biannual rhythms which run through all agro-pastoral economies. Clearly visible in Hesiod, and probably age-old even by his time, they ranged from superstitions and magical practices through seasonal tasks and periods of stress to gatherings and festivals which celebrated the vintage or the harvest. Since they structured the year, and since low productivity and wide fluctuations of rainfall generated an unstable oscillation between glut and famine which only systematic storage systems could smooth over, the margin of manpower available to a community for non-agrarian tasks, military or other, was limited in quantity and was available only at certain times of year. In this fundamental way the natural environment was a force severely restrictive of expansion or growth. True, communities whose class of *basilēes* was large enough to be a fighting force had some advantage, but since only the exaction of rents or 'gifts' could assemble the surplus value needed to maintain a leisured class, the disbenefits of maintaining social control rose proportionally. It is not chance that communities such as those of Sparta, Crete, and Thessaly whose elites were (or thought themselves to be) immigrant also led the way in intensifying such systems of social control.

2.4 The Supernatural

Though the present sketch attempts to keep a critical distance from the attitudes and values which are visible in extant texts, it is impossible to ignore the effects on the development of Greek societies which derived from the force and powers attributed near-universally by Greeks to the supernatural. Already well developed and mature in our earliest extant texts, and probably inherited in part from the Late Bronze Age, a complex theological framework had grown up to envelop and explain the forces which operated in the natural world. As in most such systems, gods were seen as the fount of such forces, so that ways of gaining their attention and benevolence were essential. Though the topic cannot be explored in detail here, four aspects of it are seminal.

The first, inherent in any theology which accommodates a number of gods, is the degree to which gods were imagined as individuals with distinct (though overlapping) zones of primary influence. Inevitably with any acephalous system shaped through time by countless individual human decisions and preferences, the distinctions were untidy and fluid, so that while overarching powers in sky, land, sea, and underground, or in the afterlife were attributed to some major deities, and while other gods had powers especially in particular areas of human or natural life, yet others (particularly Athene and Hera) might be nearer to being envisaged as all-purpose protectors of particular communities. To complicate matters further, there are clear cases both of convergence and of gods gaining or losing prominence in proportion as their special area of imputed power became more or less socially important: the emergence of Asklepios as the specific healing god, or of Apollo as the 'patron saint' of oracles and of *nomos* ('due order'), are palmary examples.

The second aspect is (again) spatial. Whatever its origins, which are much debated, there emerged during the EIA a convention that gods were best worshipped, addressed, and honoured in specific locations which one or more of a variety of signs had singled out as appropriate.⁵⁹ Their emergence might form a pattern, as with former Mycenaean palace sites or with the sea-girt promontories (Sounion, Calauria, Tainaron, etc) which gave privileged access to Poseidon as god of the sea. They might reflect the presence of other natural features such as caves, springs, or groves, or might preserve the memory of an epiphany, a dream, or a lightning-strike. In these and other ways there emerged a sacred landscape of cult-spots and sanctuaries which served human needs and purposes and therefore became places of resort, pilgrimage, and even assembly. Here again the model needs to accommodate different trajectories of

development, contingent upon location. As a first approximation one may distinguish between those cult-spots which lay clearly within the territory occupied by a first- or second-order community and those which lay outside its control or interest. The former could come to be controlled, exploited, and adorned by the members of that community, creating thereby a set of loosely co-ordinated cults and festivals which might differ substantially from the set generated within a neighbouring community while nonetheless retaining a strong family resemblance. The local cohesion thus created was further cemented by the emergence of local calendars whose month-names reflected the rhythms of the agro-pastoral year and its commemorative festivals and varied from one community to the next. Such multiplex cohesion went far to assist the crystallization of senses of 'civic' identity, to comprise thereby what has become known as '*polis* religion',⁶⁰ and to channel energy and material resources towards the expansion and elaboration of sanctuaries.

Other cult-spots, however, might lie elsewhere, in wildernesses, in marginal lands, or on the boundaries between ecological zones, or might be felt to be the property of a group which traced its ancestry back to the deity concerned. Such spots might come to provide complementary functions. Since both they and those who travelled to and from them could be deemed to be under the protection of the god, they came to offer safe neutral territory, whether for intercession with the god, or for festivals, contests, feasting, social networking, competitive display, and assembly. Especially if they were well sited in an accessible location (principally by sea), they could become valued central places. It is no accident that the populations of human landscapes formed by a number of primary communities of roughly equal size came to use them as centres, whether periodically or continuously: salient examples among many are the sanctuaries of Demeter at Anthela near Themopylai for the 'dwellers round' the Malian gulf (hence the word *Amphiktyones*), that of Apollo at Thermos for the scattered valley cantons of Aitolia, that of Apollo at Delos for the Ionic Cyclades, or that of Apollo at Triopion for the six Dorian states of south-western Anatolia.⁶¹ This mode of articulation and linkage thus yielded two kinds of second-order formation, the so-called *ethnē*, composed of a number of small primary communities, and the Amphictyonies, which typically came to have larger members (whether nucleated second-order *poleis* or *ethnē*) drawn from a rather wider geographical range.

A third aspect, equally spatial and equally to do with cult, contributed even more radically to the Greek political map of the late archaic period. Three routes of its influence have to be factored into the model. The first was the product of the attractiveness which a

particular sanctuary might come to have because of the power which the deity concerned was deemed to have in this or that arena of life. Classic examples, already prominent in or by the seventh century BC, are Eleusis with its cult of Demeter as the patron goddess of cereal fertility, Ephesos with its cult of a multifunctional Artemis, or Delphi with its cult of an Apollo who offered both verbally explicit oracles and the authoritative patronage of social order. There were many others. Such a sanctuary needed services, such as building construction and maintenance, the supply of animals for sacrifice, or the feeding and housing of pilgrims and visitors, and therefore became at least an agro-town on its own account. If no one neighbour was powerful enough to extend 'protection' over it, it enjoyed effective independence, becoming a temple-state. Ephesos did, and long remained so; Eleusis came into the orbit of Athens; Delphi, in ways utterly obscured from us by subsequent mythologizing, was detached from the Corinthian orbit and came under the protection of the (largely Thessalian) Amphictyony of Anthela. This is not to claim that a temple-town necessarily became a temple-state, for virtually all polities came to see the advantages of hosting a sanctuary whose god and cult attracted pilgrims and visitors. It is rather to claim that the balance of forces made certain polities more likely, and more able, than others to keep a distance from power-politics and to be seen above all as the custodian of the interests of the god in question.

The second route also stemmed from the attractiveness of sanctuaries, but this time also from the emergence of nucleated towns (see section 2.5 below), from the enhanced human resources which they might therefore command, and from individual or collective ambitions to expand areas of control. Amid such expansion, sanctuaries with their prestige, centrality, and opportunities for display before a more than domestic clientele were a prime target. The principal case study has been the sanctuary of Hera in the Argolid, located between the primary communities of Mycenae and Tiryns on the eastern edge of the Argive plain but taken over by Argos at a debated but early date and firmly linked to Argos by what became the classic expedients: architectural investment, appointment of the priestess, and a ceremonial procession between sanctuary and town.⁶² A second sanctuary of Hera, this time on Samos, had the same experience, as did Didyma further to the south on the Anatolian coast, somehow brought under the control of Miletus.⁶³ So also did Eleusis, represented as being wholly on its own in the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* but later (and perhaps already) Athenian, with the entry to its sanctuary reoriented to face Athens,⁶⁴ while Dion had become both a *polis* and the principal sanctuary of the kingdom of Macedonia well before the Graeco-Persian Wars.⁶⁵ Such developments have proved

very hard to date, probably because they were not ‘events’ so much as gradual intensifications and reorientations, managed by oracles and personalities. Furthermore, insofar as they provided stability and an enlarged presence on a real or a mental map, they were mostly beneficial to both parties, and went far to shape the political map of Old Greece: as the sad later history of the sanctuary of Zeus at Nemea shows, victim of a three-way tug-of-war between Argos, Cleonai, and Corinth,⁶⁶ it was better to be swallowed by one predator than be torn apart by three.

The third route is visible also in Colonial Greece: the deliberate fostering of sanctuaries as boundary-markers or as potential exchange-points on major routes. Examples of the first category are those created at the northern, southern, and eastern limits of the plain taken over by the colonists of Poseidonia,⁶⁷ while the second category probably includes the temple of Apollo at Bassai, located as it is at the eastern edge of the territory of Phigaleia but overlooking the path between Messenia and Olympia, as well as the age-old sanctuary of Apollo at Abai on the road from the plain of Phokis to the nearest coast and that at Ano Mazaraki in the mountains of Achaia.

There remains a fourth general aspect, probably the most important of all. Even aside from the primordial roles which sanctuaries, festivals, and rituals fulfilled in the lives of individuals, families, and communities, they unwittingly generated a role for those communities themselves, for they all needed ‘management’ and ‘managers’. The terminology is anachronistic, but the challenge was not: decisions had spasmodically to be taken, resources had to be identified and levied from the population, cult personnel had to be chosen, premises (however basic) had to be looked after, rules of behaviour had to be enforced, new cults had to be accommodated on the ground and in the calendar, tensions between the devotees of rival cults had to be eased, and so on. These demands were ongoing and peremptory: every community had to have some sort of management system to deal with them. Alkinoos’ structure at Scherie (section 1.3 above) provides one model: no doubt there were others. Indeed, it is not too much to claim that the needs generated by the force and powers attributed to the supernatural contributed substantially to the shapes and remit of the various polities which emerged in and from the Greek EIA.

2.5 Convertible Resources

The gifts which Odysseus received on his departure from Scherie were not just tokens: they consisted of concentrated and portable wealth.⁶⁸

One may view them within two very different registers. One is their social context in the poet's world, where for Alkinoos and his fellow *basilēes* their gifts were an aspect of the obligations imposed by the conventions of hospitality. That did not make them a one-way transaction, for such gifts had invisible strings attached even if the return might be long-delayed, might concern other persons, and might involve benefits other than material objects: but the poet does not choose here (as he does elsewhere) to pursue such chains of reciprocity. The other is the economic register proper, for if we leave aside their unreal scale, and consider them simply as objects, each with its own individual history, they are the result of several sequences of productive processes. The first is the primary production of (mostly agrarian) commodities. Some of them, such as the gifts of clothing, had been transformed locally and domestically, reflecting a society wherein 'there is no reason to doubt that most forms of economic endeavour were local and related to personal subsistence'.⁶⁹ Others however had been acquired, that is, by exchanging items of household production directly or indirectly for them. One must therefore envisage a second set of productive processes, namely (for the objects mentioned by the poet) those of finding and mining metal ores, precious or otherwise, of smelting them or refining them into more or less pure form, and of transforming the raw metal into craftsman-made objects. Acquisition procedures have then to follow which transport them into the storerooms of the *basilēes*. They may be internal to the population of the community, or they may have involved a chain of transactions which extended over long distances: though the source of the copper component of the bronze tripods and cauldrons may have lain comparatively close at hand, the tin certainly began its journey far away from Greece.

Since, as in all societies, objects of use or ornament were the main goal, the challenge lies in adequately envisaging the range of modes implicit in the phrase 'acquisition procedures'. One, already alluded to, was production-and-use by the self-sufficient household, whether on the small scale portrayed by Hesiod or from the larger holdings that are implied in later literary sources and have to be postulated in any case for horse-breeding. A second was transfer, whether from slave or serf labour or from share-cropping tenants to a landlord, or by redistribution through contributions to communal consumption and cultic or princely feasting, or by levies of the kind proclaimed by Alkinoos. A third, again well illustrated in epic and later legend,⁷⁰ was violent and predatory behaviour by land and sea. Other modes, however, involved systems of outreach and exchange, all the more certainly when the extant but indirect evidence for them (mostly ceramic) is found in, or comes from, regions which lay far beyond the

direct politico-military reach of any patron, landowner, or dynast that can be envisaged for EIA Greece and when each commodity—fish, salt, iron, wood, ivory, amber, silver—required a different pattern of acquisition from a different region or regions. It is fortunately unnecessary to broach the unending debate about the specificities of those systems of outreach and exchange: what matters is to register, first, the level of energy which was displayed by participants, secondly the distances eventually involved throughout the Mediterranean and beyond, and thirdly the economic institutions which were evolved or adopted in order to facilitate and manage transits and exchanges. Though, as reflected in the ever-changing debate over the finds from the north Syrian port of Al Mina at the mouth of the Orontes,⁷¹ the ethnic identities of the participants in such exchange systems cannot be inferred from artefacts but only (and with caution) from the languages used in the scattered epigraphic evidence that later appeared, Greek participation eventually came to predominate, no doubt assisted by whatever eclipse of Tyre lies behind Ezekiel 27. Greeks came therefore to be in a position to assemble the knowledge of the Mediterranean littoral and its potential for exchange and colonization which is already reflected in the *Odyssey*. Whether driven by profit-seeking merchants themselves, by customers in Old Greece with surpluses of primary produce available to exchange for exotica, or by a desire on the part of communities or individuals to acquire land as the one immovable commodity, the Greek outreach across the Mediterranean from the later EIA into the archaic period and beyond comprises one of the most remarkable and sustained exercises of targeted social energy that the region has ever known, creating a set of route-based economies⁷² and networks that went a long way towards defining the culture of the entire Mediterranean.⁷³

2.6 Memory, Imagination, and a Sense of Identity

The sixth and final source of energy to be sketched is the most nebulous but yet the most pervasive, for it will have continually affected all members of every community in EIA Greece. It is perhaps also the hardest for those of us who live in fully literate societies to embrace conceptually and even emotionally, for it involves imagining what it would be like to have one complex core skill (reading and writing) wholly absent from the mind and replaced by another, the developed use of memory. It is therefore appropriate to begin this section⁷⁴ by citing a shrewd observer's portrayal of a group of men who had that developed skill. 'Few of the old men could write or read,

those in middle age found reading hard and writing a grind; the young were defter penmen, but [...] were not advanced in the craft [...]. A by-product of this scholastic void was a universal gift for lively and original talk: the flow and style of their discourse were unhindered by the self-consciousness which hobbles and hamstring the rest of us. They had astonishing memories. These often reached back to their great-grandfathers' day, and by hearsay, far beyond. In an island of long lives, this made all the past seem recent: compelling proof of the continuity of history.⁷⁵ Thus Leigh Fermor, vividly recalling his Cretan colleagues in the Resistance after 1941 but also reminding us of how in a near-illiterate echelon even of a literate society memory performs the essential function of selecting and shaping the past. It is no guarantee of accuracy, of course: a consideration which perpetually presents the would-be historian of ancient Greece with telescoped genealogies⁷⁶ and with myths and legends, stories and foundation-narratives, which have undergone various processes of modification and can neither be ignored nor safely re-historicized. It will be otiose here to do more than to signal the role played by the Homeric epics: reflected in representations from the later eighth century BC onwards but with deep roots in previous centuries, their half-real, half-unreal world was a quintessential amalgamation of memory and imagination. It took centuries for that world to lose its status as the common history of the collective of all who spoke Greek, and indeed it gained that status in the first place because, as always, the past is shaped in memory by its utility for the present. All that the historian can do is to recognize memory (both that of individuals and that of collectives) as an emic creative force.

Moreover, memory shapes space as well as time. Just as the men of Scherie are presented authorially as having previously lived in a specific region,⁷⁷ or as later overseas settlements fostered a memory of their city (or cities) of origin, so too traditions of earlier migrations, often located in time with reference to the Trojan War, created overlapping and disarticulated mental maps of long-distance land- and seascapes. Closer to hand, the numinousness of natural and man-made features—especially caves and springs and mountain tops, or the abandoned monuments of the Mycenaean past—permitted the emergence or recreation of *lieux de mémoire*:⁷⁸ if a few sanctuaries such as that of Apollo at Abai in Phokis enjoyed continuous use from the LBA into the EIA and beyond, latter-day unilateral action reused tholos tombs as places of cult, imitated 'Cyclopean' walling, and interpreted a 'small rise in the ground' at Olympia as the tumulus of Pelops,⁷⁹ thereby helping to fill out (or cut across) whatever routes of movement by land and sea had been generated by the other forms of energy sketched above (sections 2.4 and 2.5).

If the effect of memory was thus to create or preserve lines of linkage in time and place, it was quite otherwise with that of collective senses of identity and ethnicity.⁸⁰ Here above all our use of the term ‘Greece’ is dangerously anachronistic, for the Homeric term ‘Achaioi’ no longer applied in real life outside a small coastal region on the northern fringe of Peloponnese.⁸¹ So, too, the various transcriptions of ‘Iaones’ used in Akkadian and other Levantine documents from the mid-eighth century onwards were primarily an etic term,⁸² and only very gradually and belatedly did the the issue of ‘Who is Greek?’ take shape among Greek speakers with the expanded use of the term ‘Hellenes’ and the issue of access to high-status crown contests. On the one occasion when we are told the issue arose (so late c.500),⁸³ Herodotus’ story has it resolved in terms of descent and emigration: however accurate or embroidered the story, its emphasis on descent reflected a core instinct among Greek speakers, even if they might also be aware of the ingenious ways in which poets and other myth-makers could manipulate and extend it.

The danger is therefore not just terminological but also historical, that of retrojecting into the EIA and the archaic period the instincts of ‘Greek’ commonality which are reflected in Herodotus. True, regional levels of commonality-by-descent are visible enough, especially those which were articulated in terms of the ethnic terms ‘Iaones’, ‘Dorieis’, and ‘Aioleis’, since both ‘Iaones’ and ‘Dorieis’ were articulated in terms of subgroups whose names are widely attested across region after region⁸⁴ and must reflect EIA practices of social cohesion, whatever they were, as well as the obvious distinctions of dialect. Yet, aspects of material culture such as the ten regional pottery styles identified in Coldstream’s classic study, or the various versions of the Phoenician alphabet as used for Greek, are more localized, just as the radii of attraction even of sanctuaries of wider appeal cut across such ‘ethnic’ boundaries. Even so, the most radical rebuttal of commonality consists of the sheer number of nucleated settlements which spread across, and drastically extended, the post-Mycenaean world: not just those called *poleis* in ancient or modern terminology, but also those in their hundreds which came to be first-order settlements of the kind illustrated above (section 1.3). Even if force and statecraft, as deployed in this landscape or that by ‘the exceptional individual’ or social group, were able to create and maintain a structure of segmentation and subordination (whether as *polis* or *ethnos* or monarchy), it is striking how widely personal and collective identity came to be articulated in terms of such first-order communities.⁸⁵

2.7 Towards the Emergence and Consolidation of the *Polis*-State

Throughout this chapter, its text has focused on the ‘pre-civic’, and the word ‘citizenship’ has barely appeared. That was deliberate, and requires explanation. Twenty years ago, for the third edition of *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, I provided for the lemma ‘Citizenship, Greek’ a text which began ‘Greek citizenship stemmed from the fusion of two distinct but related elements, (a) the notion of the individual state as a “thing” with boundaries, an ongoing existence, and a power of decision, and (b) the notion of its inhabitants participating in its life as joint proprietors.’ Though it survives unchanged in the fourth edition,⁸⁶ and though I do not repudiate that formulation, I now see it as inadequate: partly because it seriously underplayed the elements of commensality and cult community that other contributions to this volume (e.g. Blok, Ismard, Whitley) rightly highlight, but mainly because it did not delve far enough back into the roots of social action and was therefore still ‘Newtonian’ in its applicability. Both for that reason and because of the need to accommodate the social trajectories which shaped the non-*polis* polities of late archaic and classical Greece, it was therefore essential to hold in abeyance one’s knowledge of the developed notion of ‘citizenship’ as set out by Alain Duplouy in this volume ([chapter 1](#)), and instead to attempt to identify the principal forces that generated its emergence.

That process was neither inevitable, nor linear, nor uniform: as the variety of terms used to designate such ‘joint proprietors’ reveals,⁸⁷ it reflected an array of competing focuses. They ranged⁸⁸ from ‘honour’ (*entimos* or *epitimos*, and their contrary *atimos*) through physical capability (Cretan *dromeus*), utility to the community (*chrestos*, and its contrary *akrestos*), location in a nucleated settlement (*astos*), or familial dependency (*etēs*), to the term which came to prevail (*politēs*, *poliatas*), perhaps preferred precisely because of the ambiguity of the word *polis*. Yet at bottom, as adumbrated in section 2.1 above, the process also reflected an absence, or rather two successive absences. The first has aroused remark for over a century, viz. the total erosion of the power over human and natural resources which had been wielded from the Mycenaean palaces (whether by kings or by others is here immaterial). In the wake of that erosion, and of the evident inability even of powerful men or families to recreate it,⁸⁹ one has to envisage the territories occupied by Greek speakers in (say) the mid-tenth century BC as being devoid of authority and imposed order. Willy-nilly, therefore, in face of that absence of ‘top-down’ power the social and political space of most of Greece came to be filled by the growing multitude of first-order ‘village’ communities. Each of them perforce both created its own internal social order, via the interaction

of the six ‘bottom-up’ forms of force and social energy which I have tried to identify, and responded to whatever pressures and opportunities might impinge on them from within wider, intrinsically anarchic and predatory regional contexts.

However, a second, much less obvious absence has also to be factored into the meta-narrative. Even if it be conceded that behind the complex myth of ‘the return of the Heracleidai’ lay some memory of historical invasion (whether the ‘Dorian invasion’⁹⁰ or not), mainland Greece and the Aegean were not exposed to the reality of invasion, or even (so far as we know) to the threat of it, for the best part of five hundred years. Put simply, EIA Greece was not worth invading, for its few marketable products could be acquired via traders and its prime resource comprised heavy-armed infantrymen who were free movers and could be bought. It took the start of the silverization of eastern Mediterranean economies for the territorial acquisition of argentiferous areas such as Thrace and southern Attica to become attractive. Even then, as the prospect of Persian invasion gradually became more and more real, though various loose regional hegemonies were beginning to take shape,⁹¹ and though the *Iliad* offered a portrayal of a combined ‘Achaian’ force which would have been known to all Greeks, it took decades before an approximation to that force took shape in autumn 481. Hitherto, throughout the entire formative period of the core Greek-speaking zone, there had been no need for a suzerain or other entity to lead a defence or to exercise power—fiscal, legal, military, or charismatic—over any extended area. In consequence, any such potential elevation of the power of ‘the exceptional individual’ to exert social energy over a wider landscape had simply been militarily unnecessary, so that attempts to do so (as reflected, however distortedly, in our extant narratives about Pheidon of Argos and various tyrant dynasties) could be seen as usurpation. Other forms of force and energy had therefore a freer field of interaction via innumerable variations and combinations. No one case is well enough documented in the earth, let alone textually, to permit a ‘narrative’: all we can do is to attempt to devise a plausible model.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The vicissitudes which this chapter has encountered are set out in Davies 2011, 15 n. 1. All that needs repetition here is my very warm thanks, firstly to the editors of the present volume for their understanding, forbearance, and helpful comments; secondly to colleagues in Liverpool and Copenhagen for their comments and encouragement; and thirdly to Mario Lombardo and Flavia Frisone for

their willingness to carry an interim version in Lombardo and Frisone 2011. I am also most grateful to James Whitley for valuable conversation and for early sight of Whitley 2017.

¹ Demand 2011, 248–9 briefly reviews other recent literature that develops a modelling approach; add Luke 2003, 3–4, and (in a different sense) Étienne 2010, ch. 5 ‘Moteurs et modèles’.

² Runciman 1982 and 1990.

³ The list presented in Davies 2011, 15 n. 2 can already be lengthened: conspectus in Davies 2016.

⁴ Snodgrass 1980, 15–48, substantially modified by Morris 1987, 72–109, with Snodgrass 2006, viii and 198–220 and especially Bresson 2016, 41–70.

⁵ General overview in Scheidel 2007.

⁶ Major contributions include Hordern and Purcell 2000; Grove and Rackham 2001; Harris 2005; Demand 2011; Broodbank 2013; and Bresson 2016.

⁷ Osborne 2009, 106–23, with 346–7.

⁸ Evidence and discussion in Hansen 1998, 14–34.

⁹ *Imprimis* by Gawantka 1985, with Kinzl 1988 and the summary in Sakellariou 1989, 27–57.

¹⁰ Smith 2003; Yoffee 2005; Whitley 2017.

¹¹ ‘Secondary’, both because the EIA populations of Greece lived amongst the tangible remains of earlier polities and because some knowledge of other contemporary polities, especially those of the Levant, cannot have been wholly absent.

¹² The relevant chapters in Hansen 2000a are an education in themselves.

¹³ This formulation deliberately repudiates classification in terms of Weberian ideal types, an approach which has been grossly unhelpful for decades.

¹⁴ The earlier use of the term ‘tribe’ was effectively demolished by Bourriot 1976 and Roussel 1976; later developments are surveyed in Davies 1996b and Snodgrass 2006, 198–9. The model of a ‘loosely articulated chiefdom system [...] slowly advancing towards more complex economic and political relations’, extensively used by Donlan (cf. especially Donlan 1999: citation from p. viii) is similarly vulnerable (cf. Yoffee 2005, 22–31). Its basic ‘big man’ component is recognizable enough (see below, section 2.1) but cannot by itself generate state formation (thus also Demand 2011, 248–9, citing Small 1998).

¹⁵ One may compare the current populations of the two smallest and most isolated British Dependent Territories, Tristan da Cunha (c.277) and Pitcairn (45) (figures from *Whitaker’s Almanac* 2008, 1060–1). As recent events have shown, in the absence of accessible exogamy the latter is barely viable.

¹⁶ The dedication of this chapter honours both an old friend and the insight of the scholar whose recognition of the primordial role of the village in the Greek EIA, already signalled explicitly by Thucydides (1.5.1; 1.10.2), was set out in various papers of the 1970s. I gratefully thank Nicky Coldstream for granting her permission.

¹⁷ That is to see them as human settlements first and foremost, and only secondarily as components of second-, third-, or (in the case of Attica) fourth-order polities. Details for Attica in Whitehead 1986 and Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 624–42, especially 626 (Hansen); for Euboea, Knoepfler 1997 and Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 643–63 (Reber et al.).

¹⁸ Details in Roy 1999; Roy 2002; Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 489–91 (Roy).

¹⁹ Cf. Shipley 1997 and Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 569–98 (Shipley).

²⁰ Votokopoulou 1986.

- 21 Popham et al. 1979–80; 1993; Popham and Lemos 1996; Lemos 2006.
- 22 E.g. Skala Oropou (AR 53 [2006–7] 9); sites in the Mantinike (Hodkinson and Hodkinson 1981; Moggi 1991); the pre-700 sites ringing the later site of Gortyn (Cucuzza 1997).
- 23 The name is used authorially at *Od.* 5.34, 6.8, 7.79, and 13.160, but noticeably never by the Phaiakians themselves.
- 25 For the argument, Vidal-Naquet 1970. Quotation at 1296 (= 1973, 291 = 1981, 67).
- 24 Thus by implication Morgan & Coulton 1997, 129, but their focus on the physical evidence for the *polis* complements rather than confutes the identification of the human needs and drives which are the concern of the present chapter.
- 26 This portrayal owes much to van Wees 1992, 28–39.
- 27 Line-references in this paragraph are to his *Works and Days*, with West 1978.
- 28 But one which was at some later stage fortified (Frederiksen 2011, 12 n. 42, with references). For its location, Snodgrass 1985; 1990, 132–6 (= 2006, 462–6).
- 29 This section was drafted independently of Wallace 2009, which (gratifyingly) it closely echoes.
- 30 The words used here deliberately both leave on one side the debate whether archaic Greece had ‘genuine’ ‘kings’ (cf. Drews 1983, with Carlier’s riposte (1984, 503 ff.), Barcelò 1993, and Morris 2003) and attempt (against Starr 1961) to render their ostensible disappearance less mysterious.
- 31 The classic portrait of legitimation is *Iliad* 12.310–21, the best physical memorial being now the chariot burial at Lefkandi (Mazarakis Ainian 1997, 48–57; Thomas and Conant 1999, 85–114).
- 32 ML 2 = Fornara 13 no. 11 = *Nomima* I, no. 81 = Gagarin & Perlman 2016, 200 Dr.1, with extensive bibliography.
- 33 Details in Davies 2003.
- 34 Thuc. 6.16. Further references in Bowra 1964, 188. Attempts such as those of Agesilaos (Xen. *Ages.* 9.6–7; Plut. *Ages.* 20.1) to subvert the force of the link had no more success than Xenophanes’ critique over a century earlier (*fr.* 2 West).
- 35 *IG* I³ 131.11.
- 36 Exhaustive treatment of the topic in Wilson 2000.
- 37 Applied to Leonidas’ last-ditch defence force at Thermopylae in 480, the Spartan *hippeis* (MacDowell 1986, 67), the Theban Sacred Band (Plut. *Pelop.* 18.1), and a resistance force at Phleious in 379 (Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.22).
- 38 Helly 1995, 131–91; Morgan 2003, *passim*; Archibald 2013, 42–5.
- 39 Hansen 2006, 19–56 for discussion and bibliography.
- 40 Osborne 2009, 66–75 with 343–4, and now Bresson 2016, 41–70.
- 41 ‘Basic’: i.e. without supplementation from marine and lacustrine sources and taking no account of the negotiable proceeds of non-agrarian production.
- 42 For some reason the debate has assumed endogenous growth and has taken very little account of possible immigration. Yet the presence of individual Phoenician or North Syrian craftsmen has been inferred (Kopcke 1992; Röllig 1992; Kourou 2003; Kourou 2004), a Phoenician settlement at Kommos on the south coast of Crete is virtually certain (Shaw 1989), and the slave-trade as managed by Phoenicians and others will have yielded unquantifiable real-life counterparts of Odysseus’ swine-herd Eumaios (*Od.* 15.403–84). I leave aside the vast evidence for cultural contact (Szemerényi 1974; Burkert 1992; West 1997).
- 43 Snodgrass 2006, *passim*, esp. 445–78.
- 44 Sources in Parke and Wormell 1956: I 51–5 and (fuller) in Mari 1999.
- 45 Hdt. 4.150–67, with ML 5 and Osborne 2009, 8–15.
- 46 E.g. the regulations about easements attested at Gortyn (*IC* IV 43 Bb, 46 B 6–14, and 52).

- 47 *Iliad* 2.362–3, with Andrewes 1961.
- 48 Details of this segmentation process in Davies 1996b.
- 49 Wide-range surveys in Damgaard Andersen et al. 1997 and Osborne and Cunliffe 2005; detailed studies in Kourou 2009 and Gounaris 2009; update in Fachard 2015–16.
- 50 In general, Lang 1996; Polignac 2005; Frederiksen 2011, 99–120, especially for walled settlements (some scepticism expressed by Papadopoulos 2012).
- 51 References in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1162a (Perlman) and Davies 2005a, 158.
- 52 References at Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 379 (Freitag, Funke and Moustakis).
- 53 Wide-ranging survey for Greece in Werlings 2010: a detailed sketch of parallel phenomena in other EIA cultures cannot be attempted here.
- 54 The debate, reaching back to Granier 1931, is summarized by Hatzopoulos 1996, 261–79.
- 55 Detailed survey in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 794–809 (Hatzopoulos with Paschidis); Archibald 2013, *passim*.
- 56 Plut. *Lyc.* 6.1 and 6.8; *Nomima* I, no. 61, with commentary and select bibliography: add Werlings 2010, 214–21. The reported amendment, ‘But if the people should choose crooked, the elders and *archagetai* are to be *apostateres*’, does not seem to have adversely affected the sharing of *de facto* power.
- 57 Elements of this section were originally prepared for the entry ‘Social organization, Greek’ in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Ancient Greece and Rome* and are reused here (with modifications) by permission. Copyright © 2010 by Oxford University Press Inc.
- 58 Detailed exposition in Davies 1997.
- 59 This section too parallels Polignac 1995a, but was also composed independently.
- 60 Sourvinou-Inwood 1988; 1990.
- 61 In general, Tausend 1992; for that of Anthela-Delphi in particular, Lefèvre 1998 and Sánchez 2001.
- 62 Specifics in Hall 1997a, 67–110; general theory in Polignac 1995a.
- 63 References in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1083 no. 854 (Rubinstein).
- 64 Richardson 1974, 6–9.
- 65 References in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 800–1 no. 534 (Hatzopoulos and Paschidis); Archibald 2013, 61–2.
- 66 Perlman 2000, 131–49.
- 67 Pedley 1990, 18 fig. 6 and 98 fig. 60.
- 68 *Inter alia*, clothing, gold ornaments, and a large tripod and a cauldron from ‘each of us’ (presumably the twelve *basilēes*) (*Od.* 13.10–14). Van Wees 1992, 228–37 unpacks the social pressures involved.
- 69 Archibald 2013, 28.
- 70 And probably in tangible form too, a threat from piracy being widely seen as the stimulus of some early fortification systems in the Aegean.
- 71 Summary in Luke 2003; Osborne 2009, 105–6.
- 72 I gratefully adopt the concept of ‘route-based economies’ from Sherratt 2001.
- 73 Broodbank 2013 paints the broader picture of such Mediterranean-wide interactions.
- 74 It owes much to Luraghi 2008, especially 6–14 (‘Ethnicity and memory’).
- 75 Leigh Fermor 1966, 131; a later page (136) records their ability to recall and recite the entire text of *Erotokritos*. The literature on oral memory is naturally extensive: aperçu and references in Thomas 1992, 15–26.
- 76 Alkinoos’ (above, section 1.3) is an extreme example: the tradition about the tyrant Critias’ family (Davies 1971, 324–5) shows a more understandable degree of

telescoping.

⁷⁷ In *euruchoros Hupereia* (Od. 6.4, no doubt fictional: ‘broad-spaced Overland’ (Stanford)).

⁷⁸ As evidenced, for example, by several uses of it in Low et al. 2012 (e.g. 1 and 78–80), the title of Nora 1984–92 has become a technical term.

⁷⁹ Coldstream 1976; Antonaccio 1995, *passim*; Whitley 2001, 150–6 (‘the uses of the past’).

⁸⁰ This is not the place to adjudicate the very different emphases visible in recent discussions, e.g. Morgan 1992; Hall 1997a; 2002; Malkin 2005; Luraghi 2008; Gardner et al. 2014, 2–4.

⁸¹ Its invocation by Cleomenes as a *paraklausithyron* at the barred gates of the Athenian Acropolis (Hdt. 5.72.3) was a political resuscitation.

⁸² References in Hall 2002, 70.

⁸³ In a debate about the eligibility of King Alexandros I Philhellen [sic] to compete at Olympia (Hdt. 5.22). That date and historicity are debated matters little; the symbolism is what matters.

⁸⁴ Davies 1996b, 612–16.

⁸⁵ And how many invested in fortification, whether for protection or for prestige, if Frederiksen 2011 is right in the scale of the evidence he detected.

⁸⁶ Davies 2012.

⁸⁷ Davies 2004; Blok 2005.

⁸⁸ For reasons set out in Davies 2004, 28, I omit *homoios* and *demotes*. Comparable however to the array listed in the text, and irrespective of whether each term reflected a real role or not, were the terms adopted by post-Solonian Athens to denote its status-classes: income (*pentakosiomedimnos*), military (*hippeus*), agrarian (*zeugites*), and social dependent (*thes*).

⁸⁹ Cf. now Bresson 2016, 97–102.

⁹⁰ Reviews of the various facets of the tradition in Musti 1985; Schnapp-Gourbeillon 2002, 132–59; and (very sceptically) Osborne 2009, 47–51.

⁹¹ *Imprimis* Sparta’s links with other Peloponnesian states, the scattered *epikrateia* which the Corinthians had created, or Thessalian preponderance within the Amphictyony of Anthela/Delphi.

3

Retracing Steps

Finding Ways into Archaic Greek Citizenship

Josine Blok

In a fragment of elegiac poetry attributed to the Athenian lawgiver Solon, the speaker claims:

And I brought back to Athens, to their homeland founded by the gods, many who had been sold, one justly, the other unjustly, and those who had fled under necessity's constraint, no longer speaking the Attic tongue, as wanderers far and wide are inclined to do. And those who suffered shameful slavery right here, trembling before the whims of their masters, I set free.¹

Although we cannot tell for sure whether Solon was really the author of these lines, included in the *Athēnaiōn Politeia*'s account of Solon's legislation, it is highly likely.² The situation this passage describes must certainly belong to the archaic age. In the classical era, no Athenian could be a slave to another nor be sold as such abroad.³ But tradition recalled that once matters had been very different and the landmark change was attributed to Solon. What interests us here are the implications of this passage. As Josiah Ober and Philip Manville argue, by these measures Solon created the elementary rights of citizenship: he made the whole *polis* responsible for the freedom of all the citizens, laying the foundation for the political participation that was to evolve over time.⁴ But these rights—if such we may call them—could not be created from scratch. Solon could envisage and carry out these measures only if a more or less general notion existed of who was an Athenian, that is, a member of the community such as to be redeemed, and if he could draw on a prevalent sentiment that these

Athenians ought not to be slaves, but free. The Athenians Solon thus meant to save and protect were presumably all peasants; at least, they did not belong to the classes who had access to political office, *in casu* the archonships, neither before nor after him. In sum, underlying Solon's regulations for Athenian citizenship in the domain of lawgiving and political office was another form of citizenship, a strong notion of Athens as a community of free citizens with obligations towards each other, however high or humble they might be.

This passage of Solonian poetry and the situation to which it refers exemplify the leading question of this volume: how are we to conceptualize citizenship in Greek *poleis*, such as were typical of the archaic age, where political office was restricted to a small, male elite? In my contribution, I will first look somewhat more into the problem itself. What exactly do we wish the notion 'citizenship' to explain and what means do we have for finding answers? To that end, I shall draw attention to citizenship in the sense of 'community' and to forms of participation other than in political office.

1. What Kind of Citizenship are we Looking For?

The situation that a *polis* consisted of citizens, some of whom had access to political office and many, namely all the female citizens and often numerous male citizens, had not, was normal in the archaic age, but it was also very common in the classical era. Participation in political office, therefore, was not the defining feature of citizenship in ancient Greece. Aristotle knew this very well. In the section at the beginning of book 3 of the *Politics* where he seeks to establish a definition of a citizen of a *polis*, he famously states that a *politēs* is he who possesses the right to share in bouleutic and judicial office in a *polis*, and that a *polis* is a group of such people that is sufficient to maintain independence of life.⁵

In this passage, however, Aristotle explicitly makes a distinction between his own definition, which is to support his overall argument in the *Politics*, and what the Greeks do in reality, which is defining a citizen as someone born from one or two parents of citizen status. Indeed, in contemporary Greek discourse a *politēs* meant 'someone belonging to a *polis*' but one could not tell from the word itself whether or not this citizen had access to political office. It was therefore necessary for Aristotle to coin his own meaning of this word, in distinction from common Greek usage, and that is what he does in this passage. In his own ideal *polis*, only a limited section of the citizen body was to be involved in political office; he labels these the *politai*,

in line with his own definition, but leaves the question as to what the free citizens of the *polis* without political participation are to be called, in the dark.⁶

That citizenship in ancient Greece was tantamount to political participation is, therefore, a misunderstanding that we need to replace by a conception that does justice to the realities of the Greek *poleis*. A notion enabling us to cast our net more adequately is offered by political scientist Will Kymlicka: ‘citizenship is intimately linked to liberal ideas of individual rights and entitlements on the one hand, and to communitarian ideas of membership in and attachment to a particular community on the other’.⁷ For ancient Greece, the notion of ‘rights’ had better be exchanged, with some exceptions, for ‘effective claims’ *vel sim.*, but with this modification his conception is an adequate guide to find our way into Greek citizenship, including that of the archaic age. Once we appreciate that the two parts of citizenship, community and participation, are both distinct and connected, the differences between modern and pre-modern, including archaic Greek, forms of citizenship may be better understood. In the Western democracies today, the connection between both parts is very tight, cast in the principle of equality both in civil law (community) and in entitlements to participation. All citizens belonging to the community today can be politically active citizens, a situation that makes it difficult to appreciate the distinction between the two tiers. In democratic Athens, where all male Athenians were (ideally) politically active citizens on a principle of equality, at least after 450, the distinction between political and communitarian citizenship likewise would seem virtually non-existent, at least for men.⁸ Yet citizenship regimes based on political inequality can be understood as forms of citizenship nonetheless.⁹ In the Dutch Republic of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for instance, magistrates were selected from an elite by means varying from town to town, but usually forms of indirect election and co-optation. Checks and balances amongst the governing bodies prevented power coalescing into too few hands. Participation by a wider section of the citizen body was effectuated by venues for making requests to the town council, by pressure through bodies such as guilds, civic militias, and neighbourhoods, and by networking through institutions of charity and the churches, and ultimately the threat of riot and rebellion—institutions and practices in some of which women also played a prominent role.¹⁰

For a long time, the prevalent historical view, influenced by the modern combination of equality in law and political participation, considered Aristotle’s definition in the *Politics* an adequate instrument for historical analysis of citizenship in ancient Greece.¹¹ Since the

1990s, however, a revisionist view has been gaining ground that such modern notions can serve neither as a guide to understand the structure of the ancient Greek *polis* nor as a matrix to chart its historical emergence—the archaic *poleis* did not develop inevitably into the classical democracy of the Athenian type.¹² The former conception of Greek citizenship based on a model of individual, legal rights has now gradually changed into a notion of citizenship as a status embedded in a social context. Nonetheless, the revisionist approach seems to maintain the assumption that citizenship was realized essentially in political office. I infer this from the tendency to acknowledge religion as a formative factor of ancient society but to leave this insight behind as soon as it comes to discussing citizenship, and from the tendency to regard citizenship as a qualification of men only, also when it comes to understanding the *polis* and its subgroups beyond actual political bodies, whereas women were clearly citizens too, albeit not politically active citizens.¹³

When we now discard the notion that access to political office was the single or even main defining feature of citizenship, then what made the Greeks of the archaic age citizens, rather than merely subjects of an aristocracy or tyranny? Or, in other words, how were the community and its participation defined and practised in such ways that the members were considered citizens whether they could hold political office or not?¹⁴ In trying to answer these questions, I use two methodological premises.

Firstly, analysis of Greek citizenship vocabulary is essential to understand the Greek notion of citizenship, since it illuminates the practices and values in which this discourse was used. And it is revealing that any analysis needs to begin with changing language in more than one sense. For many centuries, ancient Greek had no equivalent of our modern abstract noun ‘citizenship’. The first instance of *politeia* famously occurs in Herodotus’ *Histories*, in a passage on the strategy of the seer Teisamenos after the battle of Thermopylae to gain the position he desired in a foreign *polis*, just as the seer Melampus had once done.¹⁵ By *politeia* Herodotus means membership of the *polis*, because earlier in this passage he refers to ‘sharing in everything’, but also, and perhaps more strongly, a state run by *politai*, as the word is shaped after *basileia*, a state run by a *basileus* (king). Featuring also the earliest occurrence of the singular ‘citizen’ (*politēs*), Herodotus uses a new vocabulary that presumably reflects intensive debates on citizenship at Athens. But perhaps he himself made a contribution here to this new vocabulary, because his usage of *politeia* differs slightly from its generic meaning in the late fifth and fourth centuries, as the whole body of rules and conventions that shape a *polis*. Only in the second half of the fourth century did *politeia* come to denote also

‘citizenship’, namely conceived as having a part in (making) these rules.

Just as the abstract noun ‘citizenship’ was lacking for a long time, our modern notion ‘citizen’ has no clear Greek equivalent either. *Laos* and *dēmos* refer to social collectives, the first as followers of a leader, the second as a group inhabiting a certain territory and acting, as we shall see below (section 4), as the touchstone of communal decisions.¹⁶ *Politēs* and *astos* are generic words, meaning ‘member of the *polis*’ and something like ‘belonging to us’ respectively; both have connotations of living in a town, but not necessarily of political participation. For the Greeks, ethnics like *Athēnaios* or *Korinthios* conveyed the communal citizenship based on descent that mattered most to them.¹⁷ It is important to note that all these Greek words for ‘citizens’ show a symmetrically gendered morphology, differentiated into masculine and feminine gender when referring to a single man or woman (*astos*, *astē*; *politēs*, *politis*; ethnics), with a feminine plural for female groups and a generic masculine plural for male or mixed groups, as normal in Greek. In the classical age, this vocabulary shows more variety in forms and meanings, while in the archaic age only the generic plurals *politai* and *astoi* were used for both men and women.¹⁸ An adequate conception of Greek citizenship must accommodate this vocabulary, which indicates that in some essential way both men and women were citizens.¹⁹ This conclusion confirms that holding political office, from which female citizens were barred, was not the primary feature of Greek citizenship, a fact that fits the situation in the archaic age.

Secondly, abandoning the conventional focus on political office to look instead for the two components of Kymlicka’s definition, community and participation, the best way to do so seems to be working backwards, retracing steps from a classical starting point.²⁰ This may seem paradoxical when the revisionists are surely right that the classical democracy was in no way the necessary outcome of the archaic *polis*. But Greek citizenship as we know it from classical sources guides or at least influences our search for its genesis earlier in history in one way or the other. Not only is the wealth of classical sources indispensable to understand what citizenship *could* be about, but it is only by virtue of what citizenship became that we can be aware of its origins at all. Once we acknowledge this line of argument, we can be more conscious of how we use it and be cautious not to press the evidence into teleological or anachronistic models.

On these two premises, it is significant that even in classical Athens citizenship was not described as participation in political office. Although politics in the sense of decision-making institutions and processes were highly important, in particular for male citizens,

citizenship discourse at Athens reveals that *archē* and *krisis* were not considered its core issue.²¹ It seems that the notion of citizenship was generally taken for granted, but in contexts where its core values and expectations were emphatically expressed, it was captured in the formula *meteinaí* or *metechein tōn hierōn kai tōn hosiōn*: to have a share in the things of the gods and in all human affairs that are pleasing to the gods.²² *Ta hiera* are all things humans give to the gods in return for divine gifts and *charis*, *ta hosia* include all human conduct, among humans themselves and towards the gods, that aims at proper relationships with the gods. Both components include the human (re)production and property that are the results of these divine favours and that in turn are employed to sustain the relationships with the divine. The formula is predominantly attested in classical Athens, but it also occurs in some form in other *poleis*. As we shall see below (section 2), the main elements of the formula date to the archaic age.

Identifying the *polis*' reciprocity with the gods as the core of the *polis*, the citizenship formula represents the two directions effective in this relationship: vertically the relations between humans and gods, and horizontally those between humans, including hierarchies among them.²³ On the basis of this notion of the *polis* as a network of reciprocal relationships between human and divine, I will argue that in archaic Greece citizenship was shaped by three interlocking frameworks, shared cults, shared descent, and shared laws, in which cult was the primary domain of all citizens' participation.²⁴ It is probably no coincidence that in Athens these domains—cults, laws, inheritance, and jurisdiction—were the shared province of the three original archons, with defence of the *polis* included in that of the Polemarchos. Men's political offices and military duties entailed privileges and obligations depending on this primary domain. Although some elements also apply to the Panhellenic community, I shall focus on the *polis* as the essential unit of Greek citizenship.

2. The Foundational Role of Cult

There is nothing new in claiming that cult was a defining factor of the Greek *polis*.²⁵ Yet its fundamental role in shaping the *polis* as community, territorial unit, and political entity cannot be overestimated. The genesis and well-being of the *polis*, the protection of its lands, and the reaping of its fruits depended on cooperation between humans and gods, each party fulfilling the role befitting its status and resources. The gods gave their divine powers (fertility, courage, justice, victory) without which no human effort could be

effective, and in exchange for these benefits (*agatha*), humans gave the gods rewards (votives, sacrifice) provided out of human property. Once these gifts were made divine property (*hieros*), humans managed this for them. Giving *hiera* is abundantly attested in the archaeological, epigraphical, and literary record as a structuring feature of archaic Greek society. In sum, this reciprocity benefited both parties, weaving *charis* between them.²⁶ Moreover, the human community involved the gods in relationships among themselves. Pivotal for the development of the *polis* were the ways in which humans engaged the gods in creating and effectuating the rules of society.

Archaeological and epigraphical evidence from the early Iron Age onwards reveals the strong interdependence of cults, territory, and communities developing into *poleis*. Signs of nascent communities and social differentiation at local level are found in evidence of ritual dining, in some cases connected to sanctuaries, in others to cemeteries.²⁷ Larger communities are marked by the construction of prominent sanctuaries forging the connection between a group and a particular place. They defined the territories of *poleis* and their interregional networks, developing into coherent cultic and social landscapes.²⁸

That the cults shared by the community were essential in the emergence of the *polis* as citizen community can be traced in the shifting meanings of the noun *polis*. It derives, as is well known, from epic *p(t)olis*, more precisely *akropolis*, the stronghold where the people found refuge in times of danger and where the central sanctuaries were located.²⁹ At Athens, fifth-century decrees still referred to the Acropolis, the sacred centre of the city, as the *polis*.³⁰ The meaning of the word was carried over from the stronghold with its sanctuaries to the people who participated in the cults and their territory, a development recognized by Thucydides, who described how at Athens the *polis* expanded from the original cultic centre on and around the Acropolis (2.15.3–6). In classical Greek, *polis* refers in the first place to the community of which the *politai* are the members, consisting of all its *oikoi* with their private properties, its common property, and the property of the gods; here, we find the outcome of what began in the early archaic age.³¹

In cultic life, as in everything else, the archaic *poleis* were dominated by a self-styled elite.³² Their self-presentation, attested in their burial practices, splendid votives, and general lifestyle, with the *symposion* as the special venue of predominantly male sociability, required a wider group from whom they could distinguish themselves and whose respect, if not downright dependency, was an essential component of their status.³³ This wider group, who appear in written

sources as the *dēmos/damos*, *politai* and *astoi*, showed their piety by numerous small votives in archaic sanctuaries. Although they did not perform public sacrifices or other prominent cultic roles themselves, these non-elite *politai* were essential participants nonetheless in the public cults that were fundamental to the notion of communal citizenship, involved as engaged members of the crowd in festivals, in the rear of processions, as audience of paeans, hymns, dithyrambs, and non-sympotic *epinikia*, and sharing—modestly—in the sacrificial distribution.³⁴ Solon's sacrificial calendar shows that by the early sixth century Athens had a substantial range of *polis* cults and festivals.³⁵

Reciprocity with the gods entailed numerous such communal rituals of giving *hiera* to the gods, but also engagement of the gods in the human relationships of the *polis* and of its individual members. Prominent among such relations that the gods themselves especially protected were the obligations towards guests and suppliants, the respect of children due to their parents, and proper respect for and burial of the dead. All the rules, conventions, and expectations guiding the conduct of humans involving the gods, notably the rules of giving them *hiera* and of observing conditions of purity necessary when facing them, and the rules guiding the fundamental conduct among humans just mentioned, came to be comprised in a single noun, *hosiē*, attested for the first time in the *Odyssey*.³⁶ The adjective *hosios* qualified all situations, actions, and things that were (to be) in accordance with *hosiē* or fulfilled its purpose; it was a strong value term of wide social significance. *Hosios* first occurs in the Theognidea (130–1): 'Nothing, Kyrnos, among humans is better than a father and a mother who observe *hosios dikē*.'³⁷ The speaker here commends justice that accords not only with human law, but also with obligations that the gods value highly; typically, the lines identify one's parents, that is, descent and upbringing as foundations of social excellence, as the source of this god-abiding justice.³⁸

In sum, although in our extant sources the formula *hiera kai hosia* that represents the core of citizenship does not occur before the mid-fifth century, its components originated in the archaic age. Taken together, they capture the reciprocity between humans and the gods in actions, expectations, thoughts, and gifts, an agreement to mutual benefit to last over time forging a strong bond that we may label a covenant. I use this hermeneutical term, familiar from the Hebrew Bible (in ancient Greek, no such explicit notion existed) here to compare conceptions of society's foundations in Greece and the Near East in which some features are quite similar, notwithstanding some important differences.³⁹ Essential for the Greek notion of citizenship is that a community emerged which defined itself by its covenant with the gods, that encompassed the entire *polis* in which each *oikos* had a

share.⁴⁰ The *oikos* had no specific gods of its own, except Zeus Ktesios, but worshipped in its household cults the communal gods for its own particular benefit. Even the *oikos*' Hestia, goddess of the hearth, was a private representation of the goddess whose cult embodied the centre of the *polis*.⁴¹

A fine example of how cult operated as the fundamental, structuring element of a *polis* is the decree regulating the relations between a group of Hypocnemidian Locrians settling at Naupaktos and their *polis* of origin. For setting up a colony, in whatever way it took place in other respects, *polis* structures had to be created on the spot that in the 'old' *poleis* had grown over time. Before returning to other decrees below, here I draw attention to the ways in which this decree shows the creation of a *polis* as primarily a *cultic* community.⁴²

IG IX 1² 3: 718 (c.500–450): ἐν Ναύπακτον : κα(τ) τῶνδε : ἡἀπιφοικία : Λοφρὸν τὸν : ὑποκναμίδιον : ἐπεὶ κα Ναυπάκτιος : γένηται : Ναυπάκτιον ἔοντα : ἡόπο < > ξένον : ὅσια λανχάνειν : καὶ θύειν : ἐξεῖμεν : ἐπιτυχόντα : αἱ κα δεῖλεται : αἱ κα δεῖλεται : θύειν καὶ λανχάνειν : κέ(δ) δάμο κέ(ρ) ροινάνον : αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ γένος : κατ' αἰρεῖ : τέλος τοὺς : ἐπιφοίρους Λοφρῶν : τῶν ὑποκναμίδιον : μὲ φάρειν : ἐν Λοφροῖς τοῖς ὑποκναμίδιοις : φρίν κ' αὖ τις Λοφρὸς γένηται τῶν ὑποκναμίδιον. (etc.)

The *apoikia* (goes) to Naupaktos on these terms. It is permitted that a Locrian of the Hypocnemidians, when he has become a Naupaktian, being a Naupaktian, receives (*lanthanein*) his due portion (by lot) and sacrifices (*thyein*) where / in the way it is *hosiē* for a stranger, when he happens to be (in Locris) if he so wishes. If he so wishes, he may sacrifice and receive his due portion (by lot) of the *dēmos* and of the (sub)groups, he himself and his descendants, for ever. Those of the Hypocnemidian Locrians who live in the *apoikia* will not pay *telos* among the Hypocnemidian Locrians, until someone has become a Hypocnemidian Locrian again.' (etc.).⁴³

Next, a series of regulations follow, securing that the colony would maintain a sufficient number of people, on the rights of inheritance and on jurisdiction.

Crucial here is that in the first clause of the foundational document the colonists constitute themselves as a community vis-à-vis their *polis* of origin (Locris) in terms of *hosiē* (*hosia* in the dialect of the decree), here comprising the rules of sacrifice, notably on the composition of the group and the ways in which each participates.⁴⁴ *Lanthanein* means receiving by lot one's due portion, either one's rightful part of an inheritance or (as here) one's share of sacrificial meat; hence, the verb was used for other forms of distribution by lot. *Thyein* is bringing an (animal) sacrifice or participating in such a ritual, normally with the ensuing sharing of meat. At this communitarian level, the decree does not make any distinction between the elite and the ordinary citizens, but defines the *polis* by distinguishing between insiders and outsiders in terms of sacrifice. Normally, a stranger participated in a

sacrifice on a single occasion, for instance on a visit. By this decree, by contrast, every colonist and his descendants, who now had their own covenant with the gods and fitting sacrificial regime in their new *polis* Naupaktos, could *always* participate in Locris ‘as strangers’ because they were former Locrians.⁴⁵ In other words, citizenship was defined in terms of participation in sacrifice of the *polis* and its subgroups (if that is what the *koinana/es* are). This basic structure of the *polis* operates in this decree as a ‘constitution’, from which all other regulations are derived. Moreover, the decree illustrates that citizenship in this sense was in principle inherited from one’s forebears, but also—and this was particularly relevant in the case of colonies—that the *polis* could accept and incorporate newcomers, either from the metropolis or from elsewhere or from local settlements. As long as citizenship was based on descent from *one* citizen parent, incorporation of newcomers was relatively easy; if they wished to integrate themselves, or rather their descendants, into the citizen body, they could do so by marrying a citizen. This takes us to the second aspect, descent.

3. The Formative Role of Descent

Descent is almost universally a criterion of membership of all (ethnic) communities, but descent structures and their functions in society at large vary considerably. In ancient Greece, descent was the dominant metaphor of creating identity: all claims to material and immaterial wealth, both public and private, were cast in terms of a heritage of one’s forebears; only legitimate heirs could claim a part, be it ever so small, of *ta patrōia*.⁴⁶ Such inheritance rights in the present were normally based on physical, ‘real’ descent, but often such claims were underpinned by stories of mythological descent. This was the case in the elite families of the archaic world, but also most Greek *poleis* and *ethnē* in their entirety envisaged their origins as descent from a god, a hero, the earth, or a river and a human being. A particularly interesting variety of descent identity is what I label metaphorical descent, where a claim was only made to being a legitimate heir to a (socially) valuable inheritance and not to real descent from the legatee. Interesting examples are the Homeridai as ‘heirs’ of Homer’s gifts, (archaic) *phylai* and phratries claiming to be ‘heirs’ but not physical descendants of their *archēgētai* (‘original founders’) and the same holds true to some extent for most Athenian *genē*, the groups of families who supplied the priests and priestesses of the *polis* cults.⁴⁷ In matters of citizenship, mythological and metaphorical descent

operated as narrative shells holding real descent in actual society. As narrative constructions, such metaphorical descent claims combined a prestigious point of origin with egalitarian claims to shares of the heritage in the present.

This genealogical discourse, both flexible and socially compelling, was particularly effective in the construction of citizenship. It created a connection between the present *polis* and its origins by identifying the present *politai* as the legitimate heirs of their ancestors and hence of their territory and its wealth.⁴⁸ Given the fact that all the *polis*' present benefits were the result of its covenant with the gods made by the ancestors (*ta patrōia*) perpetuated over time in the cults *kata ta patria*, membership of the *polis* meant having a part in this whole as a legitimate heir of one's part in the communality.⁴⁹ Legitimate descent thus became the criterion of citizenship of the *polis* and its subgroups, encompassing all citizens, rich or poor, male and female, with political power or without. Indicated in classical texts by the verb *meteinaí*, usually in a construction of *meteinaí moi* and a noun or quality indicating the *polis* in the genitive, this notion of citizenship also applies in archaic Greece.⁵⁰ Although the rules differed in detail, *polis* membership everywhere in Greece depended on legitimate descent, that is, from a socially acknowledged union, with inheritance rights in one's *oikos* and in the *polis*. Greek marriage patterns show several common features: a preference for *polis* endogamy but in some *poleis*, especially in the archaic age, more flexibility; bilateral kinship with a preference for the male side; partible inheritance among the heirs, usually equal shares for sons and a fitting portion for daughters in the form of a dowry, and full inheritance through daughters in absence of male heirs (*epiklerate*).⁵¹

Ancient Greek citizenship can therefore be defined as follows: *citizenship, i.e. polis membership, was a status defined by descent, conceived as being a descendant of the original founders of the covenant of the polis with the gods, more precisely as being a legitimate heir to a share of this covenant.* This applies equally to men and women, as members of the kin group and as heirs.⁵² All claims to participation in the *polis*, whether in cult or by political influence, with great prominence or in modest roles, were derived from this notion.⁵³

How far back we can trace this system in historical evidence varies from *polis* to *polis*. Mycenaean sources indicate by *dēmos* the self-subsistent population of an area around a palace, but whether these peoples were the real ancestors of the early Iron Age Greek populations is impossible to ascertain.⁵⁴ Again, we need to look backwards, with the rules of legitimacy and inheritance rights that make up an important part of the earliest extant written laws, exemplified at Gortyn from the late seventh century onwards, in

colonies such as Naupaktos and at Athens in Solon's laws, consolidated and extended in the classical era.⁵⁵ In the classical period, in many *poleis* including Athens, legitimacy was controlled by phratries, clusters of patrilinear families within a *polis* operating as support group of each member family, in particular concerning matters of birth and death. Although self-proclaimed descent lines were created to produce an authoritative social presence, the fact that nearly all Ionian *poleis* shared the phratry-festival Apatouria, as well as linguistic evidence, suggest that phratries may in reality have been a phenomenon of high antiquity, predating the Ionian migration.⁵⁶ If so, it does not mean that these early phratries had the same functions as their counterparts in the classical period, for in the course of time legitimate descent became ever more important as the foundation of citizenship, intertwined with the structures of the *polis*.⁵⁷ In the epic world of the *Iliad*, all free men apparently were members of phratries and *phylai*; the latter may have been aggregates of phratries, but the connection is unclear.⁵⁸ At Athens, Draco's law on homicide of the late seventh century (reinscribed in 409/8) presupposes a developed system of phratries, which had a decisive role in asking retribution for the death of a member or pardoning the killer.⁵⁹ In Delphi, the phratry (?) Labyadai regulated funerals of its members in the late sixth century.⁶⁰ *Phylai* are attested in Dreros and three *phylai* at Sparta in the seventh century, and the four Ionian *phylai* at Athens with their *phylobasileis*, who figure in Solon's sacrificial calendar, go back at least to the seventh century as well.⁶¹ At Sicyon in the early and Athens in the late sixth century, new *phylai* were created, each with their 'founding' hero and cultic programme.⁶²

Additional information can tentatively be derived from the genealogies of families. Prominent families claimed descent from heroic forebears and genealogies were constantly adapted to the needs of the present.⁶³ Some families managed to construct family lines that convinced their fellow citizens of their high antiquity and some may have had a kernel of truth. This is especially the case for the Attic *genē*. Claiming the special honour of representing the *polis* in its exchange with the gods, they needed special qualifications. A *genos* member was a metaphorical heir of the *genos'* *archēgetēs*, who had received this honour from the gods at the time of the covenant. This right to eligibility for priesthood was inherited by birth in a *genos* family from two Athenian parents, requiring long lines of correct descent (*ithagenēs*). In the classical era, such lines were convincingly (re)constructed over more than seven generations, including switches to the female line.⁶⁴ Presumably, these genealogical constructions were supported by written lists that in the archaic age were lacking or defective, but public credibility of legitimate office holding may have

exercised some external control over orally reproduced claims. The earliest written evidence on a *genos* concerns the Kerykes, who supplied the herald (*keryx*) and *dadouchos* at the Eleusinian Mysteries, attested on Solon's *kyrbeis*, taking this *genos* officiating in the cult of Eleusis back at least to the seventh century.⁶⁵

An important element of archaic Greek citizenship is the system of inheritance rights and its social application more widely. Whereas among their eastern Mediterranean neighbours primogeniture prevailed, the Greek communities practised partible inheritance, division of the paternal property into *klēroi* assigned to equal heirs by lot (*lanchanein*). Again, the gods had established this principle, in the division of the world amongst Zeus, Poseidon, and Hades, as told in the *Iliad*. In book 15, Iris takes a message from Zeus to Poseidon forbidding him to influence the course of the war. Poseidon retorts that he need not accept any command from his brother, who, although the elder, is his equal. As the legitimate sons of Kronos and Rhea, the three of them—Zeus, Hades, and himself—partitioned the world into three equal parts; each acquired his portion by lot (*lanchanō*) and is equal with the others in *timē* (social value). They are *homotimos* (of the same *timē*), *isomoros*, and of *isos aisē* (with equal *moira* and *aisē* = share).⁶⁶ Poseidon's insistence in this episode on equality between the three sons of Kronos and Rhea must be compared with a scene in the *Odyssey*, book 14, where Odysseus pretends to be a son of a Cretan noble with a concubine (*pallakis*). When still alive, his father treated him with the same *timē* as his many legitimate (*ithageneis*) sons, but after his death, the legitimate sons distributed the inheritance in *klēroi* amongst themselves, giving only a small part to the bastard brother.⁶⁷ These epic episodes exemplify a pattern in the use of the lot, where defining the composition of the group, in this case appointing legitimate heirs, was a human responsibility, whereas assigning a part to each of them was a divine decision, expressed by the lot as the will of Zeus, who as the god of order oversaw the proper functioning of the system.⁶⁸

This principle, originating at *oikos* level, came to be used as a method for assigning other kinds of property or status in other settings. If a group needed to select someone to be superior to the rest, they could measure inequality by weighing differences in birth, age, wealth, or other such qualities. But if it was impossible or undesirable to decide who was the best among them, the members of a group would conceive themselves as equals and leave the selection to the gods. The socially most powerful metaphor to do so was to identify the group as heirs of a common ancestor or founder, among whom shares = lots were assigned by divine will. This worked particularly well in the organization of the *polis*. In aristocracies and oligarchies,

the groups thus defined were small and elitist, in democracies large.⁶⁹ I suggest that partible inheritance and its concomitant system of allotment have played a crucial role in the conception of equality that became so important in Greek political life, over and against systems of distribution based on difference and hierarchy.⁷⁰ This takes me to the third element, law.

4. The Structuring Role of Law

To discuss the meaning of law for the self-definition of a community needs no justification, especially in the case of ancient Greece. In Greek, *nomos* means tradition before it means written law, and, in the archaic era, the latter was commonly called *thesmos*. As we just saw, specific rules underlying the cultic life and crucial inter-human relationships were called *themis* or *hosiē*, most of which were unwritten but occasionally spelt out in writing as well.⁷¹ The earliest extant laws all seem to belong to a wave of writing laws in the mid-seventh century.⁷² Instead of asking who was entitled to make such laws and reintroducing the issue of political office, we may detect in the scattered evidence how archaic law created communitarian citizenship and elementary arrangements about participation.

We may then envisage a *polis* as the community among whom particular *nomoi* were valid: all those belonged to a particular *polis* who recognized its *nomoi*, either orally transmitted or as written regulations, as binding and who saw themselves somehow represented in them. H. Van Effenterre and F. Ruzé seem to have had something like this in mind when they organized the first volume of their collection of archaic inscriptions *Nomima* around the construction of insiders and outsiders. The earliest examples date to the seventh century and show (no. 1) in Gortyn a notion of one's own community (*astos*) bound by rules of fair reciprocity (*dika*), implicitly contrasted with foreign (*xenos*), and (nos. 17 and 41) in Elis the pronouncing of penalties and entrenchment clauses which make the property of the offender *dēmosios*—in other words, the *dēmos* was formally the collective owner of property and a subject in this law.⁷³ An early sixth-century law from Chios (ML 8) refers to *rhetai* (A l. 2), binding pronouncements of the *dēmos* that need to be observed, here concerning property of the goddess Hestia, and (on side C) to a *dēmosiē bo(u)lē* of fifty members per *phylē* that is to meet every month. In the extant, heavily damaged text of thirty-two lines, the word *dēmos* and cognates occur five times, plus three references to *dēmarchoi*. In whatever way the members of the *boulē* and the *dēmarchoi* were

selected, at Chios the whole *dēmos* was at least notionally represented in its laws. A famous law from Dreros of the mid-seventh century on rotation of the office of *kosmos* refers to the *polis* as decision-making community.⁷⁴ Whether or not ordinary male *politai* did much more in an assembly than accept what had been proposed by more prominent citizens seems to have varied according to time and place.⁷⁵

Laws consolidated the *polis* as a human community and perpetuated its covenant with the gods, devolving human and divine property and obligations towards the gods and fellow humans onto future generations. Inheritance rights based on rules of legitimacy are among the earliest topics laid down in archaic law, as we just saw, reflecting in law the intimate connection between ‘public’ and ‘private’ in the very structure of the *polis*. Besides the Naupaktos decrees, this is well illustrated in other archaic laws. On Crete, an agreement of a *polis* with the *hieromnamon* Spensithios stated: ‘[to grant] to Spensithios and his descendants freedom from all taxes as long as he records and remembers *damosios* matters for the *polis*, both divine and human’. That these ‘matters of the *dēmos*’ are to be understood as obligations is inferred from a regulation in the Gortyn Code using the same terminology, that an adopted son inherits from his adopted father if ‘he fulfills the adopter’s divine and human matters (obligations)’.⁷⁶

Such a notion of the *polis* we also saw underlying Solon’s laws for Athens, with which this essay begins. In the vocabulary of classical Athens, as I argued above, being an Athenian meant sharing in *hiera* and *hosia* of *oikos* and *polis*, that is, in reciprocating obligations with the gods and with other humans. Classical evidence shows that the *polis* was obliged to prevent families from leaving no heirs at all. The reason for this becomes clear once we recognize that every family held a share, both in its household cults and in its share of the common cults, in the *polis*’ covenant. The *polis* was therefore responsible for keeping all families intact that ‘originally’ belonged to the ancestral *polis*.⁷⁷ It is not implausible that by redeeming the enslaved citizens Solon aimed at restoring this ‘original, ancestral’ body of citizen families. In his other laws, Solon consolidated this group by his rules of legitimacy, inheritance rights, and protection of orphans and heiresses. The sacrificial calendar that Solon drew up to refund the newly organized *polis* Athens in its covenant with the gods has many, though presumably more modest, counterparts in sacrificial calendars and other ‘sacred laws’ elsewhere, made for *poleis* or their subgroups.⁷⁸

Throughout the Greek world, oath-taking appears as an essential means of creating the ties between a community, the gods and agreements with the force of laws.⁷⁹ Susan Guettel Cole has aptly

described this particularly effective method to forge a common, political identity of the participants, but takes the latter to be only men.⁸⁰ In many political settings this was presumably the case, but the fact that the *polis* included women as well as men is occasionally articulated in laws and decrees. Whereas the founding decree of Naupaktos implicitly included men and women in its terms, an oath sealing the bonds between the Naupaktians and a group of Messenians shortly after the mid-fifth century did so explicitly.⁸¹ Likewise, the oath and curse founding the new *polis* of Cyrene in the early seventh century engaged not just politically active citizens, but explicitly men, women, boys, and girls, thus binding all the citizens of the colony and its mother city Thera to each other and the gods.⁸² It promised to those who adhered to this pledge and their offspring *polla kai agatha* (plenty of good things = gifts of the gods) but to those who broke it destruction of themselves, their offspring and their property—a fixed expression in decrees and other binding agreements as a warrant of their fidelity to their stake, and that of their *oikos*, in the future of the community.⁸³

5. Conclusion

By retracing our steps from a classical vantage point, but disengaging as much as possible from an evolutionist model, I have tried to sketch what citizenship may have entailed in archaic Greece, when in each *polis* only a few men participated in *archē* and *krisis* while the majority of citizens did not. I have argued that communitarian citizenship was a firmly constructed notion of belonging to a community, comprising *polis* membership by birth as heirs of the ancestors' covenant with the gods. Citizenship included men and women, and was put into action in the cults that defined the *polis* and its subgroups by perpetuating the covenant. Entitlement to political and religious office (*timai*) was derived from this communitarian citizenship. The three constitutive elements, cult, descent, and law, must have existed in some form for some time since the Early Iron Age, but evidence of coherence between them takes us back to the seventh century, when writing was applied to all three.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank Roger Brock and Alain Duploux for inviting me to join this enterprise and for their constructive comments. I am also grateful to

the participants of the colloquium at Leeds (7 May 2009) and of the meeting of the European Network for the Study of Ancient Greek History at Warsaw (16–17 Oct. 2010) for their responses to a draft of this essay.

¹ *Ath. Pol.* 12.4; Solon *fr.* 36; ed. and transl. D.E. Gerber (Loeb), slightly modified. The core of the present essay was written in 2012 and is updated here with a few essential references; for an extensive discussion with full bibliography, see now Blok 2017, to which I further refer below.

² For the problems of Solon's authorship of these orally transmitted songs, Lardinois 2006; Stehle 2006. In Blok and Krul 2017, we argue that the actions of the speaker concerning the release from debt slavery and its sequel are so distinct from the general persona of 'the wise man' and so specific for Solon the lawgiver, that for this fragment, as well as for *fr.* 4, Solon's authorship is highly likely.

³ Only if the *polis* decided in court that someone had unjustly pretended to be an Athenian (*graphē xenias*), could the culprit be sold into slavery; the crux is, of course, that in such cases the victim was deemed *not* to be an Athenian.

⁴ Ober 1993a; Manville 1990, 132–3. The nature of the 'constraint' that had driven many Athenians across the Attic borders and that Solon removed by a measure called *seisachtheia* in our evidence (*Ath. Pol.* 6.1) is debated: some take this to be mortgages on land or securities on the person, whereas Harris 1997 argues for a system of payment for protection and maintenance of internal order.

⁵ *Arist. Pol.* 3.1275b17–24.

⁶ For this argument, Blok 2005; more extensive analysis in the context of the *Politics*, Blok 2017, ch. 1.

⁷ Kymlicka 2002, 284. His definition implies that political decision-making is an important but not the only domain of citizens' participation. For the theoretical background of Kymlicka's conception, Blok 2017, ch. 1, where I combine his definition with one proposed by Walzer 1988.

⁸ See e.g. Meier 1980, 40–1: 'Die politische Zugehörigkeit wurde so zentral und als allgemeine Zugehörigkeit konkurrenzlos [...] Wenn auch Metöken und Sklaven und natürlich die Frauen von politische Rechten ausgeschlossen blieben, resultierte daraus eine relativ außerordentlich weitgehende *praktische Deckung des Kreises der beteiligten an Politik mit dem der davon Betroffenen*' (italics added).

⁹ For instance, around 1780 the electorate in Great Britain was c.4% of the population, but those who made use of their prerogative c.1%, in Prussia and Austria the electorate was c.0.1%, in France nominally less than 10% but active 0%; those who assembled as *citoyens* in 1789 claimed to revive an ancient right. In the French Revolution and its aftermath until 1810, the active electorate varied between 6% (1789) to 24% (1792) and 8% (1804) of the population. See Fahrmeier 2007, 15, 38, who also shows how in the last two centuries a much wider concept of citizenship evolved into a strictly political one.

¹⁰ Prak 2010.

¹¹ The *Copenhagen Polis Centre* directed by Mogens Hansen has produced a wealth of data and a series of impressive publications on the ancient Greek *polis*, but its interpretative model, that primarily identifies the *polis* with its political institutions, with marginal attention to other factors including religion, is unsatisfactory; see also chapter 1 in this volume.

¹² Manville 1990; 1994; Walter 1993; Ostwald 1996; Davies 1997; Foxhall 1997, 113–18; Brock and Hodkinson 2000; Cartledge 2000; Carter 2004; Davies 2004; Hall 2007; emphasis on religious rather than political aspects, Connor 1994.

¹³ Political perception still prevailing, see e.g. Rhodes 2009. Manville 1990, 76–90 and Anderson 2003, 13–21 noticing problems in defining early citizenship seem unaware that the greatest stumbling block is their concept of citizenship in terms of political entitlement. Walter 1993 shows that citizenship entailed participation in many *polis* arrangements other than political office, but treats only men as citizens. Liddel 2007 explores the numerous obligations of which citizenship consisted, but has difficulties accounting for civic obligations of female citizens as a structural ingredient of citizenship.

¹⁴ See also the pertinent questions formulated by Davies 1997, 32–3, and his observations in Davies 2004.

¹⁵ Hdt. 9.34: Ταῦτα δὲ λέγων οὗτος ἐμμέετο Μελάμποδα, ὡς εἰκάσαι βασιλῆην τε καὶ πολιτῆην αἰτεομένους. ‘With these words, he (Teisamenos) imitated Melampus, in so far as we can compare asking for *basileia* with asking for *politeia*.’ For the development of the notion of *politeia*, Bordes 1982.

¹⁶ Cf. Werlings 2010, 65, 87.

¹⁷ For citizenship vocabulary, Blok 2005 and slightly revised in Blok 2017, ch. 4. On my own findings, that are based on a full quantitative and semantic analysis, I am not convinced by Cohen 2000, 49–78 that *politai* and *astoi* mean respectively citizens with political rights in the Aristotelian sense and ‘locals’, nor by Osborne 2011, ch. 4 that *politai* was the default word in classical Athens (that was *Athēnaioi*) or that *astos* refers to political rights, who do not provide the necessary evidence for their views.

¹⁸ For generic use of the plural *politai*, see e.g. Hom. *Il.* 15.557–8: πρίν γ’ ἡὲ κατακτάμεν ἡὲ κατ’ ἄκρης / Ἴλιον αἰπεινὴν ἐλέειν κτάσθαι τε πολίτας. ‘till either we kill them or the citadel of steep Ilium will be taken and its *politai* killed’; the word recalls all those who live inside the walls of the city, but usually the men were killed and the women taken captive and sold into slavery. *Il.* 22.429–30: Ὡς ἔφατο κλαίων, ἐπὶ δὲ στενάχοντο πολῖται / Τρωῆσιν δ’ Ἐκάβη ἀδινοῦ ἐξῆρχε γόοιο. ‘Thus he spoke, weeping; and the *politai* mourned with him. And with the Trojan women Hecabe began her lament’; Hom. *Od.* 7.131; *Od.* 17.206; Hom. *Hymn. Dem.* 99: ὅθεν ὕδρευοντο πολῖται. ‘where the *politai* fetched water’. For *astoi* e.g. Pind. *Nem.* 2.24; Pind. *Pyth.* 11.28. Singulars appear only after 450, see Blok 2017, ch. 4.

¹⁹ For symmetries of men and women’s roles in the public life of the *polis*, see Sourvinou-Inwood 1995; Blok 2001; Blok 2009a; Blok 2017, ch. 5.

²⁰ Entitlement to political office could be motivated by military participation (Raaflaub 1997; 2006a) or by landed property (Foxhall 1997; van Wees 2006b), but such entitlements were created by specific rules, not a structural ingredient of citizenship generally. See also Ehrenberg 1937, 148 on working backwards and Robinson 1997 for results of such a method for archaic political structures.

²¹ In the lengthiest extant defence of citizenship, by Euxitheos in his appeal against Euboulides (Dem. 57), the speaker does not refer even once to any political or judicial office to identify himself as a citizen, except to his role as demarch to explain how he gained the hatred of his fellow demesmen by doing his duty for the common good. Instead, to underscore his claims to citizenship he focuses on his descent, his participation in cult, and his eligibility for priesthood; cf. Blok 2017, ch. 1.

²² E.g. the ‘ephebic oath’ (RO 88; Lyc. *Leocr.* 77); on granting or losing citizenship (Apoll. *Neaira* (= [Dem.] 59) 104; Dem. 57.3; Dem. 23.65), in the agenda of *boulē* and assembly (Ath. *Pol.* 43.2–6), in a situation of need and emergency (Thuc. 2.52.3–4), Isoc. 7.66, etc. On the meaning of *hiera kai hosia*, Maffi 1982, and as core of the *polis*, Connor 1988; Blok 2009c; Blok 2014, and extensively Blok 2017, ch. 2.

²³ Lazzarini 1989–90 coins the terms ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ based on votive inscriptions; cf. Pulleyn 1997 for prayer, Keesling 2003 for votives, Griffith 2009, esp. 76 for hymns and other (archaic) lyrical poetry.

²⁴ This also implies that priest(ess)hood was a far more important public office than is commonly assumed, cf. Ekroth 2008. For the parameters of participation on this notion of citizenship, see concisely Blok 2013 and extensively Blok 2017, ch. 5.

²⁵ I cannot revisit all the evidence, archaeological or otherwise, here; for cult as constitutive of the *polis* and its subgroups: Sourvinou-Inwood 1988; 1990; 1995; Osborne 1993; Aleshire 1994; Cole 1995; Burkert 1995; Georgoudi 1998; Parker 2005. Inclusion of *metics* in Athens on this model: Blok 2007; Wijma 2014; Blok 2017, ch. 6.

²⁶ Reciprocity between humans and gods: Linders 1975; Versnel 1981; van Straten 1981; 1995; Parker 1998; for divine *charis* esp. Pulleyn 1997; Bremer 1998; Parker 1998. Without the gods, the city could not survive: see Parker 2005, 387–451 for the ‘gods at work’ and the coherence between their functions in Athens.

²⁷ Archaeological evidence of ritual dining in archaic Attica, van den Eijnde 2010; in Greece generally: Bergquist 1990 lists non-square dining places from the tenth century onward (table 2) and archaic square ones on Paros, Cape Zoster, Thasos, in Delphi, Perachora (table 1); ritual dining fundamental to archaic Greek society: Schmitt-Pantel 1992, 17–113; Seaford 2004, 48–66 esp. on ‘Homeric’ society; Ulf 2006 for interregional relations; for festive dining as core element of *polis* institutions, Blok, van den Eijnde, and Strootman 2017.

²⁸ Archaeological evidence Polignac 1995a; Morgan 1990; 1994; Hölscher 1998; Osborne 1994; Auffarth 2006; Cole 2004, ch. 1; van den Eijnde 2010. Border sanctuaries defining the *polis*: Polignac 1995a; connections with centre by axes, Hölscher 1998; creation of group identity as *ethnos* and *polis*, Morgan 2003; interregional networks Freitag et al. 2006.

²⁹ *Polis* = *akropolis* = stronghold with sanctuaries: Hom. *Il.* 6.257; 11.181; 17.144; Hom. *Od.* 8.555.

³⁰ *Polis* meaning ‘acropolis’ is in the fifth century attested in approximately a hundred decrees, in the requirement that they be deposited *em polei* (on the Acropolis; first certain case is *IG* I³ 11.12). In the fourth century, writing *acropolis* in full became common. Beside this fixed formula, other phrases refer with *polis* to the Acropolis: *IG* I³ 4.A–B; 45; 52.4; 127; 718; 1179.11.

³¹ For the classical age, [Arist.] *Oec.* 1343a10–11: Πόλις μὲν οὖν οἰκῶν πλῆθος ἐστὶ καὶ χώρας καὶ κτημάτων αὐτάρκες πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν. For *hieros* versus *dēmosios* and *idios* property: Horster 2004; Blok 2010; Papazarkadas 2011.

³² At Athens, the *genē* providing *polis* priesthoods were an elite of birth rather than of wealth (Lambert 2015 and see below, section 3 at n. 64), but here as in other *poleis* the *archontes* who performed prominent cultic duties were selected on criteria of birth and/or wealth.

³³ Archaic Greek elites distinguishing and in fact defining themselves by self-presentation, Duplouy 2006a; social distinction effectuated in burial and grave goods in Greece, generally Osborne 1996, 78–88, details for Attica Houby-Nielsen 1992; 1995; 1996; elite self-styling in the *symposion*, Węcowski 2014.

³⁴ For small votives in Greece generally Polignac 1995a; Osborne 1996, 88–98; for Attica, van den Eijnde 2010; distribution of sacrificial meat, Ekroth 2008. For the ‘obscure’ participants in festivals, Jameson (1999). Pind. *Isthm.* 5.46–52 includes the sailors of Aegina, as heroes of the battle of Salamis (480), in his praise for an aristocratic youth.

³⁵ Solon’s calendar: Lys. 30.17; Martina 1968, F471–6; Leão and Rhodes 2015, Fr. 80/2–86; Lambert 2002 for fragments included in the *polis* calendar of c.400, for the context, Parker 1996, 43–55. For the multiple definition of a *polis* cult as a cult

serving the interests of the *dēmos*, and/or funded by *dēmosios* money, and/or supervised by the *polis* in some way, including (praising) its priest(ess), Aleshire 1994; Lambert 2010, 144–7; Blok 2017, chs 2 and 5; Pirenne-Delforge 2005 especially on *dēmotelēs*.

³⁶ Od. 16.421–5: guests and suppliants; Od. 22. 411–13: the dead. Simon. fr. 541 (Loeb): overall decent conduct; *Hymn. Hom. Cer.* 207–11 and *Hymn. Hom. Ap.* 237–8: rituals of gifts to the gods. *Hosiē* is conduct that *creates* divine favour (*charis*), *contra* Willi 2008 who takes it that *hosiē* means divine favour. For a full semantic analysis of *hosiē* and *hosios*, Peels 2015; she observes that the relations covered by *hosiē* in this sense are especially long-term reciprocal relations between humans. *Contra* Jay-Robert 2009, chs 2 and 3 who sees *hosiē* as originating among the gods. For conditions of purity, Parker 1983, who stresses the notion of purity as a symbolic way of coping with the metaphysical nature of the divine (18–19). *Hosiē* could be used as equivalent of *themis*: Hsch. s.v. ὅσιη; Suda, η 152 Ἡ θέμις; ὡς νόμος, ὡς προσήκον.

³⁷ Thgn. 130–1 (Gerber, Loeb): οὐδὲν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι πατὴρ καὶ μητὴρ ἀμεινον/ ἔπλεθ', ὅσοις ὁοσίη, Κύρνε, μέμηλε δίκη.

³⁸ Cf. Duploux 2006a, 43–8 on claimed descent and upbringing as constitutive in asserted 'nobility', in Theognis and other contemporary poetry.

³⁹ The original Hebrew Bible idea of *b'ērît* does not entail explicit codification in regulations, but 'any agreement or union among parties, that need not have any verbal expression at all [it is...] an action and a state, a relationship based on various symbolic rites enacting union', McCarthy (1978) 10–17; see also Blok 2014; Blok 2017, ch. 2, where I use throughout 'bond' rather than 'covenant' to prevent confusion of the Greek variety with the very strictly encoded form the agreement with the divine acquired later in the Hebrew Bible tradition.

⁴⁰ In classical sources, the connection between *hiera* and *hosia* of the *oikos* and of the *polis* is explicit: Isae. 6.47; [Dem.] 43.51; Schol. Aeschin. 1.39: ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι νόθῳ μὴδὲ νόθῃ μὴ εἶναι ἀγχιστεῖαν μὴθ' ἱερῶν μὴθ' ὁσίων ἀπ' Εὐκλείδου ἄρχοντος 'for according to the law no male or female bastard has any claim, based on kinship, to *hiera kai hosia*, as of the archonship of Eukleides (403/2)'. Dem. 39.35: 'I too regard you as a brother. What is the proof of this? You possess your portion (μέρος) of the patrilinear estate (τὰ πατρῶα) after my father's death. You participate in *hiera and hosia* (ἱερῶν, ὁσίων μετέχεις).'

⁴¹ In the classical age, this was usually the *prytaneion*; in classical Athens 'there coexisted [...] a narrower sense in which the ancestral gods were the gods of the restricted groups into which one was born, above all it seems those of the household and the phratry, perhaps also those of the deme', Parker 2005, 21. Cf. Brulé 2005 for the links between gods of *oikos* and *polis* in Greece generally.

⁴² On creating a colony, special areas were designated for the gods beside those for humans, and oaths were taken with concomitant sacrifices and usually a repetition of such oaths and sacrifices after a set time; their oath bound the colonists at Naupaktos for thirty years (l. 12–14).

⁴³ Syll.³ 47; ML 20; Körner 1993, no. 49; *Nomima* I, no. 43; for commentary, Graham 1964, 49–51; Gehrke 1993; Beck 1999; Peels 2015, 191–2; Giangiulio this volume, chapter 11, section 2.1.3. Many aspects of the text are difficult to ascertain due to the extreme brevity of the formulations and to the ambiguities in morphology. I also discuss this decree in Blok 2011, with a slightly different translation and comment, and in Blok 2017, ch. 6. Reading οὔ as ὁπόθεν 'where' rather than ὅπως (in the way of) is possible (and followed by Meiggs and Lewis 1988). Although the conditions are not the same, their results are similar: on both, entrance to the sanctuary was allowed to certain groups, but with different cultic roles. Compare RO 93, where the relation between Olbia and Miletus is settled as

equal claims for both parties. Another decree, usually taken to be slightly older and found nearby (ML 13; Körner 1993, no. 47; *Nomima* I, no. 44; Vatin 1963), called ‘the bronze Pappadakis’ after its first editor, also contains regulations on the inheritance rights of sons and daughters of the lands involved; the precise relation between the two decrees is unclear, but a connection between them is generally assumed.

⁴⁴ Most editions read ὅπο ξένον ὅσα λανχάνειν καὶ θύειν ἐξεῖμεν, i.e. that someone would receive (*ta*) *hosia*. Meiggs and Lewis 1988 take these *hosia* to be ‘civil rights’ (with *lanthanein*), but this is impossible because *hosia* are never ‘civil rights’ and by definition no stranger receives such rights in any *polis*. Körner 1993 translates ‘Opferportionen erhalten’, which is correct concerning the comprehensive role of sacrifice in this phrase, but erroneous in that portions of sacrificial meat are not *hosia* but *hiera*. Instead, ὅσα (ὁσίη) defining the group of participants in the ritual is well attested, e.g. the contemporary sacrificial calendar of Selinus (c.500–450), Lupu 2005, no. 27.12: θύοντο θῦμα καὶ καταγιζόντο οἷς οἷα ‘those for whom it is *hosiē* shall sacrifice the victim and perform the consecration’. *IDēlos* 68 Delos (fifth c.) ξένωι οὐχ ὁσίη ἐστὶ [ἐντα], ‘It is not *hosiē* for a stranger to enter’. *IG* XII 1; *Lindos* II, 26 (c.400) Ὑακιν[θίω]ν ἐνδε-κάται Διὶ Ἀμαλῶ[ι]/ κάπρος ἐξάμην[ος]/ θύει ἱεροθύτας /Αἰγῆλιος. γυναιξί/ ὅκ ὅσα. ‘On the 11th of Hyakinthios; to Zeus Amalos; a boar six months old; the sacrificing priest made the offering, an Aigelian. For a woman not *hosiē* (to enter and participate in the sacrifice)’. Cf. Graham 1964, 49–51; Peels 2015, 203–4; I have changed the accent in the decree accordingly. Peels 2015, 29–33 observes that the Naupaktos-decree uses *hosiē/a* with accusative (and implied infinitive), whereas the usual form is with dative (it is *hosiē* for someone); she also adds linguistic arguments supporting the reading of ὅσα instead of (*ta*) ὅσα.

⁴⁵ The intention of the decree seems to be to bind the citizens of Naupaktos as strongly as possible to their new *polis*, without cutting the ties with their former *polis* utterly for ever.

⁴⁶ For the evidence underlying this argument, Blok 2017, ch. 3.

⁴⁷ Duploux 2010 shows that names ending on -ῖδαι or -άδαι usually indicate multiple descent in one generation; in the case of ‘anthroponyms’ such as the Asklepiadaí, a group presented itself by such names as ‘heirs’. Of the Homeridaí, we know that some saw themselves (and were seen by others) as descendants of ‘Homer’ in some way, but that some did not, claiming to be Homer’s heirs in their art rather than by some (fictitious) descent (see e.g. Harp. s.v. Ὀμηρίδαι; Schol. Pind. *Nem.* 2.1–2 = Hippostratos *FGrHist* 568 F5) on which West 1999; Duploux 2010, 337–9.

⁴⁸ Origins of *poleis*: Hall 1997a; Kühr 2006; descent as metaphor of identity and claim to status of *poleis* and families at Athens, Blok 2009b. Even colonies that could recollect their foundations in historical time created myths about their origins in these terms, cf. Dougherty 1993; Malkin 1994a.

⁴⁹ For descent as criterion of citizenship Davies 1977; Lambert 1998; Blok 2009b; 2009c, especially in Athens; on descent rules and marriage patterns in Greece, generally Vêrilhac and Vial 1998; Patterson 1998; Wilgaux 2000; 2006; in Athens: Patterson 1990; 2005; Blok 2017, ch. 3.

⁵⁰ In classical Athens: Soph. *OT* 430; Eur. *Heracl.* 185; [Dem.] 59.104; Dem. 23.40; 24.59; 57 *passim*; in (mythical) Sparta: Hdt. 4.145, common descent as the foundation of *metechein*.

⁵¹ For an excellent, concise discussion of these marriage and inheritance patterns, see Patterson 1998, more extensively also on forms of *polis* endogamy prevalent in the classical era, Vêrilhac and Vial 1998.

⁵² Duploux 2006a and 2010 rightly emphasizes that descent claims were

primarily claims to social recognition, especially in the archaic age; Hall 1997a and 2002 argues that descent as component of ethnic identities fostered claims to territorial property and aspirations to visibility. In the comparable case of citizenship, such claims became intertwined with or realized in ‘real’ descent.

⁵³ I discuss these forms of participation concisely in Blok 2013 and extensively in Blok 2017, ch. 5.

⁵⁴ Werlings 2010, 29.

⁵⁵ Gortyn, late seventh century: *Nomima* II, no. 23; mid-sixth century: *Nomima* II, no. 37, etc.; Solon: Martina 1968, F426–63; Leão and Rhodes 2015, Fr. 47a–58, with Lape 2002/3. Naupaktos: see above, n. 43, for the bronze ‘Pappadakis’ on the inheritance rights.

⁵⁶ Athenian Apatouria perhaps derived from Ionia, cf. Hall 2007, 54. The Athenian Apatouria took place in Pyanepsion, named after the festival for Apollo Pyanopsia; the Athenian calendar had no month named after the festival, whereas Miletus and Delos did, *ibid.* and Bickerman 1980, 20; Hannah 2005, 71–82. Linguistic evidence: whereas in all Indo-European languages *phrater* means blood brother, in all Greek dialects it means phratry member, showing that the I-E meaning changed probably at a very early stage (see Lambert 1998, 267–70).

⁵⁷ Most groups based on claims of ‘ancient’ descent in fact emerged *pari passu* with the formation of *polis* structures, as Roussel 1976 argued convincingly for *phylai*, phratries, and other groups, and Bourriot 1976 in particular for the *genē*. As we know them in archaic and especially classical times, these groups certainly did not represent (vestiges of) a primordial tribal past. Nonetheless, evidence points to some elements that may well go back to the Dark Ages, notably a kernel of the phratries (see next note) and of some *genē*; Lambert 1999, and see n. 64.

⁵⁸ Hom. *Il.* 2.362–3: ‘Select men by *phylē* and phratry, Agamemnon, that a phratry will be in action with its phratreres, and a *phylē* with its fellow-*phylai*.’ Cf. Hom. *Il.* 9.63–4.

⁵⁹ IG I³ 104 (ML 86) 16–23; on this law, Stroud 1968; Lambert 1998, 25, 248–9; Phillips 2008.

⁶⁰ RO 1. The Labyadai were presumably a phratry; the extant text of their regulations consists of several parts of various dates, beginning in the late sixth century, see Blok 2006 for all references.

⁶¹ Spartan *phylai*: Tyrtaeus (*fr.* 19 West); Hall 2007; *phylobasileis* as attested in Athens’ *polis* calendar: Lambert 2002. Dreros: *Nomima* I, no. 64.

⁶² Hdt. 5.67. At Athens the ten Cleisthenic *phylai* were added to the Ionian *phylai*, which were never abolished but gradually became obsolete except in cultic contexts; see previous note on *phylobasileis*, and perhaps for phratries, cf. Eur. *Ion* 1575–88.

⁶³ Mythical descent in the sixth-century *Catalogue of women* (Ps-Hesiod); the *Genealogiai* in prose made by Hecataeus of Miletus (*FGrHist* 1 F13–35) on the (mythological) origins of the aristocracies of Thessaly, Argos, and Sparta; Acusilaus of Argos (*FGrHist* 2) F2 on the Homeridai, and F23–8 on the aristocracy of Argos, etc. Stories of prominent Athenian families (Thomas 1989), Argive genealogies (Hall 1997a); construction of ‘aristocratic’ families in archaic Greece, Duploux 2006a, ch. 1.

⁶⁴ On the *genē* generally, Parker 1996, 56–66 and lists of *genē* in appendix 2. For descent rules of the *genē* and inheritance of rights in the female line, Blok 2009c; genealogical lists of *genē*, Blok and Lambert 2009. *Ithageneis*, an adjective applied to individual Athenian *genē* in Hesychius’ lexicon, and further Hesych. (also Suda) s.v. γεννήται· οἱ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους μετέχοντες καὶ ἄνωθεν ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς σχόντες κοινὰ ἱερά. οἱ δὲ ὁμογάλακτας καὶ φράτορας συγγενεῖς τοὺς γεννήτας. ‘*Gennētai*: those who are members of the same *genos* and have from the very beginning held cults in

common. Others call the *gennētai homogalaktes* as related *phrateres*.⁶⁵ For the first instance of *ithagenēs*, see below, n. 67; *ithageneis* as underpinning of the claims of the *genē*, Blok 2009b. *Genē* as aristocracy of birth: Lambert 2015, on the composition of the *genē*, Bourriot 1976, 1216–34; Parker 1996, 60–2; Lambert 1999; Smith 2006, 114–40. For theories on the origins of the *genē*, Lambert 1999.

⁶⁵ Martina 1968, F492 (= Athen. 6.234f). Access to their cultic roles is highly likely to have been based on inherited eligibility already in the seventh century (Blok 2009b) and their name ‘Kerykes’ was clearly derived from their function; yet later it was taken to mean descent from Keryx, a son of Hermes and a daughter of Cecrops (Androton *FGrHist* 324 F1) or of Aglauros and Hermes (according to the Kerykes) or Aglauros and a descendant of Eumolpos, the acclaimed forebear of the Eumolpidai, another important *genos* at Eleusis (Andron *FGrHist* 10 F13; Paus. 1.38.3). The process nicely illustrates Duplouy’s point (2006a, 46–8; 2010, 316–21) that claims of descent from illustrious forebears increased over the years.

⁶⁶ Hom. *Il.* 15.185–221; λαγχάνω: 190–2; ὁμότιμος: 186; τιμή of each: 189; μοῖρα of each: 195, 206; ἰσόμορον καὶ ὁμῇ πεπρωμένον αἴσῃ: 209. In this scene, the poet implicitly alludes to earlier discord among the gods, whereas now order has been created in the cosmos by equal division. This scene shows similarities with the division of the world between the gods in Mesopotamia (as observed by Burkert 1992, 90–1; West 1997, 109–10) but in the Homeric setting this division typically concerns an inheritance in equal parts, precluding one heir’s possessing the highest rank, as was the rule among the Mesopotamian gods. For a comparison between Greek and Mesopotamian systems of division and exchange, Seaford 2004, 68–87.

⁶⁷ Hom. *Od.* 14.191–210: πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι/ υἷες ἐνὶ μεγάρῳ ἡμὲν τράφον ἥδ’ ἐγένοντο γνήσιοι ἐξ Ἀλόχου· ἐμὲ δ’ ὠνητὴ τέκε μήτηρ/ παλλακίς, ἀλλὰ με ἴσον θαιγενέεσσιν ἔτιμα Κἄστωρ; [...] τοὶ δὲ ζωὴν ἐδάσαντο / παῖδες ὑπέρθυμοι καὶ ἐπὶ κλήρους ἐβάλλοντο.

⁶⁸ In Hom. *Il.* 16.441, 22.170, the principle of division (*moira*, *aisa*) is rendered as a force to whose powers Zeus has to submit, but elsewhere Zeus himself directs the division and partitioning (9.608; 17.321); on these, as on many related themes, the epic tradition is not unequivocal (cf. Sarischoulis 2008). Cf. a fragmentary law of Gortyn with the same vocabulary, making provisions of *isomoiria* for the legitimate children, distinguishing between male and female, and some regulation concerning the maternal inheritance, (IC IV 20; seventh–sixth c.): [...] ρμον | κᾶπον | αἱ δὲ [... F]ισφῶ / μοιρ[ον...] | οἱ γνήσιοι | ὅτερο[...] [...] ἔρσ)ενα | ἀναίρεσθ[αι...] ἥλε/τα | [...] α | καὶ τὰ ματρῶα | [...]. For *klēros*, *klērōsis* and *timai*, Blok 2017, ch. 5; see also Berman 2007. Primogeniture is exceptionally recorded in grants of *sitēsis* ([Plut.] *X orat.* 843c, 851f); cf. Blok and van ’t Wout 2017. For the role of the gods in guiding the lot, also Bers 2000; Sarischoulis 2008; on Zeus Linke 2006.

⁶⁹ For the political effect of the composition and size of the groups, Demont 2001. Subgroups of the *polis* claiming ‘high’ birth (on which Duplouy 2006a, 44–56; 2010, 318–23) by this strategy could divide benefits amongst them by lot.

⁷⁰ A second influence in the conception of equality may have been the division of equal shares in sacrificial meat. The formative role of sacrificial shares for other contexts of division and distribution has long been recognized, see e.g. Laum 1924; Borecky 1963; Baudy 1983; Schmitt-Pantel 1990a; Seaford 2004, 39–52. Classical evidence shows that the favourite pieces chosen as *geras* (piece of honour) were the parts that looked and tasted the best: the head or tongue, the upper shoulder and back area, and the back leg (*skelos*), a part commonly selected for priest(esse)s. The rest of the meat was divided among the worshippers in equal parts, as testified in inscribed decrees and calendars and osteological evidence (marks of butcher’s cuts on bones), Ekroth 2008, 282–3. Yet a significant feature of archaic feasting was creating and reinforcing differences in rank; equal portions of meat are in that

context rather unlikely, or only feasible within a subgroup of the wider community.

⁷¹ On *nomos*, *thesmos*, *themis*, Ostwald 1969; Hölkeskamp 2002; for *themis* and *hosiē* between oral and written, Blok 2011. Gagarin 2008 ascribes the existence of written laws to a growing population with more interaction between communities, but laws existed beyond written specimens; cf. Thomas 1995; Papakonstantinou 2008, 155–6.

⁷² For legislative bodies in archaic *poleis*, Gehrke 1993; Hölkeskamp 1994; 1999; Osborne 1997; written laws do not imply ‘democratic’ political structures, Whitley 1997, but Harris 2006 points to accountability of magistrates towards the *dēmos* as typical of (archaic) Greece compared to the concept of law in the Ancient Near East.

⁷³ *Nomima* I, no. 1 (IC IV 13) Gortyn, seventh c.: in line b.1 a ξενοδόκος figures, in line g-h. 2 φαστίαν δίκαν; no. 17 Elis (IVO 22) c.500: line a, 5: χρήματα δαμεῖνέτο; no. 41 (SEG 9.3) Cyrene (oath of the colonists): χρήματα ἔστω δαμόσια. For the meaning of the contrast pair *astos*—*xenos* for notions of citizenship, Blok 2017, ch. 4. *Dēmosios* means ‘of the *dēmos*’ without an inherent reference to democratic politics (Fouchard 1998) but with the entitlement of the *dēmos* to ownership it implies (some) authority.

⁷⁴ *Nomima* I, no. 81 Dreros c.650: ἄδ’ ἔφαδε πόλι· ἐπεὶ κα κοσμησίε, ‘The *polis* decides this; when someone has been *kosmos*’ etc. Compare representation: *Nomima* I, no. 22 (Arcades; c.500): Θιοί· ἔφαδε Δαταλεῦσι καὶ ἐσπένσαμες πόλις Σπενσιθίωι ἀπὸ πυλᾶν πέντε ἀπ’ ἐκάστας etc. ‘Gods. The *Dataleis* have decided and the *polis*, solemnly pledged, five from each *phylē*, to grant to *Spensithios*’ etc.

⁷⁵ The long-standing idea of a strong middling group of farmers as the political backbone of the *polis* is undercut by economic arguments, at least for Attica (Foxhall 1997; van Wees 2006b). For assemblies of the whole *dēmos*, Robinson 1997; Werlings 2010, 223–30, 272–82, but see Hammer 2005 for archaic political practice as ‘plebiscitary politics’.

⁷⁶ Crete, SEG 27.631, *Nomima* I, no. 22, c.500, 1–10: τὰ δαμόσια τὰ τε θιῖα καὶ τανθρώπινα. Gortyn code: IC IV 72.10.42–43: τὰ θῖνα καὶ τὰ ανθρώπινα. On these clauses, Gagarin 2011; Blok 2011.

⁷⁷ Isae. 7.30–2; cf. Parker 2005, 32–6 for this issue and further evidence; he points to the fact that the household gods were a subset of the *polis theoi patrōioi*, though the terminology of the covenant is mine. Likewise, squandering one’s inheritance was considered not only a private disgrace but also an affront to the communal interest, Isae. 9.31–5.

⁷⁸ E.g. Gortyn, IC IV 3 (seventh–sixth century); IC IV 25 (sacrificial calendar?), with in l. c.1 δᾱμος; Megara Hyblaea (first half sixth century), Lupu 2005, no. 25 (= SEG 26.1084).

⁷⁹ See the Nottingham Oath project <http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/Classics/Research/projects/oaths/intro.aspx> and the contributions to Sommerstein and Fletcher 2007.

⁸⁰ Cole 1996.

⁸¹ SEG 51.642; of both groups the women (l. 3–7) and the men pledged themselves, though only fragments of the oath remain. The explicit participation of the women may point here to a *sympoliteia* that emphatically included intermarriage, but the text does not reveal which type of bond was forged between the two groups, a bond that is further attested by joint dedications at Delphi (FD III 4.1) and Olympia (IG IX 1² 3.656). According to Thucydides (1.103), Athens had taken Naupaktos and settled there the Messenians who after their rebellion from Sparta received refuge at Athens in c.455. Most scholars see the oath as sealing the bond on this settlement, but A.P. Matthaiou (*Horos* 14–16 (2000–3), 433–54, *non vidi*, see SEG 51.642) argues for a date c.430–420 based on the Ionian alphabet and the letter forms of the inscription and on the enmity that initially must have existed between

the two groups. The latter situation, though plausible, is not the only possibility, considering the fear of Sparta they shared; it was the Spartans, not the Naupaktians, who expelled the Messenians from Naupaktos in 401 (Diod. Sic. 14.34.3).

⁸² Cyrene: *SEG* 9.3 = ML 5.45–6: πάντες συνενθόντες καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ γυναῖκες καὶ παῖδες καὶ παιδίσκαι. l. 48–51 preservation or destruction, l. 50–1 πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ. On the date of the oath included in a fourth-century inscription, most scholars now agree that the written text preserves a genuine oral tradition, though not every word goes back to the seventh century; Jeffery 1961; Letoublon 1989; Giangiulio 2001b. On the strategies in oaths (i.e. Cyrene and the founding oath of Brea, *IG* I³ 46 = ML 46) using *atimia*-terminology to be binding, van ‘t Wout 2011.

⁸³ References to male and female citizens, e.g. Sicily (*Decreti di Entella* A3 (IX Nenci) 9.11–12) an honorific and *isopoliteia*-decree of the late third century): ἀλόντων ἁμῖν τῷ πολιτῶν πολλῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν ἐβοαθήσαν αὐτοῖς καθὰ ἐδύναντο; Miletus, a decree concerning citizens donating money to the *polis* (McCabe, Miletus 41.8; late third century): τοὺς μὲν βουλομένους τῷ πολιτῶν ἢ πολιτίδων δοῦνα[ι] τῇ πόλει δραχμὰς τρισχιλίας ἑξακοσίας.

Citizens and Soldiers in Archaic Athens

Hans van Wees

In 457 BC, the Athenian assembly gave the general Myronides permission to conscript a force of citizen hoplites for an invasion of Boiotia. When some of the conscripts failed to muster at the appointed time and place, Myronides decided that these ‘ignoble and cowardly’ latecomers were not worth waiting for, so he crossed into Boiotia with only those men whose readiness to turn up promptly guaranteed that ‘in war they would not abandon their assigned place (*taxis*)’ (Diod. Sic. 11.81.4–6). They won the battle of Oinophyta and conquered Boiotia. Next year, the Athenians decided to send a fleet to attack the territory of Sparta itself, and allowed the general Tolmides to conscript a force of 1,000 hoplites. Tolmides told those liable for service that they were about to be conscripted ‘but that it would be better to serve as a volunteer than to be seen to be coerced by enlistment’. As a result, thousands of volunteers turned up, and after also conscripting the number originally allocated to him, Tolmides set off with a force of 4,000 hoplites (Diod. Sic. 11.84.4), which raided Laconia and famously set fire to the Spartan dockyards. These two anecdotes not only represent the earliest campaigns about which we are explicitly told that they relied on selective conscription,¹ but also neatly illustrate complex attitudes towards compulsory military service. On the one hand, a citizen who failed to do his military duty might well be allowed to get away with it rather than face a court martial; on the other hand, a citizen was under moral pressure to do more than his minimal legal duty and to volunteer for additional service.²

Classical Athens struck a delicate balance in imposing military (and

fiscal) obligations on its citizens by law while relying to a large extent, not on coercion, but on willingness to ‘perform’ one’s roles as a citizen, and indeed on the eagerness of some citizens to go the extra mile and outperform their peers.³ Nevertheless, access to citizenship was regulated by formal procedures as well as by acceptance by the rest of the group; citizen rights and duties were stipulated in written law as well as agreed by convention; the rules could be enforced by institutional authorities applying legal sanctions, rather than by peer pressure only. Citizenship in classical Athens was a legal status and the citizens constituted an ‘order’ defined by law (Finley 1973a, 47–51), rather than a ‘status group’ defined by peer interaction.

This ‘order’ of citizens did not exist from time immemorial but was the product of a long process of state formation, which saw the gradual replacement of informal and personal power relations, fluid structures, moral obligations, and peer pressure—typical of pre-state communities—by the kinds of formal and public power, institutional structures, legal rights and duties, and judicial coercion that are characteristic of the developed state. In the earliest stages of the process, citizenship will not have been a meaningful concept, and other forms of identity and belonging were no doubt more significant; at later stages, when citizenship did come into existence, it may initially have taken forms quite different from its late fifth- and fourth-century incarnations. The challenge is to determine, despite the severe limitations of the evidence, when and how citizenship developed between c.750 and 450 BC.

In tackling that challenge, a good deal of scholarship from the 1980s onwards right up to the present volume has taken the view that at Athens and across the Greek world at large, levels of state formation remained very low until the late sixth or early fifth century, and by implication that citizenship remained an essentially fluid and informal status until the end of the archaic period. Specifically with regard to military obligations, it is widely held that at Athens a conscript army did not exist before the reforms of Cleisthenes in 508 BC, and that a public navy was not established until another twenty-five years later by the ship-building programme of Themistocles. Until then, any Athenian military activity is supposed to have been conducted on a personal, irregular, and voluntary basis.⁴

This is not a tenable view, I would argue. While developments in state formation do accelerate in the decades either side of 500 BC, it does not follow that in earlier centuries legal and institutional development was negligible, rather than merely a little less advanced. Contemporary inscriptions show that written law and formal political office existed from at least c.650 BC onwards. We have few details, but that is because the surviving contemporary material is so limited and,

for our purposes, random: in the early archaic period absence of evidence cannot be taken as evidence of absence. As for classical and Hellenistic authors who tell us about archaic laws and institutions, their terminology and interpretations are liable to be anachronistic and some of what they say may be mere speculation, but scholars have been too quick to dismiss these sources out of hand, or given themselves licence to accept or reject such later information to suit a preferred model of archaic history. Instead, we need to judge each piece of information on its own merits. Finally, it is fair to say, as Alain Duplouy does in the introductory chapter to this volume, that traditional scholarship has given too much weight to the ‘formalist’ history of laws and institutions and not enough to the ‘substantivist’ analysis of individual performance, informal group dynamics, and social networks (see Duplouy, this volume, chapter 1, section 6), but this does not mean that we should now concentrate on the latter to the exclusion of the former. We should investigate *both* the informal *and* the formal, legal, institutional aspects of citizenship.

On that basis, I hope to show in what follows that there was indeed a difference between archaic and classical Athenian citizenship in respect of military obligations, but that the difference lay not in greater informality and fluidity, but on the contrary in stricter legal regulation of military and other obligations for the social and political elite, as opposed to the majority of the population whose liability for military service was more limited. From Solon’s reforms onwards, the distinctive archaic form of Athenian citizenship was membership in a hierarchical set of juridical ‘orders’ with precisely defined and differentiated rights and duties, whose significance faded only in the late fifth century with the rise of democratic government.

1. Oligarchy, Democracy, and Civic Military Obligations

The idea that citizenship might have been more stringently regulated in the sixth century than in the fourth century BC may seem counter-intuitive, and to go against the tide of the process of state formation, but a relative lack of regulation was regarded in antiquity as a typical feature of the kind of democratic regime that Athens developed. Under democracy, ‘anyone can do what he likes’ (Plato *Resp.* 557b), even in military matters. Thucydides gave the sentiment a positive spin in Pericles’ Funeral Oration: whereas the Spartans create courage ‘by laborious training’, ‘we have a relaxed lifestyle, yet we are no less prepared to go out and face equally great danger’; ‘we are willing to face danger, not primarily due to law, but to our courageous

character' (2.39.1, 4). Plato offered a sarcastic variation on the theme when he said that 'such a way of life is wonderfully pleasant in the short term': 'there is no compulsion at all in such a city to govern, even if you are fit for government, nor to be governed, if you don't want to, nor to go to war when there is a war on, nor to keep the peace when the others do so' (*Resp.* 557e). By the same token, a citizen in a democracy is free to dedicate himself to warfare on a whim 'if he seeks to emulate some warlike men' (561d). Plutarch tells a moralizing story about the people of democratic Tarentum who lived relaxed lives and ignored warnings that things would change if they accepted Pyrrhus and his army into the city: when Pyrrhus arrived, he imposed and enforced conscription so rigidly that many Tarentines chose to leave their city rather than live in 'slavery' (*Pyrrh.* 13–16.2).⁵

In contrast to the limits of state control over military training, equipment, mobilization, and discipline in democratic cities, oligarchic governments are credited with a greater degree of intervention. Plato's ideal state has compulsory military training (*Leg.* 829a–31b), clear and stringent military regulations (see below, section 2), and a law that anyone who 'makes peace or war privately, without the community' will be punished by death (955c). Aristotle's *Politics* shows that 'oligarchic schemes in legislation' typically imposed strict control on the rich:

With regard to the assembly, all are allowed to take part in meetings, but if they do not attend only the rich are liable to a fine, or a much greater fine; with regard to magistracies, those who meet the property qualification (*timēma*) are not allowed to exempt themselves under oath, but the poor are; with regard to the courts, there is a fine for the rich if they do not serve on the jury, but the poor are scot-free [...]

In the same way they also legislate with regard to ownership of military equipment and exercise in the gymnasium (*peri tou hopla kektēsthai kai tou gymnazesthai*): for the poor are allowed not to own any, but the rich who do not own any are liable to a fine, and if they do not exercise in the gymnasium there is no fine at all for the former, but the rich are liable to a fine so that they will take part on account of this fine, but the others will not take part because they have nothing to fear. (4.1297a17–35)

Note that the 'poor' (*aporoī*) are not excluded from political, judicial, or military roles, but merely exempted from the obligation to serve, which is imposed only on the 'rich men' (*euporoī*) to balance their exclusive full political rights. When Aristotle goes on to say that in democracies 'they do the opposite', he means that there is no compulsion for anyone: no one is fined for avoiding assemblies or jury service but everyone is paid for fulfilling their civic duties (4.1297a36–9). Military duties are not even mentioned here.

From these fifth- and fourth-century characterizations of oligarchy

and democracy we cannot necessarily infer that archaic regimes with restricted political participation operated in the same way as classical oligarchies—though they may have done—but we can conclude that the level of formal regulation of citizen duties in democratic Athens was exceptionally low by classical Greek standards. If we are to avoid the mistake of projecting classical conditions back into the archaic age, then, we should allow for the possibility that in less-democratic archaic Athens standards of regulation were higher rather than lower.

A peculiar feature of the military law of classical Athens hints that legislation was indeed more stringent once: one of its provisions was apparently no longer enforced in the fourth century. The law stipulated three offences:

Solon, the ancient lawgiver, believed that the draft-evader and the man who left his post and the coward alike must be liable to the same penalties [...]

The lawgiver therefore forces the draft-evader and the coward and the man who leaves his post to keep outside the lustral basins of the agora, and does not allow him to be crowned with a wreath or to attend public sacred rites.

(Aeschin. 3.175–6)

The same three offences head a list of crimes which according to Andocides were punishable by loss of citizen rights, without loss of property, before 403 BC (1.74). They are said in a prosecution speech of 395 BC to have been covered by a single statute:

He is the only citizen liable to the whole law, for he could rightly be convicted of draft-evasion insofar as he did not march out amongst you despite having been listed as hoplite; [of leaving his post, insofar as in the infantry]⁶ army he alone did not present himself along with the others to be assigned a post; and of cowardice insofar as he chose to serve in the cavalry when he was obliged to face danger among the hoplites.

(Lys. 14.7)

Although the accused, Alcibiades (Junior), is here said to be guilty of cowardice—and his defence countered that he was not (14.5)—the formal charge brought against him was not ‘cowardice’ (*deilia*), but ‘draft-evasion’ (*astrateia*, 15.1, 4) or ‘leaving his post’ (*lipotaxion*, 15.11).⁷ This is characteristic of fourth-century Athens, where rhetorical claims that one’s opponent was a coward were frequently bandied about in court and assembly, but no one was actually prosecuted for cowardice, only for *astrateia* or *lipotaxion*.

The sole allusions to trials for cowardice at Athens occur in Aristophanes’ comedies: Dicaeopolis in *Acharnians* (1129) and Paphlagon in *Knights* (368) are threatened with prosecution on this charge, which shows that in the early years of the Peloponnesian War (425 and 424 BC) this was at least conceivable. Two prosecutions from 330 BC show that a century later this was no longer an option. The

orator Lysurgus claimed that Leocrates was a coward (1.130, 132) and a traitor (1.59, 68, 149) for leaving Athens after the battle of Chaeronea eight years earlier, but rather than prosecute him on these charges, he chose to accuse him of ‘draft-evasion’ (*astrateia*) and ‘leaving his post’ (*lipotaxion*, 1.147; cf. 1.8–9, 76–8). By Lysurgus’ own admission, this stretched the interpretation of the law so far that it required the assembly to act as ‘lawgivers’ and set a new precedent (1.9)—yet he preferred this strained charge to a simple accusation of cowardice. In the same year, Aeschines, arguing that Demosthenes should lose his citizen-rights as punishment for alleged cowardice at Chaeronea, felt the need to explain the legal basis for this claim, citing the legislation of ‘Solon, the ancient lawgiver’, as quoted above, and commenting:

‘Yes, there are public suits for cowardice (*graphai deilias*). Some of you may be surprised that there are public suits against nature (*phuseōs*). There are!’

(Aeschin. 3.175)

He evidently assumed that his audience no longer thought of ‘cowardice’ as a meaningful category in law: they saw it as a generic character trait which could not in itself be liable to prosecution and was only an offence insofar as it took the form of specific kinds of behaviour, such as draft-evasion or leaving one’s post.

Accordingly, the military regulations in Plato’s *Laws* (943a–45b) do not include a law on cowardice in general, but only specific laws on draft-evasion, desertion, and throwing away one’s shield, all in sharply defined circumstances (see below, section 2). Around the time *Laws* was completed, an Athenian expedition to Tamynae in Euboea apparently haemorrhaged manpower—perhaps because it was early in the year and many citizens were in a hurry to get back to Athens to celebrate the Dionysia festival—but all the charges brought in connection with this and earlier fourth-century campaigns were of draft-evasion or leaving one’s post, not cowardice, and hardly any were seriously pursued or enforced.⁸ In 349 BC, Demosthenes went so far as to advocate a legal reform in order to improve Athens’ military efficiency: ‘some of the laws concerning those who go on campaign’, he argued, should be repealed, because these ‘make those who are disorderly go scot-free’ (3.10–11).

Xenophon reflected this Athenian attitude a few decades earlier when he wrote that in Sparta cowards were made to suffer, but in ‘other cities’, ‘when a man is proved a coward, the only consequence is that he is called a coward. He goes to the same market as the brave man, sits beside him, and frequents the same gymnasium, if he chooses’ (*Lac.* 9.3–4). This statement may sound like a rhetorical exaggeration but is in fact very nearly true if, as we have suggested,

‘cowardice’ as such was no longer prosecuted, and other disciplinary offences, if prosecuted, were only haphazardly enforced, if at all. This brings us back full circle to the prosecution of Alcibiades in 395 BC, where we already see signs that the established law on military offences was no longer in tune with contemporary attitudes. Prosecution and defence debated what the law actually meant (Lys. 14.5–6; see further below, section 2), and the prosecutor told the jury that they would be acting as ‘lawgivers’ insofar as their verdict would set a precedent for the future interpretation of the law (14.4). Moreover, the prosecutor anticipated that the jury would hesitate to convict because they felt that ‘the law was too strong’ and ‘the punishment was too great’, so on that point he changed tack and told the jurors that they were *not* lawgivers and should simply enforce the rules (15.9).

In short, a law regulating military discipline had been established before 403 BC but was regarded as problematic by 395 BC and barely enforced in the fourth century; its broadest offence, ‘cowardice’, was apparently no longer deemed a viable legal charge at all. A parallel development may be seen in the disciplinary powers of the generals and cavalry commanders, who, ‘when they lead an expedition, have the authority to imprison a disorderly man (*ataktōn*) and to bar him from service and to impose a fine, but they do not usually impose fines’ (*Ath. Pol.* 61.2, 4). Just as the legal obligations of the soldiers were not strictly enforced, the legal powers of the officers were not strictly applied in Aristotle’s day, and we hear of some very mildly punished instances of extreme indiscipline which suggest that the same was true already in the early fourth century.⁹

Fourth-century Athens thus had laws governing military obligations and discipline which were out of touch with common attitudes—attitudes exemplifying the ‘laxity’ in military and other matters that critics regarded as characteristic of democratic regimes. As suggested, then, we should not assume that the process of state formation always entailed a linear development towards ever greater legal regulation of citizen duties: while the rules are likely to have become increasingly formal and precise, they did not necessarily become more comprehensive or demanding.¹⁰ We may further conclude that Athens’ military laws must have been first enacted at a time when Athens was less democratic than it was in the fourth century. In all likelihood this will take us back to a time before the democratic reforms of Ephialtes and Pericles. The latest plausible date would be the reforms of Cleisthenes, but a closer look at the law will show that it may well date further back and could indeed be the work of ‘Solon, the ancient lawgiver’ to whom Aeschines attributed this legislation.¹¹

2. CIVIC MILITARY DUTIES IN CLASSICAL AND ARCHAIC LAW

What exactly was the scope and purpose of military law in classical Athens? Most informative here is Andocides' list of offenders disenfranchised before 403 BC:

All who left their post, or were convicted of *astrateia* or *deilia* or *anaumachia*, or threw away their shields, or were convicted of three times bearing false witness or three times issuing a false summons, or maltreated their parents—all of these were deprived of citizen rights (*atimoi*) but kept their property. (Andoc. 1.74)

We have already seen that the first three of these offences were covered by a single law, not three separate statutes, and that the third element, 'cowardice', was later regarded as too generic to be a viable basis of legal action, an aspect of a man's 'nature' rather than a form of illegal behaviour. The remaining two military offences, *anaumachia* ('failure to fight in naval battle'), and throwing away one's shield, might in principle have been liable to punishment under the same law, as forms of cowardice or 'leaving one's post', but the latter offence, at any rate, does seem to have been the subject of a separate law, to which I shall return.

The most striking feature of the law on *astrateia*—as I shall call it for convenience—is the very wide scope created by the inclusion of three named offences and reinforced by the vagueness of all three. The terms *astrateia* and *lipotaxion* were almost as ill-defined as cowardice. Plato's *Laws* admittedly defined the two terms unambiguously as respectively draft-evasion and desertion,¹² but normal Athenian usage was not so clear, and indeed Plato may have been responding to this lack of clarity. *Astrateia* literally means 'not serving in a campaign', and could be used for 'freedom from having to serve'¹³ as well as 'refusal to serve'; in principle therefore *astrateia* could cover any form of absence from the army. *Lipotaxion* was even more ambiguous, since the meaning of 'leaving one's post' depended on what 'post' (*taxis*) one had in mind: a man's individual position in a rank-and-file formation; his allocation to a unit or ship; his place in infantry, cavalry, or navy.¹⁴ Even evading the draft altogether could be labelled *lipotaxion*. In 361 BC a decree of the Athenian assembly convicted of 'leaving their post' all trierarchs who had stayed at home and had hired substitutes to captain their ships (Dem. 51.8). Similarly, Boiotos was charged in 348 BC with *lipotaxion* because he failed to join the army and stayed in Athens (Dem. 39.16–17).¹⁵

In one exceptional passage, *lipotaxion* is much more narrowly defined—more narrowly even than by Plato. In the trial of Alcibiades, the defence offered a highly restrictive interpretation of the offence which was indignantly rejected by the prosecutor:

some have the nerve to say that no one could be charged with *lipotaxion* or cowardice because no battle has taken place, and the law commands that if a man leaves his post to go towards the rear on account of cowardice while the others are fighting, on that man the soldiers should sit in judgement. (Lys. 14.5)

The text from ‘if a man leaves his post’ onwards sounds as if it might be a direct quotation of the law, and accordingly it has been argued that *lipotaxion* was confined to leaving the ranks during battle.¹⁶ But this is impossible. First, it is contradicted by the examples already cited of *lipotaxion* being used as a term for draft-evasion, and by other law court speeches which clearly use the term in a much wider sense.¹⁷ Secondly, on this narrow reading the law would have imposed a penalty for flight from combat but bizarrely not for outright desertion from the army.¹⁸ Finally, if the scope of the offence was so clearly limited, the prosecutor in Alcibiades’ case could hardly have even considered arguing that Alcibiades’ actions (Lys. 14.7; 15.6)—transferring himself from infantry to cavalry—qualified as *lipotaxion* and cowardice. Everything thus suggests that the prosecutor was right to insist that the law had a much wider scope, even if it also *included* retreat during combat: ‘You hear, gentlemen of the jury, that the law applies to both those who retreat to the rear during battle *and* those who are not present in the infantry army.’¹⁹

We may conclude that *lipotaxion* and *astrateia* were broad terms which overlapped with one another and with ‘cowardice’,²⁰ and that the law was so vaguely formulated that it was open to quite different, minimalist and maximalist, interpretations. I would suggest that the law was broad and repetitive in its terminology because it was intended to be comprehensive, to cover all conceivable military offences from draft-dodging to desertion via any lesser shortfall in meeting one’s military obligations. Even acts of insubordination were potentially covered: we know that in Sparta, at any rate, disobedience to orders could be prosecuted as a form of ‘cowardice’ (Thuc. 5.72.1). If even the relatively hierarchical Spartans preferred not to penalize insubordination as such but to focus on the cowardice that supposedly motivated disobedience, the same will have been true of the Athenians and other Greeks who adopted a more egalitarian view of military and political authority. The oath sworn by young men on first joining the Athenian militia, cited by Lycurgus in his discussion of ‘leaving one’s post’ (1.77), said nothing about obeying orders but promised merely ‘not to abandon the man who stands beside me’.²¹ The Athenian law on military offences surely took the same egalitarian approach and included insubordination along with other offences under the rubrics of ‘leaving one’s post’ and ‘cowardice’.

Even if Alcibiades’ defence did not quote the law verbatim, its

skewed paraphrase does offer an important clue to the nature of the law, insofar as it apparently said that ‘if a man’ committed any of a wide range of military offences ‘the soldiers should sit in judgement’ (Lys. 14.5). In other words, the purpose of the law was not to define an offence but to prescribe a procedure: it specified which court should deal with such cases. From Aeschines’ reference to the law we know that it also specified a legal procedure, namely the public written charge (*graphē*), as well as a penalty, namely loss of citizen rights (*atimia*) in the form of being banned from the agora and public sacrifices (3.175–6, cited above). These details of procedure and punishment are confirmed by other evidence.²² In its use of the public *graphē* and its allocation of jurisdiction to a popular court—the assembled soldiers—the *astrateia*-law featured the two key elements associated with Solon’s legal reforms, and could thus in principle go back to Solon’s day.²³ Perhaps this law instituted for the first time a legal procedure for behaviour that had previously been punished by informal means; alternatively, it may merely have replaced an older legal procedure.

Of the two remaining military offences in Andocides’ catalogue, *anaumachia* occurs in no other source, except later lexica which explicitly cite Andocides and define it as refusal by a ship’s captain to take his vessel into action.²⁴ This offence might have been subsumed under *astrateia*, *deilia*, or *lipotaxion*,²⁵ but was perhaps singled out for separate legislation because a captain’s actions would have more dramatic consequences than individual cowardice: he could single-handedly prevent an entire crew of up to 200 men from taking part in battle.

‘Throwing away one’s shield’ (*tēn aspida apoballein*), colloquially known also as ‘flinging away one’s shield’ (*tēn aspida rhiptein*), might also have been covered by ‘cowardice’, but it has generally been thought that this was made a distinct offence because it endangered the cohesion of the entire hoplite phalanx. The assumption is that one could not run with a hoplite shield but would drop it as soon as one turned to flight: the offence would thus have been the same as *lipotaxion* in the narrowest sense: retreating from combat.²⁶ This is disproved, however, by Plato’s insistence that losing one’s equipment is often perfectly pardonable and that it is shameful and liable to punishment only in one particular set of circumstances, namely ‘when a man is overtaken by the enemy and, although he is armed (*echōn hopla*), does not turn around to defend himself but voluntarily drops or throws away his equipment’ (Leg. 944c). Here, preserving the cohesion of the phalanx is clearly not the issue: the battle has already been lost, and a soldier in retreat or flight is about to be caught by a pursuing enemy. One might think that at this stage, with defeat

already sealed, saving one's life at the cost of losing one's shield was a sensible option, as indeed the poets Archilochus (*fr.* 5 West) and Alcaeus (*fr.* 438a L-P) proclaimed, and yet this is what the law forbade.

Moreover, the law seems to have referred not only to shields but to 'throwing away one's military equipment' (*ta hopla*). The passages in Lysias that referred primarily to the legal position, rather than to the act in battle, speak of 'the equipment' at large, not just the shield. Plato, too, in formulating an analogous law, spoke of *ta hopla* in the plural.²⁷ In practice of course the shield was the heaviest and most awkward piece of equipment, the first or only thing to be jettisoned, but it is significant that these laws did not privilege it.

What emerges is not a law with a tactical purpose, but a law enshrining the supreme value of arms and armour, which a citizen must never surrender. Accordingly, a false accusation that a man had abandoned his arms was liable to be prosecuted under the law of slander, which tabooed this allegation as one of the most serious insults, along with 'murderer' and 'father- or mother-beater' (Lys. 10.6–9, 12) but not, so far as we can tell, with allegations that a man had failed in any other military duty. This confirms the particular shame attached to the offence. In the same vein, the first words of the oath of the Athenian ephebes were: 'I shall not shame the sacred arms' (*ta hiera hopla*; RO 88.6–7). For Plato, jettisoning one's equipment was a more shameful offence than draft-dodging or deserting, which in an ideal world would be punished by being turned into a woman (*Leg.* 943d–44b).²⁸

The principle that military equipment should never be given up extended beyond the battlefield: archaic laws banned handing over arms and armour as security for loans.

Not without reason some blame the majority of Greek lawgivers, who prohibited taking as security for a loan military equipment and the plough and other most vital necessities, yet allowed the people who used these to be seized.

(Diod. Sic. 1.79.5)

'The majority of lawgivers' here may have included Draco at Athens, whose laws allowed the sale into slavery of persons as security for debt, before Solon abolished this custom.²⁹ If a ban on securing loans on military equipment was once in force at Athens, it had evidently lapsed by the early fourth century, since we hear of men forced by poverty to pawn their cuirasses and shields (*Ar. Plut.* 451).³⁰

An important clue to the date at which abandoning one's arms and armour became an offence lies in its appearance in the law of slander. This law must go back to Solon, because the original version imposed

a fine of only 5 drachmas, a tiny sum which makes sense only in an early sixth-century context, before the widespread adoption of coinage reduced the value of silver; in the fourth century, the fine was 500 dr.³¹ If the accusation of abandoning arms and armour was the subject of early sixth-century legislation, then the act itself must surely also have been made liable to legal punishment at this time.

If so, this legislation against the surrender of military equipment was a notable innovation. The evidence of Archilochus and Alcaeus shows that down to c.600 BC, abandoning one's shield was not yet generally regarded as a crime. Archilochus' assertion that he did not care that he had dropped his shield to save his life (*fr.* 5 West) could perhaps be dismissed as a deliberately scandalous claim, appropriate to the genre of iambic song, but the same cannot be said for the elegy in which Alcaeus asked his friend Melanippus to tell people back home in Mytilene: 'Alcaeus is safe, but [his armour] men from Attica hung up in Athena's temple' (*fr.* 438a L-P). Neither the genre, the rest of this poet's oeuvre, nor the sentiment of the verses suggests any sort of mockery or defiance of convention, let alone a confession to a crime. What exactly the Athenians dedicated in Athena's temple at Sigeion is obscured by a serious corruption of the verse, but all three surviving ancient paraphrases of the text say that Alcaeus threw away 'his equipment' (*ta hopla*) in the plural, as in the Athenian law.³² An early sixth-century ban on discarding military equipment was thus something quite new.

This explains what would otherwise have been a puzzle: what was the point of a separate law on abandoning military equipment, with a corollary in the law of slander, given that this was the ultimate act of cowardice and thus clearly a form of *deilia* covered by the law on *astrateia*? I suggest that, while the *astrateia* law introduced a new procedure for existing offences, the present law and the law on slander were substantive rather than procedural: they formally defined as illegal actions which had previously been merely shameful.³³

Completing the legal provisions attested in classical Athens are further procedural laws which reinforced the punishment of loss of citizen rights. Persons convicted of military offences who were caught illegally entering the agora or attending sacrifices could be 'bound' and brought before the Heliaea court to suffer further punishment.³⁴ A speaker in assembly who had avoided the draft or thrown away his shield (or maltreated his parents, prostituted himself, or wasted his inheritance) but had not been prosecuted, or had got away with ignoring the verdict, could be denounced on the spot and prevented from addressing the people.³⁵ Aeschines' attribution of this and related laws to 'Solon, the ancient lawgiver, and Draco and the lawgivers of those days' (1.6) may not inspire confidence, but on the

other hand the provisions of the law are neatly complementary to those of the *astrateia* and slander laws and may have been enacted at the same time, as part of systematic legislation on a citizen's military and other duties.³⁶

So much for military laws attested in classical Athens which may go back to the archaic period and to Solon. In addition, we have evidence for archaic laws which were no longer valid in the classical period, regulating the provision of arms and armour, horses and ships by citizens. A duty to provide arms and armour is attested in the oldest surviving inscribed public Athenian decree, dated to c.500 BC. This decree sets out the obligations of Athenian settlers on Salamis, who must 'pay taxes and perform militar[y service]' and '[themselves] p[rovi]de military equipment [worth t]hir[t]y dr[achmas]', to be inspected by the local magistrate (*IG I³ 1.3, 8-12*).³⁷ Likely restorations of the damaged text suggest that these duties also applied at Athens.³⁸ In view of the date, one could take this obligation as an innovation introduced by Cleisthenes' reforms in 508 BC, but in that case it would be surprising that not a single classical text refers to a legally prescribed minimum value of the military equipment a citizen was required to own. In the light of this silence and of Aristotle's observation (cited above) that a legal obligation to acquire arms and armour was typical of oligarchies but not democracies, it seems more likely that our inscription represents pre-democratic practice, still in use in Cleisthenes' day, but no longer enforced by the late fifth century.

The system of property classes which Solon is said to have used to allocate a range of political rights on the basis of wealth is likely also to have served to allocate a range of military obligations, as we shall see. By making hoplite service obligatory for the three highest property classes, this system made ownership of arms and armour compulsory for men at this economic level, and it would have been only a small step further to define an acceptable minimum for military equipment. The military role of these property classes is no longer attested after the Peloponnesian War (see below, section 4).

Already under Solon, Athens had a body of officials, the *naukraroi*, charged with mobilizing military resources. The *naukraroi* and their districts, the *naukrariai*, featured in several laws which the sources reliably attribute to Solon but were obsolete in the classical period. Later lexicographers mention these officials' military responsibilities:

A *naukraria* was for some time the twelfth part of a tribe, and there were twelve *naukraroi*, four in each 'third'. These men voted on the war tax-levies (*eisphorai*) in the demes and the expenditures from them. Each *naukraria* provided two horses and one ship, after which it was probably named. (Pollux 8.108)³⁹

Since these military roles are not mentioned by earlier sources, many scholars have rejected the lexical evidence as a product of unreliable later speculation, but *naukraros* and *naukraria* can only mean ‘ship’s captain’ and ‘captaincy’ so these institutions must have had a naval function. The omission of this naval role from classical accounts such as the Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia* reflects, I have argued elsewhere, an anti-democratic view which denied the ‘naval mob’ any place in Athens before the Persian Wars. Institutional arrangements for mobilizing warships are well attested in medieval European kingdoms with only a modest level of state formation and there is nothing inherently implausible in their existence in archaic Athens. Since there were four ‘tribes’ in Solon’s day, the ‘captains’ between them provided forty-eight ships in war, compelled ninety-six citizens to serve as cavalry, and raised war taxes.⁴⁰

A further military role is implied by an oral tradition which credited ‘the chiefs of the *naukraroi*’ with leading the Athenian troops in opposing an attempted *coup d’état* by Cylon, a generation before Solon (Hdt. 5.71). The ‘captains’ were evidently responsible for mobilizing infantry as well as cavalry and ships, and could in principle have had the formal authority to enforce an obligation to serve and to provide arms and armour of a certain minimum value.

Finally, the earliest surviving Greek poetry hints at compulsory military service even before Solon and the introduction of written law. There is admittedly no sign of this in the martial exhortations of Callinus or Tyrtaeus, which allude only to the soldier’s fear of shame and hope of fame, but one would not expect to raise morale by threatening punishment.⁴¹ Compulsory service does, however, feature in Homer’s *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.

While the various leaders among the Greeks follow Agamemnon voluntarily, as a favour, the men who follow these leaders in turn include Euchenor of Corinth who went to Troy ‘to avoid the harsh punishment of the Greeks’ (*Il.* 13.663–70) and the son of Polyctor who drew lots with his six brothers to decide which of them would go to Troy with Achilles (24.396–400). Homer’s word for ‘punishment’, *thōē*, is a normal legal term for ‘fine’, and whether or not it already had this meaning in epic, it is clearly a sanction communally imposed by ‘the Greeks’ for failure to serve. The drawing of lots amongst brothers implies that the family was under an obligation to send one, and only one, man to Troy; whether the obligation was to Achilles personally, to king Peleus, or to the community of the Myrmidons, we cannot tell. In the Cretan stories in the *Odyssey*, we hear both of a man embroiled in a violent feud because he refused to go to Troy as a follower of the king (*Od.* 13.256–66) and of a man reluctant to lead troops to Troy but compelled by the community to do so: ‘there was

no way at all to refuse, for harsh was the voice of the people' (14.235–9). Even on the side of the Trojans, threats of coercion reinforce the powerful motive of fighting in self-defence: Hector threatens to kill a man for shirking the fight or encouraging others to hang back (*Il.* 12.248–50). He also says that he 'will not allow' any man to leave the army and that

a Trojan who is excessively concerned about his property must collect it and give it to the people for public consumption [συλλέξας λαοῖσι δότω καταδημοβοῖῃσαι]; better for one of them than for the Greeks to enjoy it. (18.300–02)

This rather obscurely worded passage only makes sense as a threat: a man who deserts to look after his property rather than risk his life in war will be punished with public confiscation of his wealth, which after victory will be enjoyed by another owner.

In sum, military service was not entirely a matter of voluntary participation even in the heroic world of Homer: informal but powerful forms of coercion, including the death penalty for cowardice and confiscation of property for desertion, are attested. Given the importance of warfare, these forms of coercion are likely to have been among the first to be formalized when laws began to be written down from c.650 BC onwards. Accordingly, one would expect the laws of Solon, too, to have addressed such matters, and indeed we find that the law which made it a punishable slander to accuse a man of having abandoned his arms and armour must go back to Solon, as must the law which made it a crime to abandon one's equipment. We cannot independently date the various procedural military laws, but they are attributed to Solon, they prescribe a procedure that features all the elements associated with Solonian legislation, and they must be relatively early since they were out of date by the fourth century. Yet other laws which clearly are of Solonian date testify to the existence of authorities, the 'captains', in charge of mobilizing troops, horses, ships, and money for war. All this amounts to a strong case for the imposition of legal military obligations on citizens in or by 594 BC. We may conclude that in Solon's time, if not before, citizen duties to provide arms and armour, horses and ships were formalized; abandoning one's equipment was criminalized; officers and the assembled militia were given formal legal power to punish men who fell short in any of their military obligations, and supplementary laws deterred false accusations while also imposing additional penalties on those who flouted the verdict of the soldiers.

3. Universal Military Duties: Waging War ‘With The Whole People’ (Pandēmei)

On whom were these various military obligations imposed? The prosecutor of Alcibiades raised this very question and answered with two further rhetorical questions (Lys. 14.6):

Is it not anyone who has the right age? (οὐχ οἵτινες ἂν τὴν ἡλικίαν ταύτην ἔχωσιν;)

Is it not those whom the generals enlist? (οὐχ οὓς ἂν οἱ στρατηγοὶ καταλέξωσιν;)

These two categories, I would argue, do not combine to mean ‘anyone of the right age who is drafted by the generals’—which would be redundant since it surely went without saying that the generals enlisted only men of military age—but refer to two types of levy. In one, ‘anyone of the right age’ was obliged to serve; in the other, only those hand-picked by the generals. Modern scholars have had much to say about the second type, selective conscription by ‘listing’, which supposedly prevailed in fifth-century Athens and was replaced by mobilization ‘by age group’ in the fourth century, but they have virtually ignored the first type, the general levy of ‘the entire people’ (*pandēmei*) or ‘the whole army’ (*panstratiai*),⁴² which is nevertheless well attested in archaic and classical Greece.⁴³ We shall see that the general levy was a major feature of citizens’ military lives, which imposed obligations on all men but only lightly enforced these, while selective conscription imposed stricter obligations, but on far fewer citizens than is usually envisaged.

An Athenian general levy invaded Megara in 431 BC (Thuc. 2.31.1), the largest Athenian army ever assembled, including ‘no fewer than 10,000’ citizen hoplites, ‘no fewer than 3,000’ metic hoplites, ‘besides a large crowd of light-armed’ (*psiloi*, 2.31.2). Comparison with the figures for total Athenian hoplite manpower in that year (2.13.6–7) shows that this levy did not include ‘the oldest and youngest’ who were stationed in forts and on the city walls, and so presumably included only those over twenty and up to about forty years of age.⁴⁴ These *panstratiai* incursions continued twice a year, albeit with shrinking numbers on account of manpower losses to the plague, until 424 BC (4.66.1).

In that year, an Athenian general levy crossed the city’s other border to invade the territory of Tanagra in Boiotia, as it had done at least twice before, in 457 (Thuc. 1.107.5) and 426 BC (3.91.4): ‘Hippocrates mobilized the Athenians *pandēmei*—the Athenians themselves and the metics and any foreigners who were present’

(4.90.1). This again included ‘light-armed’, who were explicitly not specialists but simply ‘many non-hoplites (*aoploi*) who followed since there had been a general levy of the available foreigners and the citizens’. These light-armed were thus ordinary poorer citizens, and their number is said to have been ‘many times’ (*pollaplasioi*) that of the Boiotians (4.94.1), who had ‘more than 10,000 light-armed’ (4.93.3). ‘Many times’ ought to imply more than double the number, which could only be true if light-armed of all ages, not just the twenty–forty-year-olds, joined the levy; alternatively, Thucydides exaggerated and there were at most 15,000 Athenian light-armed.⁴⁵ They would still have outnumbered the hoplites: Thucydides implies that there were at least 7,000 Athenian hoplites (4.93.3, 94.1) and there can have been no more than 10,000.⁴⁶ ‘The majority of the light-armed’ had left the area before the Boiotians counter-attacked, and only ‘a few’ were left (4.90.4, 94.1), but nevertheless ‘a large number of light-armed (*psiloi*) and baggage-carriers (*skeuophoroi*)’ died in battle (4.101.2). This last phrase confirms again that the light-armed were not baggage-carriers, that is, the hoplites’ personal attendants (usually slaves), but soldiers in their own right.⁴⁷ The same was surely true of the ‘crowd’ of light-armed that joined the twice-yearly invasions of Megara.⁴⁸

While it is of course true that Athens conducted many more campaigns during the Peloponnesian War that did not involve general levies, this is hardly surprising given the nature of the conflict as a war for naval hegemony, and we should rather stress that *all* Athens’ acts of aggression against its immediate neighbours during this war were undertaken by general levies. If Athens had not adopted the ‘Periclean strategy’ of offering no full-scale opposition to Peloponnesian invasions of Attica, we would no doubt have seen general levies mobilized in defensive action as well. Our evidence for fourth-century wars is less detailed and likely to understate how common general levies were: it is only due to a chance allusion in Lysias (3.45) that we know the Athenian contingent in the battle of Coroneia in 394 BC to have been a general levy—none of our narrative accounts say so. This general levy did not merely make a quick raid over the border but marched right across Boiotia. Even more remarkably, an Athenian general levy came to the aid of Sparta in 369 BC: in the morning the assembly decided on a *pandēmei* expedition led by Iphicrates and by dinner time ‘12,000 young men’ had gathered at the Academy; ‘they say many came out before Iphicrates himself did’. This force marched all the way to Corinth, and from here made a series of incursions into Arcadia (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.49, 51–2; Diod. Sic. 15.63.2).

Athenian fleets could be mobilized by general levy, too. Near the

start of the Peloponnesian War, fire signals warned the Athenians of a Spartan night attack on Salamis, so that at dawn ‘the whole community’ came running down to the harbour, embarked chaotically, and crossed over to the island (Thuc. 2.94.2); a very similar incident occurred in 411 (Thuc. 8.94.3). The ships that fought the Persians in 480 were manned ‘by the whole community’ (*pandēmei*, Hdt. 7.144.3; Thuc. 1.73.4), but on this occasion there was time to prepare and a more organized procedure was adopted, according to the Decree of Themistocles (ML 23), as inscribed in the third century BC. The generals divided up the citizens and the metics into 200 crews, one for each ship. There were only 100 oarsmen per ship, rather than the normal 170, so it is clear that the generals were not selecting crews but co-ordinating the allocation of as much manpower as Athens could raise at the time. At least part of the shortfall was surely made up by slaves brought along by citizen oarsmen.⁴⁹ This certainly happened at Arginousae in 406, when the Athenians embarked ‘all those who were of military age, both slaves and free men’. This general mobilization was slow—it took thirty days (Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.24)—and produced a low-quality fleet, which was forced to adopt a unique double-line formation to prevent loss of formation (1.6.29–32).⁵⁰

At Salamis and Arginousae, total available citizen manpower was not enough to fill the ships and mobilization was genuinely universal, but most fleets were not quite so large and did not quite need all available manpower, so that a degree of selection took place even when the levy was on such a large scale that it was as good as ‘general’. We hear that ‘the Athenians themselves’ crewed 100 ships in 428 BC (Thuc. 3.16.1), or 83 ships in 394 (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.61; Diod. Sic. 15.34.3–35.2), and these numbers would have required virtually all citizens up to the age of forty to be involved, even if the term ‘general levy’ is not used.⁵¹ Both on land and at sea, Athenian general levies typically mobilized all or almost all free men, citizens, and resident foreigners, regardless of social status or military equipment, and often large numbers of slaves as well. The only restriction seems to have been one of age, judging by Thucydides’ comment that ‘the oldest and the youngest’ stayed at home to guard the walls and forts, leaving the mass invasions of Megara to men up to the age of forty.

Athens was not unusual in this respect. The Spartans raised a general levy, led by one of the kings, five times during the Peloponnesian War. Twice, the levy barely went beyond the borders of Laconia (Thuc. 5.33.1, 54.1), but on two occasions, both in 418 BC, ‘the citizens themselves and the helots marched out *pandēmei*’ (5.57.1, 64.1) to invade Argos and Mantinea respectively, and in 404 BC a general levy marched all the way to Athens, laid siege to the city, and

forced the Athenians to surrender (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.7). An age limit on citizen participation is indicated by the fact that on the expedition against Mantinea one-sixth, 'the oldest and youngest', turned back at the border and went home to defend Sparta (Thuc. 5.64.2–3). The mobilization of the helots is remarkable. Two units of helots equipped as hoplites are mentioned in the Mantinea campaign,⁵² but Thucydides can hardly have been referring to these when he spoke of 'a general levy of helots'.⁵³ He surely implied that a great number of helots took the field, presumably as light-armed rather than as hoplites, since he made no further reference to them in his detailed discussion of hoplite numbers.⁵⁴

An exact parallel occurs in Herodotus' account of the Spartan levy for Plataea in 479 BC. This involved the mobilization of 35,000 light-armed helots, 'every single one equipped for war' (9.29.1; cf. 10.1; 28.2), as well as 5,000 Spartiates. A battlefield grave for the fallen helots proved their presence (9.85). Herodotus implies a contrast with the 'select' *perioikoi* (*logades*) mobilized at the same time (9.11.3), so this force of Spartiates and helots is likely to have been a general levy, as indeed the huge numbers suggest.⁵⁵ It seems likely, therefore, that Spartan general levies normally included large numbers of helots serving as light-armed infantry, just as Athenian mass mobilizations included light-armed citizens and slaves.

Thucydides further describes in some detail the repeated mobilization of a general levy of Syracusans in the face of the Athenian invasion of 415 BC (6.64.1, 3; 65.1; 91.2). The inferior quality of 'men who defend themselves with the entire community' compared to 'selected' troops like the Athenian force is deemed self-evident (6.68.2), and it may have been their lack of confidence as much as their larger number which made the Syracusans adopt a formation twice as deep as that of the enemy (67.2). As in Athens and Sparta, the general levy included light-armed—stone-throwers, slingers, archers—who engaged their Athenian counterparts 'in the usual manner' before the hoplites advanced (6.69.2). The general levies of other Greek states are not described in any detail, but they are mentioned often, taking the field not only in defensive action against invaders,⁵⁶ but also to attack neighbours⁵⁷ and to help distant allies.⁵⁸ In one remarkable instance, a general levy from all cities of Achaia crossed the Corinthian Gulf to invade Acarnania (Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.3). The defeat of an Ambraciot general levy illustrates once more that such forces are of a different order of magnitude from levies by 'listing': Thucydides refused to give the huge number of casualties since no one would believe him (3.105.4, 110.1, 113). The Corinthian general levy again left behind 'the older men' to defend the city, though they might come out in an emergency (Thuc. 4.42.3; 4.44.4).

The age limitation on general levies attested in Athens, Sparta, and Corinth means that such mass mobilizations, reported down to 369 BC in Athens, were fundamentally no different from the supposedly new system of levy 'by age class', attested at Athens from 366 BC onwards. Aeschines says that his first experience of military service occurred in that year, when he went on 'a campaign called "by the sections" (*en tois meresi*)', along with his 'contemporaries' (*hēlikīōtōn*), and that he subsequently also went on 'the other successive expeditions by eponyms and sections' (2.168), as well as further campaigns, including one where he served among the 'picked troops' (*epilektoi*, 2.169). 'The eponyms' were forty-two heroes who gave their names to forty-two year-groups of citizens aged eighteen to fifty-nine, and men could be mobilized by sets of year-group, from eponym A to eponym B (*Ath. Pol.* 53.4, 7), so Aeschines must mean that in his day a set of year-groups was called 'a section', and that mobilization of all men within a certain age class could be variously called 'by sections' and 'by eponyms'.⁵⁹ Plato similarly distinguished between service 'in a section' and service by selective conscription (*Laws* 943a3–4). Several mobilizations by age are attested: in 352, the Athenians planned but failed to send out forty ships manned with citizens up to the age of forty-five (*Dem.* 3.4); in 347, they manned fifty ships with men up to the age of forty (*Aeschin.* 2.133); and in 322, they levied men up to the age of forty for the army (*Diod. Sic.* 18.10.2).

Scholars have assumed that this was a wholly new system of mobilization, which replaced selective conscription by 'listing' not long before 366 BC, and it has been suggested that much smaller expeditionary forces were mobilized in the same way, by calling up only a very few year-groups.⁶⁰ In fact, for smaller forces selective conscription by 'listing' continued to operate until at least 348 BC,⁶¹ and we have no evidence for mobilizations of less than twenty or twenty-five year-groups at a time. Such large, non-selective levies 'by sections' were in effect the same as the earlier 'general levies', typically restricted to the same age range. Indeed, the system of organizing citizens into year-groups with eponymous heroes may go back to the Peloponnesian War, or earlier: it is not mentioned by Thucydides, but we are told that Philochorus' account of fifth-century Athens described it 'in detail', which suggests that he believed it to have been in place already.⁶² Whether or not this is true, the mid-fourth-century system in essence continued the earlier general levy.

The classical general levy in turn continued archaic practice. As noted above, the earliest known event in Athenian history, the attempted *coup d'état* by Cylon in the 630s, involved a *pandēmei* mobilization 'from the countryside' (*Thuc.* 1.126.7) which laid siege to the Acropolis for a few days, before the troops started leaving and

their commanders—the archons according to Thucydides, the ‘chiefs of the *naukraroi*’ according to Herodotus (5.71)—led the remaining soldiers in a massacre of Cylon’s supporters. As Thucydides envisages it, this was clearly not some spontaneous gathering but a formal mobilization, led by the chief magistrates. The detail that many men left before the end may serve to exculpate the majority of citizens from the ‘curse’ attached to the ensuing massacre, but it is also a plausible story about a general levy, which was harder to control and included many poorer men who could not afford a long absence from work and were in a hurry to go home.

Another general levy took place in 546 BC, when Peisistratus and his allies marched from Marathon towards Athens and ‘the Athenians from the city’ responded with a *panstratiiai* mobilization, defeated by a surprise attack on their camp at Pallene (Hdt. 1.62.3). This levy took a long time to materialize, and some Athenians took Peisistratus’ side, but that does not mean it was more voluntary or less formal than any later general levy. Much has been made of Athenian resistance against Isagoras and his Spartan allies in 508 BC, supposedly a uniquely spontaneous democratic uprising, but the precedents of opposition to Cylon and Peisistratus suggest that this, too, was simply a general levy raised by the relevant magistrates to resist an attempted *coup* with external support.⁶³ Whether the Athenian forces that occupied parts of Boiotia in 519 and Chalcis in 506 were general levies we are not told, but given that they must have been large armies, it does seem likely.⁶⁴

At Marathon in 490 BC, the Plataeans came to Athens’ aid *pandēmei* (Hdt. 6.108.1), and one would imagine that the Athenians themselves mobilized *en masse*, too. Herodotus does not say so, but neither does he say that only the hoplites or a more select body marched out: he simply speaks of ‘the Athenians’ throughout (6.103–17).⁶⁵ The number of 9,000 Athenian hoplites at Marathon given by later sources,⁶⁶ like the 8,000 hoplites at Plataea in 479 BC (Hdt. 9.28.6), must have amounted to a general levy of all twenty–forty-year-old hoplites at least, given that two generations later a larger Athens could still muster only 13,000 men in that age group. As for non-hoplites, later tradition said that the levy included even ‘unfit men’ and slaves (Paus. 10.20.2); these slaves were said to have been freed before battle, and slave casualties were given a tomb near the battlefield (Paus. 1.32.5; 7.15.7). If slaves fought, non-hoplite citizens surely also fought at Marathon,⁶⁷ as irregular light-armed, just as they did at Plataea, where light-armed were as numerous as hoplites (Hdt. 9.29.2).

For most of the archaic period, Athenian fleets were not large enough to require a general mobilization, but with the introduction of the trireme in the late sixth century, manpower demands increased, and just before or after Marathon, when the navy reached seventy

triremes, it would have taken almost all citizens aged twenty–forty to man it. But Athens may have already relied on hired oarsmen, including non-citizens, rather than on compulsory mobilization, and the first general naval mobilization may not have taken place until 480 BC.⁶⁸

Over a span of three centuries, we thus see general levies defending Athens, crossing the border into Boiotia, Megara, and Corinth, and occasionally manning fleets to fight on the other side of the Aegean, often if not always including citizens of all classes as well as resident foreigners and slaves, restricted only by age, with forty or forty-five as the upper limit. Spartan general levies marched even farther, and had a higher age limit,⁶⁹ but otherwise the same pattern of age-limited mass mobilization occurred here and elsewhere in Greece.

The sheer scale of such mobilizations, the short time in which they often had to be arranged, and the participation of poor, light-armed citizens who so far as we know were not organized in units under commanders but formed a mere ‘mob’, must have made it hard to exercise control and to ensure that citizens met their obligation to take part.

This is best illustrated by the account of defensive mobilization in Aeneas Tacticus’ *How to Defend a City*. When ‘a message or fire signal’ announces that an enemy has crossed the border, men gather to defend ‘the part of the territory being damaged’ (15.1). At this point, especially if the warning arrives suddenly or at night, the city is in chaos, and it is up to the generals to create a viable army from scratch. Their immediate task is to stop citizens from rushing out in small scattered groups ‘to rescue their possessions from the countryside’ (15.2; 16.2) and to ensure that the men are organized into improvised units: ‘the generals must gather together those who turn up at the gates until a certain number has been reached, a full unit or two units, then organize them and give them a sensible leader’, and only then let them march out, ‘as much as possible in formation’ (*taxis*, 15.3). A series of such ad hoc units are sent out in rapid succession, so that each ‘section’ (*meros*) is close to the others, and all can quickly join forces if necessary without having to ‘come running from far away’ (15.4). Signs are put up at forks in the road and wherever routes diverge, so that ‘those who are left behind’ will not get separated from the rest (15.6). The same kind of gradual, informal mobilization features in a historical example cited by Aeneas: in 376/5 BC, the people of Abdera responded to an invasion by Triballians ‘with all speed, strength and commitment’ (15.9) and, undeterred by initial losses, ‘called out to one another to hurry to the rescue of those who had marched out, until the city was emptied of men’ (15.10).⁷⁰

The generals had to contend not only with citizens excessively eager to fight but also with men who were 'afraid to face danger' or 'completely unprepared' and thus unwilling or unable to march out (16.2). Accordingly, they needed not only to encourage the fearful but also to 'provide equipment for some' (*tous de hoplizonta*, 16.3), presumably by handing out arms and armour from a public store, perhaps an arsenal or more probably a temple, to those 'unprepared' men who turned up at the gates without their own kit.

Although the instructions so far concern the hoplite forces, they were not the only or even the first troops to march out. The generals must send ahead 'the available cavalry and light-armed [*kouphoi*]' to reconnoitre and occupy heights, in order to protect the hoplites (15.5). When the time is right to attack the invaders, the general should use the cavalry to occupy in advance the enemy's lines of retreat, 'set ambushes with the picked troops [*epilektoi*] and show yourself to the enemy with the other light-armed', before finally leading forward the assembled hoplites 'in formation, not far behind the sections sent ahead' (16.7). The picked troops are here evidently envisaged as light-armed and must be either specially trained citizen units or mercenary troops; accordingly, 'the other light-armed' must be the citizens who could not afford to serve as hoplites. These poorer men thus led the way, but were if anything even less regularly organized than the hoplite units which followed.⁷¹

In Aeneas' general defensive levy, everything is improvised, and the same must be true of the times when the Athenians ran down to Peiraeus to launch their ships in a panic, or when 12,000 men marched out in aid of Sparta within hours of the decision to mobilize *en masse*. Even in less hurried general levies the process often seems to have been highly informal. The Syracusan levy in 415 BC was so loosely organized that at the start of battle 'some men' who had gone back to town were forced to run out again and belatedly take a place in the army wherever they could (Thuc. 6.69.1). The 'disorganized anarchy of the masses', as well as a lack of experience and training, was subsequently blamed for defeat (6.72.3–4; cf. 6.70.1; 7.3.3). When the Athenian general levy marched to Coronea in 394, a certain Simon did not join them until the battle was over, and proceeded to beat up his regimental commander (Lys. 3.45). The group of demesmen who reach the battlefield only when combat is already in progress in Theophrastus' *Characters* (25 [27] 3–4) are best understood as late arrivals in a general levy, too. And in a naval mobilization of 362 BC which was probably also a general levy, many demesmen never reported to their ships at all; rather than chase after them, the captain decided to hire professional rowers instead ([Dem.] 50.7).⁷²

At the other extreme, it may not be a coincidence that some stories about citizens putting up an impressive display also occur in the relatively informal setting of a general levy. It was in the mass naval mobilization of 480 BC that Cimon ‘and friends’ made a show of volunteering to serve as humble marines despite being high-status horsemen by walking in procession up the Acropolis and dedicating their spurs (Plut. *Cim.* 5.2), while Cleinias son of Alcibiades turned up with a private trireme and crew (Hdt. 8.17). At Tanagra in 457, Cimon is said to have tried to join the levy despite being in exile, and when he was barred from doing so arranged for ‘his friends’ to form a unit of 100 and carry his panoply in combat, fighting to the death to prove their and his loyalty to the city (Plut. *Cim.* 17.3–5).

Despite the often chaotic nature of mass mobilizations, taking part in a general levy in classical Athens was in principle compulsory, not merely voluntary. One Xenocleides was convicted of *astrateia* for failing to join the levy of 369 BC; he was hardly a typical case, since he had publicly spoken out against the expedition and so made himself vulnerable to prosecution, but the fact remains that even after a barely controlled mass mobilization an absentee was in principle liable to be prosecuted for failure to serve ([Dem.] 59.27). In the probable general naval levy of 362 BC, the assembly ordered ‘the Councillors and demarchs to make lists [*katalogoi*] of demesmen and deliver naval personnel’ ([Dem.] 50.6), rather than rely on volunteers, and the Decree of Themistocles envisages a similar compulsory mobilization for the general naval levy of 480 BC, not only for citizens but also for metics (ML 23.27–35). During the Peloponnesian War, whether or not to include metic hoplites in the general levy was again a matter for the Athenian authorities to decide.⁷³

Were general levies compulsory already in the archaic age? If one accepts the argument of the previous section that Athens’ law on *astrateia* went back at least as far as Solon, then it must have applied above all to the general levy, which was after all the most important form of mobilization in self-defence and in war against neighbours. Thus each *naukraria* will have been obliged to produce not only a ship for naval levies and two horsemen for expeditions by land (see above), but as many hoplites and light-armed as it could muster for general levies. Even the decision whether to fight as a hoplite or as light infantry may not have been left to individual preferences and resources but subjected to regulation, judging by the decree compelling settlers on Salamis to provide arms and armour worth at least 30 drachmas, and by Aristotle’s comments on compulsory training and ownership of arms under oligarchic regimes (see above, section 1). Moreover, there is indirect evidence for this degree of public intervention also in the peculiarities of the second system of

mobilization, selective conscription, to which we shall turn in section 4.

Military service in general levies was, in short, compulsory in principle but hard to enforce in practice. Especially when the militia was mobilized in a hurry, officers would have found it very hard to check that every man of the right age had turned up and was equipped as he should be. Keeping track of citizens, metics, and slaves who fought as irregular light-armed and did not even operate in organized units would have been almost impossible. Yet they could exercise some control in retrospect, at least. In classical Athens, men mobilized and fought among informal peer groups of fellow demesmen within their ‘tribal’ regiment,⁷⁴ and in archaic Greece more hierarchical ‘war bands’—rather like the band of Cimon’s friends at Tanagra—may have played a similar informal part in general levies.⁷⁵ Soldiers in these groups will have kept an eye on each other’s performance, taking note of absences and acts of ‘cowardice’ as well as bravery, and they had an opportunity to bring these to the generals’ attention when the army reassembled after the campaign to sit as a court martial.

4. Restricted Military Duties: ‘Listing’ and Volunteering

Our final question is whether in the archaic age forces could be conscripted for smaller, offensive expeditions as well as general levies, or whether such campaigns relied purely on volunteers motivated by the hope of plunder or conquest, personal loyalty to a leader, or a desire to prove oneself as a warrior. At least two archaic Athenian campaigns did rely on volunteers—the (re)conquest of Salamis around 600 BC, and the occupation of the Chersonese c.550—but in both cases the troops aimed to settle in conquered territory,⁷⁶ so one would expect service to be on a voluntary basis. We cannot infer that this was the norm in all expeditions, and the hints in Homer that the expedition against Troy relied to some extent on compulsory mobilization (see above, section 2), suggests an alternative scenario. The first strictly contemporary evidence for selective conscription at Athens comes from Thucydides and dates to the Peloponnesian War, but the anecdotes recorded by Diodorus and cited at the start of this essay allow us to date the custom back to at least 457 BC, and the Aristotelian *Athenian Constitution* (26.1) assumes a still earlier origin (see above, n. 1). This is another case where the lack of direct contemporary evidence is not significant enough to infer that the system did not exist in the archaic period. We need to ask whether

this type of mobilization would have been viable and useful in archaic Athens, and if so, whether any evidence implies its existence.

The process of selective conscription of fixed numbers of hoplites was called 'listing' (*katalegein*), denoting both selection and writing down of names. Selected hoplites served *ek katalogou*, 'from a list' or 'by enlistment', which probably did not refer to a central register on which their names were recorded but merely to the fact that their names were put on the lists compiled for each campaign by the generals and 'tribal' commanders as they hand-picked men up to the number decided by the assembly, ranging from 1,000 to 4,000 hoplites in the fifth century.⁷⁷ These lists were posted in the agora at the monument of the 'tribal' eponymous heroes to advertise the names of the conscripted, and copies were available to the commanding officers of each tribal regiment, who at the mustering of the troops ticked the names of absentees.⁷⁸ Selective conscription was thus much more tightly controlled than the typical general levy, and accordingly most of the prosecutions for *astrateia* of which we are aware concerned restricted mobilizations.⁷⁹

Conscription did not exclude volunteering, and indeed it was thought better to volunteer for such missions than wait to be drafted, as we saw in the story of Tolmides' expedition. Volunteers in classical Athens are rarely mentioned, but it does not follow that they were rare. Aristophanes' *Birds* advises angry young men to channel their aggression into warfare and sign up for mercenary service or for civic garrison or campaigning duties, which implies that they had a choice and could volunteer.

'Let me give you some sound advice, young man, the kind of thing I myself learnt as a boy. Don't beat your father, but take this wing [= shield] in one hand, this spur [= spear] in the other, consider this crest a coxcomb, serve garrison duty, go on campaign, make a living in mercenary service, and let your father live. Since you are a warrior, fly off to the war in Thrace and do your fighting there.'

(1362-9)

I suggest that volunteers presented themselves at an early stage and the generals placed their names on the 'lists' before making up the required numbers with conscripts. So long as volunteers formed a minority, this would be unremarkable and not enter the historical record. Accordingly, our two other references to classical volunteers concern exceptional cases in which they formed the majority of hoplites. We hear of the 3,000 volunteers for Tolmides' expedition only because he bent the rules: rather than accept only the first or best of the volunteers for a force of 1,000, he accepted them all, and drafted 1,000 conscripts in addition. Similarly, we know of volunteers in Tolmides' campaign in Boiotia a decade later only because,

exceptionally, *all* his hoplites had volunteered.⁸⁰

The same combination of conscription and volunteering is found in the recruitment of cavalry and ship's captains in classical Athens. At the start of their term of office the generals compiled a list of 400 trierarchs for that year, and although wealthy men would ideally volunteer for inclusion in the year's list the process always also involved legal coercion (ps.-Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 3.4), initiated not only by the generals but also by enlisted captains trying to avoid service by means of the *antidosis* procedure.⁸¹ The cavalry commander recruited replacements for the men lost or retired from the previous year's cavalry so as to keep the total number at 1,000, and Xenophon advised him to identify suitable rich young men whom he should try to persuade to join voluntarily, but could if necessary compel by legal means (*Hipparchikos* 1.9–12).

For naval mobilizations short of a general levy, voluntary service was the norm, starting with the hoplites who served as marines. When Thucydides in his account of a naval action in 412 BC says, seemingly *à propos* of nothing, that the twenty-five Athenian ships 'had marines from among the hoplites, who were forced to serve by enlistment' (εἶχον δ' ἐπιβάτας τῶν ὀπλιτῶν ἐκ καταλόγου ἀναγκαστούς, 8.24.2), his purpose in mentioning this is to show what unusual and desperate measures the Athenians were forced to take at this time. Slightly earlier in the year they had introduced a law enabling them to break into the 'iron reserve', kept untouched through almost twenty years of war (8.15.1). Other texts confirm that volunteer hoplite marines, typically ten per ship, were the norm, and that they were enrolled by the generals.⁸² The dozen or so sailors and 170 oarsmen required for each trireme also served on a voluntary basis, but were recruited for wages by the ship's captain; they were not necessarily citizens at all, but included resident aliens, foreign professionals, and slaves.⁸³

In short, every citizen could volunteer for any kind of military service, the richest citizens could be compelled to serve as trierarchs and cavalrymen, and some citizens could be 'listed' to serve as hoplites. Scholars have assumed, naturally enough, that everyone who could afford hoplite arms and armour would be liable for selective conscription, just as they were liable to serve as hoplites in general levies. Yet the evidence surprisingly suggests that in classical Athens selective conscription applied only to a much smaller, richer class of men.

Aristophanes, Antiphon, and Thucydides indicate that Athens' four property classes played a role in conscription and that the lowest class, the *thētes*, was exempt. The role of these classes is implied by a report that the richest two, *pentakosiomedimnoi* and *hippeis*, were

granted special exemption from a general naval levy in 427 BC (Thuc. 3.16.1), perhaps because they had paid the lion's share of a heavy war tax that year.⁸⁴ The key point is that the exemption is not for 'the rich', 'tax-payers', or 'liturgists', but for particular property classes: evidently these were meaningful categories when it came to conscription. In the same year, Aristophanes' *Banqueters* said that *thētes* 'did not serve on campaigns' (*ouk estrateuonto*, fr. 248 K–A). Since no one was exempt from general levies, in context this presumably meant either that *thētes* did not serve as hoplites, or that they were not liable to selective conscription. In 419 BC, Antiphon used the phrase 'to make all the *thētes* hoplites' (fr. 61 Thalheim): the point here is not that, unsurprisingly, many citizens were not hoplites, but that the orator used the name of the formal property class rather than refer to 'all the poor' or 'all citizens'. It is implied that the *thētes* had a different military status from the higher property classes.⁸⁵ Finally, Thucydides distinguished two kinds of Athenian hoplites mustered in 415 BC: those recruited 'by enlistment' (*ek katalogou*) and *thētes* who served as marines (6.43.1). He might have simply contrasted conscripted regular hoplites and volunteer marines, but by adding that marines came from the lowest property class he implied that conscripted hoplites came from the higher classes. Evidently, at least some *thētes* did own hoplite equipment, so that they were able to volunteer for service as marines,⁸⁶ but unlike the higher classes they were not liable to service by 'listing'.⁸⁷

This may seem odd, but there is further evidence that not all men able to afford hoplite service were actually liable to selective conscription: the level of wealth below which one belonged to the *thētes* was much higher than one might have expected. The threshold for the third class, the *zeugitai*, 'yoke-owners',⁸⁸ was set at an annual harvest of 200 *medimnoi*. If this was the typical Athenian crop of barley, it required 13.8 ha of land, worth 7,590 dr., much more than one needed for keeping a yoke of plough oxen, and three times as much as necessary to be able to afford hoplite equipment. A property of this size would be large enough for the owner to qualify as a member of the 'leisure class'. We may estimate that only about 15 per cent of the classical Athenian citizen population would have such properties, whereas about 40 per cent could afford to serve as hoplites.⁸⁹

Some scholars have concluded either that our sources must be wrong about the property threshold or else that property classes were not linked to military obligations after all, on the grounds that Athens would have wanted to be able to mobilize as many hoplite soldiers as possible, not just large landowners.⁹⁰ Yet the implication that the *thētes* included many men who could afford hoplite service but were

not liable for selective conscription fits neatly with Thucydides' testimony that in his day many *thētes*—at least 2,000⁹¹—owned hoplite equipment but served only on a voluntary basis. There are other pointers, too, to the high economic status of hoplites conscripted by 'listing', starting with the striking assumption that all conscripted hoplites would bring a personal (slave) attendant on campaign (Thuc. 3.17.4) and the belief that service 'by enlistment' caused disproportionate numbers of casualties among 'the wealthy'.⁹² The fact that conscripted levies were very much smaller than general levies—at most 4,000 men, and more typically only 1,000–2,000, when Athens had 13,000 hoplites aged twenty to thirty-nine—is significant.

Also telling is Aristotle's conception of an ideal state in which only hoplites have citizen rights, but not all hoplites do: instead he recommends setting a property threshold 'as high as possible' while still including just over half the male population. Whatever he has in mind exactly, Aristotle's scheme implies that the citizenship property requirement should be set higher than the minimum necessary for hoplite service, and he goes on to spell out that the excluded will still be able and willing to serve as hoplites if treated well and given pay.⁹³ The distinction made by Aristotle, between richer hoplites who deserved to share political power and poorer hoplites who did not, was anticipated by the oligarchs who took power at Athens in 411 BC. They proposed to share power with only 5,000 hoplites, at a time when Athens must still have had 9,000 hoplites at the very least.⁹⁴

Down to at least 415 BC, then, the property classes apparently played a role in assigning military obligations, and drew a line between what one may call 'leisure-class hoplites' and 'working-class hoplites', between hoplites of the highest three property classes who were liable for selective conscription, and hoplites among the *thētes* who were not. What was the rationale for this distinction? Since selective conscription was typically used for longer campaigns overseas, one might argue that only members of the leisure class could afford to serve on such campaigns. But even in the archaic age naval crews probably did not have to serve at their own expense, in view of the existence of a dedicated fund 'for the *naukraroi*' which will have paid for their maintenance, while in the classical period all who served on overseas expeditions received a wage in silver coin.⁹⁵ Another possibility might be that the obligation to serve on campaigns other than general levies was imposed on the rich as an extra liability, just as liturgies and ad hoc war taxes were imposed only on the rich. Against this, however, counts the ancient view that 'the poor' in Athens did not see overseas expeditions as a liability but as an opportunity to earn pay and other rewards which they were keen to

enjoy themselves.⁹⁶ Since it would have been in Athens' interest to make as many men as possible liable for hoplite service, I would argue, rather, that a system which confined this liability to the leisure classes must have been introduced at a time when only the leisure classes were *able* to serve as hoplites.

The institution or reform of the property-class system is attributed to Solon, and according to our sources the central problem which faced Solon was extreme inequality of wealth: 'all the land was in the hands of a few' (*Ath. Pol.* 2.2; 4.5). Since Solon emphatically did not resort to a general redistribution of land, even after his reforms relatively few men must still have owned a great deal of land and the majority very little. In other words, there was no significant class of 'middling' farmers but a sharp polarization between rich and poor.⁹⁷ This situation explains the high property threshold: immediately below it, where one might have found middling men who could also afford to serve as hoplites, there was simply a wide gap in the early sixth century, and below that gap only men who were too poor to serve, *thētes* in the literal sense of the word, 'hired labourers'. In Solon's day, unlike in the fifth century, the high property threshold thus made perfect sense and imposed liability for hoplite service on everyone who could afford it.

When social and economic developments from the second half of the sixth century onwards created a middling class of farmers, as well as craftsmen and traders, there were increasingly many *thētes* who could afford to serve as hoplites,⁹⁸ but the system did not need to be changed, because they would simply take part in general levies along with everyone else and they could take part in selective levies by volunteering. The presence of 'poor' Socrates at the siege of Potidaea and the battle of Amphipolis may be an example of the latter. Moreover, naval campaigns often involved only the normal trireme crews which were recruited on a voluntary basis; where they did involve additional selective conscription of hoplites they were usually, for most of the fifth century, so successful that few of the rich will have complained when they were occasionally forced to serve. As soon as the Peloponnesian War began to take its toll, however, the system began to meet resistance. In 427, the comment that the *thētes* 'did not serve on campaign' was surely made as part of a complaint that their exemption for selective conscription was unfair. The proposal in 419 'to make all the *thētes* hoplites' suggests a plan to change the military role of property classes.

After 415, this military function disappears from our record altogether. Significantly, the oligarchs of 411 no longer used the property-class system to select their richer 5,000 hoplites. The reason was probably that the property classes were defined entirely in terms

of landownership and that this was no longer an adequate basis for distinguishing between rich and poor by the late fifth century: a proposal to restrict citizen-rights to landowners in 403 BC (Dion. Hal. Lys. 32) was rejected because this would have excluded ‘many horsemen and hoplites’ (Lys. 34.4). Accordingly, we no longer hear of the property classes playing a military role in the fourth century, and they also came to be ignored as a qualification for political office, even though they did continue to exist as a legal category.⁹⁹ As in the case of military legislation, therefore, we have an institution plausibly associated with Solon which is still attested in the late fifth century but then falls into disuse.

Along the same lines, the two highest property classes do not seem to have had a distinct military role in the fifth century, but they may well have done under Solon. The second class consisted of *hippeis*, ‘horsemen’, after all, and their property threshold will have coincided with the ability to keep at least one horse. Before the introduction of state subsidies in the mid-fifth century, this meant that only the top two classes could be liable for cavalry service. A link between liability to serve as trierarch and membership of the highest class is not mentioned by any classical source, yet it is probably no coincidence that this class was defined, as its name *pentakosiomedimnoi* implies, by ownership of enough land to produce an annual harvest of 500 *medimnoi* of barley: the value of such an estate can be calculated at about 3 talents, which was also the estimated property value which made a citizen liable to service as a trierarch in the fourth century.¹⁰⁰ There was thus at least a rough, *de facto*, correlation between property classes and military obligations, and this connection may have been a formal part of the system as originally conceived by Solon.

Alain Duploux and others have argued that the archaic ‘property classes’ were merely a set of informal social distinctions that did not entail formal rights or duties, only moral claims and expectations.¹⁰¹ It is indeed likely that the ‘horsemen’, ‘yoke-men’, and ‘hired men’ derived their names from pre-existing informal labels designating respectively landowners rich enough to keep a horse or a yoke of plough-oxen, and a mass of men who owned too little land to be fully independent and therefore worked as hired farm hands. But the *pentakosiomedimnoi* do not fit this mould. Duploux suggests that this, too, was an informal label, like *geōmoroi*, ‘land-sharers’, which elsewhere denoted a landowning elite. But nowhere else do we find differentiation between two levels of the rich: we find either ‘land-sharers’ or ‘horsemen’, not both. Nor is there any other instance of an elite with a name as precise and unwieldy as ‘five-hundred-bushel-men’. Everything suggests that this label was an artificial and formal additional distinction established amongst an elite that had previously

been known simply as ‘Horsemen’, as in neighbouring Eretria and Chalcis.¹⁰² Moreover, it is not likely that the three lower classes remained vague ‘social’ labels when the new upper property class was so precisely defined: surely formal property thresholds were also set for these classes when the category of ‘five-hundred-bushel-men’ was introduced. Since the latter are attested in Solonian laws, we may conclude that formal property classes were indeed created by Solon, if not earlier.

Our sources do not explicitly credit Solon with assigning military duties to his property classes, so in theory the obligations might have been added later—though not as late as the fifth century, when, as I argued above, they were already out of synch with economic realities. In practice the silence of our sources is likely due to their exclusive focus on the political dimensions of Solon’s system, and it seems obvious that duties and rights must have been part of the same package. Only if political privileges were balanced by military (and fiscal) obligations could one be confident that citizens would not claim higher status than they deserved, especially since this was probably a matter of self-assessment. Liability for military service was thus in all likelihood already part of Solon’s original system, which set not only formal property thresholds, but also dictated that all those above the lowest threshold of 200 *medimnoi* were obliged to keep a set of hoplite arms and armour, and serve with this equipment whenever required. At the two higher levels, one could be required from time to time to provide in addition a horse or a ship, respectively, but not everyone was required to maintain a cavalry horse or warship permanently.

In principle, it is possible that under Solon the obligation of the leisure classes to serve as hoplites was only enforced for general levies, and that select expeditions still relied exclusively on volunteers. It has been suggested, moreover, that it would have been impossible to enforce (selective) conscription without formal records of who was liable, and that the citizen registers which seem to have functioned as such in the classical period were kept by the demes, which only acquired such administrative roles after Cleisthenes’ reforms.¹⁰³ However, we have a clue to the earlier existence of citizen lists in the peculiar name of the classical deme registers, *lēxiarchika grammateia*, and we also have some reason to think that there were not always enough volunteers for early Athenian campaigns.

That deme records were called ‘lexiarchic registers’ puzzled ancient lexicographers, and they tried to explain this name from the etymology of *lēxis*, ‘something that falls to one, by lot or by right’ (from the verb *lanchanō*). They concluded that these were either lists of men who ‘ruled’ their ‘allotment’, that is, were in charge of their

inherited estate, or lists of men among whom 'rule' was 'allotted', that is, were eligible to hold magistracies.¹⁰⁴ Modern scholars have tended to favour the first option, but both are clearly mere guesses, and it is in fact clear from contemporary evidence that the classical registers included every male citizen from the age of eighteen, not just property owners or potential office holders.¹⁰⁵ As Henri Van Effenterre pointed out long ago, the 'lexiarchic registers' are simply 'the registers of the *lēxiarchoi*' (1976, 13), the lexiarchs being an obscure body of six officials whose only attested classical role is to regulate attendance in the assembly, with the help of thirty citizen assistants and the famous Scythian archers.¹⁰⁶ If the deme registers were called 'lexiarchic', it must be because they had once upon a time been maintained by the lexiarchs, and that time must have been before the reforms transferred this responsibility to the demes. Already in archaic Athens before Cleisthenes, formal written citizen lists thus existed, and were kept by a board of lexiarchs.¹⁰⁷ As Van Effenterre also pointed out, the only other Athenian board of six was that of the *thesmothetai*, established by Solon according to our sources (1976, 13–14), and certainly of archaic date. It seems reasonable to infer that the lexiarchs also went back to Solon and were 'in charge of what is allotted', that is, responsible for making sure that citizens received the rights and fulfilled the duties assigned to them by Solon's system of property classes.¹⁰⁸

Not only would conscription thus have been viable, but it may well have seemed necessary even in the early sixth century, in view of the difficulty the Athenians experienced in the wars they fought at the time. Solon may have (re)conquered Salamis with the aid of 500 volunteers, but tradition also claimed that this happened only after many defeats and after Solon famously composed a song in which he exhorted the Athenians to fight for the island and not to live with the 'shame' of being 'Salamis-losers'.¹⁰⁹ Evidently volunteers did not always line up for hard-fought wars and modest rewards. The initial conquest and settlement of Sigeion shortly before Solon's time was probably also achieved by volunteers, but for many decades afterwards Athens remained embroiled in wars to defend or reconquer the city from Mytilene, and it seems less likely that there were always volunteers for these.¹¹⁰ Similarly, it was Athenian volunteers who occupied the Chersonese, but we have to wonder whether Peisistratus' imposition of regime change in Naxos at around the same time would equally have been achieved by Athenian volunteers, or mercenaries, alone.¹¹¹ At a minimum, we may note that in Solon's lifetime Athens fought two wars which proved hard to win, and that this could easily have provided a stimulus to introduce, if it did not exist already, conscription for selective campaigns as well as general levies.

In sum, volunteering was always important to Athenian armies and especially fleets, and like service in general levies it provided opportunities not only for citizens, rich and poor, but also for foreigners (in the navy) and slaves (as oarsmen and personal attendants) to ‘perform’ and assert or enhance their status. But from Solon onwards at least, the city also had the option of resorting to selective conscription of hoplites, and this was a matter of strict legal obligation for the leisured elite which occupied the three highest property classes, an obligation which a commander, if he wanted to, could enforce with the aid of lexiarchic registers, mobilization rosters, and prosecution in the soldiers’ court.

5. Conclusion: Citizens and Soldiers Under Solon

‘The political community must consist exclusively of those who have the military equipment’ (Arist. *Pol.* 4.1297b1). A simple rule applies in the ideal city of classical Greek political theory: all citizens are obliged to be soldiers and only citizens are allowed to be soldiers. The realities of military service in the classical period are hard to discern behind this ideological screen, and they are positively obscure in earlier ages, but a close look at the evidence reveals wider participation in war in the classical period than the philosophical ideal suggests, and more complex, formal regulation of military obligations in the archaic age than recent scholarship has been inclined to imagine. Classical military institutions in fact provide important clues to the nature of their archaic predecessors because some of the practices attested during the Peloponnesian War prove to be, not newly sophisticated institutions, but relics of the Solonian system, which duly disappear in the fourth century.

It seems very likely that private raiding, informal war bands, personal loyalties, and voluntary military service played an even more prominent role in archaic Greece than they did later, but it would be wrong to assume that there were not also communal wars and compulsory service. We find signs of the latter already in Homer, and at Athens Solon instituted, or indeed merely reformed, a complex institutional framework for public warfare. He obliged the leisured elite, which made up the three highest property classes, to serve as hoplites whenever required by the state—making it a crime to abandon one’s arms and armour to the enemy, and perhaps also setting a minimum value for the equipment (see above, sections 2 and 3)—while obliging all other citizens to serve in levies ‘with the whole community’ in whatever capacity they could afford. Levies were

organized by administrative districts called *naukrariai*, which could also demand ships and horses from the two richest property classes. Solon may have instituted a board of 'lexiarchs' to record and monitor the different obligations and rights allocated to the property classes, and he almost certainly provided a new, public, legal procedure to punish lapses from military duty.

Cleisthenes' reforms transferred most of the responsibilities of *naukraroi* and lexiarchs to the demes, and created new military units and commanders, but appears not to have touched the military dimension of the property classes or the military laws of Solon, both of which we still find in place in the early stages of the Peloponnesian War. Social and economic developments since the late sixth century, however, had caused the property-class system to fall out of line with the realities of property-ownership, no longer exclusively in land, and no longer as polarized as it had been under Solon. At the same time, political developments meant that Solon's military laws were no longer congenial to the new democratic culture. Perhaps by the latter part of the Peloponnesian War, and certainly by the early fourth century, the Solonian system was therefore largely abandoned or no longer enforced, although we cannot easily discern the stages by which this happened. The mobilization of general levies of all citizens and other residents, unjustly neglected by modern scholars, is the one thing that continued in essentially the same form throughout.

The evidence for all the above is of course precarious but it seems to me important that we do not simply reject it out of hand, especially not on the currently common assumption that archaic Greece could not have known the degree of formalization, institutionalization, and state formation that the sources seem to indicate. We cannot assume a priori that archaic Greece was either a complex or a simple world, but must be guided by what the written and material evidence tells us. In the case of military obligations, it tells us that volunteering for service and conspicuous display of military status, undoubtedly vital parts of archaic civic life, took place within an institutionalized framework; indeed, a framework that was in some respects more institutionalized than it came to be under the democracy of classical Athens.

This brings us at last to an answer to our fundamental question: to what degree was the archaic citizen body a formal juridical 'order' with legally enforceable rights and duties, or rather an informal 'status group' defined by peer judgement of one's 'performance', with moral but not legal obligations and privileges? As we have interpreted the Solonian system, the top three property classes did form a set of distinct juridical orders of citizens, with formal qualifications and strictly defined, publicly enforced, military obligations (as well as fiscal obligations and political privileges). The lowest property class,

by contrast, did not constitute such an order, at least so far as military duties were concerned: it was obliged to serve in a general levy, but so were non-citizens, and it had no legal military obligations beyond this (or fiscal obligations, or political rights beyond attending assembly and popular court). For the lower classes, therefore, citizen status in important respects remained fluid and informal, and needed to be asserted by ‘performing’ in war and other arenas.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The insightful comments of Alain Duplouy and Roel Konijnendijk on a draft have helped me improve this chapter; any remaining failings in argument or errors of fact are my own.

¹ Thucydides’ much briefer account of both campaigns (1.108) gives no details about conscripts or volunteers. A chronologically vague comment in *Ath. Pol.* 26.1 suggests that conscription had already been in use at Athens before 462 BC (as noted by Christ 2001, 399); the Themistocles Decree refers to non-selective conscription of naval crews in 480 BC (ML 23.23–5): see below at n. 49.

² For full and excellent discussion of the classical evidence for such attitudes, see Christ 2006, 45–142; Roisman 2005, 105–29. Christ, however, underestimates the role of volunteering: significantly, he tells the Myronides-story twice in detail (2006, 59, 93–4), but confines the Tolmides-story to a brief footnote (49 n. 14); elsewhere, he dismisses Plut. *Per.* 18.2 as merely ‘a different version’ of the Tolmides-story (Christ 2001, 399 n. 4), which it clearly is not: see further below at n. 80.

³ See also e.g. Gabrielsen 1994; Whitehead 1983, on the performance of liturgies. The role of ‘performance’ in the negotiation of status is brilliantly analysed by Duplouy 2006a.

⁴ For the army, see e.g. Frost 1984; Christ 2001, 399; Pritchard 2010, 7–16; for the navy, see e.g. Haas 1985; Gabrielsen 1985; 1994, 26–37; 2007, 254–5; Wallinga 2005, 7–11; cf. Hale 2009, 8–20.

⁵ Cf. Christ 2006, 63, citing some of these passages: Athens, ‘in keeping with democratic values, stopped short of rigidly forcing its free citizens to comply with conscription’. For the very limited extent to which Greek cities organized military training in particular, see van Wees 2004, 87–95.

⁶ Some words are missing from the text in most manuscripts, but one later MS reinserts a necessary reference to *lipotaxion*. The supplement adopted here is that of Thalheim 1877; Lipsius 1905, 454–5 n. 3 emended to ‘*lipotaxion*, insofar as he did not present himself’; see Hamel 1998a, 366–76.

⁷ The titles of the relevant speeches refer to the case as a prosecution for *lipotaxion* (Lysias 14) and *astrateia* (Lysias 15): for the relation between the two offences, see below at n. 20.

⁸ Tamynae, 348 BC: Plut. *Phoc.* 12.3 (desertion a general problem; Phocion chooses to allow it); Dem. 39.16–17 (Boiotos charged with *lipotaxion* for staying in Athens to celebrate Dionysia, but apparently not punished: Dem. 40); Dem. 21.103 (Demosthenes charged with *lipotaxion* but prosecution dropped); Dem. 21.110, 164–6 (Meidias rhetorically accused of *lipotaxion* from cavalry; both Demosthenes and Meidias were back in Athens for the Dionysia). Three convictions for *astrateia*: Sannio the chorus trainer, and Aristides the chorus-leader (Dem. 21.58–9, 60;

punishments not enforced); Xenocleides the poet ([Dem.] 59.27; *atimia*, exile). On limited enforcement of these laws, see Christ 2006, 59–63, 118–24; van Wees 2004, 108–13.

⁹ Notably the mere ‘barring’ of Simon for hitting a superior officer in 394 (Lys. 3.45, allegedly the only soldier on the entire campaign to be punished in this way); and the mere ‘talking to’ received by the drunk and disorderly sons of Conon (Dem. 54.4–5); see further Hamel 1998b, 59–63. We have two instances of Athenian generals with the power to execute soldiers, both of which date to the Peloponnesian War (Lys. 13.67; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.15), and stand in contrast to the disapproval in the 390s of Iphicrates’ action in stabbing a sentry (to death?) for falling asleep (Frontin. *Str.* 3.12.2). This may confirm a change in attitudes towards discipline, but on the other hand the earlier offences probably constituted treason rather than mere indiscipline.

¹⁰ I have argued elsewhere for a similar development in fiscal obligations: *eisphora* was levied on all three highest property classes under Solon, but the burden was shifted largely onto the highest two classes under Cleisthenes, then confined to the equivalent of the highest property class after 377/6 BC (van Wees 2013b, 83–97). At the same time the laws and procedures involved no doubt became more complex, as in other areas of public finance (see Rhodes 2013; Fawcett 2016).

¹¹ Aeschin. 3.175, as cited above; also Dem. 24.103. I accept of course that attributions by orators of Athenian laws to Solon have very little value as historical evidence. Conversely, it is also worth remembering that some archaic laws did remain valid in theory even though they were ignored in practice: see *Ath. Pol.* 8.1, 47.1 on the Treasurers of Athena.

¹² Plato *Leg.* 943a: *astrateia* ‘when someone fails to appear due to some cowardice, without the generals letting him off’; 943c–d: *lipotaxion* when a soldier on campaign ‘leaves for home earlier than the officials in charge lead them back’.

¹³ Ar. *Pax* 526, noted by Lipsius 1905, 453.

¹⁴ See Echeverría 2008, 170–1; 2012, 305–6, for the meanings of *taxis*.

¹⁵ Less compelling than actual convictions for the offence are rhetorical statements to the same effect: Demosthenes’ claims that Meidias ‘left his post’ three times which includes him staying at home and sending a hired substitute to serve as trierarch (21.163; the other two occasions involve transfers from cavalry to navy, 21.161–2, and back again, 21.164–6). The orator Lycurgus argues that ‘leaving one’s post’ includes not taking up one’s post in the first place (1.77, 147).

¹⁶ Hamel 1998a; e.g. Lipsius 1905, 452, also thinks that the law is being cited verbatim, but suggests that the citation was incomplete and that there were other clauses: see below, n. 18.

¹⁷ See evidence cited at and in n. 15. Cf. [Dem.] 50.63: a captain who leaves his ship and returns to Athens before his successor has arrived is ‘leaving his post’. Hamel 1998a tries to explain away all these broader usages of *lipotaxion* as rhetorical tricks, but her arguments are unconvincing.

¹⁸ Lipsius 1905, 452/3 posited that the law had a separate clause, not cited, to cover this: ‘hinzufügen dürfen wir zu den letzten Paragraphen: und wer das Heer ohne Befehl verläßt’. Hamel argues that there was in fact a separate offence of desertion, called *l(e)ipostration* (1998a, 364, 376, 399–403). However, our three references to this offence all refer to whole units or contingents abandoning campaigns, rather than individuals deserting: Hdt. 5.27.2 (cities destroyed by Otanes for *lipostratia* during Darius’ Scythian campaign); Thuc. 1.99.1 (allied contingents abandoning Athenian campaigns); schol. ad Ar. *Eq.* 226 (Cleon bringing a charge of *leipostration* against the entire Athenian cavalry on an unknown occasion; the references to a *graphe lipostratiou* in Pollux 6.151; 8.40; schol. ad Thuc. 6.91.7 may all refer to Cleon’s charge, since this accusation can hardly have been very

common). Other lexical references to *lipostation* throw no light on the precise meaning of the term (Hesych. s.v.; *Suda* s.v.; *Lex. Seg.* 276.33; all cited and discussed by Hamel 1998a, 399).

¹⁹ Lys. 14.6: ἀκούετε, ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ὅτι περὶ ἀμφοτέρων κέϊται, καὶ ὅσοι ἂν μάχης οὐσης εἰς τοῦτίσω ἀναχωρήσωσι, καὶ ὅσοι ἂν ἐν τῇ πεζῇ στρατιᾷ μὴ παρῶσι. Also 14.5: law covers ‘all those who are not present in the infantry army’; 14.11: law also covers retreats during battle. The emphatic references to the *infantry* army were probably a sleight of hand: failure to serve as a hoplite was essential to the prosecution case, but the law probably used a generic term such as *strateuein* which included service in cavalry and navy as well.

²⁰ The near-interchangeability of *astrateia* and *lipotaxion* explains how Alcibiades’ prosecutor can bring ‘a public charge of *astrateia*’ (Lys. 15.1, 4) yet sum up his case by saying that he has shown that Alcibiades ‘left his post’ (15.11); similarly, Dem. 39.16–17 refers to an accusation of *lipotaxion* which is apparently part of a public suit for *astrateia*. The overlap between the terms was noted by e.g. Todd 2000, 162; Carey 1989, 144; MacDowell 1962, 111; Lipsius 1905, 454; already in nineteenth-century scholarship cited by Hamel 1998a, 363 n. 7, who (wrongly) rejects this majority view.

²¹ Inscribed version: Tod II.204; RO 88; for structural differences between this oath and the more hierarchical Oath of Plataea, see van Wees 2006a, 126–7. For the limits of hierarchy in Greek armies, see further e.g. Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.16; Hamel 1998b, 59–63; Hornblower 2000, 57–61, 72–3; van Wees 2004, 108–12; Lendon 2005, 74–7; Christ 2006, 40–1, 95 n. 16; Crowley 2012, 105–7. Plato’s *Leg.* did define *astrateia* and *lipotaxion* in hierarchical terms insofar as the offences explicitly entailed disobeying orders, but this definition reflected Plato’s extraordinary enthusiasm for hierarchy (*Leg.* 942a–d) which was untypical of Greek attitudes.

²² Soldiers constitute court, presided over by generals or taxiarchs: also Lys. 14.15, 17; 15.1–2; Dem. 39.17; cf. Plato *Leg.* 943a–945b. (ps-Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 3.5 has ‘the people’ judge cases arising from military campaigns.) *Graphē*: also Lys. 15.1 (*astrateia*; *dikē astrateias* at Dem. 39.16); Dem. 21.103 (*lipotaxion*); Pollux 8.40 (*lipotaxion* and *astrateia*; cf. 6.151); *Suda* s.v. *lipotaxion*; cf. Plato *Leg.* 943a–d. Punishment is *atimia*: also Andoc. 1.74; Dem. 21.58–60; 59.27. See Lipsius 1905, 112–14, 143, 452–4; Hamel 1998b, 63–4; Christ 2006, 59–60.

²³ See van Wees 2011a on the ‘law of *hybris*’ as genuinely Solonian; our military law is structurally similar to the *hybris* law in covering an entire category of offences (offences against the person; offences committed on campaign), and assigning these to a popular court via the *graphē* procedure.

²⁴ So defined by Pollux 8.40, 42–3; other lexical references are *Suda* s.v. *anaumachia* and *Lex. Seg.* 217.21, both with explicit citation of Andocides (all entries quoted by Hamel 1998a, 403–4).

²⁵ The words *stratos* and *taxis* applied to army and fleet equally, and accordingly so did *astrateia* and *lipotaxion*. A further offence, attested only in Pollux, is *liponautia*, ‘deserting from one’s ship’, said to be the naval equivalent of *lipotaxia* and subject to a *graphē* (8.40, 42–3); given that *liponautia* does not feature in Andocides’ apparently comprehensive list, it may not have been a distinct offence in law, but an informal term used by prosecutors who wished to be specific about what kind of *lipotaxion* they were alleging. The reference in [Dem.] 51.11 to trierarchs who ‘bind and punish’ crewmen who abandon their ship is presumably to an ad hoc measure, not to a legal procedure; oarsmen were usually hired, not drafted, and many were not citizens.

²⁶ Full recent discussion: Schwartz 2009, esp. 147–55. Presumably the same assumptions underlie Pritchett’s unsubstantiated claim that *rhipsaspia* was included under *lipotaxion* (1974–91, II, 233).

²⁷ Lys. 10.1: an *eisangelia* accuses Theomnestus of having thrown away *ta hopla* (in 10.12, the accusation is ‘flinging away his shield’, but this is a distortion in order to claim that Theomnestus had countersued despite the charge differing from the wording of the law); 10.9 quotes verbatim from the law, but here ‘throw away’ has no object (in 10.12, the object is ‘shield’ but this is a paraphrase, not a quotation); 10.23, 25 twice describe the legal case as between one who ‘saved’ and one who threw away *ta hopla*. At 10.21–2, descriptions of the action in battle refer specifically to the shield. Schwartz 2009, 26–7, argues that *hoplon* must have meant ‘shield’ in the law, but overlooks the use of the plural: *ta hopla* must refer to the rest of his equipment as well. Plato *Leg.* 943b–c specifically refers to a single individual throwing away plural *hopla*, as Saunders 1991, 324 n. 3, points out. I would suggest, therefore, that the references to the shield rather than *ta hopla* in Aeschines (1.29) and in Andocides’ list imply that there are paraphrases, not quotations of the legal formula.

²⁸ Note also the anecdote that Epaminondas, dying on the battlefield, asked first ‘Is my shield safe?’ and only then asked whether his army had won the battle (Diod. Sic. 15.87.6; Schwartz 2009, 153).

²⁹ Since these sources criticized the laws in question, they are likely to be referring to genuine archaic laws; later or invented laws are typically attributed to early lawgivers as models of ‘good’ laws.

³⁰ A scholion on the passage (repeated in *Suda* s.v. *enechuron*, ε1291) suggests that it means poverty forced people to break the law, but that seems strained. The comment does, however, confirm that a ban on pawning armour once existed: ‘Amongst prohibited things, it seems, is to deposit arms [*ta hopla*] as pledges. So he is saying about Penia [Poverty] that by her own force she compels [people] to break the laws which decreed not depositing arms as pledges’ (tr. D. Whitehead, *Suda Online*). Lipsius 1905, 456 n. 13 was wrong to reject this.

³¹ Solon, *Laws fr.* 32a Ruschenbusch (Plut. *Sol.* 21.1); 32b (Lys. 10.12); 33b (*Lex. Cantab.* 671.7); cf. Leão and Rhodes 2015, Fr. 32a, 32b, and 33b.

³² See Hdt. 5.95; Strabo 13.1.38; Plut. *Mor.* 858b. A plausible emendation of the text includes a reference to *entea*, ‘military equipment’ (plural). The abandoned shield in Anacreon *fr.* 381b has no context, so need not have been dropped by the poet(’s *persona*). Schwartz 2009, 147–50 may be right that Archilochus was out to shock (*contra* Schwertfeger 1982; van Wees 2004, 172) but his notion that Alcaeus tried to limit the damage to his reputation by composing a song about his own cowardice would make the poem the worst backfire in the history of reputation management.

³³ van Wees 2004, 172, 174, argued that Archilochus’ and Alcaeus’ ‘shameless’ dropping of shields reflected the fluidity of the archaic phalanx, and that it was the emergence of the more rigid classical phalanx which led to the criminalization of shield-dropping. In view of Plato’s explanation that the offence only occurred when an army had already been defeated, I would now suggest instead that its criminalization reflected an increase in the symbolic value of *ta hopla* without also implying a change in the nature of archaic hoplite combat, which on other grounds I still regard as quite fluid.

³⁴ Dem. 24.103; a trial before the Heliaea is attested only by a law inserted into the text (24.105), but is a logical consequence of ‘binding’, since imprisonment was not a punishment in its own right.

³⁵ See esp. Aeschin. 1 (esp. 28–30); Lys. 10; with Fisher 2001, 157–9; Lipsius 1905, 278–82.

³⁶ In Aeschines’ version, the law has a subject heading, *dokimasia rhētorōn*, which is unlikely to have been a feature of the archaic law, but may simply have been added when the laws were reinscribed in 403 (like the heading ‘first *axōn*’ in Draco’s

homicide law).

³⁷ τελεν καὶ στρατ[εύεσθ]αι [...] τ]ὰ δὲ [h]όπλα π[αρέχ]εσθ[αι] αὐτός τ]ριά[κ]οντα δρ[αχμ]ον].

³⁸ E.g. [καθάπερ Ἀθῆ]νε/σι, ‘as at Athens’ (Guarducci); for other supplements, see ML 14.

³⁹ Also *Lex. Seg.* 1.283.20: *naukraroi* are ‘those who provided the ships, acted as captains and were subordinate to the polemarch’; since the polemarch had lost his military role by the classical period, this statement is based on at least some knowledge of archaic Athenian institutions.

⁴⁰ For a full discussion of the evidence, see van Wees 2013b, 44–61; cf. Figueira 2011, who also treats the *naukrariai* as a genuine archaic military institution, *contra* e.g. Gabrielsen 1985 (cf. 1994, 19–24); Frost 2005, 106–7, 152–3, 175–90; Schubert 2008, 39–48; Pritchard 2010, 8–15. Duploux, this volume, chapter 10, section 2, and 2014, 649, notes a parallel for obligatory provision of horses in a law of Cyme: ‘each citizen was under compulsion to keep a horse’ (Arist. *fr.* 611.39 Rose).

⁴¹ Callinus *fr.* 1.1–3, 6–7, 8–21 West; Tyrtaeus *fr.* 10–12 West; in *fr.* 10.3–10, the defeated soldier wandering abroad with family *and parents* might have been formally exiled (Cairns 1993, 162) or in voluntarily exile to escape a worse punishment (Ducat 2006a, 10), but seems to me more likely to be a refugee after the destruction of his city (van Wees 2004, 149 n. 56; 2011b, 95–6). One may compare the emphasis on voluntary sacrifice and the absence of any mention of the draft in classical Athenian funeral orations for the war dead, who had mainly been conscripted, as noted by Christ 2006, 63–4.

⁴² In a military context, the two terms are interchangeable, as is clear from e.g. Thuc. 2.31; in a non-military context, *pandēmei* can include women and children: e.g. Thuc. 1.90.3, 126.6; 3.3.3; 5.82.6.

⁴³ Christ 2001, an exhaustively detailed study of mobilization, finds room for only two sentences on the subject: ‘When military objectives warranted it, [...] hoplites [...] or all able-bodied men [...] could be called upon to take the field *en masse*’ (408–9); ‘Mass mobilizations, in fact, are the exception rather than the rule in Athenian military history; normally the generals needed only a fraction of the available hoplites’ (411; cf. 2006, 53). See also Jones 1957, 178. Hansen 1985, 83–9; Hamel 1998b, 24–8, do not consider general levies at all.

⁴⁴ Hansen 1981, 19–24; 1988, 23–5 assumed an upper age limit of fifty and noted that this was demographically incompatible with Thucydides’ numbers for field troops and home guards; van Wees 2004, 241–2 suggests that the simple solution is to assume instead an upper age of forty.

⁴⁵ In 431 BC, citizens and metics together provided 30,000 hoplites and cavalry (Thuc. 2.13.6–7); the citizen population at the time has been estimated at 60,000 (Hansen 1988, 14–28) to which we should add c.10,000 metics, i.e. potentially 40,000 light-armed of all ages, which after deduction of losses to the plague leaves some 27,000; the 20–39-year-olds would constitute c.60 per cent, i.e. 15,000.

⁴⁶ Given a field army, including metics, of up to 16,000 in 431 BC (Thuc. 2.13.6) and losses of about one-third to the plague plus casualties of war, Athens would have had no more than 10,000 hoplites left.

⁴⁷ See esp. Welwei 1974, 57–65. Since the purpose of the levy was to fortify a position in Boiotian territory, it has been suggested that the numerous light-armed were included only to help construct fortifications, and would not normally be part of a general levy in such numbers (Gomme *ad loc.*); cf. the *pandēmei* wall-building at Athens in 479 (Thuc. 1.90.3), at Argos in 417 (Thuc. 5.82.6), and by Athenians at Corinth in the late 390s (Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.18). However, Thucydides’ explanation for their presence is simply ‘since there had been a general levy’ (*hate panstratias genomenēs*), which implies that their large-scale mobilization was routine, as Aeneas

Tacticus also assumed: see below at n. 71.

⁴⁸ Cf. Thuc. 1.106.2 for Athenian *psiloi* fighting in Megarian territory, c.459 BC, when even the oldest and youngest hoplites are deployed in the absence of the bulk of the field army.

⁴⁹ Hunt 1998, 41 draws attention to Hdt. 8.142, where a Spartan refers to Athenian 'slaves (*oiketai*) useless for warfare', presumably as opposed to those slaves who were useful and served in the fleet.

⁵⁰ Cf. Pl. *Men.* 243c; Diod. Sic. 13.97.1. Hunt 1998, 87–95 argues convincingly that the mobilization of slaves on this occasion was unexceptional, although their reward—enfranchisement and citizenship—was unusual, one of several such schemes in the last years of the war. It was surely the exceptionally high proportion of citizens in this fleet which caused the outcry in Athens against the generals' failure to rescue the crews of twenty-five lost ships (Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.34; 1.7).

⁵¹ Assuming 30,000 adult male citizens in 394, the 20–39-year-olds would have numbered about 18,000, when 83 ships required 16,600 men. The population was larger in 428, but at that time Athens also had citizens serving on another 170 ships (100 guarding Attica, Salamis, and Euboea, Thuc. 3.17.1; 40 on Lesbos, 3.3.2; 30 in Western Greece, 3.7.1), so there will barely have been enough to provide the 20,000 men required for the additional 100 triremes.

⁵² 'Brasideians', including 700 helots (Thuc. 4.80.5), and an unspecified number of emancipated helots (5.67.1).

⁵³ *Contra* Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1970, *ad loc.* Hunt 1998, 60–1, summarizes other attempts to explain away the helots and suggests a parallel with the light-armed helots at Plataea, below (1998, 33–9).

⁵⁴ The reason why Thucydides mentioned the helots in 418 but not in connection with the two earlier general levies may be that he was concerned to stress the scale of the army of 418, which he described as 'the finest Greek army up to that point' (5.60.3).

⁵⁵ The Spartans are said to have planned a *pandēmei* levy in 480 (Hdt. 7.206) before events at Thermopylae overtook them, and the situation was at least as critical in 479. Herodotus' figure of 5,000 Spartiates is well below the total figure of 8,000 Spartiates of military age which he mentions elsewhere (7.234.2), but I would argue that the latter figure reflects the tradition that the original number of Spartiate citizens was 9,000, and that by 479 BC the actual number had fallen to little more than 5,000: van Wees, *forthcoming*.

⁵⁶ E.g. Hdt. 7.203 (Locrians at Thermopylae); Thuc. 3.5.2 (Mytilene); 5.57.2 (Phleious); 8.55.3, 61.3 (Chios).

⁵⁷ E.g. Thuc. 2.5.1 (Thebes v. Plataea); 3.7.3 and 94.1 (Acarnanians v. Oiniadai, Leukas); 3.95.3 (Locrians v. Aetolians); 4.25.7 (Messana v. Naxos); 5.75.4 (Epidauros v. Argos); 6.7.2 (Argos v. Orneai); Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.10 (Chersonesitans v. Selymbria, Byzantium); 5.4.42 (Thebes v. Thespiiai); 7.2.4 (Argos v. Phleious).

⁵⁸ E.g. Thuc. 4.72.1 (Boiotians, Megara); 7.1.4 (Selinous, Syracuse); Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.18 (Methymna, Mytilene).

⁵⁹ So convincingly Christ 2001, 409–15; 2006, 52; *contra* Andrewes 1981 and van Wees 2004, 103–4. One of Aeschines' campaigns was to Mantinea in 362, where the Athenians sent 6,000 hoplites (Diod. Sic. 15.84.2), presumably a general levy limited to rather few age groups (20–35?). Xen. *Vect.* 3.7 says that much money was spent on the army in 366 and 362, implying that these levies were paid.

⁶⁰ *Contra* Christ 2001, 411. The general idea that age-class mobilization replaced selective conscription was wrongly adopted also by e.g. van Wees 2004, 103–4; Hamel 1998b, 26–8.

⁶¹ *Contra* Christ 2001, 415 (and with Hansen 1985, 110 n. 248), Dem. 39.8 of 348 BC is clear evidence for the continued existence of selective conscription: the

argument relies on a system in which soldiers are individually conscripted by name, not by year-group. Plato's *Laws* (as cited above), of about the same date, also recognizes selective conscription alongside mobilization 'by section'.

⁶² Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 F38; the discussion featured in his Book 3, which covered the fifth-century to 404 BC. Christ 2001, 412 n. 54; Harding 2008, 121 assume that it was a digression.

⁶³ See van Wees 2008, 20–5; *contra* Ober 1993a.

⁶⁴ Hdt. 6.108.4–6 and 5.77, with discussion in van Wees 2013b, 68.

⁶⁵ It has often been inferred that Herodotus meant hoplites only because he claims that the Persians thought the Athenians were 'mad', 'since they saw that they were few, and that these men were driving themselves forward at a run, without having horse or arrows at their disposal' (6.112). Rather than an indirect authorial claim that the Athenians had no cavalry or light-armed at all, this is surely meant to represent a Persian impression of the majority of Greek troops charging towards them, who, whether hoplite or light-armed, lacked the two weapons on which the Persians most prided themselves: horse and bow (e.g. Hdt. 1.136). Athens may well have sent its few hundred cavalry and archers to Marathon, but Herodotus could very plausibly imagine that these would not have made much of an impact on what the charge looked like from a Persian perspective.

⁶⁶ 9,000: Paus. 10.20.2; Nep. *Milt.* 5; Suda s.v. *Hippias* (1)/ι 545. 10,000: Just. *Epit.* 2.9.

⁶⁷ Unless Hunt 1998, 26–8, is right that arming slaves was less threatening than arming poor citizens.

⁶⁸ Seventy triremes: Hdt. 6.92, 132, with discussion in van Wees 2013b, 64–8. They would have required 14,000 men, when Athens may have had c.18,000 20–40-year-olds (see above, n. 51).

⁶⁹ The 'oldest and youngest' sent home in 418 amounted to only one-sixth (Thuc. 5.64.3), i.e. 18–19 and 55–59-year-olds; the Spartan army at Leuctra included men up to the age of 55 (Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.17).

⁷⁰ Date: Diodoros (15.36.1–4), who explicitly speaks of an initial '*pandēmei*' mobilization, but differs from Aeneas in blaming the ultimate defeat of Abdera on treachery by Thracian allies rather than on excessive zeal and a lack of organization.

⁷¹ *Contra* Best 1969, 120–1; Whitehead 2001, 139, 141–2, who take the *kouphoi* to be specialist units.

⁷² The speaker describes multiple simultaneous crises, including threats to the grain supply ([Dem.] 50.4–6), and says that the assembly 'voted that the trierarchs should launch the ships' (50.4 and 6): this suggests that all trierarchs and thus all available ships were mobilized.

⁷³ Thuc. 2.31.2; the liability of metics for hoplite service is also attested by Xen. *Vect.* 2.2–4, which can only refer to general levies; cf. Whitehead 1977, 82–6.

⁷⁴ Demesmen as informal unit: Lys. 16.14; Is. 2.42; Theophr. *Char* 25 [27]; demesmen as witnesses to military record: Lys. 20.23. Cf. Whitehead 1986, 224–6; Osborne 1985, 82–3.

⁷⁵ See van Wees 2004, 95–7.

⁷⁶ Plut. *Sol.* 8–9; Hdt. 6.34–8.

⁷⁷ See Christ 2001, 400–3 (*ek katalogou* as 'by enlistment'); Hansen 1985, 81–6 (*ek katalogou* as 'from a list'). Thucydides 2.56.2, 58.3; 6.31.2 gives 4,000 as the highest number conscripted.

⁷⁸ As pointed out by Christ 2006, 71–2, 93, citing Pollux 8.115; Soph. *fr.* 144.

⁷⁹ E.g. the expeditions to Haliartus for which Alcibiades Junior was 'listed' (Lys. 14.7; 15.11) and prosecuted, and to Tamynae by 'a small force' (Plut. *Phoc.* 12.1) which entailed many accusations.

⁸⁰ Plut. *Per.* 18.2. This is how I would counter the objection by Christ 2006, 49

and n. 15, that there is not enough evidence to posit what he calls a ‘two-track system’, and that therefore ‘the vast majority of hoplites [...] were probably conscripts’; see n. 2, above.

⁸¹ See in detail Gabrielsen 1994, 43–102.

⁸² IG I³ 60 (c.430 BC): generals to recruit 150 volunteers, almost certainly five marines per ship; Thuc. 6.43.1: marines not ‘by enlistment’, i.e. volunteers (see below at n. 86); ML 23.23–7 (Themistocles Decree, 480 BC, if genuine): generals mobilize marines and archers separately from rest of crew.

⁸³ E.g. Gabrielsen 1994, 107–9; Morrison et al. 2000, 114–18.

⁸⁴ As suggested by van Wees 2013b, 96.

⁸⁵ These fragments of Antiphon and Aristophanes come from Harpocration, s.v. *thētes kai thētikon*.

⁸⁶ The suggestion that marines (unlike any other fifth-century Athenian hoplites) ‘may well have been given their armour by the state’ (de Ste. Croix 2004a, 21) is highly unlikely; fighting as a marine required special skill and could not have been left to men who did not even own the equipment.

⁸⁷ Rosivach 2002b; Gabrielsen 2002 try to explain away the evidence (except Thuc. 6.43.1). De Ste. Croix 2004a, 27, objects to a lack of evidence for quantitative property qualifications: see below at n. 102.

⁸⁸ For this meaning of the name, see van Wees 2006b, 352–60; Duploux 2014, 650–1; *contra* Whitehead 1981, who argued for ‘yoked men’, meaning hoplites ‘yoked’ in the phalanx.

⁸⁹ See van Wees 2013a, 229–32; 2006b; 2001; Foxhall 1997, 129–32. Leisure class: Davies 1981, 28–9.

⁹⁰ De Ste. Croix 2004a, 47–8 notes the problem (with Boeckh 1886, 581) and concludes that the property qualifications must be wrong (cf. Rosivach 2002a; Gabrielsen 2002, 95–8). Rosivach 2002b; Gabrielsen 2002, 92–4 reject any link between property class and military service. Others conclude that the qualifications must represent a later raising of the threshold: Raaflaub 2006a (c.460 BC); Valdés Guía and Gallego 2010, 270–7 (c.400 BC).

⁹¹ Since Athens could muster more than 200 ships with ten hoplite marines each.

⁹² Arist. *Pol.* 5.1303a8–10; *Ath. Pol.* 26.1 speaks instead of casualties among ‘the decent folk among both the people and the wealthy’, so assumes either wider conscription or extensive volunteering.

⁹³ Arist. *Pol.* 4.1297b2–6; see discussion in van Wees 2001, 57–8.

⁹⁴ See Thuc. 8.65.3; *Ath. Pol.* 29.5; Lysias 20.13, with van Wees 2001, 56–7.

⁹⁵ See van Wees 2013b, 41–2, 70–3.

⁹⁶ E.g. Thuc. 6.24.3–4; *Ath. Pol.* 24.1.

⁹⁷ For full discussion, see van Wees 1999a; 2006b; 2013a.

⁹⁸ See in more detail van Wees 2013a, esp. 236–40; 2013b, esp. 128–33.

⁹⁹ *Ath. Pol.* 7.4 (ignored in fourth century); for continuing legal role see de Ste. Croix 2004a, 8–13.

¹⁰⁰ See van Wees 2013a, 230–1: 500 *medimnoi* of barley weighed 13,750 kg, which required 17.2 ha (assuming a high barley yield for Attica of 800 kg/ha), which needs to be doubled for biennial fallow, i.e. 34.4 ha or 378 *plethra*, at a minimum price of 50 dr. per *plethron*: 18,920 dr. For the estimated ‘liturgical census’, see Davies 1971, 20–4; Gabrielsen 1994, 45–53.

¹⁰¹ Duploux 2014; de Ste. Croix 2004a, 7, 48 (‘military and social groups that already existed in Solon’s day’); Rosivach 2002a, 39–47.

¹⁰² As noted by de Ste. Croix 2004a, 49, who however rejects formalization of the remaining classes.

¹⁰³ These are the arguments of Frost 1984, adopted by many since; see n. 4, above.

¹⁰⁴ Control of property: Harpocration s.v. *lēxiarchika grammateia*: *lēxeis* are *klēroi* and *ousiai*; Photius s.v. *lēxiarchika grammateia* (1) = Suda λ. 463. Eligibility for magistracies: Photius s.v. *lēxiarchika grammateia* (2) = Suda λ. 462.

¹⁰⁵ See Whitehead 1986, 35–6 n. 130; Fisher 2001, 142–3. ML 23.29–31; [Dem.] 50.6 show use for naval mobilization and imply that even poor citizens were included; *IG I³* 138.1–7 suggests a military connection; Aeschin. 1.18, 103; Lycurg. 1.76 show citizens were registered at eighteen; see also Isae. 7.26; Isoc. 8.88; Dem. 44.35–7; 57.26, 60.

¹⁰⁶ Pollux 8.104; see also Hesychius and Photius s.v. *triakonta*, who cite as evidence ‘Phrynichus’, probably the fifth-century comic poet, though the fragment is not included in *PCG*.

¹⁰⁷ It seems to me more likely that the lexiarchs operated as a board and were collectively responsible for the citizens’ *lēxeis* than that they were each ‘leader of a *lēxis*’ as Van Effenterre suggests; he imagines *lēxeis* as ‘sections, ranks, age-classes or social groups’ (14).

¹⁰⁸ This implies that the lexiarchic registers included an indication of property class, which in view of the significance of property classes they surely must have done even in the fifth century (cf. *Ath. Pol.* 26.2 and *IG I³* 46.43–6 for the significance of property classes in 457 and c.445 respectively). There is some indirect evidence for this in the Aristotelian *Oikonomika* 1347a18–24 (2.2.5): among Athenian colonists at Potidaea taxable wealth was registered ‘by individual property, in whatever place it was located’ rather than ‘all together in each man’s own deme’; the latter was evidently the (Athenian) norm. Athens controlled Potidaea from 429 to 405 and 362 to 351 BC, but since *eisphora* taxes were collected by symmories rather than demes after 377 BC, it must in fact be the earlier date.

¹⁰⁹ Plut. *Sol.* 9 and Solon *fr.* 1–3 West. The alternative tradition that Salamis was conquered by a single triaconter and a fishing fleet (Plut. *Sol.* 9.1–3) was an etymological folktale and cannot be treated as evidence for early Athenian warfare: see van Wees 2013b, 59.

¹¹⁰ Hdt. 5.95; cf. Alcaeus *fr.* 167, 428 L-P; Strabo 13.1.38–9; Plut. *Mor.* 858a–b; Diog. Laert. 1.74.

¹¹¹ Naxos: Hdt. 1.64.2; *Ath. Pol.* 15.3.

Associations and Citizenship in Attica from Solon to Cleisthenes

Paulin Ismard

The relative positions of Solon and of Cleisthenes in modern historiography would probably have presented a paradox to an Athenian of the classical period. It almost seems as if the Solonian myth that was created in fourth-century Athens has been paralleled in modern historiography by a Cleisthenic myth which has turned the reformer into a 'geometric' magician, creating the basics of Athenian democracy and civic identity from scratch.¹ The Cleisthenic period would thus represent a divide between two radically different societies. In spite of subsequent modifications, the dominant implicit image is often still one wherein a traditional society, based on kinship-groups and to some degree symbolized by the *genos*, was replaced by a rational society organized in terms of civic life and its subdivisions (mainly tribes and demes). In such a context, and irrespective of the difficulties which the literature on the subject presents, the term 'association'—insofar as it is taken to denote an organization in private law founded upon voluntary membership—has long seemed to find no echo in the social realities of the archaic period.

Nonetheless, in the last thirty years the existence of associations in the Athens of the classical period has stimulated many major studies. They have been moving towards the formation of a fairly widespread interpretative model which links the development of associations to that of the institutions of democracy. Associations are thus often presented as 'cities in miniature'.² The most recent major contribution, that of Nicholas Jones, has even seen the phenomenon of associations

as a ‘response’ to the gradual consolidation of the democracy.³ For both models, the city, or civic circumstances, are deemed to have provided the stimulus for major evolutions in Athenian communal life. Associations are therefore secondary in the causal chain, being nothing more than the products of a civic structure which reached maturity at the end of the sixth century BC. In this way, any active role played by associations in the shaping of Athenian civic identity is deliberately downgraded.

In explicit contrast to such a model, this essay is intended to study the ways in which associations were able to take part in the slow elaboration of civic identity in sixth-century Athens. That approach requires at the outset that one should not read into Athenian society of the archaic period the rigidity of certain distinctions which belong to the classical city—those between public sphere and private sphere, or between civic subdivisions and so-called ‘private’ associations. It presupposes also that we should adopt from the start a broad notion of citizenship as a ‘total social fact’ which has no clearly privileged field of activity and whose definition itself evolves and sharpens until the end of the sixth century. For a period within which politics has not yet become a specific area of community life,⁴ we shall try to assess how different components of Athenian society gradually align themselves with the civic community via associations (in the broad sense) and their specific customs. The task will therefore be to analyse the role of the associations in the processes of integration within the ‘city as society’, in order to see how they flow into the ‘city as institution’ at the dawn of the classical period.⁵

1. The Law of Solon on Associations

A single document, of exceptional but complex evidential value, provides the inevitable point of departure for any study of the custom of association in the archaic period: the law of Solon on associations. It is cited in the *Digest* as a quotation from Gaius, who attributes it to the Athenian legislator. Apart from the hypothesis, recently advanced by I. Arnaoutoglou, that it is a creation of the Hadrianic period, a consensus has emerged in recognizing the archaic origin of the law.⁶ However, the law has hardly ever been used in order to investigate the diversity, and above all the historical role, of association in archaic Attica.

Ἐὰν δὲ δῆμος ἢ φράτορες ἢ ἱερῶν ὀργίων ἢ ναῦται ἢ σύσσιτοι ἢ ὁμόταφοι ἢ θιασῶται ἢ ἐπὶ λείαν οἰχόμενοι ἢ εἰς ἐμπορίαν, ὅτι ἂν τούτων διαθῶνται πρὸς ἀλλήλους, κύριον εἶναι, ἐὰν μὴ ἀπαγορεύσῃ δημόσια γράμματα.⁷

If (the members of) a deme, or phrateres, or participants in sacred *orgia*, or sailors, or participants in dining or burial groups, or members of a *thiasos*, or persons who go away for plunder or trade, anything that they agree among themselves is to be valid unless public writings forbid. [tr. J.K. Davies]

This is not the moment to rehearse the various arguments which can lead us either to consider this law as authentic or to see it as a creation of the Empire.⁸ I shall content myself by recalling the four elements which offer evidence in favour of the authenticity of the text: (1) the existence of the range of groups mentioned in the law can be documented from sixth-century Athens, while their existence at a later period is more than dubious; (2) linguistically, the text transmitted by the *Digest*, which contains certain voluntary or involuntary anachronisms, presents no contradictions with what we know of the rewriting of the laws of Solon at the end of the fifth century; (3) the law can perhaps be associated with the citation by a historian of the Hellenistic period of a law of Solon concerned with the *orgeōnes*;⁹ and (4) the law is related in format to several authentic Solonian laws, some of which may not have been in force in the classical period and are known to us only via later sources.¹⁰

The list which the law of Solon sets out shows the breadth and the diversity of associative behaviour in archaic Athens. Moreover, it looks as if the distinctions that are traditionally used in order to distinguish the various Athenian associations (private versus public) hardly appear adequate to encompass a phenomenon which is characterized by great variety and heterogeneity. The law does not set out the different groups in a hierarchical order, any more than it subsumes them in a single category: the term *koinōnia* seems to be unknown to the legislator. Lastly, it unquestionably cites only some of the associations of the archaic period, a fact which has nonplussed most historians in their quest to identify in the law the communities of a hypothetical archaic *politeia*. In that respect, however, one may detect an indication of an archaic form of law, far removed from any instinct towards codification.¹¹ More fundamentally, because of its very format the law lends itself poorly to any institutionalist reading of the community life of the archaic period. It allows a glimpse of the complex and various social affiliations of the archaic city, far removed from institutionalist readings which are at bottom prisoners of the models of fourth-century political philosophy and which presuppose a model of political hierarchization of communities within the framework of a *politeia*, clearly established even before the time of Solon.

The law establishes boundaries by defining the areas which are appropriate for associations and for the city as a whole: through these definitions, the various communities are acknowledged by the city.

Within this perspective, the law easily finds its integral place as part of the wider Solonic programme which aimed to create links between the public and the private domains in order to allow civic life to function.¹² After all, if these communities are recognized in such a way, then it is not so much under the aegis of an all-embracing term which might provide them with a juridical personality but rather via a specific procedure, that of ‘making an agreement’ (*diatithesthai*). The term denotes the act of making a will in Solon’s famous law of succession. In any case, a more general sense is attested, notably in the epigraphy of the classical period, where *diatithesthai* can denote any form of exchange which takes place within the framework of transmitting the rights of ownership over a thing or a person.¹³

2. Solonian Citizenship

However, it remains to establish the way in which the law of Solon on associations related to the question of the development of citizenship in sixth-century Athens. Most of the studies devoted to Athenian citizenship in the time of Solon organize their approach around three problems: the distribution of the citizen body into four *telē*, the existence and scope, wide or narrow, of a hypothetical *Boulē* of 400, and the extension of rights of access to the city law courts.¹⁴ The core of discussion naturally turns on the indications provided by the *Athēnaiōn Politeia* about the Solonian *politeia*. Yet Aristotle nowhere mentions the existence of a right of citizenship as part of the oeuvre of Solon. In contrast, Plutarch implies the existence of a law of citizenship:

Παρέχει δ’ ἀπορίαν καὶ ὁ τῶν δημοποιήτων νόμος, ὅτι γενέσθαι πολίτας οὐ δίδωσι πλὴν τοῖς φεύγουσιν ἀειφυγία τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἢ πανεστίους Ἀθήναζε μετοικιζομένοις ἐπὶ τέχνῃ. Τοῦτο δὲ ποιῆσαι φασιν αὐτὸν οὐχ οὕτως ἀπελαύνοντα τοὺς ἄλλους, ὥς κατακαλούμενον Ἀθήναζε τοὺτους ἐπὶ βεβαίῳ τῷ μεθέξειν τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ ἅμα πιστοὺς νομίζοντα τοὺς μὲν ἀποβεβληκότας τὴν ἑαυτῶν διὰ τὴν ἀνάγκην, τοὺς δ’ ἀπολελοιπότες διὰ τὴν γνῶμην.¹⁵

His law concerning naturalized citizens is a surprising one, because it grants naturalization only to those in permanent exile from their own country, or who were emigrating with their families to Athens to practise a trade. Solon’s object here, we are told, was not so much to discourage others as to invite these particular categories to Athens with the assurance that they could share in the *politeia*. He also deemed as trustworthy both those who had been compelled to leave their country, and those who had left it through set purpose.

[tr. Ian Scott-Kilvert (Penguin), but with much modification]

There is no reason to question the authenticity of the law.¹⁶ If one

follows the logic of Plutarch's text, this law was different from the simple law about the return of the *atimoi* mentioned in chapter 19. It is probable that the law, which defines categories in terms of their activity, was very far removed in its form from laws of citizenship of the classical period: if this kind of citizenship is incomprehensible for Plutarch, as it probably had been since the fifth century,¹⁷ that is probably because it did not follow the route of explicit participation in deliberative institutions, such as the very hypothetical Council of 400.

Plutarch identifies two categories of persons considered by the law: on the one hand, those who had been exiled by their city, on the other a set of individuals drawn to Athens in order to ply a trade there. In reality the law would have had to concern itself both with freedmen and with an entire incoming population of non-Attic origin, perhaps in part comprising *atimoi*. The law does not seem explicitly to confer the right of political participation on the new citizens. To understand its real sense, it may be helpful to consider similar legislation on the conferment of citizenship and on the reception of *allopoliitai* in other cities of the late archaic and early classical periods. F. Ruzé has in fact shown that the first attestations of citizenship in the late sixth century, before the boundaries of political participation were clearly defined, made of it above all a privilege based on 'the security of goods and persons and on the guarantee of being able to enjoy the produce of one's property'.¹⁸

Lower-ranking communities were often the intermediaries that guaranteed the exercise of such rights, as one can observe in early fifth-century Cretan inscriptions. When at Arcades, at the end of the sixth century, the scribe Spensithios had his right of citizenship recognized, it was in virtue of his joining the community of the Dataleis, with the agreement of the city as a whole.¹⁹ Likewise, at Gortyn in the early fifth century, the city incorporates a new population by recognizing the community of the Latosians, to which it accords the right of residence and perhaps guarantees an *asylia*. Such a procedure reflects the importance of community membership in the definition of citizenship. At the same time it reveals the very incompleteness of their status as citizen: these new Latosians are all under the protection of the *kosmos* of foreigners.²⁰ In the same city, at the start of the fifth century, if Dionysios is incorporated in the citizen body of Gortyn, it is by a decree issued by the city and population of Avlon, and his integration within the civic body explicitly presupposes that he joins the community of the inhabitants of Avlon.²¹

In these three cases, the communities of Avlon, the Latosians, or the Dataleis cannot all be securely located nor identified, but the structure of integration into citizenship is explicit enough: each time, it is through the intermediary of a specific community of the city that

an individual has his rights of citizenship conferred. The term ‘civic subdivision’, which presupposes a clearly defined model for the hierarchization of different groups within the body of a *politeia*, does not really apply to such communities, which can decide by themselves, as in the cases of the Dataleis or of the inhabitants of Avlon, whether to bring this or that individual into the city. It is perhaps more exact to see in this fact the traces, in the archaic city, of ‘a non-egalitarian assemblage, a mosaic of components with different origins and specific rights’.²² In the Attic context, the *seisachtheia* and the arrival into Attica of new inhabitants must have imposed a demand for affiliation on a series of communities—phratries, *genē*, but also demes, *orgeōnes*, or *thiasoi*—which could probably guarantee the elementary rights which defined citizenship in the archaic period, principally the legal security accorded to an *oikos*. Everything therefore suggests that Solon’s legislation accorded citizenship to part of the population living in Attica on a communitarian basis which bypassed the traditional frameworks of phratries and *genē*. In the Solonian context, the question of land, which (as F. Ruzé has shown) formed part of the ‘typology of integration’, was absolutely central. One may suppose that integration within communities made possible an access to land which would otherwise have been prohibited.²³

It is clearly impossible to decide the precise relationship between the law of Solon on associations, which acknowledges the activity of a range of communities, and this law on citizenship. What is more, it would be dangerous to suppose that the one derives from the other. It remains nonetheless the case that the two laws describe in my view the same historical configuration, that of a very weakly integrated sixth-century city within which there were multiple communitarian affiliations, and where the first political entitlements within the ‘city under construction’ were probably linked to them. However, our hypothesis about citizenship in the time of Solon would have no value if it did not recognize the existence of two communities, the Gephyraioi and the Lycomidai.

3. The Gephyraioi

It is in book 5 of his *Histories*, when he describes the origins of the tyrannicides Harmodios and Aristogeiton, that Herodotus comes to present the community of the Gephyraioi:

The Gephyraioi, to which the murderers of Hipparchos belonged, came according to their own account originally from Eretria (Οἱ δὲ Γεφυραῖοι, τῶν ἦσαν οἱ φονέες οἱ Ἰππάρχου, ὥς μὲν αὐτοὶ λέγουσι, ἐγεγόνεσαν ἐξ

Ἐρετρίης τὴν ἀρχήν). My enquiries, however, have made it clear to me that they were Phoenicians, descendants of those who came with Kadmos into the country now called Boiotia: they used to live in the part of that country which they were assigned by lot, the canton of Tanagra. Thereafter, when the Kadmeioi had been the first to be expelled by the Argives, these Gephyraioi were then expelled by the Boiotians and turned to Athens: and the Athenians admitted them to be their fellow-citizens under certain conditions, imposing on them a small number of restrictions which are not worth recounting (Ἀθηναῖοι δέ σφεας ἐπὶ ῥητοῖσι ἐδέξαντο σφέων αὐτῶν εἶναι πολυλίτας, <οὐ> πολλῶν τεων καὶ οὐκ ἀξιαπηγήτων ἐπιτάξαντες ἔργεσθαι).²⁴

A little further on, Herodotus notes an exceptional fact concerning them:

Καὶ σφι ἰρά ἐστι ἐν Ἀθήνῃσι ἰδρυμένα, τῶν οὐδὲν μέτα τοῖσι λοιποῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι, ἄλλα τε κεχωρισμένα τῶν ἄλλων ἱρῶν καὶ δὴ καὶ Ἀχαιίης Δήμητρος ἱρόν τε καὶ ὄργια.²⁵

There are a number of sanctuaries established for them in Athens, to which the other Athenians have no right of access, separately from the other sanctuaries, especially a sanctuary and mystic ceremonies for Demeter Achaia.

Herodotus' narrative is not our only source of information. We know from elsewhere that the Gephyraioi, with roots in the region of Aphidna, occupied a frontier zone on the boundaries of Attica, in contact with Boiotia and close to Euboea. While Herodotus emphasizes the Eretrian origin of the community, the lexicographers mainly report their origin in Tanagra. Finally, late sources report the Gephyraioi as having been offered as a *dekate* at the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi.²⁶ Although inscriptions of the imperial period make reference to a *genos* of Gephyraioi,²⁷ nothing allows us to apply the term to the archaic community: by reporting that the cult of Demeter Achaia was confined to them, Herodotus' narrative even seems to imply that the group was not the holder of civic priesthoods and in that respect did not constitute a *genos*. We may note more generally that Herodotus scarcely concerns himself with describing the community as *genos*, *orgeōnes*, or *phratry*, a fact which reflects yet again how inadequate a taxonomy basically devised in the classical period was for understanding archaic phenomena.

If we believe Herodotus, the Athenians had then conferred citizenship on the Gephyraioi with certain restrictions which were not worth recording. We must certainly understand that a right of settlement and a form of juridical protection had been accorded to them, but that these terms should not be equated with complete citizenship. Minor though they were, these restrictions were probably at the core of the conflict which was to ensue after the assassination of Hipparchos. Indeed, according to Thucydides, it was the prospect that Harmodios' sister might participate in the *kanēphoria* during the Panathenaia which triggered the act of tyrannicide:

Having invited Harmodios's sister, a young girl, to come carrying a basket in a certain procession, they then rejected her on the ground that she had never been invited because she was not worthy (διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀξίαν εἶναι). When Harmodios took the affair very fiercely, Aristogeiton's resolve was greatly sharpened because of him.²⁸

As P. Brulé has shown, the anecdote leads us to suppose that the *kanēphoria* comprised a ritual privilege that was reserved for certain families, within which the Gephyraioi were not included.²⁹ One cannot locate very precisely the date at which the community was incorporated within the Athenian city, but the documentation about the Gephyraioi is nonetheless rich in information. It allows us to detect, for the very community which produced the two tyrannicides, the existence of an incomplete citizenship (from the point of view of the classical period) that had no well-established place or stable institutional content—a sign of the lack of political integration within the sixth-century city.

One may wonder whether the traditions concerning the Gephyraioi may not find an echo in part of the Athenian tradition about the deme Philaidai, cited by Plutarch in the context of the conflicts between Athens and Megara for the control of Salamis. He reports the anecdote according to which Solon, in front of the Athenian judges, had established a link between the deme Philaidai and the story of Philaios and Eurysaces, sons of Aias:

Φιλαῖος καὶ Εὐρυσάκης οἱ Αἴαντος υἱοί, <τῆς> Ἀθήνησι πολιτείας μεταλαβόντες, παρέδοσαν τὴν νῆσον αὐτοῖς καὶ κατώκησαν ὁ μὲν ἐν Βραυρώνι τῆς Ἀττικῆς, ὁ δ' ἐν Μελίτῃ, καὶ δῆμον ἐπώνυμον Φιλαίου τὸν Φιλαίδων ἔχουσιν, ὅθεν ἦν Πεισίστρατος

Philaios and Eurysaces the sons of Aias, having taken a share in citizenship at Athens, transferred the islands to them and settled, one at Brauron in Attica, the other in Melite, and they have a deme Philaidai named after Philaios, to which Peisistratus belonged.³⁰

The nature of the connection between the deme Philaidai and the island of Salamis certainly remains very unclear. However, the anecdote indicates that there probably existed a tradition which went back to Solon's time about the incorporation of the community of Philaidai within the body of the city, and that Plutarch interpreted it as a genuine acquisition of citizenship.

4. The Lycomidai

For the study of the *genos* of the Lycomidai in the archaic period, Plutarch's *Life of Themistocles* is our main source:

The bastard Athenians used to assemble at Kynosarges [...] Themistocles persuaded some young men of good birth to come down to Kynosarges to exercise with him: he succeeded, and by this means, it seems, he secured the abolition of the distance which separated the bastards from the citizens of pure birth (τὸν τῶν νόθων καὶ γνησίων διορισμὸν ἀνελεῖν). All the same, his membership of the *genos* of Lycomidai is indisputable (ὅτι μέντοι τοῦ Λυκομιδῶν γένους μετεῖχε, δῆλόν ἐστι): when the sanctuary of initiation of the deme of Phlya, which was the common property of the Lycomidai (τὸ γὰρ Φλυῆσι τελεστήριον, ὅπερ ἦν Λυκομιδῶν κοινόν), was burnt down by the barbarians, he had it restored and decorated with paintings himself, as Simonides narrates.³¹

Themistocles will then have been a member of the *genos*, which evidently celebrated *orgia* in the region of Phlya. Though it was termed a *genos* by Plutarch, who was certainly closely linked to the Lycomidai of the imperial period,³² the community does not appear to hold civic priesthoods, and the phrase claiming that the *telestērion* of Phlya was their common property sits poorly once again with our knowledge of the *genē* of the classical period: it is not inconceivable that the Lycomidai constituted a *genos* somewhat on the margins of the great civic cults. However, one can scarcely challenge his evidence for the actual existence of a community of Lycomidai, attested elsewhere by a fourth-century *horos*,³³ or for Themistocles' membership of that community.³⁴

Elsewhere, Pausanias transmits certain traditions concerning the early history of the community. A certain Mousaios, behind whom some scholars have wished to detect the famous Onomacritos, an associate of the Peisistratid regime, may himself have been of the Lycomidai, a supposition which suggests that the community was at the origin of the Orphic traditions associated with Eleusis.³⁵ There is also a tradition, transmitted by Pausanias, which attributes to the Lycomidai the foundation of the Mysteries of Andania.³⁶ The *genos* was evidently flourishing in the Athens of the imperial period, and the traditions which link the *genos* with Eleusis and Andania are very late, a fact which should discourage us from doing what is often done by making the Lycomidai into an influential *genos* which was at the heart of the city's religious innovations in the sixth century.³⁷

Nonetheless, the ambiguities associated with the figure of Themistocles encourage us to formulate a hypothesis about the civic status of the Lycomidai in the sixth century. The legend of his plebeian origins is certainly questionable, and A. Shapiro has moreover considered it possible to identify sixth-century members of his family within the Athenian elite.³⁸ However, everything suggests that the recognition of his citizenship was problematic. Plutarch implies that he was a *nothos*, and links him with Kynosarges. It is hard to imagine a glaring anachronism on the part of Plutarch which might

have led him to interpret the young Themistocles in the light of Pericles' law.³⁹ Everything suggests that Plutarch is here picking up a literary tradition which links the figure of Themistocles to a *notheia* that was totally different from the *metroxenia* which was widespread among the early fifth-century Athenian elite. Further, in the classical period there existed a literary tradition, attested by two fragments of Aischines the Socratic, claiming that Themistocles had been disinherited by his father.⁴⁰ Plutarch cites this tradition while disputing it, and speaks of a procedure of *apokēryxis*, which one must interpret as an exclusion from the *oikos*, pronounced by a father.⁴¹ Themistocles' *notheia* should thus be understood as the absence of the recognition of legitimate filiation which it was the task of the phratry to attest. It implied exclusion from the paternal *oikos* and, more broadly, from the phratry. In this sense Themistocles could not claim the ancestral 'pure birth' of the *gnēsioi* which Plutarch refers to. Nonetheless—and Plutarch recognizes the paradox (ὅτι μέντοι)—Themistocles belonged to the *genos* Lycomidai. Like the Gephyraioi, the Lycomidai may have enjoyed only an incomplete citizenship in sixth-century Athens. One could even suppose that it was through this *genos* as intermediary—recognized within Attica but without any place in the phratry system—that he could finally acquire political rights in the city, to the point of becoming eponymous archon in 493/2, by virtue of the law of the Cleisthenic period transmitted by Philochorus, which enjoined that the phrateres were obliged to receive into their body *gennētai* and *orgeōnes*.⁴²

Through the example of the Gephyraioi, and to a much more uncertain degree those of the Philaidai and the Lycomidai, one can thus detect the existence of several communities through whose agency the first entitlements of a citizenship still largely in process of formation could be recognized.⁴³

Our hypothesis suggests that the law of Solon on citizenship involved an extension of the civic community beyond the traditional framework of the phratries. This enlargement of the civic community lay at the heart of the political conflicts of the sixth century. In fact, one can identify at least three events which reflect the decisive role played by competing definitions of citizenship in the instability of the sixth century.

5. The *Diapsēphismos* of 510

By describing Peisistratus' supporters among the Attic population, the *Athēnaiōn Politeia* presents the history of sixth-century Athenian

citizenship in a striking summary:

Ranked with this faction were the men deprived of debts due to them, discontented because of the hardship arising from this, and those who were not of pure Athenian descent, because of their fear (καὶ οἱ τῷ γένει μὴ καθαροὶ διὰ τὸν φόβον). This is confirmed by the fact that after the overthrow of the tyrants the Athenians held a review of the citizen body (ἐποίησαν διαψηφισμόν), because many men were taking a share in political rights though not entitled to do so (ὥς πολλῶν κοινωνούντων τῆς πολιτείας).⁴⁴

On the evidence of the *Athēnaiōn Politeia*, then, behind Peisistratus lay the support of many men whose status could be the object of controversy in the mid-sixth century. The citizenship which we saw had probably been conferred on them in the time of Solon risked being withdrawn from them. It is possible that the episode of Peisistratus' chariot-ride with the Thracian garland-seller Phye gave a symbolic seal of recognition to the new rights held by such elements of the Attic population.⁴⁵ Besides, Aristotle cites the episode of the *diapsēphismos* that was to be held in 510, which organized the exclusion of the men who were improperly taking advantage of the *politeia*.⁴⁶ Though one can grasp without difficulty the intention underlying the *diapsēphismos* (but cannot however attribute it explicitly to Isagoras),⁴⁷ the nature of the procedure remains largely obscure. The only other known *diapsēphismos* is that of 347/6, which the orators termed a *diapsēphisis*. In accordance with the decree of Demophilos, the latter implied a review of the citizen-lists in the demes. One could suppose that Aristotle was using a juridical term of the classical period in order to describe an archaic reality that was much more complex. Though one can envisage that in 510 a comparable check of the citizen population involved the scrutiny of numerous *lēxiarchika*, it is difficult to specify its nature in the absence of the civic structures which the demes became after the Cleisthenic reform. Some historians have suggested that the procedure must have rested exclusively with the phratries, which would imply the exclusion of all those who were not members. The suggestion is attractive but unprovable. In any case, the procedure must have relied upon communities' lists, and a considerable proportion of the inhabitants of Attica were excluded from them.

6. The Expulsion of the 700 *Epistia*

Herodotus also mentions a process of exclusion from the *politeia* during the stasis which set the partisans of Isagoras against those of

Cleisthenes:

Notwithstanding Cleisthenes' departure, Cleomenes still presented himself at Athens with a small force. On his arrival, at the urging of Isagoras, he expelled as polluted seven hundred Athenian families (ἀπικόμενος δὲ ἀγῆλαττει ἑπτακόσια ἐπίστια Ἀθηναίων, τὰ οἱ ὑπέθετο ὁ Ἰσαγόρης).⁴⁸

The term *epistia* is puzzling, and indicates yet again the variety of terms which were specific to the communitarian structures of the sixth century.⁴⁹ When he came to relate the event, Aristotle in contrast would merely employ the term *oikos*.⁵⁰ The reference to the pollution of the *epistia* is striking: it locates the events within the continuity of the remarks of the *Athēnaiōn Politeia*. In that sense, it is inadequate to read it as a simple ostracism of the partisans (very numerous, if so) of Cleisthenes. Exclusion from the city relied very certainly on precise criteria which defined citizenship.

The two episodes narrated by Herodotus and Aristotle confirm the pre-Cleisthenic structure of citizenship which we have tried to identify. A plurality of communities with very little mutual integration defined a common citizenship which was largely incomplete: since it rested on a right of protection which took communitarian form, its recognition could be the object of periodic challenges leading to the exclusion from citizenship of important communities of Attica.

7. Cleisthenes the Restorer

Such instability in respect of the definition of citizenship would in a way be resolved by the Cleisthenic reorganization. The first direction of the reform consisted undoubtedly in an egalitarian distribution of rights to citizenship, effected by the integration of the general population of Attica in the deme and phratry structures, thanks to which everyone could see himself guaranteed both the right of political participation and the protection which the status of citizen provided. In this way the reform would close the circle which had been breached in Solon's time with the enlargement of citizenship, by giving the latter its own context of expression and precise communitarian structures. This was moreover how the sources of the classical period, who made Cleisthenes into a continuator or restorer of the work of Solon, understood the reform⁵¹—and it is hard to understand with what justification they could misrepresent an aristocratic option or a repression of the revolutionary violence of the end of the sixth century.⁵² Nonetheless, in respect of the Solonian definition of citizenship, Cleisthenes' reform introduced an innovation

of substance: it created an organized and articulated hierarchy of communities which were called upon to give substance to the renewal of the civic framework.

The role of the historical person 'Cleisthenes' in the events of 508/7 is not at all easy to identify, and some indications even suggest a sort of self-organizing community on the part of the Athenian *dēmos*.⁵³ Moreover, the project as a whole was very certainly part of a large-scale regional reconfiguration: at Eretria and perhaps at Corinth, at the end of the sixth century, political structures similar to that of the reform of Cleisthenes seem to take shape, probably within the scope of the current slogan *isonomia*.⁵⁴ There is therefore no necessity to postulate a thinking head which devised the reform from top to bottom: the various communities of archaic Attica are certainly the real activators of a reform which did no more than integrate within a common administrative framework groups which in many cases had had a long previous existence.

One should however note that no definition of citizenship is linked to Cleisthenes' reform: it was less important to define the notion of 'citizen' than to construct communitarian structures which alone could guarantee the rights attached to this evolving citizenship. Hence, until Pericles' law it was the traditional communitarian customs of the various associations which fixed the rules by which an individual was affiliated to the civic community. In reality, by embracing all citizens, and their structures of traditional affiliations, within the framework of the demes and phratries—consistently with the slogan of *isonomia*, understood as a 'principle of "apportionment" or "distribution" of rights and duties among citizens consistent with *isotēs*'⁵⁵—the reform, so far from consisting of the decline of certain 'traditional' communities to the advantage of a rational *politeia*, above all organized separations and groupings within a set of different communities, and created levels which allowed a multi-dimensional communitarian life to function.⁵⁶ H. Van Effenterre has emphasized the institutional innovation, in the cities of the late archaic period, which was represented by the separation of the locations of sovereignty, split between Assembly and Council.⁵⁷ In a city such as Athens, where 'the Council was merely a sort of miniature image of the citizens as a body', such an articulation will have had as its main function that of ensuring 'the intervention of the time factor'.⁵⁸ One is tempted to detect echoes of such a separation in the Cleisthenic communitarian framework, notably through the distinction and shaping which it creates between the two basic communities, the demes and the phratries, in the definition of citizenship. In this respect, the Cleisthenic reform aimed not so much at creating a form of civic centrality as at placing the different parts of the territory on

the same level as each other and at organizing adequate forms of *linkage* among the various communitarian structures. In this way, the variety of communitarian identities would not be a hindrance to citizenship on the model of unconditional affiliation to a civic body: on the contrary, it would be the precondition for the existence every time of a *blank space*, an interval between different communitarian roles.

(Translated from French by John K. Davies)

¹ Cf. recently Rausch 1999 and Anderson 2003.

² Cf. most recently Baslez 2006.

³ Jones 1999.

⁴ Cf. Schmitt-Pantel 1992, 107–13, and Duploux, this volume (chapter 1, sections 2 and 6).

⁵ I borrow the terms ‘city as society’ and ‘city as institution’ from Polignac 1995b.

⁶ Arnaoutoglou 2003, 44–57. For the body of scholarly discussion concerned with the law, see Ismard 2010, 44 n. 6.

⁷ Digest 47.22.4 (= Ruschenbusch 1966, F76a = Leão and Rhodes 2015, Fr. 76a). I adopt the text of the edition of Mommsen and Krueger 1985 [1886] 4, 793.

⁸ For a more detailed presentation see Ismard 2010, 44–57.

⁹ Seleucos *FGrHist* 341 F1 (= Ruschenbusch 1966, F76b = Leão and Rhodes 2015, Fr. 76b): Σέλευκος δ' ἐν τῷ ὑπομνήματι τῶν Σόλωνος Ἀξόνων ὀργεῶνάς φησι καλεῖσθαι τοὺς συλλόγους ἔχοντας περὶ τινος ἥρωας ἢ θεοῦς: ‘Seleucos, in his treatise on the *axones* of Solon, states that one calls *orgeōnes* those who hold assemblies dedicated to the cults of the heroes or of the gods’.

¹⁰ For this view of the Solonian laws see the remarks of Scafuro 2006.

¹¹ Cf. on this point Hölkeskamp 1999, 262–9.

¹² The most striking element in this legislation, which seeks to strike a point of balance between *koinon* and *idion*, is without question the sumptuary legislation. Cf. Schmitt-Pantel 1998.

¹³ For the term *diatithesthai*, see Biscardi 1983, esp. 33. The term was the point of departure for Louis Gernet’s reflections on the relationship between contract and the act of association. Its inclusion within the scope of the law on associations would bear witness to ‘la protection assurée à un droit statutaire: le fait de l’association domine l’élément individuel du contrat’ (see Gernet 2001).

¹⁴ For recent bibliography on the question, cf. Almeida 2003, 58–67 (where one notes the significant absence of Ruzé 1997).

¹⁵ Plut. *Sol.* 24.4.

¹⁶ For further detail on this point, and for bibliography about the law, I refer to Ismard 2010, 73.

¹⁷ Here too one may suppose that the law must have been preserved among the laws of Solon ‘which they no longer use’ (ἐν τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς Σόλωνος οἷς οὐκέτι χρῶνται) mentioned by *Ath. Pol.* 8.3.

¹⁸ See Ruzé 2003b, 170: ‘la sécurité des biens et des personnes et la garantie de pouvoir jouir des fruits de sa propriété’.

¹⁹ *Nomima* I, no. 22. For the exact status of the *Dataleis*, see Van Effenterre and Ruzé 1994, 106. The decree is certainly an employment contract, but at the same time it is concerned to integrate an individual within the citizenship, whether he is already a citizen and new privileges are to be accorded him within the city, or

whether he is a foreigner and the rights which are accorded him amount to citizenship. All things considered, it looks more appropriate to speak in terms of civil status than in terms of citizenship. For the debate over the citizenship of Spensithios, see Van Effenterre 1973, 35–6.

²⁰ *Nomima* I, no. 16.

²¹ *Nomima* I, no. 8.

²² ‘Un assemblage inégalitaire, une mosaïque de composantes aux origines diverses et aux droits spécifiques’, Van Effenterre and Ruzé 1994, 27, who also refer to the existence of ‘collective rights which recognised or re-established within the civic community primary communities the origins and nature of which were very varied’ (55).

²³ See Ruzé 2003a.

²⁴ Hdt. 5.57.

²⁵ Hdt. 5.61. For the cult of Demeter Achaia and the links which it attests between Attica and Boiotia, see Suys 1994. For the Gephyraioi and their role in the definition of a frontier space in several aspects, Polignac 2007, 125–6.

²⁶ Eust. *Il.* 3.222 (408).

²⁷ *SEG* 30.85, l. 2–3, l. 16–17.

²⁸ Thuc. 6.56.1.

²⁹ Brulé 1987, 303–4. One may even speculate whether the exceptional honours conferred on the tyrannicides might not be to some degree explained by the non-Athenian dimension of the community. For the honours conferred on the two tyrannicides, see Gauthier 1985, 92–5.

³⁰ Plut. *Sol.* 10.3.

³¹ Plut. *Them.* 1.4.

³² Frost 1980, 64–5.

³³ *IG* II² 2670; Finley 1951, no. 146.

³⁴ Bourriot’s idea (1976, 1260–1) of refusing to make Themistocles a Lycomid seems wholly excessive. One may further observe that his hypothesis of a conflict between Alcmaeonidai and Lycomidai in the archaic period is groundless (Bourriot 1976, 1263–6).

³⁵ See Paus. 1.22.7. In addition, Hippolytos, *Refutatio omnium haeresium* 5.20, suggests that the mysteries of the Lycomidai were even more ancient and more lavish than those of Eleusis.

³⁶ Paus. 4.1.5–7.

³⁷ Thus Boehme 1970, 314–21 has suggested that the Lycomidai had a Messenian origin, Onomacritos being a member of the community. Within the same perspective, cf. Shapiro 1989, 73 and Shapiro 1990, who does not hesitate to assign to the archaic period the link between the *genos* and Eleusis.

³⁸ Cf. Shapiro 1989, 73.

³⁹ Ogden 1996, 54–8 has rightly pointed out that even if Plutarch had committed an anachronism by referring to Kynosarges, the description as *nothos* was not due to chance, with certain traditions stating that the mother of Themistocles was a *hetaira* (cf. Bicknell 1982a).

⁴⁰ Aeschin. *Socr. fr.* 1 and 4. For these two fragments, see Berry 1950.

⁴¹ Plut. *Them.* 2.8. For the *apokéryxis* of Themistocles, see Piccirilli 1987, 24–31.

⁴² For the archonship of Themistocles: Thuc. 1.93.3. In respect of the fragment of Philochorus (*FGrHist* 328 F35), I once more refer to Ismard 2010, 104–6.

⁴³ Could a comparable interpretative framework be applied, for example, to the *genos* of the Salaminioi, attested from the fourth century onwards?

⁴⁴ *Ath. Pol.* 13.5 (tr. P.J. Rhodes).

⁴⁵ Hdt. 1.60.4 and *Ath. Pol.* 14.4. According to Cleidemos (*FGrHist* 323 F15), Phye would have been given in marriage to Hipparchos.

⁴⁶ For the authenticity of the *diapsēphismos* (against F. Jacoby, *FGrHist* IIIb, suppl. 1, 158–60, who saw it as an invention of Androtion), see Welwei 2000; Pleket 1969; Fornara 1970; Manville 1990, 175–89; Ruzé 1997, 354; Kienast 2005.

⁴⁷ K. Welwei's initial reading of it, adopted by Manville and Kienast, interprets the episode as an aristocratic move, perhaps initiated by Isagoras, that was intended to exclude from citizenship those whom Peisistratus had incorporated. One can hardly improve on Will's judgement of the episode (1971, 110): 'La seule chose qui apparaisse claire en cette affaire, c'est que, entre 510 et 507, les chefs de faction cherchèrent à manipuler le corps civique athénien aux mieux de leurs intérêts. L'origine du *diapsēphismos* est probablement à chercher du côté aristocratique, mais son attribution à Isagoras reste hypothétique, et douteuse.'

⁴⁸ Hdt. 5.72.

⁴⁹ For the term *epistion*, cf. Cromei 2000, 44–54, who interprets it as being of suppliants. Might the term possibly reflect an earlier status as *allopoliatai*?

⁵⁰ *Ath. Pol.* 20.3.

⁵¹ Cf. especially Isoc. 7.16 and *Ath. Pol.* 22.1.

⁵² Flaig 2004.

⁵³ For this point, as also for what follows, I again refer the reader to Ismard 2010, 84–121.

⁵⁴ For the organization of the citizen bodies of Eretria and Corinth at the end of the archaic period, see Knoepfler 1997 and Salmon 2003.

⁵⁵ Will 1971, 104, who adds: 'L'élaboration de l'*isonomia* m'apparaît comme un "work in progress" dont Solon, Clisthène, Ephialte ne furent que des moments' (111).

⁵⁶ In the same way, perhaps, as the reform separated *de facto* the religious calendar from the civic calendar.

⁵⁷ Van Effenterre 1985, 229–37.

⁵⁸ Van Effenterre 1985, 235.

Citizenship and Civic Subdivisions

The Case of Sparta

Marcello Lupi

In the extant literature, the first occurrence of the word *politeia* to refer to the notion of ‘citizenship’ can be found in the chapters of Herodotus (9.33–5) devoted to the account of the seer Teisamenos of Elis who, together with his brother, was made a Spartan citizen sometime before the battle of Plataea.¹ The two brothers were ‘the only people ever’ to receive this honour and to enjoy, as Spartan citizens, ‘a full share of everything’. Herodotus does not specify whether they were also included in one of the Spartan civic subdivisions but there is no reason to doubt it: in another passage in the *Histories*, Herodotus himself asserts that when the so-called Minyans, who claimed to be descendants of the Argonauts, asked to live together with the Spartans ‘having a share of their privileges and a portion of the land’, the Spartans accepted, entered into marriages with the Minyans, and ‘divided them up into tribes’ (4.145.2–5). While it may be just chance that the first known use of the abstract noun *politeia* refers to Spartan citizenship, the link between the admission to citizenship and the distribution of citizens within civic subdivisions—tribes (φυλαί) and phratries (φρατρίαι) are the two most widespread typologies²—is no coincidence. As is clear from a significant number of classical and Hellenistic inscriptions granting citizenship to foreigners, the enrolment clauses prescribed that naturalized citizens were to be included within the civic subdivisions just as the children of citizens were included in the subdivisions to

which their father belonged.³

Unsurprisingly, this link between citizenship and civic subdivisions becomes increasingly hard to observe the further back one goes towards the period which, even a few years ago, used to be defined as the age of the birth of the *polis*. But it is interesting to note that John Davies—precisely in an attempt to reassess the question of the origins of the *polis*—suggested focusing on the creation of the ‘segments’ in which the members of Early Iron Age Greek communities came to be organized:⁴

what matters is the basic notion of creating or formalizing a set of segments, of roughly comparable size and standing, which can fulfil a range of functions and can thereby articulate a population in ways independent of fluid, short-term, or personality-dependent agglomerations such as households or chiefs’ followings.

Following in the footsteps of Denis Roussel’s seminal study *Tribu et cité*, which showed that structures such as the *phylai* and the *phratriai* did not represent the survivals of a tribal prehistory of the Greek world but were institutions created in the course of the archaic period, Davies has argued that the creation of civic subdivisions—or ‘segments’, as he prefers to call them—have played a crucial role in the institutionalization of archaic Greek communities.⁵ However, given the nature of the evidence, reconstructing this process is extremely problematic. In fact, the evidence for civic subdivisions, which comes mainly from inscriptions, is generally late in date and, even when considerable documentation about the subdivisions of a given *polis* is available, it should not be automatically assumed that these subdivisions were already an integral part of the political structures of archaic communities. In this context, the interesting aspect of Sparta is that the available evidence, despite its scarcity and the fact that it consists chiefly of literary sources, indicates an early effort to organize the citizen body into formal structures. Indeed, as early as the seventh century BC, the Spartans were organized into three tribes. The source for this information—a line of Tyrtaeus (*fr.* 19.8 West²)—is the first to mention the names of the three Dorian tribes.

This chapter therefore sets out to reassess the current interpretation of Spartan civic subdivisions in three ways: by highlighting the incongruities created by the indiscriminate use of sources from widely different periods (section 1: *The standard model and its limitations*), by providing an alternative interpretation that takes more account of the available evidence (section 2: *Towards a revised interpretation*), and, lastly, by defining the respective roles played by membership of civic subdivisions and participation in collective practices in the

construction of Spartan citizenship during the archaic period (section 3: *Being a Spartan citizen: civic subdivisions and collective practices*).

1. The Standard Model and its Limitations

According to a view still widely held today, referred to here as the ‘standard model’, the Spartiates were distributed into two membership structures which cut across the civic body in accordance with two different categories, one kinship-based and the other territorial: in other words, from birth they were members both of one of the three tribes and of one of the five villages which are believed to have made up the city of Sparta from the archaic period.⁶

Conclusive evidence of the existence of two subdivisions of the citizen body is provided by the most famous Spartan document, known as the Great *Rhetra*, which refers to them by using a rather obscure expression: φυλὰς φυλάξαντα καὶ ὠβὰς ὠβάξαντα. Plutarch, who is our source for our knowledge of the *Rhetra*, explains that this expression refers ‘to the division and distribution of the people into groups, the former of which he (i.e. the Spartan lawgiver) termed *phylai*, the latter *obai*’ (Lyc. 6.2–3). However, while the *phylai* definitely correspond to the three traditional Dorian tribes, the identification of the *obai* with the five villages is actually the result of an extremely fragile chain of arguments which claims to reconstruct the structure of the city during the archaic period on the basis of various sources generally dating to the Roman imperial age. Although I do not intend to explore the main issues raised by the Great *Rhetra* in this chapter, it is generally agreed that the text belongs to the archaic period (seventh century BC?).⁷ It is therefore surprising to note the continued insistence on interpreting the *obai* of the *Rhetra* using documents written up to seven or eight hundred years later. In a previous study, I pointed out the weaknesses of this theory: I sought to demonstrate that the villages that, according to the authoritative evidence of Thucydides (1.10.2), made up the *polis* of Sparta in the fifth century cannot be described as institutionally defined civic subdivisions and do not correspond to the villages—or, rather, urban districts—that constituted the framework of citizenship in the Roman period, when the city structure of Sparta had undoubtedly changed significantly compared to the age of Thucydides. By defining Sparta as a city settled in villages (πόλις κατὰ κώμας), Thucydides only intended to illustrate the settlement pattern, without any institutional implications: he was referring to a *polis* which consisted of a series of villages situated in the plain of Sparta (along the middle valley of the

Eurotas from Thornax in the north at least as far south as Amyclai), and which, nevertheless, had its centre in the village of Pitane and the adjoining acropolis of Sparta.⁸

However, in order to assess the standard model and the circumstances that led to its formulation, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the available evidence about Spartan *phylai* and *obai*, which consists of a relatively small number of sources. No one has seriously doubted that the *phylai* mentioned in the *Rhetra* were the three Dorian tribes of the Dymanes, Pamphyloi, and Hylleis. The emphasis with which the ancient tradition regards Sparta as the Dorian city par excellence⁹ leaves no doubts about this issue. However, it was not until the publication in 1918 of a Berlin papyrus containing various fragments of an elegiac poem by Tyrtaeus that ultimate confirmation for this was provided: a verse from the papyrus describes how the Spartan army was divided into three tribal contingents which were named after the sons of Aigimios, son of Doros, namely Dymas, Pamphilos, and Hyllos (the latter was Herakles' son but had been adopted by Aigimios).¹⁰ It is worth emphasizing that no reference to the Spartan Dorian tribes ever appears again in all the surviving evidence. This leaves open the issue of how long they actually played a role in Spartan institutional organization, since the military function played by the Dorian tribes in the verse of Tyrtaeus is no longer detectable in classical sources on the Spartan army.

The situation for the *obai* is more complex but, until at least the first half of the twentieth century, the only evidence consisted of a brief reference by Hesychios and a few inscriptions of Roman date. Hesychios' glosses display a degree of ambiguity because, on the one hand, they conflate *obai* with villages or at least with territorial units, and, on the other hand, they identify *obai* with *phylai*, which is completely incompatible with the framework presented in the *Rhetra*.¹¹ The evidence from inscriptions is more interesting and provided the basis for the standard model, whose essential features were formulated in 1910 by Luigi Pareti and which was described most coherently in the works of H.T. Wade-Gery.¹² The emergence at that time of the standard model was due to the epigraphic discoveries of the British School of Athens at the site of ancient Sparta in the very first years of the last century. The term *oba* appeared in several inscriptions of Roman imperial date in which the *sphaireis* (ball players) of the communities of Pitane, Limne, and Kynosoura celebrated their victory.¹³ These inscriptions were immediately associated with a passage from Pausanias (3.16.9), who, when referring to the origins of the cult of Artemis Orthia, mentions the division of the Spartan citizens into inhabitants of the four villages of Pitane, Limne, Kynosoura, and Mesoa. Although the passage of

Pausanias appears nowadays as an aetiological tale designed to justify the form that the cult of Artemis Orthia had taken in Roman times,¹⁴ it was deduced that the *polis* of Sparta was created from the synoikism of these four villages, to which a fifth *oba*, Amyclai, was later added as the result of the expansion of Sparta in the early archaic period. However, the community of Amyclai, situated some kilometres south of the town, is only defined as an *oba* in an inscription of the second century BC (*IG* V 1.26), which is utterly different in nature from the *sphaireis* inscriptions and which shows that Amyclai enjoyed a degree of autonomy from Sparta. Nevertheless, the standard model combined the four Spartan *obai* of Roman date with Amyclai and postulated a city that was made up of five villages. This interpretation appeared to provide an explanation both for the magistracy of the five ephors and for the fact that the Spartan army of the classical period consisted, according to several sources, of five military units (*lochoi*).¹⁵

As will be seen below (section 2), the only evidence from the archaic and classical periods that refers to a specific *oba* leads in a wholly different direction. However, it should be emphasized that this procedure—that is, the assumption of continuity over an almost thousand-year period from the age of the *Rhetra* to the latest inscriptions, which date to the third century AD—was a typical feature of studies on Sparta until only recently. On the basis of these considerations, it is hardly surprising that Wade-Gery stated that ‘it is now fairly clear that there were not more than five *Obai* in classical Sparta, and they cannot have subdivided any Tribes’.¹⁶ Moreover, it is significant that the fact that each Spartan citizen belonged to two different types of civic subdivision has been justified by analogy with the Athenian model. As is well known, prior to the Cleisthenic reform Athenian citizens were organized into four traditional Ionian tribes and these tribes continued to exist, albeit with an exclusively ritual role, even after Cleisthenes had introduced the ten territorial tribes. Based on this assumption, Wade-Gery interpreted the relationship between *phylai* and *obai* along the lines of the relationship in Athens between the pre-Cleisthenic and the Cleisthenic tribes. Wade-Gery did not consider it important that this implied a diachronic distinction between the *phylai* (considered to be older but maintained within Spartan organization due to a conservative attitude) and the *obai* (a more recent innovation, roughly contemporary with the *Rhetra*) which had no foundation in the text of the *Rhetra*, which placed *phylai* and *obai* on the same formal level. During the first half of the twentieth century scholars did not consider the question: the three Dorian *phylai* were assumed to belong to the series of customs that the Dorians had brought with them during the migration into the Peloponnese and therefore predated the territorial subdivisions that emerged after the

Dorians settled in Sparta. Essentially, the citizens of Sparta were considered, as Dorians, to have been divided into three *phylai* while at the same time, as residents of the villages that made up the city, they were distributed into five *obai*.

Nevertheless, Wade-Gery's theoretical construction is nourished by an idea of historical change which is lacking in the work of many of the followers of his theory. The assumption that the *phylai* of the *Rhetra* were older than the *obai* was undoubtedly arbitrary but, by so doing, Wade-Gery believed he had grasped the sense of a transformation that was supposed to have eradicated the function of kinship-based tribes, although they still remained extant, in favour of a different principle of segmenting citizenship based on the territorial and secularized division of civic structures. By contrast, the standard model ended up taking on a highly abstract nature in subsequent studies. On the one hand, it was believed that the five supposed Spartan villages, insofar as each one was required to provide the contingent for one of the five *lochoi* that made up the Spartan army, could count on an equivalent manpower, and this in itself is unlikely. On the other hand, it was also imagined that the Spartiates distributed into each of the five villages were also divided equally within the three Dorian tribes, almost as if there was an intention, at the time of the formation of the *polis* of Sparta, to distribute Hylleis, Dymanes, and Pamphyloi into equal parts between the different villages of the city (imagining, moreover, that this approximate equality had been maintained over the centuries). Interestingly, in his 1976 book, Roussel made the following unheeded observation: 'ce n'est pas avec des jeux d'esprit comme ceux-là que l'on pourra interpréter de façon satisfaisante les indications de la Rhètra'.¹⁷

It is easy to see how the theoretical framework of Wade-Gery was influenced by the paradigms that were dominant when it was formulated. However, it is surprising to find that now that these paradigms are no longer recognized in historical research, Wade-Gery's theory is still considered to be the standard model. The paradigm according to which the Dorians had already been divided into three tribes in the remote past is no longer accepted. The idea that Roman sources cannot be relied upon to reconstruct archaic Sparta is widely accepted. The paradigm that claims to make clear-cut distinctions, within the various typologies of civic subdivisions, between segments based on kinship and territorial subdivisions has been extensively criticized. Even the relationship between the *lochoi* of the army and the supposed five villages has proved, in several recent studies, to be extremely tenuous.¹⁸ Nevertheless, the standard model continues to be highly regarded.¹⁹ However, an alternative interpretation of Spartan civic subdivisions is still possible.

2. Towards a Revised Interpretation

It has become firmly established that the introduction of various forms of civic subdivisions in the Greek world during the archaic period responded to the need for rationalization and formalization of civic structures. Oswyn Murray, who, more than anyone, has recently emphasized the principle of rationality implied by the creation of civic subdivisions in Greek *poleis*, pointed out that ‘the principle of rational subordination of smaller groups to larger is a common characteristic of archaic tribal reform’.²⁰ In the light of this approach it is argued here that the *obai*, rather than constituting a civic structure that cut across the three Dorian tribes, were an internal subdivision of tribes. In general terms this thesis is not totally new, but, as far as the evidence allows, it deserves to be formulated in some detail.²¹

As previously observed, the convergence between the evidence of the Great *Rhetra* and Tyrtaeus’ poem about the Hylleis, Dymanes, and Pamphyloi confirms beyond all reasonable doubt that as early as the seventh century BC the citizens of archaic Sparta were divided into the three Dorian tribes. Moreover, Tyrtaeus’ elegy provides by far the earliest evidence of the names of the Dorian tribes, and this supports the recent hypothesis that the myth of the arrival of the Dorians in the Peloponnese, also documented for the first time in a fragment of a poem by Tyrtaeus (*fr.* 2 West²), originated within a Spartan setting.²² This means that the creation of citizenship in archaic Sparta was a process that occurred at the same time as the formulation of Dorian identity: the members of the Spartan community considered themselves Dorians and, as such, were organized within the three tribes that took their names from Hyllos, Dymas, and Pamphilos.

It is worth observing that the distribution of citizens into three tribes seems to reflect a more general ‘triadic’ division of Spartan institutional organization, which takes the form of thirty elders, of three hundred horsemen, and in the notional number of 9,000 lots of land to be assigned to as many Spartan citizens.²³ However, there is one text which, more than any other, reflects this triadic logic. The source in question is well known but, in my view, has never been fully appreciated; it is a fragment of a work by Demetrios of Skepsis taken from the first book of his work *Trojan battle order* (*fr.* 1 Gaede *ap.* Athen. 141e–f):

among the Spartans the festival of the Carneia is an imitation of military training (μίμημα στρατιωτικῆς ἀγωγῆς). For there are places, numbering nine, and these are called ‘shady places’ (σκιᾶδες) since they bear some likeness to

tents; and nine men eat in each and everything happens through the commands of a herald (κῆρυξ), and each shady place holds three phratries (φρατρία) and the festival of the Carneia is held for nine days.

It is hard to assess the reliability of this antiquarian source. Also, its chronological framework is not immediately clear: it might be going too far to assume that the ritual described by Demetrios belongs to the period of the origins of the festival of the Carneia, which the Spartan scholar Sosibios fixed at 676/673 BC, the date of the 26th Olympiad.²⁴ Nevertheless, in general terms, the almost obsessive emphasis in this text on the number three and its multiples (nine 'shady places' each containing three phratries, making up a total of twenty-seven phratries and eighty-one men) not only belongs to a Dorian ideological horizon but no longer appears by the end of the fifth century. Moreover, as an explicit imitation of military training, this ritual can be seen as a microcosm of the Spartan organization during wartime. Even the expression 'everything happens through the commands of a herald' is a reference to military organization, since it appears that the movements within the phalanx were given verbally by the enomotarch, a specifically Spartan commander, 'as if he were a herald' (Xen. *Lac. Pol.* 11.6: ὥσπερ ὑπὸ κήρυκος). It follows that the distribution of the eighty-one men on the basis of the phratries to which they belonged must reflect the distribution of Spartan soldiers at the time when the festival took on the form described by Demetrios. It is certain that in the second half of the fifth century BC, during the battle of Mantinea, the Spartan army was organized differently.²⁵ In short, the passage from Demetrios and Tyrtaeus' elegy converge in portraying the structure of the army which can probably be attributed to the archaic age and reveals a clear military function of the civic subdivisions, both the tribes and the phratries.²⁶

Tyrtaeus also states that the warriors of each of the three tribes fought in separate ranks (χωρίς). However, since the ritual described by Demetrios expressly imitated military training, it is reasonable to assume that the people who banqueted together in each 'shady-place' also fought together. In other words, each group of three phratries, whose members shared the same tent, belonged to the same tribe. This undermines the theory, occasionally put forward by some scholars, that each tent contained—or rather 'mixed'—three phratries that belonged to three different Dorian tribes.²⁷ The framework that emerges from the fragments of Tyrtaeus and Demetrios of Skepsis is disarmingly simple and is based exclusively on the principle of the gradual segmentation of larger entities into smaller units: the community of Spartiates was organized into three Dorian tribes; each of them was divided into three intermediate units which, on the basis of the available evidence, appear in the 'shady places' described by

Demetrios; each intermediate unit was, in its turn, divided into three phratries. There were three tribes, nine intermediate units, and twenty-seven phratries.

An organization of this kind is perfectly plausible if assessed from a comparative perspective. The clearest parallel comes from fourth-century (and post-synoikistic) Kos, whose civic organization, about which we know chiefly from a famous religious calendar (RO 62 = *LSCG* 151), was based on the three Dorian tribes of the Pamphyloi, Hylleis, and Dymanes, and on their further division into groups of a thousand men (χιλῖαστῦες). Since there were nine of these groups in all, the nominal size of the citizen population corresponded to 9,000 individuals. However, it is still uncertain whether the so-called ‘ninth’ (ἕνναται), which also existed at Kos, judging by the same document, corresponded to these groups of a thousand men, or alluded to the division of each of the tribes into nine parts and therefore numbered twenty-seven in all.²⁸ It is also worth mentioning the case of Argos, whose four tribes (the three Dorian ones plus the tribe of the Hynathioi) were each divided into twelve phratries, as has been proved by several recent epigraphic discoveries.²⁹

The lack of epigraphic evidence prevents us from knowing the names of the individual Spartan phratries and their distribution within the tribes, but some observations can be made. Firstly, in Spartan documentation the term φρατρία appears exclusively in the text of Demetrios and in a gloss by Hesychios;³⁰ it is reasonable to suppose that these two sources use a term widely used in the Greek vocabulary of civic subdivisions to refer to a Spartan institution that had a different (local) name. Moreover, the use of generic terminology can also be recognized in a passage from Herodotus. Discussing the foundation of Thera, the historian writes that Theras—maternal uncle and tutor of the founders of the two royal Spartan families, Eurysthenes and Prokles—left Sparta to found a city on the island that took his name but failed to convince his son Oiolykos to sail with him: ‘from Oiolykos,’ adds Herodotus, ‘was begotten Aigeus, from whom the Aigeids, a great tribe in Sparta (φυλὴ μεγάλη ἐν Σπάρτῃ), take their name’ (4.149). Since the Aigeids are not one of the three Spartan tribes, it is essential to understand what Herodotus meant by the expression ‘great tribe’. The generally accepted opinion that the term *phylē* has here the generic meaning of ‘family’ should be discarded,³¹ as is clear from a quick check of Herodotean usages of the term *phylē*: it is used in relation to the civic subdivisions of Sparta (4.145.5; 148.1), Sikyon (5.68), and Athens both before and after the Cleisthenic reforms (5.69; 6.131.1), and Herodotus also reports how the deployment of the Athenian army at the battle of Marathon followed the numerical order of the *phylai* (6.111.1); lastly, besides a

reference to a Lydian tribe (4.45.3), Herodotus mentions a Samian tribe known as Aischrionia (3.26.1) and the tribe of the Aigeids in Sparta. Using these last two passages to support a general meaning of family is entirely arbitrary,³² since all the unambiguous references in Herodotus clearly identify the *phylē* as an institutional body. Moreover, the *phylē* of the Aigeids appears in Herodotus' text shortly after the two references to the tribes into which Spartan citizens were organized. It therefore follows that the Aigeids mentioned by Herodotus must be a civic subdivision and, since they cannot be one of the three Dorian tribes, should be considered a different kind of unit, possibly an internal subdivision of the *phylai*. It is worth observing that Herodotus much preferred the term *phylē* to *phratria*, which appears only once throughout his work (1.125.3).³³

This reconstruction can be supported by the fact that Aristotle (*fr.* 532 Rose [= 539 Gigon] *ap. schol. Pind. Isth.* 7.18) knew that the Aigeids were a *phratria* from Thebes who had come to settle in Sparta. Moreover, the Pindar scholion that mentions the fragment from Aristotle also refers to other traditions according to which the Aigeids constituted a *phylē* of Theban or Athenian origin who had joined the Herakleids during the foundation of Dorian Sparta. Since this group of traditions, even when they emphasize the origins of the Aigeids from Thebes or from Athens, are related to Spartan history,³⁴ it should be assumed that they are traditions developed in Sparta which reflect the position occupied by the Aigeids within the Spartan community: if, in his *Spartan Constitution*, Aristotle considers the Aigeids as a *phratria* from Thebes, it is because he was well aware that in Sparta the Aigeids constituted a *phratria*. Thus all the oldest traditions about the Aigeids, from Herodotus to Aristotle, clearly state that the Aigeids were not a family: they were a subdivision of the Spartan citizen body.

The analysis of the genealogy provided by Herodotus (4.147.1–2; 149.1; 6.52.1–2) confirms that Aigeids and Agiads, like the other royal family of the Eurypontids, were groups of the same kind. The graphic reconstruction presented here (Fig. 6.1) helps to clarify this point: Theras, who as has been mentioned was the founder of the line of the Aigeids, descended from the Theban Polyneikes, while his sister Argeia had married Aristodemos, father of Eurysthenes and Prokles. In their turn, Eurysthenes and Prokles were the founders of two Spartan royal families although they were not the eponyms, since this role was played by their sons Agis and Euryphon (cf. *Hdt.* 7.204; 8.131). The most disconcerting aspect of this genealogy is the fact that Aigeus, the eponym of the Aigeids, lived two generations after Theras, creating the paradoxical situation in which the Aigeids only acquired this name with Aigeus, even though his paternal grandfather Theras had led several Aigeids with him to Thera—not to mention the fact that even

earlier the Aigeids, coming from Thebes, arrived in the Peloponnese together with the Herakleids. This paradox has generally been explained by scholars as a local Spartan tradition.³⁶ We can be even more precise: the aim of this tradition was to place the eponymous heroes of the Aigeids and of the two Spartan royal families on the same genealogical footing. Agis, Euryphon, and Aigeus belonged to the same generation and consequently the three lineages that descended from them were formally equivalent: if the Aigeids were therefore not considered a ‘family’ but a segment of the citizen body, the same must have been true for the Agiads and Eurypontids as well.³⁷

A further element to take into account are the so-called λέσχαί. In his description of the city of Sparta, Pausanias (3.14.2; 15.8) refers to the presence, in the area of Pitane, of a *leschē* near the tombs of the Agiad kings and another one situated next to the *heroa* of the Aigeids. In Spartan society, as Plutarch says, the *leschai* were standard places for male socialization (*Lyc.* 25.2) and they provided the setting for the ceremony in which ‘the eldest men of the tribe’ (*Lyc.* 16.1: οἱ πρεσβύτατοι τῶν φυλετῶν), after observing the newborn babies, checked the legitimacy of their birth and welcomed them into the community.³⁵ Since recognition of legitimacy and admission into the citizen body were functions generally performed in Greek cities by phratry-like bodies, Plutarch’s reference to members of the *phylai* seems to be a further case of terminological imprecision from a source that paid little attention to Spartan technical terms. It is highly unlikely that the admission of newborn babies into the community took place in front of a large gathering such as that of one of the three Dorian *phylai*, especially in a city which, during its greatest demographic expansion, would have numbered almost ten thousand adult male citizens. Instead, the fact that the ceremony took place in the *leschai* and that the only ones known in Sparta were linked to the Aigeids and the Agiads suggests that all these groups—even the Agiads who are generally considered only as a royal family—constituted phratry-like bodies.




Fig. 6.1. *Obai* (Agiads, Eurypontids, Aigeids).

This explains why Spartan tradition emphasized the relationship between the Aigeids, on the one hand, and the Agiads and Eurypontids on the other: in Sparta civic subdivisions were organized along triadic lines, and therefore the two groups that produced the two Spartan kings had to be accompanied by a third group. The Aigeids performed precisely this task and the tradition whereby Theras acted as tutor to Eurysthenes and Prokles due to his family relationship with the kings served to justify the institutional relationship between these three institutional groups by transporting it into the city's mythical past. It is therefore likely that the Aigeids, Agiads, and Eurypontids were three of the twenty-seven subdivisions of the Spartan civic body which are referred to by Demetrios of Skepsis as *phratries*.

An additional piece of evidence enables us to reconstruct, albeit hypothetically, a second group of three *phratries*, and, above all, to establish with certainty the name actually used in Sparta to refer to the *phratries*. The community of the Arkaloi makes its only appearance in an inscription that has been vaguely dated to between the sixth and early fifth century (*SEG* 11.475a = *IG* V 1.722). The text of the inscription was transcribed by the French abbé Michel Fourmont who had visited Sparta in 1730 and who, near the ancient

site of Amyclai, had been able to observe the stone stele on which it was engraved. Since no one has been able to see the stone after Fourmont, it is with his transcription that we have to deal. Fourmont is undoubtedly a controversial figure: his transcriptions were far from accurate, not to mention the forgeries for which he was responsible.³⁸ Nevertheless, in this case, Fourmont was entirely unable to understand the text he was transcribing so that it is definitely not a forgery. In 1951 A.J. Beattie offered the first coherent reading of this inscription: working on the principle that Fourmont had transcribed what he believed he could see on the basis of his palaeographic knowledge, Beattie attempted to identify ‘the visual errors which Fourmont was likely to make in transcribing an unfamiliar alphabet’.³⁹ This has led to a more reliable reconstruction of the text. It does not matter here whether Beattie’s interpretation of the whole document, which in his opinion is a *lex sacra*, is correct. For the purposes of this essay, the only part of interest is line 4, which is entirely legible, and where Beattie is certain he has recognized the words $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\delta' \ \acute{\omicron}\tilde{\rho}\tilde{\alpha}\varsigma \ \text{Ἀρκά}\lambda\omicron\nu$, ‘in the community ($\acute{\omicron}\tilde{\rho}\tilde{\alpha} = \acute{\omega}\tilde{\rho}\acute{\alpha}$) of the Arkaloi’.

This evidence clearly reveals a serious contradiction in the standard model because it shows, at the very least, the existence of an *oba* which differed from the five believed to have made up the *polis* of Sparta. It is therefore hardly surprising that scholars have found various ways of minimizing the significance of this source. Yet Beattie himself had indicated its potential implications: considering that the inscription comes from the ancient site of Amyclai, he cited the passage from Pausanias (3.1.3) about the eponymous hero Amyclas whose three sons bore the names of Argalos, Kynortas, and ‘Hyakinthus’, and from this he deduced that the Arkaloi were the *oba* whose eponymous hero was Argalos, the eldest son of Amyclas.⁴⁰ In the light of the above comments about the eponyms of the civic subdivisions of the Aigeids, Agiads, and Eurypontids, Beattie’s reconstruction is wholly convincing. More interestingly, the fact that Amyclas is reputed to have had three sons according to mythical tradition can be seen as directly related to the presence of the three civic subdivisions that took their names from them. Rather than being settled in a single *oba*/village, the Spartan inhabitants of the area of Amyclai were apparently distributed in three *obai*/phratries. This would provide further proof that the mythical traditions about the origins of Sparta were used and modified to justify the civic organization of the city. Moreover, while the presence of an *oba* that took its name from Kynortas had already been hypothesized,⁴¹ an *oba* that was named after the eponym Hyakinthus could be recognized in another late archaic inscription with a dedication made by a group known as the Hyakinthioi.⁴²

We have attempted to reconstruct the civic organization of Sparta during the archaic period using the oldest evidence available: the so-called Great *Rhetra*, some verses by Tyrtaeus, a late archaic inscription, a passage from Herodotus, an antiquarian source, and a few sources of later date (especially Pausanias) which, however, are consistent with the rough framework provided by earlier evidence. In brief, a picture emerges of a civic organization based on a gradual segmentation of the citizen body. This picture can be summarized as follows: (a) the Aigeids constituted a segmentary structure of the citizen body; (b) the Agiads and Eurypontids were a segment of the same kind as that of the Aigeids; (c) these civic subdivisions performed a similar function to that of the Athenian phratries and were organized into a tripartite structure, the same as emerges from a fragment of a work by Demetrios of Skepsis reflecting the presence in Sparta of a system of twenty-seven phratries; (d) the fact that the only reference to an *oba* in a text of late archaic age is to that of the Arkaloi and that they can be included in a tripartite structure confirms that the units referred to by Demetrios as phratries were actually the *obai* of the Great *Rhetra*; (e) the famous expression φυλὰς φυλάξαντα καὶ ὠβὰς ὠβάξαντα must therefore refer to an organization of the citizen body so that Spartan citizens belonged to one of the three Dorian tribes and to one of the twenty-seven *obai*/phratries into which the tribes were divided; (f) the opposition between kinship-based and territorial subdivisions has proved misleading since the subdivisions, despite being fictional kinship groups, also had a territorial nature.

3. Being a Spartan Citizen: Civic Subdivisions and Collective Practices

The reconstruction provided here shows that during the archaic period the Spartan community created a distinction between those included and those excluded from citizenship, using one of the instruments available to Greek cities in their attempt to ensure the rational organization of the citizen body: citizens were organized into civic subdivisions and everyone else was excluded. While the use of this instrument is not in itself surprising, it is striking that Sparta made use of such a complex organization of the citizen body as early as the seventh century BC. On the basis of the available evidence, it is hard to find significant parallels for this period. Yet despite the presence of this instrument, both ancient sources and the tradition of Spartan studies tend to emphasize other and well-known criteria of distinction between citizens and non-citizens.

As has been widely demonstrated, in archaic Greek cities some

collective practices performed the role of civic institutions.⁴³ In Sparta, in particular, citizens were required to take part in collective education with the sole exception of the heirs to the throne, who were exempted (Plut. Ages. 1.4); they also took part in collective meals known as *syssitia* on a daily basis, and the payment of monthly fees is explicitly mentioned by Aristotle as a requirement for entitlement to citizenship (Pol. 2.1272a33–7: ὁρος δὲ τῆς πολιτείας [...] ὁ πάτριος). The forms that these practices took on in the classical period were the outcome of a historical development which remains largely unknown. However, at some unknown moment during the archaic age, participation in these practices became a ‘sign’ of membership of the Spartan community.⁴⁴ But the emphasis placed by ancient sources on collective education and the *syssitia*—not to mention hunting or participation in the choruses—must be balanced against the so-called Spartan mirage: these practices were two of the most characteristic aspects of Spartan society and were therefore more liable to the process of idealization that is to be found in most of the surviving evidence about Spartan political structure. On the other hand, the presence of civic subdivisions was a feature that Sparta shared with many Greek cities and was therefore not emphasized by sources that sought to highlight the Spartan ‘otherness’.

In the concluding part of this essay I will try to define the relationship between these different ways of recognizing citizenship, in other words between the criteria that can be defined as legal membership (the organization of citizens into tribes) and those of performative membership (participation in collective practices). It is therefore crucial to identify both the function that the civic subdivisions reconstructed here fulfilled and the function that participation in collective practices played within this civic structure. With regard to the first point, it is reasonable to expect that the choice ‘to divide and distribute the people into segments’ was the consequence of the enlargement of the community of Spartiates, that is, of the physical coalescence of pre-existing communities. The term applied by Greeks of a later period to describe this phenomenon was *synoikismos*. As we have already seen, the distribution of citizens into segments was a valid way of rationalizing and organizing a community consisting of many thousands of men, and also had the advantage of providing an identity for the new community by evoking a common Dorian ancestry. In other words, such a distribution was intended, by placing it within structures of equal size, to bring homogeneity to a growing citizen body which came from the pre-existing villages, each probably of different size, population, and history.

This *synoikismos* has often been associated by scholars with the

union of the four villages of the city of Sparta, which would have occurred in a distant past when Amyclai had not yet been added as the fifth village. Even recently it has been restated that the civic structure of Sparta was the result of this coalescence.⁴⁵ However, we have seen that the theory that Sparta had been originally made up of four *obai*/villages is based on the questionable use of Roman sources, and I have here referred to an alternative interpretation of Thucydides' notion of Sparta as *polis kata komas*, whereby the *polis* of Sparta was formed from an uncertain number of pre-existing communities situated along the middle valley of the river Eurotas. It is within this historical and geographical context that collective practices can take on a new significance. A community formed from the amalgamation of several villages situated relatively far from each other certainly required formal structures for distributing its citizens, but, more importantly, required institutions that facilitated cohesion and physical contact between the various groups that joined to create it. I would therefore like to suggest that one of the functions played by collective practices was to 'mix' the members of the new community. Once again it is Demetrios of Skepsis (*fr.* 10 Gaede *ap.* Athen. 173f) who informs us that the Spartans ate their meals together along the Hyakinthian way between Sparta and Amyclai. The location of a practice required to exert citizenship halfway between the centre of Sparta/Pitane and the area of Amyclai (which provided three of the twenty-seven *obai*/phratries) reflects the intention to ensure that members of the Spartan community, regardless of their native village, mixed with each other. Even the well-known removal of boys from their families at the time they began public education (Plut. *Lyc.* 16.7–14) can be viewed in a new light. Rather than indicating state control of the lives of future citizens—a paradigm that is gradually disappearing from Spartan studies⁴⁶—it may simply have been a way of encouraging the collective education of boys who lived in villages situated a relatively long way away from the centre of Sparta. Again, a collective practice through which Spartan boys mingled with each other.

Greek political culture often employed mixing policies designed to foster civic cohesion. The case of Cleisthenes' reforms is only the most obvious example. However, unlike Cleisthenic Athens, where the mixing up was achieved by a special reorganization of civic subdivisions, ensuring that the members of Attic villages (the so-called *demes*) belonging to very different areas of Attica were integrated into the same tribe through the creation of *trittyes*, the situation in Sparta was very different. The civic subdivisions did not lead to the mixing of citizens, since the smaller units that coalesced to form larger units adjoined each other: the seat of the Agiads, Eurypontids, and Aegeids

was the area of Pitane/Sparta, while the Arkaloi were settled in the area of Amyclai together with other *obai*/phratries which took their name from the sons of Amyclas. However, mixing was achieved by different strategies. Some of these were obvious: the members of the different communities that had joined together to form the *polis* of Sparta could intermarry (and indeed the Minyans mentioned at the start of this chapter were granted the right, together with citizenship, to marry Spartan women). Above all, however, it was through the participation in communal meals and collective education that citizens from different parts of the plain of Sparta interacted with each other, building a sense of membership of a wider community around these collective practices.

During the archaic period being a Spartan citizen meant being a member of one of the three tribes and the twenty-seven phratries that made up the city. However, the adoption of rational civic structures would not have been sufficient to create social cohesion if it had not been accompanied by participation in collective rituals whereby the members of the Spartan community, suitably mixed, recognized each other as fellow citizens.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This essay is part of a wider-ranging project on the villages, civic subdivisions, and citizenship in Sparta on which I have been working for several years. Before being read and discussed in Paris in 2010, a preliminary draft of the text was presented at a seminar held at the University of Trento in March 2007. I would like to express my gratitude to Maurizio Giangiulio, who invited me to Trento, and also to Alain Duplouy and Roger Brock who encouraged me to come up with a clearer definition of what it meant to be a citizen in archaic Sparta.

¹ On the earliest examples of the terms *politēs* and *politeia* cf. Blok 2005 and Osborne 2011, 92–102, as well as Duplouy this volume, chapter 1, section 4 and Blok this volume, chapter 3, section 1. On the story of Teisamenos, see Vannicelli 2005.

² On the variety of archaic civic subdivisions and the multiplicity of their names, cf. Davies 1996b.

³ Cf. Jones 1991.

⁴ Davies 1997, 31.

⁵ Roussel 1976; Davies 2004, 26. In some of his arguments, Roussel's position is probably too clear-cut: for instance, it is likely that a core of the phratries had already developed during the Dark Ages (see Blok this volume, chapter 3, section 3 and n. 57). For an alternative view cf. Jones 1987—who undertook the most recent analysis of civic subdivisions in various parts of the Greek world—and Hansen 2004,

95–7.

⁶ For a brief overview of the standard model, see Jones 1987, 118–23.

⁷ As is well known, Meyer 1892a, 261–9 argues that the *Rhetra* was a fourth-century forgery, but this theory is now generally rejected. It is impossible to list here even a selective bibliography on this text, but see the recent interpretations offered by van Wees 1999b, Nafissi 2010, and Lupi 2014a.

⁸ Lupi 2006. Cf. Nafissi 2012, 41–4.

⁹ See e.g. Pind. *Pyth.* 1.60–6; Simon. *fr.* 13.9–10 West².

¹⁰ *Fr.* 19.8 West²: χωρίς Πάμφυλοί τε καὶ Ὑλλεῖς ἢδ' ἐ Δυμῶνες]. As was already observed by U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff when the papyrus (*P.Berol.* 11675) was published, there can be no doubt that the verse ends with the name of the missing tribe, the Δυμῶνες.

¹¹ Cf. Hsch. s.v. ὠβαί (τόποι μεγαλομερεῖς), ὠβάτας (τοὺς φυλῆτας), οὐαί (φυλαί) and οἰατῶν (κωμητῶν. Οἶαι γὰρ αἱ κῶμαι). The last two glosses show that the original form of ὠβά was ὠφά, and the original φ has had different dialectal outcomes.

¹² Pareti 1910; 1917, 173–6. Wade-Gery 1925, 560–1; 1944, 117–23.

¹³ *IG V* 1.675, 685 (Pitane); 676, 682, 686 (Limne); 681, 684 (Kynosoura). Some of these inscriptions were already known, but Tod 1903–4 was the first to analyse them as a single group.

¹⁴ Cf. Kennell 1995, 40.

¹⁵ Schol. Ar. *Lys.* 453; Schol. Thuc. 4.8. With regard to the theory of the ‘obal army’, according to which each of the supposed five villages provided a *lochos*, see also Cartledge 1987, 427–31; Singor 2002, 259–65.

¹⁶ Wade-Gery 1944, 117.

¹⁷ Roussel 1976, 237.

¹⁸ Kennell 1995, 166–7; van Wees 2006a, 158–61; Lupi 2014b.

¹⁹ This model is still found in most textbooks on Greek history and in introductions to Spartan history: see e.g. Hall 2014, 78 and Kennell 2010, 9.

²⁰ Murray 1997, 50; cf. also Murray 1990b.

²¹ Among the critics of the standard model, see in particular Lévy 1977, 91–4. However, such criticism has rarely been accompanied by the formulation of a systematic alternative hypothesis.

²² Hall 2002, 73–89. The presence of Dorian tribes in a large number of cities that claimed Dorian ancestry does not mean that these tribes, as has still been argued by Musti 1985, 38–41 and Jones 1987, 92, were the expression of a common Dorian heritage originating in the Dark Ages. See Hall 2007, 53–8, who argues that it is much more likely that the Dorian tribal names were borrowed by Sparta rather than inherited.

²³ Hodkinson 2000, 70–1 has suggested a Hellenistic origin for the figure of 9,000 for the number of lots, but the notional number of 9,000 is consistent with the demographic levels of Sparta in the late archaic period (cf. Figueira 1986) and is supported by the similar notional number of 9,000 citizens in the Dorian island of Kos (see below). To this list of archaic ‘triadic’ institutions it is necessary to add the *triakades* mentioned by Herodotus (1.65.5), a military unit that has not been clearly identified (though see Lupi 2015).

²⁴ Sosibios *FGrHist* 595 F3 *ap.* Athen. 635e–f; according to Hellanikos (*FGrHist* 4 F85), who devoted a work to the victors of the Carneia, Terpander was the first winner. For the festival of the Carneia, see Pettersson 1992, 57–72; Malkin 1994a, 143–58; Richer 2012, 423–56.

²⁵ Thucydides’ description (5.68) of the organization of the Spartan army for the battle of Mantinea is notoriously problematic (a summary of the question is in Hornblower 2008, 179–82), but there is clear discontinuity with respect to the tribal

army to be found in the poems of Tyrtaeus.

²⁶ Cf. Hom. *Il.* 2.362–3 which is the earliest evidence of an army divided into *phylai* and *phratrai*; on this passage from the *Iliad*, see Donlan 2007.

²⁷ Huxley 1962, 48–9; Forrest 1968, 45; Pettersson 1992, 62.

²⁸ Cf. Sherwin-White 1978, 153–74; Jones 1987, 236–42.

²⁹ See Kritzas 1992, 236; 2006, 426.

³⁰ Hsch., s.v. ἐπιταίειν; cf. Lupi 2005.

³¹ See, for instance, Carlier 1984, 307 n. 415: ‘l’expression ne peut guère avoir dans ce contexte que le sens de famille importante’.

³² Jones 1987, 128, 254 n. 1.

³³ Cf. Vannicelli 2012, 266 n. 29.

³⁴ For the traditions on the Aigeids, see Vannicelli 1992; Malkin 1994a, 98–106; cf. Wolicki 2002, 416: ‘Sparte est, pour ainsi dire, le centre de gravité autour duquel circulent toutes les mentions des Aigides’.

³⁵ On this famous ceremony see Lupi 2000, 115–32.

³⁶ Cf. F. Jacoby, *FGrHist* 70 F16, *Kommentar*; Vannicelli 1992, 65.

³⁷ On the use of the ‘gentilical’ names in *-idai* and *-adai* for civic subdivisions see Duploup 2010, 330–4.

³⁸ With regard to Fourmont’s journey to Sparta, see Stoneman 1985. Many of the Spartan inscriptions that he ‘transcribed’ were recognized as forgeries from the late eighteenth century; see also Spawforth 1976.

³⁹ Beattie 1951, 47.

⁴⁰ The oscillation between the voiced and unvoiced consonant (Ἀρκάλος / Ἀργάλος) is unsurprising, especially in personal names: cf. Mitchell 1984, 725–6. With regard to civic subdivisions, see the different lettering used for the Argive phratry of Μόκλαι / Μόγλαι, as emerges from several recently discovered Argive inscriptions (cf. Kritzas 2006, 426).

⁴¹ Cf. Beattie 1951, 49–50, who observed that Kynortas’ son was named Oibalos, ‘little *oba*’.

⁴² SEG 28.404. Although several doubts have been expressed (Jeffery 1990, 447, no. 51a), the first word of the text, υακινθιοι, is almost certainly a nominative plural, as noted by the first editors (Waterhouse and Hope Simpson 1961, 175). It has been suggested that the Hyakinthioi were a religious association, a sort of *thiasos* (Gallavotti 1978, 184). However, since the inscription comes from a bronze cup found at Aigai, a village situated to the south of Sparta along the road towards Gytheion, the hypothesis that it may have been an inscription made by the *oba*/phratry of the Hyakinthioi seems more convincing.

⁴³ Schmitt-Pantel 1990b; cf. Duploup in this volume, chapter 1, section 5, and chapter 10, section 1.

⁴⁴ With regard to the transformations in Spartan society during the archaic period, and chronological problems, see in particular Hodkinson 1997a.

⁴⁵ Hall 2014, 213.

⁴⁶ Cf. Hodkinson 2009b.

The Spartan Contribution to Greek Citizenship Theory

Paul Cartledge

In memoriam

† Pierre Carlier

1. Citizenship In World History

Citizenship is a vital, if also sometimes frustrating, topic. In our rather horribly globalized world today, there is clearly detectable in the recent literature of citizenship, both scholarly and otherwise, a recurring refrain—or complaint—directed against the ‘hollowing out’ (Marquand), or ‘diminishing’ (Skocpol) of contemporary modes, especially in liberal Western democracies, and a corresponding appeal to the need to ‘reconnect’ the private, individual, or familial, to the public, civic domain (Boyte). I note too—what I believe to be a clear case of cause and effect—the exponentially growing size of this burgeoning citizenship literature, which is to a degree reflected in increasingly desperate practical and pedagogical measures taken by governments to try to ensure that at least the gap between public and private does not yawn much wider.¹

There are a number of reasons, some of them good, for focusing a discussion of ancient Greek citizenship on ancient Sparta.² Admittedly, to speak of Spartan citizenship ‘theory’ may perhaps be thought to be

pushing the boat out a little too far; possibly—dare I add—it might even make Sparta look rather too like Athens.³ But at any rate I think I can fairly claim that Sparta made interesting contributions to ancient Greek citizenship practice, of a sort which imply at least thought, if not theory.⁴ If I may stretch a chronological point: Sparta's 'classical' period fell in what's generally referred to as the Greek archaic age (c.700–500 BC).⁵ Conversely, for present purposes, in the generally reckoned Greek classical period (c.500–300) Sparta arguably was still 'archaic' in a developmental sense—which indeed significantly helps to account for the problem that non-Spartan classical and post-classical Greek political and constitutional thinkers and theorists had with classifying its *politeia*.⁶ In what follows I shall therefore embrace the fifth and fourth as well as the seventh and sixth centuries.

Let me begin quite generally. Citizenship has from time to time, and place to place, seemed to be a central political, social, or cultural issue. St Paul's famous 'I appeal unto Caesar', uttered because he was a *civis romanus*, springs to mind at once (Acts 26:32); or consider the eighteenth-century French 'Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (*et du Citoyen*)'.⁷ The present era in my own country of citizenship, the UK, seems to me to be another of those times of centrality, although I could not plausibly claim that being a citizen of the UK means anything much like the same as being a citizen of France or the United States.⁸ It was not ever thus. Back in the good old days of the seventeenth-century English Revolution, many were prepared to fight, and to die, over the issue of the continued existence (or non-existence) of the crown. A famous series of debates was held in a church in Putney, south London, actually during the Civil War in 1647.⁹ The issue there was not only, or so much, whether there should be a republic rather than a divine-right monarchy, but what sort of a republic it should be. In particular, what attitude should be taken in the new post-monarchical state and society towards what we would call socio-economic class? Those Putney or 'Leveller' debates were, in other words, an unconscious rerun of the very earliest political-theoretical debates in all human history, which occurred in Greece, and more specifically in Athens, from the beginning of the fifth century BC onwards.¹⁰

But the Putney Debates were ahead of their time. The briefly interrupted hereditary English monarchy was of course restored in 1660, and the so-called Glorious Revolution of 1688—it may have been glorious, it certainly wasn't a revolution—ensured that Britain would not have a genuine either French-style or American-style Revolution in the eighteenth century. That century was the great century in the early modern era for debates over citizenship at a national, almost global, scale. In the nineteenth century and the early

twentieth the issue was not so much over citizenship as such, the nature or quality of citizenship if you like, but rather over how far the franchise should be extended: to the poor, yes, eventually, and to women, well, maybe one day, but not yet, at least not in the UK.¹¹

If small may be compared to great, citizenship has started to come back centrally on to the agenda in very recent times. The involvement with al-Qaeda of fundamentalist Islamists born and brought up in Britain has generated excited newspaper headlines such as ‘British citizenship is not compatible with fighting for the Taliban regime’ (of Afghanistan). Problems with so-called asylum seekers or economic migrants have induced the government of the UK to introduce citizenship classes and a citizenship test for would-be permanent immigrants. We here have started to look across the Atlantic to see what the United States requires of its would-be American citizens, and how that is required. There has even been some interest in the—defunct—civics programmes of US high schools, not least because since September 2001 there has been a new and compulsory ‘Citizenship’ module in our National Curriculum (imposed and enforced on all ‘state’ or ‘maintained’ primary and secondary level schools). The reform of the House of Lords—half-hearted and incomplete though it has been so far—has at least placed the issue of citizenship in the form of popular power on the public political agenda. More substantially, the entrenchment of human rights in the British law code and the development of judicial review as a check on the power of the executive have brought the British subject somewhat—but only somewhat—closer to experiencing the norms of European citizenship in the last decade.¹²

2. Ancient Citizenship

They managed these things very differently in the ancient Graeco-Roman world—or rather, since in this case ‘Greece’ and ‘Rome’ are very different from each other, in the Greek and Roman worlds. This point was succinctly and elegantly made by the distinguished French ancient historian Philippe Gauthier, who entitled an article comparing and contrasting ancient Greek and Roman attitudes to and practices of citizenship ‘Roman “generosity” and Greek “avarice”’.¹³ As an ideal type, or at least as a stereotype, that binary opposition will work very well. But it’s not just the fact of the difference, but the reasons behind that fact of difference, that are of historical interest and concern. Most of our English political descriptive vocabulary comes from Greek, not Latin, but ‘citizen’ comes to us from Latin (*civitas*, *civis*), not Greek,

and *civitas* is cognate with *civilitas*, civilization: both literally, that is etymologically, and metaphorically, that is symbolically, to be a citizen in ancient Rome was to be civilized. By implication, Roman citizenship was deemed to be one of the hallmarks, or high watermarks, of Roman culture. It was not just an institution, nor even merely a practice, but a culture, and a culture above all.¹⁴ So too was ancient Greek citizenship, for which the word was *politeia*, derived from the original state-form that they called *polis*. The traditional English translation of *polis* is ‘city-state’, and for many purposes that will still do. But the realization has dawned, properly and correctly, that a much more apt translation would be ‘citizen-state’, since that captures both the central, defining importance of citizenship in the ancient Greek world and emphasizes the ancient Greeks’ concrete rather than abstract understanding of the political community as a living corporate entity.¹⁵

To show just how closely citizenship as an institution was related to citizenship as a practice in Greece, we might observe, first, that the very same word, *politeia*, was used for ‘citizenship’ as for what we, again borrowing from Latin rather than Greek, call a ‘constitution’. Moreover, in illustration of how deeply and how intimately citizenship as both institution and practice was connected with citizenship as culture in ancient Greece, I observe that a *polis*’s *politeia* (in the sense of constitution) might be called, enthusiastically but unforcedly, its ‘soul’ (Isocrates), or (more measuredly, by Aristotle) its ‘sort of life’.¹⁶ So much for citizenship in Greece in general; now for Sparta.

3. Spartan Citizenship

Sparta—arguably—invented the citizen ideal in ancient Greece, or at least gave a first definition of it in practice. I’m going to sidestep here the vexed questions of the proper classification of the developed Spartan ‘constitution’ of the fifth–fourth centuries: was it a funny kind of oligarchy, or a funny kind of democracy, or even a funny kind of kingship, or a mixture of all three? I’ve already suggested why—in terms of perceived precocious, then arrested or frozen development—that classificatory question was found so puzzling. Instead, I’m going to concentrate, to begin with, on the ‘spirit’ of archaic and fifth-century Spartan citizenship.¹⁷ I am interested therefore as much in the qualifications laid down for gaining and holding Spartan citizenship as in the ways in which it was exercised politically. These qualifications were uniquely Spartan, although in broader, moral or cultural, terms one might say that they were also thoroughly Greek. In this respect, as

in so many others, the Spartans were the same as other Greeks, only more so, a difference of degree rather than of kind (though arguably in their total social formation, their *kosmos*, they were different not just quantitatively but rather qualitatively, being *in toto* ‘other’).¹⁸

Herodotus, composing his *Histories* in the third quarter of the fifth century, knew of just two men who had held the Spartan citizenship despite not having been born and bred as Spartans. Indeed, so singular did he find that fact that this is the one and only occasion in his entire huge work that he used the abstract noun *politeia* (*politēiē* in his Ionic dialect) in the meaning of ‘citizenship’ (9.34.1). That happens also to be the earliest recorded usage of the term in all extant Greek literature. Normally, and normatively, in other words, Spartan parentage and birth were a prerequisite for citizenship, and parentage on both sides, not just on one side, as had been the case at Athens down to 451 (it had to be the father’s) or at Gortyn on Crete (either parent).¹⁹ But that criterion of natality was only the first, and by no means the last, of a whole series of criteria—or tests—for attaining and retaining Spartan citizenship, the operation of which, indeed, never completely ended throughout an adult Spartan’s lifespan.²⁰

That in itself was a mark not only of how highly citizenship in Sparta was prized, but also of how very narrowly restricted it was. Hence the astonishment expressed by the widely travelled Herodotus, who knew Sparta at first hand (3.55), at the admission some time before 480 of two citizens of Elis to the citizenship of Sparta. The two were brothers and, more precisely to the point, members there of the Iamid priestly descent-group. For, as one might have predicted of exceptionally pious Sparta (another fact about Sparta expressly recognized by Herodotus, 5.63, 9.7), the reason the Spartans made this giant and unprecedented breach in the fortress wall of their citizenship was broadly religious, and specifically military. Sparta was a community that went to enormous lengths to secure exclusive hot lines to Apollo of Delphi and other divine sources of power.²¹ What the Spartans wanted from Teisamenos of Elis, and very reluctantly conceded they could be sure of getting from him only if he became a Spartan citizen and thus an integral part of that strong and xenophobic community, were his exclusive divinatory services.²² To such a degree did they both obtain them, and value them, that Herodotus is probably using the Spartans’ own language when he says that Teisamenos ‘won’ five ‘victories’ for them, rather as if he were the commanding general, instead of the army’s chief diviner or seer (*mantis*).²³

4. Equality

In all Greek cities, some semblance of equality, at least as an ideological ideal, was a *sine qua non* of the very existence of a citizen body of the Greek type.²⁴ The Spartans, however, sought to emphasize the in fact only relative equality and homogeneity of their citizen body by calling themselves *Homoioi*. This word is often mistranslated into English as ‘Equals’. But *homoios* (from *homos* = ‘same’) actually meant same-ish, or like in one or some, but not all, respects.²⁵ In developed Greek political theory of the fourth century BC, a rather sophisticated distinction came to be drawn between two ‘kinds’ of equality—on the one hand, the geometrical or equality according to worth (*kat’ axian*), and, on the other, the arithmetical or equality according to number (*kat’ arithmon*).²⁶ The geometrical notion was, however, a sectarian, oligarchic construct, since Greek oligarchs anticipated literally George Orwell’s ironic expression in believing firmly that some citizens really were ‘more equal’ than others. Against them, Greek ideological democrats, who saw themselves as having to fight to preserve the radical notion that a poor and humble man should count civically/politically for exactly the same as a rich aristocrat, insisted that equality was equality was equality. It is the geometric or *kat’ axian* version that more nearly applies to the equality implied or expressed in the citizenship of any Spartan, as the following series of citizenship-tests clearly implies.

From the very beginning, there was a physical criterion applied to a Spartan male’s potential for attaining citizenship, in the shape of a judgement passed by the relevant ‘tribal’ group of senior citizens on whether a male infant was fit to be reared.²⁷ There followed a physical-cum-psychological trial by ordeal in the form of the *agōgē*, Sparta’s unique, universal, and compulsory state-imposed ‘Upbringing’ which all males between the ages of seven and seventeen had not only to undergo but also to pass out from successfully. A telling phrase in Greek, literally ‘staying in’ the *agōgē*, meant managing to survive the constant series of ever more gruelling physical and psychological—rather than intellectual—tests.²⁸ Then, third, there was imposed a social-cum-political test, by election, of those who had passed through the *agōgē*, negotiated their liminal status as *paidiskoi* (between *paides* and *hēbōntes*), and finally reached the (st)age of adulthood at twenty: the test of election to a communal warrior dining mess, failure to achieve which presumably left a man in an uncomfortable state and status of limbo, of non-belonging.²⁹ Next, fourth, there was applied a disguised economic, that is property, qualification for maintaining citizenship, namely the requirement to contribute monthly a fixed minimum amount of produce to one’s dining mess.³⁰ Then, fifth, there

was applied a moral criterion—appropriate behaviour on the battlefield: to be adjudged a *tresas* or ‘trembler’ was to be deprived of such citizen appurtenances as sharing comradely fire or being asked for the hand of an unmarried female under one’s guardianship.³¹ Those Spartan males who failed either the physical, or the physical-psychological, or the electoral, or the economic, or the moral-military tests at any stage were presumably automatically placed among, or rather relegated or even condemned to the ranks of, the *Hypomeiones*, the ‘Lessers’ or ‘Inferiors’ (to whom we shall return).³²

Yet, finally, even after a Spartan had acquired and maintained his citizenship, to the extent of being able to participate in the decision-making Spartan Assembly, hierarchy and inequality were the rule here too. Normally at Sparta, voting both in elections and in decision-making was effected by shouting rather than by either ballot (*psēphos*) or the raising of hands (*kheirotonia*). So, votes in Sparta were not counted but instead measured, and those with the naturally louder voices, or who collectively shouted louder, carried more weight and clout.³³ This was the very negation of the one citizen one vote, the fundamental democratic principle of absolute equality among all qualified voters, such that every citizen should count—and be counted—for one, and no one for more than one.³⁴

In short, though Sparta was, arguably, a pioneer in implementing an idea of citizenship as connoting deep membership in a strong corporate body, and thereby instantiating a thoroughly Greek notion of *politeia*, the idea implemented by Sparta was not of a citizenship of equals, but instead one of peers, citizens who were only comparatively equal; that is, they were accounted equal in some but not all respects to each other, and, no less importantly, equal with each other in comparison and contrast to all the many other categories of unequals, the very existence of which was such a marked feature of inequalitarian, hierarchical Spartan society as a whole.

5. Recruiting New ‘Citizens’ En Masse

Finally, I turn to a process that Herodotus does not mention, no doubt because it did not exist until well after ‘his period’, but one that Thucydides was clearly rather fascinated by and on the whole reports in considerable and illuminating detail. I refer to the creation of an entire class of people, accorded the distinctive collective name of *Neodāmōdeis*, who first turn up in the 420s and disappear in the late 370s.³⁵ It was a fixed part of the ancient image—or ‘mirage’ or myth—of Sparta that Spartan society was unbendingly, unalterably

traditional and conservative. Actually, as Moses Finley was probably the first to emphasize properly, Spartan society in the later fifth and early fourth centuries underwent so many and so great changes that it was unable to contain them without imploding.³⁶ To put that another way, although there had been ‘Inferiors’ in Sparta ever since the citizens decided to constitute themselves as *Homoioi*, the size and variety of the ‘Inferior’ component grew exponentially between 450 and 350, and one important new constituent of them were those labelled *Neodāmōdeis*.³⁷

Much is unclear about them, but two things are not. The first is that their title was a compound of ‘new’ and ‘*damos*’, the second is that they were former Helots specially liberated to perform military or police functions. What exactly the *-ōdēs* suffix may have connoted is disputed: one suggestion is that it meant something like ‘smelling of’. But whatever exactly it meant, *Neodāmōdeis*, even if they were new members of the *damos*, the People or citizen body, were not on all fours with citizens born, bred, and educated as such. They were not, in a word, neo-*politai*. Rather in the same way as the *Homoioi* were equal-ish, so the *Neodāmōdeis* were new-citizen-ish, citizens in one or more but not all respects. This is hardly surprising. Had the Spartans wished to enfranchise fully any of—or any members of—the sub-Spartiate groups, surely they would have turned first to the Perioikoi, and presumably to those of Lakonia rather than Messenia.³⁸ Such Perioikoi had, I believe, been incorporated as full members of the Spartan phalanx from about 450, to compensate for the losses in the earthquake of c.464 and the endogenous population decline of the Spartan citizen body.³⁹ By contrast, when *Neodāmōdeis* were added to the phalanx—as they first were at the battle of Mantinea in 418 (Thuc. 5.68.3)—they were brigaded separately, and placed in a brigade together with Helots armed as hoplites but still unemancipated (‘*Brasideioi*’). In other words, whatever *dam-ōdēs* meant, it did not mean enjoying full and equal citizen status. And that remained the case until the reforms—or rather the revolution—of King Cleomenes III in the third quarter of the third century BC: another (Hellenistic) era, indeed another world.⁴⁰

In sum, Teisamenos and his brother were and remained the limit cases of the extension of the full Spartan citizenship to equals, a truly extreme instance of Gauthier’s Greek ‘avarice’ in this matter. The contrast with Rome could not be more stark—and how right Emperor Claudius was to stigmatize Spartan (and Athenian) stinginess.⁴¹ But could the situation have been otherwise, without Sparta’s ceasing to be Sparta? I rather think not.

6. Conclusion: Citizenship From Antiquity To Modernity

It is more than debatable whether there is any direct ‘legacy’ of citizenship from ancient Greece to the modern world; the claim for some continuity from Roman to modern European forms of citizenship is easier to establish, at least theoretically speaking.⁴² Nevertheless, there is much to be said for the view that ‘it is the Socratic ideal of a citizen who reflects and compares [...] that promises to create a richer, because more truly deliberative, democratic community’.⁴³ Even so, I would not wish to press ‘Socratic’ too literally, since I can’t say that I would myself wish to be a citizen of any ancient, pre-modern community, and that for one reason above all: the ancients were not pluralists. They did not believe that ‘others’, whether insider others or outsider others, had rights, or, at any rate, entitlements, on principle, to be different or to dissent. My ideal would rather be of ‘A constitutional association which recognizes and accommodates cultural diversity [...] and] provides the social basis for critical reflection on and dissent from one’s own cultural institutions and traditions of interpretation’.⁴⁴

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I should like to offer my very warmest thanks to Roger Brock for organizing the colloquium from which this essay eventuates, for seizing the moment to involve Alain Duplouy centrally in it, and for inviting such a fascinating cast of speakers and discussants. Roger and Alain have been models both as hosts and as editors. This was not my first crack at trying to understand the whole phenomenon of ancient citizenship; ‘Citizenship then and now: Institution, practice, or culture?’ was the subject of my invited Roberts Lecture delivered at Dickinson College, Carlisle, PA, in 2002. I should add that this essay, though substantially written very much earlier, was submitted for final editorial scrutiny only very lightly revised in January 2017.

¹ Marquand 2004; Skocpol 2004; Boyte 2004. See also n. 12.

² My previous forays include: Cartledge 1980 and 1996a. Among a multitude of recent scholars and scholarship, I would perhaps wish to single out Nafissi 2006. Among the most interesting of current projects is Hans Beck’s collaborative, McGill-based ‘The Parochial Polis: Localism and the Ancient Greek City-State’ (www.hansbeck.org/local/).

³ For an acute instance of the debate over the exceptionalism of ancient Sparta, see the fascinating exchange between Mogens Hansen and Stephen Hodkinson in Hodkinson 2009a, 385 ff. The otherwise excellent collection edited by Brock and Hodkinson 2000 was, as I noted in a review, a bit light, perhaps, on Sparta—surely the alternative, if ever there was, now as then.

- ⁴ This is a distinction I tried to insist upon in Cartledge 2009b.
- ⁵ Cartledge 1998.
- ⁶ This problem became especially acute after the invention of political theory proper, some time in the first half of the fifth century BC, and its newfound ability to analyse modes and types of rule and *politeiai* comparatively and developmentally; cf. Cartledge 2009b.
- ⁷ Nippel 2003. Gaille 1998 is a very useful cross-cultural sourcebook of texts, with a discursive ‘vade-mecum’ of themes appended.
- ⁸ Pierre Rosenvallon 1992 tellingly entitled his study of universal suffrage in France *Le sacre du citoyen*, the ‘Sacred Rite of the Citizen’. For the United States, see Allen 2004.
- ⁹ Hence the ‘Putney (or Leveller) debates’: see recently, if controversially, Worden 2012, and, briefly, Cartledge 2016, a work dedicated to the memory of John Lilburne.
- ¹⁰ One particularly stimulating way in is via Ober 1998. Cartledge 2016 was co-dedicated to Josh Ober.
- ¹¹ A case study: Hazareesingh 1998.
- ¹² Crick 2000; Delanty 2001; Archibugi 2008.
- ¹³ Gauthier 1974.
- ¹⁴ Nicolet 1980 [1988] (French original 1976); recently, and very intelligently, Connolly 2015.
- ¹⁵ Hansen 2006; cf. Davies 2004.
- ¹⁶ Cartledge 1996b.
- ¹⁷ Cartledge 1998.
- ¹⁸ I side firmly with Hansen versus Hodkinson in the ‘Sparta was/was not different’ debate; see above, n. 3. Religion seems to me an absolutely key differentia, the Spartans’ attitudes and practices in this regard tellingly being considered odd by the comparativist connoisseur Herodotus; see below, n. 21.
- ¹⁹ Athens: Patterson 2005; for the origins, Manville 1990. Gortyn: Davies 2005b.
- ²⁰ See below, section 4.
- ²¹ Richer 2012; briefly, Richer 2007; also Flower 2009.
- ²² Spartans were literally xeno-phobic: they confounded non-Greek foreigners with Greek, calling them all indiscriminately *xenoi*—Hdt. 9.11 and 55—whereas other Greeks carefully distinguished *barbaroi* from other foreigners.
- ²³ See in full Flower 2008.
- ²⁴ A citizen body might later be called collectively *politeuma*. For the trope that the *polis* was its *politai*, see e.g. ‘Nikias’ *ap.* Thuc. 7.77.7.
- ²⁵ On the term *homoioi*, see Shimron 1979. The English word peers, like French *pairs*, captures this sense of like but not identical—although both of those happen to be derived from Latin *par*, which does mean exactly equal, like Greek *isos*.
- ²⁶ Harvey 1965; 1966.
- ²⁷ Plut. *Lyc.* 16, with Den Boer 1954. For a different interpretation, see Lupi this volume, chapter 6, section 3.
- ²⁸ Ducat 2006b supersedes all previous accounts of the *agōgē* but perhaps errs somewhat on the side of individual initiative as opposed to centralist direction.
- ²⁹ Election to a mess: Xen. *Lac. Pol.* 5.2. Compare Whitley this volume, chapter 9, on the Cretan *andreia* (a term used c.600 BC by Alcman of Sparta).
- ³⁰ Apart from being liable to demotion for criminal behaviour, as was possible in other cities, it was possible in Sparta to go from being a first-class citizen to being no citizen at all—not just a second-class citizen—purely for economic reasons, which was one of Aristotle’s several major criticisms of the Spartan *politeia* as he understood it: *Pol.* 2.1271a28–38. On the manipulation of wealth in Sparta generally, Hodkinson 2000.

³¹ Ducat 2006a.

³² The term *hypomeiones* occurs just once in all ancient literature, but its source is authoritative: Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.6 (in the context of his uniquely informed account of the conspiracy of Cinadon, c.400 BC, an episode that rightly caught the attention of Aristotle). Xenophon of Athens, who as a political exile living in the Peloponnese put his own two sons through the Spartan *agōgē*, preserves other technical Spartan vocabulary not otherwise or hardly otherwise attested (*ta kala, mikra ekklesia, paidiskoi, trophimoi xenoī*, etc.).

³³ Voting by acclamation: de Ste. Croix 1972, 348–9 ('this archaic procedure—retained, as far as we know, by no other Greek state in the classical period'); Flaig 1993.

³⁴ Hansen 1977.

³⁵ Cartledge 2002a.

³⁶ Finley 1981.

³⁷ Bruni 1995.

³⁸ Shipley 1997 argued that, as 'Lakedaimonioi', Perioikoi were a kind of second-class citizens; but that classification fits, if any group, the ex-Helot *Neodāmōdeis* above all.

³⁹ Incorporation of Perioikoi in phalanx: Cartledge 2002b, 113–37.

⁴⁰ Cleomenes III: Cartledge, in Cartledge and Spawforth 2002, 35–53.

⁴¹ In Tacitus' version (*Ann.* 11.24) of Claudius' AD 48 recommendation of the admission of Gauls to the Senate: Miller 1956.

⁴² Jolowicz and Nicholas 1972; Feenstra 1992. But see also Walter 1994.

⁴³ Nussbaum 1997, 225.

⁴⁴ Tully 1995, 207. My ideal of citizenship would therefore accord with the following performative definition, offered in exceptionally testing and trying circumstances (immediately post-'9/11'), by Allen 2002, 12: 'Citizenship is the struggle, carried out through conversation, to achieve accounts of the world that accord with norms of friendship and provide grounds for action' ('Aims of Education' address, University of Chicago, 2001).

Athletics and Citizenship

Nick Fisher

1. Introduction

One of the most prominent—indeed defining—features of archaic Greece is the enormous explosion of athletic competitions in ‘civic’ contexts at festivals, from c.600 BC on, at all levels from small local games, through *polis*-run games, and to the Panhellenic contests as they spread, on the Olympia model, in the early to mid-sixth century. Their strongly ‘civic’ nature was emphasized as they came to be actively supported by the communities across the Greek world, and as competitors at the Panhellenic games represented their cities. This great expansion of contests and the contemporaneous development of athletic nudity, in both competition and training, which started perhaps in Sparta or Crete, and rapidly became generally adopted, became central to the development of a distinctive Hellenic identity.¹ This was also a period of frequent and violent political change, including the rise and fall of tyrannies, brutal conflicts over land exploitation and wealth, many deaths and exiles, and many attempts at legislation designed to create greater social and political cohesion. An important part of this process was that many communities revised the ways they understood and regulated their membership (citizenship). As is argued in many chapters of this book, access to membership may often involve not only a qualification by descent but also, or in some cases instead, a successful level of performance in certain kinds of masculine activity, such as those which display

desirable skills in physical contests such as warfare, athletics, or choral song-dance; secondly, many chapters suggest that the highly complex patterns of inheritable subgroups and associations, which had a wide variety of names, and often regulated access to specific cults and festivals which awarded civic identity, were central to the processes of regulating membership, if they remain bafflingly obscure.² It seems plausible that these developing phenomena were to some extent connected: there may have been patterns in the ways athletic performances were used both as part of socialization and as qualification procedures for future citizens; alternatively, great athletic success or potential may have aided transfers of citizenship from one city to another. Here I seek to identify some different patterns in a selection of individual cases, through the murky gloom of inadequate evidence, which is all too often contaminated by later myth-making or assumptions from periods where citizenship was becoming more clearly defined. We should recognize that variable rates of development operated in different places; and for that reason, and because the available evidence is often very sketchy, especially before the fifth century, it will be necessary, here as in other chapters, to operate with a chronologically flexible view of the transition between 'archaic' and 'classical' societies.

Valuable early testimony demonstrates the high prestige which athletic success brought, and the tangible rewards offered by many *poleis* to victorious athletes, as well as some protests from a few poets. The early Spartan poet Tyrtaeus, composing perhaps c.600 BC, shortly before the expansion of the Panhellenic games, put skill and success at running and wrestling at the start of his list of qualities or advantages (along with wealth, beauty, kingliness, or oratory), which were in his view of no civic value if they are not accompanied by 'furious valour', the capacity to endure bloody killing and holding one's place in the battle line: that alone is true *aretē* (Tyr. fr. 12.1–20 West). Tyrtaeus does not actually disparage athletics as such, let alone see a necessary incompatibility between athletic skills and military courage; his argument is that top-class athletes might not be brave or disciplined in war, and if they were not, they did not deserve their fame.³ This implicit complaint at the prestige given to athletes was more fully developed two or three generations later, after the great expansion of Panhellenic and local contests, by Xenophanes of Colophon: his blast is directed at the extreme honours—'*prohedria* at the games, dining rights from the public stores, and a gift which will be a treasure'—being given across the Greek world to Olympic victors in running, pentathlon, wrestling, boxing, pankration, or the equestrian events. In his view athletes were 'naturally' of far less use than intellectuals and advice-giving poets (Xenoph. 2.1–22 West). His tirade reflects the

growth of different events in the Panhellenic games, the primacy of Olympia, and the spread of the practice of granting economically valuable, lifelong civic honours. A welcome piece of direct epigraphic testimony for this comes from the other end of the Greek world: a sixth-century bronze plaque from Sybaris records that Cleombrotos son of DexilaFos made a dedication to Athena of a tithe of his state reward.⁴ This gives support for at least a sixth-century date for the law assigning financial rewards which Plutarch attributed to Solon (*Sol.* 23, cf. *Diog. Laert.* 1.55); further honours for Athenian victors, including meals at the Prytaneion for life, are documented for the late fifth century (*IG I³* 131). Lasting honorific memorials were further provided by the bronze or stone statues and the epinician choral songs, whether they were erected or performed at the sanctuary or in the home city, or both; in many cases the communities may have contributed to all these honours. Thus Panhellenic victors could gain honours which were as great as any mortals could hope to win and could be compared in song to those of gods or heroes; for many they could form a stepping stone to political and military careers; in really exceptional cases their fame (especially if reinforced by spectacularly dramatic actions, for good or bad) could lead to actual hero cult.⁵

In such a cultural climate, citizenship and athletic performance might intersect in a number of ways. I propose here to explore some measures cities might choose to foster gymnastics and athletics, in the hopes alike of strengthening the physical condition and skills of their members and of gaining international prestige through success at Panhellenic and other games.⁶ Two—potentially contradictory—strategies can be identified. First, states might encourage future citizens to develop athletic skills as a necessary or desirable part of the qualifications for entry into the constituent bodies of citizenship, in places perhaps along with the concomitant exclusion of non-members who lived in the community from such training and local competitions. Second, accession to *polis*-membership, often via the constantly evolving subgroups or associations through which citizenship was usually mediated, might have been eased for those marked out by athletic prowess or promise. In principle one should expect that there would have been major variations between cities and regions; hence I shall offer a selection of local case studies.

2. Sparta

Sparta is said in some sources, with some plausibility, to have played a prominent role in the development of naked athletics. The early

records of Olympic victors are chronologically unreliable, as the games may not have begun till c.700, rather than the traditional Julian date of 776,⁷ and the chronographers who compiled lists of victors (starting with Hippias of Elis) and then worked out calibrations with other events, assumed, perhaps wrongly, they were quadrennial from the start, and, further, may have used conflicting systems of calibration.⁸ But it seems none the less significant that Spartan athletes, especially runners, wrestlers, and pentathletes (but not boxers or pancratiasts), dominate the Olympic lists in the early years down to the 580–570s.⁹ Thereafter, as many more states competed, the records show diminished Spartan success in these events, though they are not completely absent, while richer Spartans began to appear as chariot victors c.550, and are especially strong in the fifth and early fourth centuries.¹⁰ Probable reasons for their early dominance include the political strength of Sparta in the Peloponnese, when the games were not yet attracting entrants from wider Greece, and the early development of organized training of Spartiate youths.¹¹ Spartans do not appear in the records of victors at the other Panhellenic games except in the equestrian events, though dedications of late archaic Panathenaic vases on the Spartan acropolis and at the Menelaion suggest some Spartans were proud of their successes at Athens: see Hodkinson (1999; 2000, 292–3).

Thucydides' statements (1.6.4–6) about the introduction of athletic nudity at Olympia are rightly criticized for their misleading foreshortening of the date ('not long ago'); in fact the evidence of representations, especially on archaic vases, show naked athletes from c.650 onwards, and nude athletes became so common and standard in Attic vases that widespread adoption of the practice must have taken place at the latest by the middle of the sixth century.¹² None the less some interesting points in his brief account may not be misguided:

The Lacedaimonians were the first to use a modest form of dress in the modern fashion and in general those who had more wealth adopted pretty much the same sorts of styles of life as the many. They were also the first to engage in naked exercise, stripping off in public and anointing themselves with oil in their gymnastic training exercises. Formerly even in the Olympic games athletes competed wearing loincloths around their genitals, and they stopped this not long ago.

The implications of this seem to be, first, that the practice of nude exercising and competing began as a result of a deliberate policy developed at Sparta whereby their elite agreed to conform in their dress and lifestyles to those of the majority as part of the development of the citizen-ideal of the 'peers' (*homoioi*);¹³ and second that from this origin the practice of athletic nudity spread first to other states and then to Olympia and the other Panhellenic contests.¹⁴ Plato's account,

which evidently depends in part on Thucydides' statements, as it repeats the misleading claim the change happened 'not long ago', attributes priority to the Cretans, followed by the Spartans (Pl. *Resp.* 452c). A strong connection seems certain between the contemporaneous developments of public male nudity and the ideal of approved pederastic love between those recently admitted to citizenship and younger boys or youths. A Spartan (or Cretan) origin of public nudity fits in well with the plausible theory which holds that the origins of this peculiar form of Greek pederasty in secretive pair-bonding between young men and boys lay as part of official rites of passage in some Greek communities, at a time considerably earlier than the archaic period. The most plausible version of this theory views the homosexual partnerships between young men and youths, which are attested in classical and later sources for Sparta and Crete, as part of the reinstitutionalized programmes of socialization developed at some point in the archaic period, and which then operated in public.¹⁵ The distinctive educational system which resulted is often now called the *agōgē*.¹⁶ Modern scholarship tends to view this development as connected to the development of political institutions such as new powers for the assembly, the creation of the ephorate, and the mechanisms for control of the helots, and as processes which took some time and were not complete until the end of the sixth century.¹⁷ Sparta became a place where athletic and musical training and public contests, performed naked, were an essential part in the upbringing of future citizens. There were continuous procedures testing their powers of athleticism and endurance, and many of her major festivals offered opportunities for those going through the system to display what they had learnt.

Four major festivals, which seem certainly archaic in origin (if not necessarily in all the details recorded by late sources such as Plutarch), provided public demonstrations of the athletic performances of the youths as they move through the age-classes; these were broadly divided into three stages, boys (*paides*, c.7–14), youths (*paidiskoi/meirakia*, c.14–20), and young adults (*hēbōntes*, c.20–30), who attained admission to the messes and finally to the status of Spartiates at the end of the process.¹⁸ First, the inducements to the boys to supplement their meagre rations by stealing food and to endure privations imposed by restricted clothing, footwear, and bedding, and constant supervision and whipping, seem to have found their ritual correlates in the rituals of Artemis Orthia at her marshy sanctuary by the Eurotas, just outside the city.¹⁹ At the cheese-stealing contest, boys and youths (probably naked) sought to steal, fox-like, as many cheeses as possible from the altar while defenders armed with whips (probably the *hēbōntes*),²⁰ tried to inflict blows on them; the

capacity to run fast and dodge, as well as to endure pain, were the qualities needed for success (cf. Xen. *Lac. Pol.* 2.8–9; cf. allusions in Pl. *Leg.* 633b). The idea behind this strange ritual seems to be an adaptation of the widely attested *bomolochia* ritual, where children obtain sacrificial meat from the altar by jokes and trickery; it is transformed into an organized, compulsory, and much more brutal form of testing of the boys who were going through their systematic training.²¹

The other three important festivals at which boys and youths performed are all associated with Apollo. The *Gymnopaideiai* were probably held in the agora, which could be called the *Choros* when given over to song-dance (Paus. 3.11.9), and could also be known as the ‘theatre’; presumably an area of the agora was made into a theatrical space for the occasion, before the marble theatre was built in the Roman period (Hdt. 6.67, Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.16, Plut. *Ages.* 29.3, Athen. 630d–631b). It was celebrated in the midsummer heat,²² and featured, probably in the archaic as well as the classical period, teams of choruses singing and dancing antithetically (*trichoria*), in three age-classes, boys, active adults, and old men.²³ In later times it was believed to have been introduced very early. The chronographic tradition found in Eusebius allocated its introduction to Olympiad 28.1 (traditionally seen as 668); but there are good grounds for scepticism about this date, as with most early Olympiad dates, and for the related traditional date for the battle of Hysiai of 669, which Argos won, for the sake of the Thyreatis. More helpful for an early date are the suggestions that a number of early poets composed songs for the festival, such as Thaletas and Alcman, which might suggest a date of at least c.600.²⁴ The name *Gymnopaideiai*, which probably originally meant ‘naked dancing’ rather than ‘naked boys festival’,²⁵ suggests that nudity was there from the beginning, as it was later at least for the boys’ and men’s choruses, and perhaps for all three. There is therefore a chance that this was the first major festival where full male nudity was on public display; it was evidently much more than a boys’ coming of age ritual.²⁶

The Carneia was another major Apollo festival (Carneios was an epiclesis of Apollo found in many Dorian states). Young men’s races were prominent. It was apparently organized by ‘Carneatai’ (Hesychius s.v. *Carneatai*), selected by lot from the ‘unmarried’ (perhaps those now eligible for marriage, but as yet not marked out for dishonour on that ground); it featured, in its full, late, form, not only a military rally and feasting, but also a quasi-scapegoat ritual, a race in which young men (*neoi*) drawn from the Carneatai, called the ‘grape-runners’ (*staphylodromoi*), chase a man wearing sacrificial ribbons (Hesych. and *Lex. Seg.*, both s.v. *staphylodromoi*). This

probably took place along the *Dromos*, described by Pausanias (3.14.6–7) as the place where training in running still in his own day took place for the *neoi*.

Finally, the Hyacinthia based at Amyclai was another Apollo festival of the whole state, which lasted three days in the later period, and arguably much longer in the classical period (Hdt. 9.7–8),²⁷ equally divided into a first half spent mourning the dead hero Hyakinthos, Apollo's beloved, at Amyclai, and a second celebrating Apollo and with processions, sacrifices, and feasts (including probably one of the 'Kopis' type), which may have moved to the theatre at Sparta; Dionysos was also involved.²⁸ Included in the second half's events were contests of lyre-playing and singing by the boys (*paides*), and horse-back parades, in the theatre, and then performances by choruses and dancers from among the youths (*paidiskoi*); and parades of the young girls (*parthenoi*) on wagons and chariots. This complex festival too seems to have incorporated elements of rites of passage for the young at various stages into a celebration of the whole community (Polycrates *FGrHist* 588 F1, *ap.* Athen. 139c–e).²⁹

In addition to this major programme of centralized festivals at which very many boys and youths (and girls) had to display their fitness and their musical and athletic skills, there were, at least by the classical period, a good many other annual athletic contests at different festivals across Laconia and Messenia at which keen athletes and rich horse-breeders could choose to compete. The primary piece of evidence is the late fifth-century career monument and inscription of Damonon (*IG* V 1.213), which records the dual career of this rich and exceptionally successful character, winning victories both in running events and subsequently in equestrian events (both on horseback and driving his chariot), and also the victories of his son Enymacratidas, running and riding; they won at nine different locations.³⁰

Beyond the festivals, much evidence attests the continuous efforts made to maintain high physical standards in the upbringing of the young through constant competition and sanctions for failure. As the youths progressed through the age-classes, there were regular contests in racing, boxing, wrestling, and some team sports, which were unusually important at Sparta (Xen. *Lac. Pol.* 4.1–2, 5.8–9, 9.4–6). Pausanias' account of the centrally placed running track (*Dromos*), where there were in his time also two gymnasia, and where the races of the young men still took place (3.14.6–7), mentions that the *Sphaireis* ('ball players?'), who were those just passing out from ephebic to manhood status, sacrificed there to an ancient statue of Heracles (3.13.9, 14.3, 15.7).³¹ The evidence from the Roman period suggests that these young men engaged in the theatre in a team ball

game, where gloves were worn, and the event was known for its violence (Lucian, *Anacharsis* 38). The importance of such sports for adult Spartiates in the classical period is confirmed by Xenophon's report that, when ball teams were being picked for these contests, proven cowards would not get picked; such men would not be welcome in the gymnasia, the mess, or in a wrestling bout and might be demoted to the lowest place in choruses (Xen. *Lac. Pol.* 9.4–5, cf. 5.1).³² Violent conflicts between groups of ephebes in the mock-battles at the Platonistas near the *Dromos* are attested in late sources (Paus. 3.14.8–10), while, again, Xenophon suggests that members of the three teams of 100 elite young men (the *hippeis*) were encouraged to fight whenever they encountered members of the other teams (*Lac. Pol.* 4.3–6). The pressure on Spartiates to demonstrate their physical qualifications throughout their lives are further revealed by the reports in Athenaios, quoting Agatharchides of Cnidos, and Aelian, if we can believe these procedures went back to the archaic period (Agatharchides *FGrHist* 86 F10, *ap.* Athen. 550c–d, Ael. *VH* 14.7): the young were inspected every ten days by the ephors, as was their clothing and bedding, and any poor performance or poor conditioning thus revealed led to beatings and other punishments.

Hence publicly directed training, and subsequent public performance, in athletic and in choral dancing and singing, were essential elements in the upbringing of Spartiates, and through the rest of their lives as Spartan citizens and soldiers.³³ These practices were all based on the principle that Spartiate citizens, who were all *homoioi*, in order to be suitable fighters for the state, should maintain a high basic level of competitiveness, physical fitness, and fighting ability (recognized by Arist. *Pol.* 8.1337a26–33). This notional 'equality' was helped by two elements: first that economically the bar for Spartiates was set relatively high in terms of agricultural contributions to their messes and hence to the elite elements of the army, and second that they alone belonged to the three 'Dorian' *phylai* and to the *ōbai*, who were probably subdivisions of the *phylai*, and may well have been twenty-seven in number;³⁴ it was these men who enjoyed full political participation, including membership of the assembly and access to magistracies. If, as Thucydides believed, Sparta was indeed a pioneer in the introduction of nude gymnastics, along with the concern to clamp down on extravagant displays of clothing or luxuries, this fits very well with these other elements of manufactured 'similarity' in their training, encouraging Spartans (not wholly successfully of course) to pay as much or more attention in awarding status, prestige, and position to physical condition and achievements as to birth or wealth.³⁵

This relative equality was achievable because from the time of the

conquests of Laconia and Messenia, the Spartiates exercised control over two large subordinate groups. The free *perioikoi* lived in their own communities, and fought in the army; it is debated whether their communities should be called *poleis*, and whether or not they may be labelled 'Lacedaimonian citizens'. The labelling issue perhaps matters less (especially since the language of citizenship may have been still undeveloped in the archaic period) than the recognition that they were free members of the Lacedaimonian state who were excluded from the Spartiate kinship structures (the *phylai* and the *ōbai*) and all political decision-making.³⁶ The Spartiates exercised from the early archaic period much more direct, and harsher, rule over the helots, on whose labour their economy depended. From the classical period we hear of a variety of smaller subgroups who did not have full Spartiate status, but had been brought up with Spartiates' sons to some extent in the upbringing: bastards (*nothoi*) (mostly sons of Spartiates and helot women), *mothōnes* (perhaps children of helots brought up as attendants for Spartiates), and *mothakes* (free-born boys, perhaps the sons of Spartiates who had become economically inferior or failed to complete the upbringing satisfactorily).³⁷ When and how these groups became defined is far from clear; it seems likely that the processes which brought them into existence began well before the fifth century, but their numbers increased significantly as the economic and social problems associated with Spartiate status grew from the mid-fifth century.³⁸ The relevance of athletic training to the activities and mobility of such people will be considered shortly.

Participation in athletic competitions was strongly encouraged, both in Laconia, demonstrated above all by the Damomon inscription (*IG V 1.213*),³⁹ and at Olympia (though apparently not so much at the other crown games). Victories here created unequal distinction, and perhaps subsequent political importance, for athletes or rich horse-owners. Success at the crown games was specifically encouraged by the typically Spartan reward apparently offered to winners in the crown games: not money or free meals, as elsewhere, but the privilege of fighting in the king's guards, presumably among the *hippeis* (Plut. *Lyc.* 22.4, *Quaest. Conv.* 639e).⁴⁰ There were limits, however, to the honours and rewards available. Tyrtaeus' early criticism of undue honours just for athletes no doubt helped to create an atmosphere of restraint, as his poems were supposedly repeatedly performed on campaigns, at royal and other dinners (Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 F216, Lycurg. *Leocr.* 107).⁴¹ Significantly, there is no evidence that any epinician was performed for a Spartan victor at Sparta. It seems that Spartan musical culture was tightly controlled by the public bodies, and there was little space for private or smaller group performances, and hence no context for or interest in invitations to non-Spartan

poets to contribute to honours for victors. In conformity then with Plato's advice against honouring the living with *hymnoi* (Pl. *Leg.* 802), Sparta placed restrictions on praise of their living citizens.⁴²

If, then, Sparta established these firm rules for 'deep' citizenship (cf. Cartledge, this volume, [chapter 7.3–4](#)), partly by transforming earlier initiatory rituals into a longer, more controlled system designed to develop and maintain trained and disciplined citizen-warriors, then it seems unlikely that individuals not born into this community and brought up there from early boyhood would be readily admitted. Aristotle reported that 'they [the Spartans] say that in the time of their former kings they would share citizenship with others, so that the shortage of population did not occur, though they were at war for a long time; and they say there were once actually ten thousand Spartiates' (*Pol.* 1270a34–9).⁴³ Whatever he or his sources might have had in mind by 'the time of their former kings', he clearly believed that in his time Spartans were very reluctant, despite their awareness of the drastic drop in their citizen numbers, to contemplate admission of significant numbers to Spartiate citizenship.⁴⁴ Herodotus also believed, presumably on the basis of his Spartan informants,⁴⁵ that Sparta was exceptionally reluctant to grant citizenship to outsiders. His story of Teisamenos the Iamid seer and his brother Hegias, which introduces us to an important category of remarkably successful and mobile experts, the military *manteis* (many of whom had athletic connections), culminates with the precise claim that 'these alone of all men were made citizens by the Spartiates', so great was the Spartans' need of Teisamenos' mantic services in the imminent Persian Wars (Hdt. 9.33–4, Paus. 3.11.5–8).⁴⁶ Teisamenos, son of Antiochos, was a *mantis*, and a member of the Iamidai of Elis, part of the famous and long-lasting *genos* of the Iamidai, a professional association based at Olympia who 'swarmed across Greece and in Sicily' (Roussel 1976, 77). He had narrowly failed to win the Olympic pentathlon (having been told by Delphi ambiguously that he would win five victories); the Spartans eventually agreed to his hard terms, namely full Spartiate status for himself and his brother Hegias at Sparta. His exercise of military seercraft, working with the kings, then helped the Spartans to win his five victories, in the form of five battles between 479 and 458/7, from Plataea to Tanagra (Hdt. 9.33–4).⁴⁷ The branch of the Iamidai thus established at Sparta remained influential; his grandson Agias worked as *mantis* with Lysander at Aigospotamoi (Paus. 3.11.5), while Teisamenos the *mantis*, perhaps Agias' son, was involved in Cinadon's conspiracy, whipped and executed (Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.11); Pausanias saw the family tomb of the Iamidai near a temple to Artemis (Paus. 3.12.8).⁴⁸ We shall meet other Iamidai later (see also Bourriot 1976, 358–74; Flower 2008; Duplouy 2010, 336–7); at

Sparta, they seem to be the exception that proves the rule of her xenophobic resistance to granting citizenship to foreign specialists (cf. also Cartledge this volume, chapter 7, section 3; Lupi this volume, chapter 6, section 1; Brock this volume, [chapter 12](#)).

The picture has to be qualified, however, as forms of upward mobility for some subgroups inside the community were increasingly made available, at least from the early to mid-fifth century. Helots played various and increasing roles in the Spartan army, and the process probably began in the archaic period. As Hunt (1998) has demonstrated, their substantial presence in Spartan and other Greek armies was systematically suppressed or underplayed by ancient historians for ideological reasons. Very large numbers of helots are attested by Herodotus as serving and dying, apparently in the hoplite phalanx, in the Persian War battles of 480–479; apparently there were seven helots to each Spartiate at Plataea, most perhaps drawn up behind one or more Spartiates in an eight-man phalanx (Hdt. 9.28, 9.29, 9.80, 9.85, 8.25; see Hunt (1998) 26–52). It seems unlikely that such substantial use of helots was a complete innovation in these campaigns, and probable that many helots, either as combatants or as attendants, had regularly accompanied the army on campaign. The next body of evidence surfaces in Thucydides' narrative of the Archidamian War. He asserts controversially that helots were invited, at some unidentified point, perhaps shortly before 424, to put themselves forward if they could claim excellent military service, in the expectation of being freed; about 2,000 did and were promptly done away with (Thuc. 4.80). In 424, 700 helots were enlisted as hoplites to go to the Thraceward region with Brasidas, along with Peloponnesian mercenaries (Thuc. 4.80), and in 421, the survivors were freed, allowed to settle where they liked, and then settled (usefully) on the Elis–Lepreon border along with the *neodāmōdeis* (Thuc. 5.34), who must be helots who had previously been given freedom in similar circumstances. *Neodāmōdeis* appear as separate units in a number of other campaigns in the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 5.67, 7.19, 8.5), and in later campaigns down to 370/369 all in considerable numbers (Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.4, 3.4.2, 6.5.24). Exactly what civic status these 'new demos-men' were granted is not clear, but it was evidently less than political equality with the Spartiates, who were alone eligible for the assembly or magistracies.⁴⁹ Some members of the other subgroups mentioned above, the *mothōnes*, bastards (*nothoi*), and the *mothakes*, who are likely to have been part of the lesser status combatants at Plataea, and who might participate to some extent in the upbringing, as dependents or clients of young Spartiates, might conceivably win some promotion. Probable cases are the *mothakes* who were in exceptional cases apparently restored to

Spartiate status, namely Callicratidas, Lysander, and Gylippos,⁵⁰ the promotion presumably earned by spectacular performance (Phylarchus *FGrHist* 81 F43, *ap.* Athen. 271e–f, Ael. *VH* 12.43).⁵¹ It is uncertain whether these ingenious inventions of new and divisive statuses short of Spartiateness, which encouraged patronal relations inside the system, predated the Persian Wars or even the mid-fifth century. It is also possible that some or all of them maintained or acquired forms of membership of local sub-communities.⁵² But good or bad performance in the many athletic and musical contests, as well as in warfare, was likely to have been of considerable importance in promotions or demotions. However, there is no evidence either way on whether entry into contests in the international arenas was open to any of these members of lesser status-groups.

There was also a special category of non-Laconians (the *trophimoi*) who were permitted to follow the *agōgē*. Xenophon's account is the most interesting: describing the elements of the army Agesipolis took for the campaign against Olynthos in 381, he says:

πολλοὶ δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν περιοίκων ἐθελονταὶ καλοὶ κάγαθοι ἡκολούθουν, καὶ ξένοι τῶν τροφίμων καλουμένων, καὶ νόθοι τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν, μάλα εὐεידεῖς τε καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει καλῶν οὐκ ἄπειροι.

Many of the perioikoi too, excellent men (*kaloι kagathoi*), followed with him as volunteers, and some foreigners from the so-called *trophimoi*, and bastards of the Spartiates, men in good shape and not without experience of the good things offered by the city. (Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.9)

This implies that some of the *trophimoi*, foreigners brought up in the Spartan system, would feel a moral obligation to fight in the army in exchange for the benefits received. Grounds for Spartiates to accept such sons of *xenoi* as *trophimoi* would include increasing the patronal or networking relationships between elite Spartans and non-Spartans, as well as their military contribution. It is hard to say when this practice began, how popular this option was for non-Spartans, or whether, if they completed the upbringing, they acquired citizenship, whole or partial, as well as military benefits of the training, useful networks of friends, and the expectation of army service.⁵³ There is a reasonable case for accepting the accounts in Plutarch (*Ages.* 20.2) and Diogenes Laertius (2.54) that Xenophon's sons Gryllos and Diodoros spent some time in the *agōgē*, presumably while Xenophon, Agesilaus' *xenos*, was serving Spartan purposes occupying the estate he had been given at Skillus in Triphylia. It seems likely that the sons could participate in hunting expeditions in Spartan territory, and perhaps also compete in the Laconian games, as they did at Skillus (Xen. *An.* 5.3.10); they might even have fought with the Spartans, before fighting in the Athenian cavalry, along with their Spartan allies, at Mantinea in 362.⁵⁴ But it seems less likely that such foreign friends

would be able to enter, as Spartans, any competitions held outside Laconia.

3. Cretan Cities

Cretans, in antiquity, as in more recent times (as in the Cretan resistance to the German occupation),⁵⁵ have excelled at running, especially long-distance running in the mountains (cf. Pl. *Leg.* 625d).⁵⁶ Cretans appear a reasonable number of times (eight) in the Olympic victor lists for the *dolichos*, from Ergoteles of Knossos in 472 onwards (on Ergoteles' change of citizenship see below, section 6).⁵⁷ A clear conceptual connection can be seen in many Cretan cities between the demonstration of running skills and the processes of acquiring citizenship.

From the early days of Greek political theorizing until the present day, the social and educational developments of the Cretan cities have been seen as broadly comparable to those at Sparta. But identifying institutional and social developments in the 100 or so Cretan cities in the archaic period is very difficult. Literary sources such as Plato, Ephorus, and Aristotle are persistently guilty both of vague generalization about Crete as a whole, ignoring local variations, and over-systematic theorizing, usually in comparison with Sparta.⁵⁸ The material record provides many public inscriptions of great value in providing qualifications to broad generalizations: above all the early regulations and 'sacred laws' from the sixth and early fifth centuries; what used to be seen as a mysterious sixth-century 'gap' in material culture has been narrowed, and what remains is now more plausibly explained as a widespread collective restraint in terms of status display, especially perhaps in the cities of central Crete.⁵⁹ These inscriptions from the archaic, classical, and Hellenistic periods reveal much about archaic institutions and institutional language; but it is as difficult here as at Sparta to be specific about the dates of introduction of many procedures which first appear in fifth-century or later documents.

From this range of evidence it seems probable that there were traditional rites of passage for young Cretans at least in a good many cities, as in Sparta, with institutionalized homosexual pair-bondings; running races seem to have played a prominent part in these rites along with hunting expeditions, military training, choral song and dance, and feasting. Such practices would then seem to have been reinstitutionalized to constitute entry requirements for the male *andreia*, through which community-membership was negotiated.⁶⁰ The

eighth-to-seventh-century bronzes of nude pairs of men and youths with hunting equipment found at Kato Symi provide plausible evidence for early homosexual pair-bondings.⁶¹ The argument for reinstitutionalization of such pair-bondings in some classical Cretan cities starts from the generalized account in Strabo, taken from Ephorus (*FGrHist* 70 F149): according to this, in Crete lovers spent time ‘abducting’ and treating kindly their socially approved beloveds, and the culmination of the relationship was when the pair returned to the *andreion* from a sojourn in the wild and the beloved received adult male symbols as presents, consisting of items of military clothing, an ox, and a drinking cup. If we can trust the statements in Strabo that it was an honour for boys to attract a reputable lover and a disgrace for an attractive boy to fail to attract one, it seems that such pairings have become not an initiatory requirement for all future citizens, but rather a commonly enacted and sanctioned affectionate relationship.⁶² Exactly where and when such practices went on is hard to say.

Epigraphic evidence is much stronger for the practical and symbolic significance of running as an essential activity of citizens and for the terminological distinctions involved. In inscriptions from many cities, we find a category of adult males called ‘runners’ (*dromeis*). As has been demonstrated by Tzifopoulos (1998), these are those of immediate post-‘ephebic’ age who have been admitted to adult status and with it gained access to the running events (*dromoi*) and training facilities (*gymnasia*): perhaps those aged c. twenty–thirty.⁶³ If they were of free status, they had some specific functions of their own, and some, but not quite all, citizen rights.⁶⁴ In many cities specific duties given to the *dromeis* included performing in races at festivals, being involved in the signing of treaties, and perhaps also garrison duties, while at Gortyn free *dromeis* might act as witnesses only in inheritance cases.⁶⁵ The ephebes in the immediately preceding stage are in some inscriptions called the *apodromoi*, at least at Gortyn; and they were said by a lexicographer to be ‘those not yet able to take part in the public *dromoi*’ (Ar. *Byz. fr.* 48).⁶⁶

Many Cretan festivals, which were still evidently flourishing in the Hellenistic period, celebrated boys’ coming of age; their titles, brief descriptions in some inscriptions and associated myths all suggest rituals involving exchanges of clothing or the temporary adoption of nudity.⁶⁷ For the *Ekdysia* (‘Taking off’) at Phaistos we have the description of its related myth which featured Galateia, Lampros, and their daughter, who was raised as a boy and in accordance with her mother’s wishes was transformed at maturity into the youth Leucippos (Ant. Lib. *Met.* 17); youths at Malla, Lyttos, Dreros, and Axos are said to strip (*egduomenoi*) when swearing their citizenship oaths.⁶⁸ One can deduce that at the culmination of the rite new citizens shed

(‘*ekduesthai*’) their perhaps feminized clothing, were seen naked, and then received adult male clothes or armour (explicitly in Lato, *IC I* 16.5.21–5; at Lyttos at the festival of *Periblēmaia* (‘Putting on’), *IC I* 19.1.17–18).

Athletic training appears, in rather obscure ways, in our limited sources for grants of citizenship in Cretan cities. Aristotle (*Pol.* 2.1264a20–5) states that the Cretans gave their ‘slaves’ (*douloi*—perhaps including the whole range of non-free statuses) other privileges but forbade them gymnastics (*ta gymnasia*)⁶⁹ and the possession of arms; a striking confirmation of the centrality of athletic training to the concept of citizenship. The rule, if genuine, may be compared to the supposedly Solonian laws (see below, section 4), excluding slaves from exercise and from rubbing themselves with oil in the wrestling grounds and from being lovers of free boys, but Cretan institutions place even greater emphasis on this element of the life of the free.

A few inscriptions provide some information on archaic Cretan conceptions of citizenship and the granting of civic rights.⁷⁰ The *mitra* which displayed in an *andreion* the contract made with Spensithios (*Nomima I*, no. 22 = DA1 GP, mid-sixth century), records that ‘the Dataleis’ and ‘we the *polis*’ offered specific rights and civic protection to Spensithios and his sons in return for the permanent salaried post as official scribe and remembrancer; unfortunately it is not clear whether he was a foreign expert with rare literacy skills, or already a member of his community.⁷¹ It is not clear either whether we have one or two communities involved in the decision. Jeffery and Morpurgo-Davies (1970) and many others suppose that the Dataleis were a smaller group related to a *polis*, perhaps Arcades,⁷² while Viviers (1994) argued the case for supposing that the document is a combination of a general decree on the post passed by the Dataleis, who were a *polis* based at Afrati, and the specific contract offered to Spensithios by its representatives. Gortyn and the members of a Gortynian subgroup, the community of Avlon, gave a grant of various privileges to a military expert, Dionysios (*Nomima I*, no. 8 = G64 GP, c.525–500), which included tax exemptions, landownership, civic rights, and something to do with the *gymnasion* (perhaps equal access to it?); he had won this through his warlike courage and benefactions.⁷³ No case exists of a Cretan city honouring specifically an athletics expert; it is perhaps conceivable that a city might have been as generous to a promising athlete as Gortyn was to Dionysios for his military contribution, given that they conceived of the functions and identities of their tribal units in both military and athletic terms.⁷⁴ On the other hand, as with Sparta, granting great honours to and encouraging display from athletes, as other

individuals, seem to have been discouraged in Crete, and priority was not placed on winning Panhellenic competitions.⁷⁵ Hence Cretan recruitment of foreign athletes into their *andreia* seems unlikely.

One may note finally that at Gortyn, adoption was permitted, and the adopter apparently had a free choice of whom to adopt (*Code* 10.33–11.23 = G72 GP, *Nomima* II, no. 40, mid-fifth century); but it is not clear if adoption of a foreigner was permitted, rather than a citizen or a non-citizen resident, an *aphetairos*. At *Code* 11.10–17 the *mnâmon* [*kosmou*] *kseriou*—the ‘remembrancer of the magistrate for external affairs’ becomes involved where an adopter rejects an adoptee, and the *mnâmon* is to ensure that the stated payment of 10 staters goes to the rejected adoptee. This might suggest that an adoptee might be a foreigner;⁷⁶ but it has been held to suggest rather that the adoptee, whether a bastard or not, reverted to the class of *aphetairoi*, and these were included within the purview of the *xenios kosmos*. In other Gortynian inscriptions we find the *xenios kosmos* concerned with regulating foreign workers (*IC* IV 79 = G79 GP, *Nomima* I, no. 30, early fifth century) and charged with protecting the rights of those, who may be either perhaps returning exiles or émigrés, or freedmen, who have been given the status of members of the community of Latosians (*IC* IV 78 = G78 GP, *Nomima* I, no. 16, early fifth century).⁷⁷ Amid much uncertainty, we find an evident concern to define membership and civic rights, and there are grounds for suspecting also considerable flexibility in practice, both in relation to a *polis* and its sub-communities (not necessarily themselves wholly contained within one *polis*) and in relation to admission of new members from outside.

In conclusion, while Cretan cities show concern for legal issues of status and citizenship, and though a qualification in running was built into the initiation festivals and procedures, Cretan cities seem also in the sixth and early fifth centuries to have been strongly hostile to individual honours and displays. There are hints that outsiders, or non-citizen members of the community, might be given citizenship, and it is not impossible that running ability, as well as military or scribal skills, might be attractive features in possible candidates; but it seems unlikely that successful non-Cretan athletes would consider acceptable the rewards available from cities which were so unfriendly to the normal forms of public honours and displays given to victors. It is at least symbolically significant that the two Cretan instances of athletes’ transfers were the Cnosian runner Ergoteles who migrated to Himera which offered him greater fame (see below, section 6), and the later runner Sotades who moved to Ephesos. Both were exiled by their original cities, Ergoteles before the transfer, as a result of *stasis*, and Sotades as a consequence of the switch.

4. Athens

Athenians begin to appear on the Olympic victor lists in the seventh century, with runners in the *stadion* and the *diaulos*. Indications that some ambitious politicians sought to build careers on athletic success begin with Cylon and his failed attempt at a tyranny (Hdt. 5.71, Thuc. 1.126); Eusebius' date for his victory in the *diaulos* (35th Olympiad) is traditionally equated with 640, which may well not be accurate; but there is a strong case for putting Cylon's coup and the problems resulting from its suppression before Draco's legislation as well as before Solon's (see e.g. Hornblower 2004, on Thuc. 1.126.3).⁷⁸ The earliest victor in chariot-racing is probably Alcmaeon (traditional date 592), followed by Megacles and Hippocleides, who took such prominence at the elaborate courtship competition for the tyrant Cleisthenes' daughter Agariste at Sicyon (Hdt. 6.126). There was a major expansion and reorganization of the Panathenaia in the mid-sixth century (traditional date 566) to create a *polis*-based set of international contests, which in due course made their civic games among the most successful of local games, following closely on the creation of the circuit of four Panhellenic games. It is not clear what forms of athletic contests had preceded this expansion: whether there were only elite funeral games, or also contests at a major civic festival for Athena.

Procedures for regulating citizenship at Athens were radically transformed by the reforms of Cleisthenes in the last decade of the sixth century, after which two separate, equally all-embracing, systems were created: new citizens had to be enrolled both in their freshly defined local demes, which brought with it membership also of the new thirty trittyes and ten tribes, and also in the phratries, which probably existed before, but were perhaps now expanded to embrace every community, to which pre-existing groups such as *gennētai* and *orgeōnes* became linked.⁷⁹ Before Cleisthenes, modes of acquiring citizenship are likely to have been considerably more varied and haphazard. A large number of subgroups, defined by varying criteria (regional, local, and pseudo-kinship), probably existed: the old Ionian tribes, phratries, *genē*, naucraries, *kōmai*, also *orgeōnes* and *thiasōtai* and localized groups of immigrants such as the Gephyraioi. These groups will have kept some form of lists (*lēxiarchika*) of their members (written or perhaps still orally maintained), and members will have regarded their membership of the whole community as deriving from that.⁸⁰ There are many interesting indications from the time of Solon's

legislation in the early sixth century of community concern with issues of citizenship and athletics, and evidence for serious political disputes over claims of both groups and individuals to be Athenian.

Three cases in the records of Solon's laws are relevant to these questions. Firstly, on the importance of athletic victories for the state, Plutarch records that Solon fixed financial rewards for some Panhellenic victors, namely 100 *drachmai* for Isthmian winners and 500 for Olympic (Plut. *Sol.* 23.3); Diogenes Laertius claims this was a restriction on earlier more generous rewards, and that the other games attracted comparable amounts (1.55). A fragmentary decree of the 430/420s (*IG* I³ 131) reasserts *sitēsis* at the Prytaneion and 'other rewards' for winners at all four periodic festivals. The texts of the law as cited by Plutarch or Diogenes cannot go back to Solon. It is hard to believe that rewards at any time were limited to Olympic and Isthmian victors to the exclusion, say, of the Pythian; and in any case Solon's legislation preceded the institution of both the Isthmian and the Nemean games in the mid-sixth century; and Solon would not have been able to fix rewards in terms of Athenian coinage.⁸¹ It remains possible that in this, as in many other cases, there was a Solonian basis to a law which was later developed (cf. Scafuro 2006); one might suppose that Solon began the process of encouraging high-level athletic competition by offering non-monetized rewards (and perhaps *prohedriai*) for the *Olympionikai*.⁸² Then, perhaps in stages, the system would have been subsequently monetized, extended to the other games, and enlarged to include *sitēsis* to Panhellenic victors, the descendants of the tyrant-slayers, and then (rarely) to other benefactors.⁸³

Secondly, Aeschines in 346/5 quoted laws passed by 'the lawgiver' (i.e. Solon) which excluded slaves from exercising in the *gymnasia* and rubbing their bodies with olive oil, and from being the lovers of free youths (Aeschin. 1.138). There is a strong probability that these laws go back to Solon or at least to the early or mid-sixth century. In addition to Aeschines' claim that they were Solonian, Plutarch three times asserted a Solonian origin (*Sol.* 1, *Mor.* 751d, also 152b); but what counts most for an early date for these laws is the use of the rare word *xēraloiphein*.⁸⁴ The idea of restricting gymnastic activity and engagement in socially approved homosexual partnerships to free males has, as we saw, parallels with Cretan laws and Spartan practices.⁸⁵

Athletics, then, was a serious business in archaic Athens, and athletic training and its associated pederastic pursuits were restricted to free men. There is no evidence that any level of physical performance was a formal requirement for young men to enable them to be enrolled in the naucraries, phratries, *genē*, *orgeōnes*, or other

units, before Cleisthenes' reforms, or in the demes and phratries after his reforms. There are, however, signs in the fifth and fourth centuries of a concern for the physical training and fitness of new citizens. Youths were admitted to their demes after a scrutiny of their parentage and a visual inspection of their naked bodies to determine if they were adult (*Ath. Pol.* 42.1–2, *Ar. Vesp.* 578); the idea of some conformity to the ideal of the fit citizen body may have been involved, in addition to an assessment of their physical maturity (at a time when documentation of birth was lacking and birthdays not celebrated).⁸⁶ After Cleisthenes, many contests which tested athletic skills and physical fitness and beauty, all or most organized through the new ten tribes, were instituted at the Panathenaia and many other festivals: the war-dances (*pyrrhikai*), possibly not tribal, for teams of boys, beardless youths (the 'proto-ephebes'), and men; the torch-races (*lampadēphoriai*) for the youths, featuring teams of relay-runners selected from each tribe; and the 'manhood trial' (*euandria*), also tribal and for the youths, which probably featured naked team displays of military preparedness.⁸⁷ These events were probably added to the Panathenaia in the years closely following the Cleisthenic reforms; whether they had any precursors is uncertain.⁸⁸ There are also initiatory elements in certain Athenian rituals, most obviously the cross-dressing and running races of the Oschophoria (with its links to the Theseus and Crete myth).⁸⁹ But there seems no reason to suppose that (at least before c.386–366) all youths had to engage in such rituals or contests, or that there was a programme of athletic and military training for them as a specific qualification for citizenship. So we may suppose that athletics were strongly encouraged at archaic Athens and accepted at all levels, and nakedness was introduced there as everywhere else, but such training was not viewed as a compulsory element in boys' upbringing.

The third relevant Solonian law is that concerned directly with citizenship. After Cleisthenes' reforms, citizenship depended on the demes and the phratries which regulated their own membership lists, under scrutiny from the people's assembly as a whole; the rules were later tightened by Pericles' citizenship law of 451/0. Admission of individual non-Athenians to citizenship demanded a decree of the assembly, based on a case made for the candidate, authorizing their enrolment in deme and phratry. During the period between Solon and Cleisthenes, however, the situation was no doubt much less systematic; and this led to challenges. Plutarch cites a Solonian law (*Sol.* 24.4):

Παρέχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ ὁ τῶν δημοποιήτων νόμος, ὅτι γενέσθαι πολίτας οὐ δίδωσι πλὴν τοῖς φεύγουσιν ἀειφυγίᾳ τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἢ πανεστίους Ἀθήναζε μετοικιζομένοις ἐπὶ τέχνῃ.

The law on creating citizens also provides a problem, because it grants the chance to become citizens solely to those permanently in exile from their own land, or those moving with their whole families (*panhestiois*) to Athens to exercise their craft (*epi technē*).

The grounds were that he wished to attract only those sorts of immigrants, and especially those who would be securely committed to membership of their new *polis*. Ismard (2007, 20–5; 2010, 72–6) suggests speculatively, using the Cretan parallels mentioned above, that such incorporation may often in fact have involved the granting of limited citizenship—e.g. rights to own land, security in relation to the laws—without involving full political participation, through acceptance in some smaller group such as a naucrary, a *genos*, a phratry, or a group of *orgeōnes*. At the fall of the tyranny, the belief that many were improperly exercising some citizenship privileges was sufficiently widespread that a general scrutiny (*diapsēphismos*) was carried out (*Ath. Pol.* 13.4), and presumably many were expelled. As part of the reforms of Cleisthenes, however, many ‘foreign and slave metics’ were made ‘new citizens’ (*neopolitai*) by being enrolled in the freshly organized demes and phratries (*Arist. Pol.* 3.1275b34–9; *Ath. Pol.* 13.4). It has been plausibly suggested that those benefiting from this process were mostly exiles and *technitai* admitted under the Solonian law and mercenaries and other supporters employed by the tyrants, who had been excluded by the *diapsēphismos* or whose status was still questioned.⁹⁰ The language of our limited sources does not positively compel the supposition that skilful athletes had been among those accepted into the various communities; it is not certain that under the Solonian law athletic prowess would readily have been described as a *technē*, and they would apparently have to be making a permanent move. But in view of the recognition of the value to the city of athletic success and its connection to the exercise of citizenship in the *gymnasia*, and the supposed connection between gymnastic and military skills, it is likely enough that where exiles, potential immigrant families, or mercenaries happened to be able to proclaim athletic abilities, it would have been considered an advantage.

5. Corinth, Argos, And Aegina

Three major states in the northern Peloponnese and the Saronic Gulf deserve a brief mention, though here too the lack of early evidence pushes us to consider developments shortly after as well as before the Persian Wars. Corinth and Argos each had strong interests in athletics, providing competitors with some success and organizing games in

their own cities and at the Panhellenic shrines at Isthmus and Nemea.⁹¹ We can identify in both cities moments when significant changes in their citizen formations took place. In addition to managing the Isthmian sanctuary, games, and buildings, Corinth developed its own contests. Morgan has plausibly argued that in the early fifth century a significant development of racetrack and facilities in the heart of the city in the Lechaion Road Valley, probably for a new torch race for Athena Hellotis (cf. Pind. *Ol.* 13.38–40 and *scholia*), strengthened the civic value of athletics for the city.⁹² At some point Corinth adopted a complex eight-based system of tribes and three regional subgroups, designed to mix the citizens up in new ways, which arguably anticipated Cleisthenes' reforms in many respects.⁹³ Salmon proposed that this change took place some time during the tyranny of Cypselos (seventh century),⁹⁴ but the hint in Nicolaus of Damascus (*FGrHist* 90 F60) that it was made by the new regime after the fall of the tyranny in the sixth century seems more plausible.⁹⁵ Unfortunately we know very little of the internal politics at Corinth. In the first half of the fifth century, Pindar's epinician for Xenophon (*Ol.* 13, 464 BC) is at pains to emphasize the order and stability of the moderate oligarchy, while a Pindaric dithyramb (*fr.* 70c Sn.-M.) apparently hinted at the possibility of *stasis*.⁹⁶ But there is no specific evidence to support the idea that the state showed flexibility in admitting new citizens.

Argos seems a little more hopeful, at least shortly after the Persian Wars. Its citizenship structures were transformed, probably in the mid-460s, by the new, more democratic regime. The latest evidence, including the major financial archive to be published by C. Kritzas, attests four tribes (the new Hynrathioi added to the three Dorian tribes Hylleis, Pamphyloi, and Dymanes), new subdivisions of twelve phratries per tribe, as well as a separate designation of citizens by a toponym (*pentēkostys* or *kōmē*); in such a way that *kōmai* were not simply subdivisions of phratries; and a large number of separate political and financial magistracies.⁹⁷ Here too the increase in the complexity of citizen subgroups may be a further parallel to, or even reflect the influence of, Cleisthenes' reforms, and suggest a conscious attempt to mix the citizens up to break down old divisions and scores. In view of the population disaster of the defeat at Sepeia, Argos may well have needed new citizens, like Thespiiai after the Persian Wars (Hdt. 8.75), and the new arrangements may have facilitated admission of new citizens from elsewhere. The civic importance of athletics at Argos in this period is demonstrated by a number of indications. In the two decades after 480 Argives achieved some success at Olympia (Moretti 1957, nos. 204, 210/222, 241, 260; Hornblower 2004, 204–5). They developed, or revived in grander form, their own major

games, the Hecatombaia at the Argive Heraion, a victory at which is celebrated by Pindar's *Nemean* 10 for Theaios (see also Pind. *Ol.* 9.87–8, 13.107–9). Their pervasive interest in exerting influence at Cleonai and managing the Nemean games was in all probability a major cause of the North Peloponnesian conflicts which have come to be known as the 'First Peloponnesian War', as Argos attempted to recover sovereignty over Cleonai and the games from Corinth (*Schol.* Pind. *Nem. hypotheseis* c & d).⁹⁸ Especially striking for state sponsorship are the entries in the papyrus record of Olympic victors reporting single-horse and four-horse chariot victories won by the Argive people as a collective in 480 and 474 (*P.Oxy.* 222 col. 1 lines 6 and 31; Moretti 1957, no. 207, 233).⁹⁹ Again, I would follow Morgan (2007, 249–61), in supposing very strong connections between the development of new political systems, the encouragement of athletics and the development of the games at the Heraion; if, like Thespiiai, the regime was looking for new citizens to be admitted to their new tribes, good athletics qualifications might increase the desirability of candidates.

The athletically distinguished island of Aegina also merits a brief word. Its success in the late archaic and early classical periods, above all in the combat events, is particularly evident to us because of the number of Aeginetans who employed Pindar and Bacchylides. Though there was some *stasis* related to the conflicts with Athens between c.500 and 457, there is no specific evidence for tribal changes or for recruitment of new citizens. Aegina has usually been seen as a haven of traditional aristocrats, members of supposedly exclusive descent groups, such as the Bassidai, and devoted to athletics; these groups are often referred to by Pindar and labelled as *genē*, *geneai*, or *patrai*. Many scholars assume these 'clans' are associations of traditional and snobbish Aeginetan families who formed a traditional landed aristocracy.¹⁰⁰ This picture has been challenged, in view of the very probable dependence of Aegina's wealth and relatively high population on overseas trade and piracy rather than farming;¹⁰¹ some scholars prefer to speak of a 'commercial aristocracy', or of 'problematized elites'.¹⁰² I would prefer to avoid the slippery term 'aristocracy' altogether and envisage more mobile and shifting 'elites'.¹⁰³ The *patrai* seem most probably pseudo-kinship groups with a constructed ancestor set in the post-heroic age, but they were probably bilateral, relatively recent, constructions, unrelated to the patrilineal Dorian tribes.¹⁰⁴ It seems possible then that the powerful oligarchic elites were fairly mobile, and that supposedly exclusive *patrai* could admit appropriate new members, whether by marriage, adoption, or adlection. If so, we cannot exclude the possibility that such well-networked groups with many foreign connections might on occasions have invited good athletes as well as rich adventurers into

their groups.

6. South Italian And Sicilian Cities

If we are to find solid evidence in any Greek region for strongly positive attitudes to the admission of athletes to citizenship, the ‘colonial’ cities of Magna Graecia offer by far the most plausible places. There are two main and interconnecting factors: intense athletic ambitions and constant political disruptions. First, the western Greeks exhibited a particularly deep concern to compete and win in the Panhellenic games, especially at Olympia, and to display their triumphs; this process began early and came to reach startling proportions. In South Italy, Croton held an unparalleled dominance in running events during the sixth and early fifth centuries; while the tyrant cities in Sicily scored a great many victories in the equestrian events.¹⁰⁵ Taras also features very highly, with eight *olympionikai* attested between c.520 and 336;¹⁰⁶ its most famous athlete was Iccos, known for his healthy training regime and his abstinence from sex (Moretti 1957, no. 307, Pl. *Leg.* 839c–840c). Western victors, their families, and their states expended much wealth proclaiming their success and commitment to the Panhellenic games, with victory monuments, dedications of statues, or of military victories, and ‘treasuries’ built at Olympia and Delphi. Patrons from Sicily and from Locri and Metapontum are dominant in Pindar’s and Bacchylides’ epinicians: Pindar’s four books of forty-five poems include fifteen for Sicilians, mostly for the tyrant dynasties of the Deinomenids and Emmenids or their associates, and two for Hagesidamos of Epizephyrian Locri; Bacchylides’ collection has three for Hiero of Syracuse and one for Alexidamos of Metapontium.¹⁰⁷

Burial practices also contribute to this impression. Most strikingly, a remarkable series of tomb complexes at Taras presents a startling confirmation of how deeply victories were felt.¹⁰⁸ Tomb A has four sarcophagi and fragments of five Panathenaic vases, dated 530–480; Tomb B has six sarcophagi, with items of athletic interest, *alabastrai*, and strigils; one Panathenaic vase, with chariots, c.520–10, and four fine volute kraters with scenes of *symposia*, Heracles, and chariots, along with many other sympotic vases, *skyphoi*, *oinochoai*, *kylikes*, *hydria*.¹⁰⁹ Tomb C has only one sarcophagos, but it contained four Panathenaic vases, of which one is a training pentathlon scene with a discus and long jump; one a chariot scene; one a boxing scene; and the last one is too fragmentary for the event to be determined: they are dated to the early fifth century. Tomb D has three sarcophagi and one

Panathenaic vase with boxers. Tomb E has one with *haltēres*. It is generally assumed, reasonably enough, that these are tombs of very wealthy men proud of their athletic careers, and hence reveal the sport-obsessed nature of the Tarantine elite. It is unclear why one athlete has a tomb all to himself, whereas others get buried in large groups; it presumably represents his exceptional, celebrity status, and conceivably he had been given heroic honours.¹¹⁰ It is also uncertain whether these are family or wider kinship groups or some sort of *hetaireia*.¹¹¹

The reputation of South Italian cities for exhibiting intensity and unscrupulousness in the pursuit of athletic fame is also indicated by two interesting, if contradictory and dubious, stories from Athenaios' account of South Italian luxury (*truphē*) in Hellenistic historians. He quotes Heracleides Ponticus' statement that one example of the Sybarites' *truphē* was their attempt to darken the reputation of the Olympic games by advertising their own games at exactly the same time, and offering excessively high prizes (521e–522a, Heraclid. Pont. fr. 49 Wehrli); and immediately afterwards he cites Timaeus for the alternative view that it was Croton who tried to destroy the Olympic festival by advertising simultaneous games with large silver prizes (522a, c?d, Timaeus *FGrHist* 566 F45).

Secondly, there are the frequent disruptions of populations in the region resulting from internal and external wars and the ambitions of tyrants. From the outset, new settlements (founded by people not necessarily all from the same 'mother city') meant the creation of new citizenship rules and subgroups;¹¹² continued migration of new settlers seems often to have been welcomed, and will have created frequent occasions for their revision. Warfare and political unrest created constant and violent transformations, at least from the late sixth and early fifth centuries, and especially under the tyrants of the first half of the fifth century. Alcibiades' statement (Thuc. 6.17.2; cf. also 4.61, 6.38) that the Sicilian cities consisted of mixed populations and had frequent changes and transplantations of citizens had a good deal of justification in the history of the previous hundred years (if his sneers at their capacity to fight for their state proved disastrously wrong). The frequent cases of large-scale forced population changes (expulsions, enslavements, and importations) will have produced an equal number of reorganization of citizen bodies,¹¹³ and mass invitations to new citizens, many from mainland Greece, many of whom were mercenaries. Spectacular examples in the same year (476) are Hieron's removal of citizens from Naxos and Catane, and the importation of 10,000 new settlers (5,000 from the Peloponnese), no doubt many of them mercenaries, and the rebranding of Catane as Aitna; and Theron's massacre of dissidents at Himera in 476 and the

importation of new citizens, ‘both Dorians and others’ (Diod. Sic. 11.49).¹¹⁴

In the light of these two features, then, it cannot be coincidence that almost all the specific cases attested where victorious athletes or sponsors of equestrian events claimed membership of more than one city, or where cities are supposed to have sought to persuade athletes or ex-athletes to join them, involve Sicily or Southern Italy (see [Table 8.1](#)). The evidence for these cases, found mostly in later authors such as Diodoros, Pausanias, or Athenaios, is not without problems, but their general direction seems a good indication of a genuine trend; our accounts often suggest that the changes in allegiance may be for political or military reasons as well as, or instead of, sporting ambitions. It is not surprising that in view of the fitness and some of the skills needed for athletic success, in many cases the same men excelled in the games and in warfare.¹¹⁵ There is also a significant difference between those who competed as athletes and those who displayed their wealth and ambition by entering teams in the equestrian events. We may look at the main examples.

Table 8.1. Possible cases of athletes’ change of citizenship or double citizenship

Name	Dates	Original city	New city	Event(s)	Comments	Source(s)
1. Glaucos	c.520	Carystos	Camarina	boxing	Gelon’s governor of Camarina	Moerdt 1957, 134; Paus. 6.101–3, Dem. 18.319; Aeschin. 3.189
2. Proxialtes	early 5th cent.	Mantinea	Syracuse/ Camarina	?	Dedication at Olympia records change of citizenship	IGO 268 <i>Nominata</i> I, no. 20
3. Phormis	c.480	Megalaias (Arcadia)	Syracuse	Chariot race?	Offerings of horses & chariotiers	Paus. 5.27.1
4. Lycortas	c.480	?Arcadia	Syracuse	?	Dedicated offerings for Phormis	Paus. 5.27.7
5. Hagenias	746B	Lamid, at Elis, also Strymphalos?	Syracuse	Mule race	Seen and associate of Hiero	Moerdt 1957, 248; Pind. Ol. 6 —performed in Strymphalos
6. Ergoteles	472, 462, other victories	Knossos—exiled	Himera	Long distance race	Fled status at Knossos	Moerdt 1957, 224, 231; Pind. Ol. 12; Paus. 6.4.11
7. Philippos	Olympic victory before 520	Croton—exiled	Went to Cyrene, then with Doricus to Sicily	?	Died in Sicily, heroised by Egesta for beauty	Moerdt 1957, 138; Hédt. 5.47; Paus. 8.10.3
8. Astylos	488, 484, 480	Croton	Syracuse	Stade and diatlos	House & statues at Croton destroyed	Moerdt 1957, 178, 9, 186–7, 196–8; Paus. 6.13.1
9. Dorian son of Diogenes	463–	Rhodes—exiled	Thuri, and back to Rhodes	boxing, pankration	Long career of war, politics, exile and return	Moerdt 1957, 322, 326, 330; Pind. Ol. 7, Thuc. 3.8, 8.35; Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 1.5.19; Paus. 6.7; <i>Syll.</i> ² 82; IGIO 153
10. Dicaon	c.390, 384, many victories	Calontia	Syracuse	Boys’ stade, other races	Bribed by Syracuse? But Calontia destroyed by Dionysius I	Moerdt 1957, 379, 388–9; Paus. 6.3.11; <i>Antik. Pal.</i> 13.15
11. Sosades	384, 380	A Cretan city—exiled	Ephesos	Long-distance race	Bribed to switch for 2nd victory	Moerdt 1957, 390, 398; Paus. 6.18.6
12. Antipatros	380s	Miletus	Syracuse	boxing	Refused inducement by Dionysius I to switch	Moerdt 1957, 365; Paus. 6.1.6

Glaucos (no. 1), son of Demylos, of Carystos in Euboea was a boxer with a spectacular career as a multiple *periodonikēs* in the last quarter of the sixth century. Late stories, not necessarily false, attest his rise from lowly origins, as his remarkable strength was first witnessed by

his farmer father when he mended a plough with his fist;¹¹⁶ and, among other stories, some more evidently mythical than others, he is said to have been appointed governor at Camarina by Gelon, and then assassinated, which probably provoked Gelon's sack of the city in 484 and transfer of the inhabitants to Syracuse (Hdt. 7.156).¹¹⁷ It is not recorded how he came to settle in Sicily, or whether he adopted new citizenship before or after his boxing career ended, but at the least there must have been some connection between his spectacular boxing career, his accumulation of great wealth and military and political career in the service of the Sicilian tyrant, and his final heroicization.¹¹⁸

The next group consists of a number of individuals who left Arcadia and acquired citizenship, fame, and fortune at Syracuse; they are often treated as mercenaries (e.g. Nielsen 2002, 79–83), but this may be oversimplification. Olympic victories are also attested or very probable. Praxiteles (no. 2) left a dedication on a statue base at Olympia (*IvO* 266; *Nomima* I, no. 20; *CEG* 380; early 5th century):

ραξιτέλες ἀνέθεκε Συρακόσιος τόδ' ἄγαλμα
καὶ Καμαριναῖος πρόσθα <δ> ἐ Μαντινέαι
Κρίνιος υἱὸς ἔναιεν ἐν Ἀρκαδίαι πολυμελο<ι>
;ἐσλὸς ἔον, καὶ Φοι μνᾶμα τόδ' ἐστ' ἀρετᾶς.

Praxiteles dedicated this statue, Syracusan
and Camarinan, but before in Mantinea
he lived, son of Crinis, in Arcadia rich in flocks,
a good man (*eslos*) and this memorial is for his excellence (*aretē*).

The dates of the dedication and Praxiteles' moves are uncertain. If, as the word order might suggest, he settled in Syracuse before Camarina, the dedication might have been made shortly before 484, while Gelon was still in control of Camarina; alternatively he may have started in Camarina, and resettled in Syracuse along with the rest of the population after Gelon razed the city, in which case the dedication may be some time before c.460; or conceivably he moved from Syracuse to Camarina at its re-establishment in 461.¹¹⁹ In view of the site of his statue, Praxiteles is very likely to have won a victory at Olympia; but whether his athletic success or his military aptitudes, or both, encouraged his move to Sicily must be left open.¹²⁰ A similar pair of cases are the rich dedications of charioteers and horses recorded by Pausanias (5.27.2–8), which reflected the wealth and achievements of Phormis (no. 3) from Mainalos ('Phormis dedicated this / an Arcadian from Mainalos, but now a Syracusan') and his friend Lycortas (no. 4). Phormis went from Mainalos to Syracuse to fight for Gelon and Hieron; but the dedications described by Pausanias

—at Olympia and also at Delphi—suggest both his military prowess (Phormis defeating enemies) and equestrian victories, horses and charioteers; it is of course possible that equestrian triumphs came after the lucrative military campaigns.

Finally, in this group Hagesias (no. 5) brings the Olympian seers back into the picture. He is the honorand of *Olympian* 6 as victor in the mule-race (472 or 468):¹²¹ the poem has a pervasive dual focus, both Stymphalos, where it was to be first performed, and Hiero's Syracuse, to where it will travel; correspondingly there is a good case for supposing that Hagesias enjoyed multiple citizenship, though of which cities is not entirely clear (*Ol.* 6. 97–103).¹²² His mobility, however, reflects more his fame and usefulness as a military seer than his success as an Olympic winner. Like Teisamenos, he was a mobile member of the mantic *genos* of the Iamidai (*Ol.* 6.72–4).¹²³ Pindar describes him as still enjoying the significant post of 'steward' (*tamias*) of the prophetic altar of Zeus at Pisa (Olympia), and devoted much of the ode to the birth of Iamos, the eponymous founder of the *genos*, and the subsequent fame of the *genos* at Olympia (*Ol.* 6.4–8, 28–74).¹²⁴ When Pindar describes him as a 'co-founder of famous Syracuse' (*Ol.* 6.6–7), there may possibly be an allusion (as the *scholia* suggest) to a claim that an Iamid seer contributed to the founding of the city under Archias. There is also a very strong connection with Stymphalos, where the prayers and athletic victories of his mother's male relatives have encouraged Cyllenian Hermes and Olympian Zeus to grant Hagesias his triumph (*Ol.* 6.77–82). There is a strong possibility that Hagesias enjoys also a form of citizenship, or at least high status, at Stymphalos, in view of its prominence in the poem, the facts that it was to be first performed there and that the *kōmos* (= performances of the song) will travel from 'home to home' (*Ol.* 6.99), and the final metaphor of the two anchors, indicating his connections to and support from both Stymphalos and Syracuse.¹²⁵ It is also clear that now Hagesias is a citizen of Syracuse, and a close friend and supporter of Hieron; the claim to be a 'co-founder' of that city may rather, or also, refer to his mantic contribution to Gelon's refounding of Syracuse in 485 and Hiero's foundation of Aitna (cf. Diod. Sic. 11.38.5, 11.49.1; 11.66; 11.76.3).¹²⁶ Hagesias' attractiveness to the Syracusan tyrant thus probably rested primarily on his religious expertise; in addition to his value as a seer, especially on campaigns and at city foundations, he may well have exploited the Iamid connections in developing the cult of Zeus Olympios and Syracuse (see Shepherd 2015); but no doubt his sponsoring activities in the games and his wide-ranging elite networks in the Peloponnese and in Sicily were also beneficial to his powerful friend.¹²⁷

The Knosian runner, Ergoteles son of Philanor (no. 6), was

proclaimed a citizen of Himera when he won the *dolichos*-race at Olympia in 472 and 464 (see above, section 3); both Pindar and Pausanias reveal that he had been exiled from Knossos through *stasis*, and welcomed, given citizenship, and honoured at Himera. Pindar's comment is: 'Like a cock fighting within by its native hearth, the honour of your feet would have dropped its leaves without fame if internecine *stasis* had not deprived you of your Knossian fatherland' (*Ol.* 12.13–15). This suggests that he would not have found it easy to achieve comparable fame, including an epinician by a top poet or a fine statue, because Cretan cities were less prepared to reward their high performers with strong marks of distinction.¹²⁸ Hence political conflict and future advantage may have combined in persuading him to seek a new life in the West. The conclusion from these cases seems then to be that the Sicilian cities had much to offer to athletes as well as to military men or seers as inducements to switch citizenship, and that many who transferred were successful; Pindar's phrasing at the end of his song, where he tells Ergoteles 'having been crowned at Olympia, twice from Pytho and at the Isthmus, you adorn the warm baths of the nymphs, associating by your own (new) lands' (*Ol.* 12.16–20), hints elegantly at the reciprocal benefits of victories for the welcoming city and for its new citizens.¹²⁹

Stasis was also deeply involved in some other famous cases of mobile athletes. Philippos son of Bucatidas of Croton (no. 7), an Olympic victor and the most beautiful Greek of his time, was exiled (*ephuge*) from Croton after he had tried and failed to marry the daughter of Telys, the tyrant of Croton's enemy Sybaris. He went to Cyrene and operated as a freelance raider with his own ship, apparently fighting with Dorieus there, and finally died fighting with him near Egesta; he was heroized by the Egestans, on account of his exceptional beauty, which had probably been on display both in the games and on the battlefield (*Hdt.* 5.42–7).¹³⁰ A century or so later, one of the most successful of all athletes, the pancratiast and boxer Dorieus of Rhodes (no. 9), spent some time during the Peloponnesian War operating as a citizen of Thurii, when in exile from Rhodes, though also known as a Rhodian.¹³¹

The early fifth-century case of the runner Astylos of Croton (no. 8), and the fourth-century cases of Dicon, Sotades, and Antipatros, show that offers of transfers occurred not infrequently, but that there were dangers of hostility in the home city, and social stigma for those thought to be changing citizenship out of opportunism or for financial inducements, rather than for a good reason such as exile. According to Pausanias, Astylos, a three-times winner in Olympic races, proclaimed himself a Syracusan on the latter two occasions (484, 480) 'to do a favour (εἰς χάριν)' to Hieron; Hieron rewarded him with a statue at

Olympia, but the Crotoniates were so angry that they turned his house into a prison and pulled down his statue.¹³² It may also be the case, as argued by Christesen (2010, 26–32), that the Spartan decision to create a new statue of their earlier famous victor Chionis and perhaps also effect his heroicization was motivated by the desire to rival this display, as his statue was placed next to that of Astylos and the number of Chionis' victories enlarged to match the Syracusan's (Paus. 6.13.2). Dicon of Caulonia (no. 10) was allegedly bribed by Syracuse to switch his allegiance between his victories in 392 and 384; however, Dionysios I destroyed the city and gave its inhabitants citizenship in 389 (Diod. Sic. 14.106), hence the allegation may be unfounded. More plausible accusations of such bribery concern Sotades (no. 11), who won a long-distance victory in 384 as a Cretan, but then was 'bribed' to appear for Ephesos in 380, for which he was exiled; and Antipatros (no. 12) a boy boxer from Miletus, who refused to accept the offer of money made to his father by envoys from Dionysios I of Syracuse, preferring the glory of being the first Ionian to have his statue dedicated at Olympia.

These stories may then reflect a wider trend. Western states in the late archaic and classical periods may have operated a determined policy of offering citizenship and possible wealth to athletes as well as to soldiers and other experts. Suspicion is pointed above all at Croton and secondly at Syracuse.¹³³ The dubious stories in Athenaios mentioned above, that Sybaris, or Croton, tried to damage the Olympics by advertising high-value prizes for their own games, may have a basis in the perception that either or both of these cities fostered athletic victors by any methods, fair or foul, by developing training facilities, offering rewards to successful athletes from at least the sixth century on,¹³⁴ or citizenship to promising candidates from outside (who might also be useful in other spheres, such as the military). The case that Croton made such public subventions is circumstantial but strong.¹³⁵ Their success rate in the hundred years or so between c.588 and 480, above all in running, is extraordinary: they produced twenty out of the seventy-one Olympic victors in non-combat contests in the period, and three of the most famous of all Greek athletes—the great wrestler Milo, the runner Phayllos,¹³⁶ and Astylos. Croton's remarkable and proverbial success was discussed by Strabo (6.1.12):¹³⁷ the main explanation he proffers is that the city was especially well suited for health and good condition, and he also mentions the fame added by the presence of a large number of Pythagoreans and of Milo the Pythagorean and great wrestler.

Modern scholars have proposed various theories, all of which have perhaps some plausibility. Some develop Strabo's ideas, suggesting that the elitist government of the 1,000, heavily influenced by the

Pythagorean *hetaireia*, and the medical traditions associated with Alcmaion and practised by doctors such as Democedes, encouraged effective training and dietary methods for athletes. In particular, Mann suggests that the phrase used by Iamblichus (VP 130) for the Pythagorean constitution of Rhegion, *gymnasiarchikē politeia*, supports the view that gymnastic training was made compulsory for citizenship and political participation in Croton as well, comparable to the requirement in many Cretan cities, where—as we have seen—post-ephebic citizens were called *dromeis*.¹³⁸ Miller (2000, 286–7, cf. 2004, 217–18, 233) argued that the democratic constitution established towards the end of the sixth century, encouraged by the physician Alcmaion, combined with the egalitarian atmosphere of the naked athletes in the gymnasium, encouraged wider participation in athletics. Young (1984, 140–6), tentatively supported by Kyle (2007, 82, 213) and Golden (1998, 142–3), suggested that Croton, wealthy and prepared to be flexible about citizenship for the period down to its decline c.480, devoted substantial sums to attracting foreigners to settle and offered them good training opportunities, as they also attracted doctors and philosophers. As Croton began its decline, Syracuse then applied the same methods, and pointedly recruited the Crotoniate Astylos.

There are chronological and other problems with treating any of these as an exclusive explanation, but they may all be relevant at various times. Against Mann, Croton's success was well under way before Pythagoras reached there c.530; against Miller, Croton did not become democratic until the Pythagoreans were removed after the destruction of Sybaris, c.510;¹³⁹ and against Young, Croton's general wealth and power did not come to a clear end in the 480s, when Astylos defected to Syracuse, but continued to the mid-fifth century, though there seems to have been some further *stasis*, and a tyrant, Cleinias.¹⁴⁰ These explanations are all speculative, and none is adequate in itself. While there is admittedly no direct evidence of positive financial inducements for such programmes, Young's supposition of public subsidies and support does seem likely to have been a constant factor (why it ceased to be successful, or was abandoned, remains unclear); other factors may each have played a part at various times.

Finally, as we have seen, it is Syracuse, under its various tyrants, which appears repeatedly in our sources as the city to which individual experts flocked and found success; of our athletes, Glaucos, Praxiteles, Phormis, Lycortas, Hagesias, Astylos, Dicon, Sotades, and Antipatros (Table 8.1 nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, and 12) all took on Syracusan allegiances.¹⁴¹ In the cases of Astylos, Dicon, and Sotades, bribery is explicitly alleged. It seems reasonable then to add athletes

to the other experts (soldiers, generals, charioteers, poets, seers) whom these tyrants were very ready to persuade, by various means including citizenship, to attach themselves, temporarily or more permanently, to the cities under their control; it makes sense to view this as closely related to their determination to move populations about, to found or refound cities, and to make exceptionally splendid displays at the Panhellenic games and sanctuaries. In such cases, we should not insist that individuals must have changed citizenship in order to be declared at (for example) Olympia a Syracusan, an Aetnaean, a Crotoniate, or a Thurian; as Hornblower argues, *de facto* dual citizenship, or letting an old allegiance lapse, and taking it up again later, may also have been quite frequent.¹⁴²

7. Conclusion

The complexity of the subject and the patchiness of the evidence make it difficult to reach firm conclusions; but where we suspected various types of connections, in different places, between athletic training and competition and the regulation of membership in these developing communities, our hypotheses of such patterns have been strengthened rather than weakened. In conformity with the historiographical tradition which extends back to the fourth century BC, Sparta and the Cretan cities seem to have adopted broadly similar approaches. They both set a qualification in athletic and physical training for sons of citizens before they could be admitted to the male associations such as *syssitia* or *andreia*, through which active membership of political bodies and the citizen army was regulated. They also developed some form of approved, partially reinstitutionalized, homosexual partnerships. Neither encouraged external honours such as epinicians for their successful athletes or horse-owners; Sparta rewarded them with military prestige rather than financially. Sparta's increasing insistence on setting qualifications for admission to the *syssitia* in terms of birth, wealth, or fitness helped to create a confusing variety of lesser statuses, though promotion out of them could also subsequently be earned. It is very unlikely that athletic successes in themselves were grounds for outsiders to gain access to citizenship in Sparta (seers provided the exception), but athletic performance may have helped in Crete. The Athenians valued and rewarded athletes and equestrian sponsors; they did not impose an athletic qualification for citizenship, but took early measures to encourage voluntary activities at gymnasia, including 'noble pederasty', by excluding slaves; and, as a result of Solon's law and the rule of the tyrants, may well have

opened up citizenship, perhaps via membership of one of the city's subgroups, to athletes among other skilled immigrants. In athletically ambitious cities such as Corinth, Argos, and Aegina, it is possible to suggest connections between changes in citizenship qualifications through new tribal subgroups and a greater openness to accepting skilled foreigners, but direct evidence is unfortunately lacking. For positive encouragement directed at athletes, including cases of successful or unsuccessful attempts at poaching, substantial evidence points almost exclusively to the ambitious and wealthy 'colonial' cities of Sicily and Southern Italy, and above all to Croton and Syracuse. Explanations for these phenomena should be based on two related factors: first, the existence in those cities of constant warfare, multiple regime changes, and ruthless disruptions of populations and creation of new settlements; and second, and more important, the intense desire among the elites of these wealthy and less traditional cities for mass success in the Panhellenic games, above all at Olympia. This seems to have led them to adopt innovative methods of training and education and somewhat less scrupulous methods of recruitment of successful athletes from the 'Old Greece', both for their potential victories and their supposedly transferable skills.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Very many thanks to Alain Duplouy and Roger Brock for organizing the 'Archaic Citizenship' project and its two conferences, and all the participants of the event in Paris in May 2010 where the oral version of this essay was delivered; and to Gillian Shepherd, and once more to Alain and Roger, for invaluable comments and suggestions on my draft.

¹ On the date of the introduction of athletic nudity, cf. Thucydides (1.6) and Plato (*Resp.* 452c), with the discussions of Bonfante 1989; McDonnell 1991; Golden 1998, 65–6; Christesen 2002; 2007b; Brulé 2006. Sparta: Cartledge 2001, 91–105. Crete: Leitao 1995.

² On these subgroups, see Davies 1996b, as well as Duplouy, Davies, and Ismard this volume, chapters 1, 2, and 5.

³ Cf. Hodkinson 1999.

⁴ Moretti 2002, 295–6; Ebert 1972, addendum.

⁵ See Currie 2005, ch. 8.

⁶ Cf. Arist. *Pol.* 8.1337b23–8, 1338a19–22, 1338b9–16, 1338b36–39a19, who discusses the practices in Greek states fostering gymnastics in order to instill courage (*andreia*) as well as win victories in the games, and points out the dangers of overtraining young bodies too soon.

⁷ See Morgan 1990, 46–9, 89–90; Mallwitz 1988, 98–101; Golden 1998, 63–5.

⁸ See Shaw 2003; Christesen 2007a.

⁹ There were forty-three Spartan victors out of the seventy-one recorded in the athletic events from the 15th Olympiad (trad. date 720) to the 50th Olympiad (580); see lists in Moretti 1957; Mann 2001, 121–3. The names of the victors are probably mostly accurate, though dates before the early sixth century are quite uncertain: see Christesen 2007a, ch. 2 on the chronographic work of Hippias of Elis, suggesting that Hippias may have filled up some early gaps with Spartan names.

¹⁰ See Hodkinson 1999; 2000, 305–33.

¹¹ Cf. Arist. *Pol.* 8.1337a26–33, 1338a9–30; Mann 2001, 124–5.

¹² Cf. Bonfante 1989; McDonnell 1991; Golden 1998, 65–6; Scanlon 2005, 70–6.

¹³ See Cartledge this volume, chapter 7, section 4, on the term.

¹⁴ It would be possible, if one wished, to accept both this account of the growth of nudity as civic practice in Sparta or Crete, and either of the stories in late sources that Orsippos of Megara or Akanthos of Sparta was the first athlete to run naked and be crowned at Olympia (Paus. 1.44.1, *IG* VII 52, Dion. Hal., *Ant. Rom.* 7.72.2), presumably after the authorities there had decided to adopt the practice. The date of Orsippos' Olympiad may well be a good bit later than the usual calibration of the Olympiad date as 720 (Christesen 2007a, 353–9). For a more sceptical view of Thucydides' statement that the practice began at Sparta, Hodkinson 2000, 219–21.

¹⁵ E.g. various versions in Leitaio 1995; Cartledge 2001, 91–105; Ducat 2006b, 179–201; Davidson 2007, 315–43; criticisms of this view in Dover 1988, 115–34; Hodkinson 1997a, 90–1. More recently Link 2009 has argued that Cretan pederasty was more systematically institutionalized, while the Spartan version was not compulsory or tied tightly into the educational system, but was socially and politically very important.

¹⁶ In fact the Greek term is not used of Sparta in classical texts, and not used even later of the educational system as such, but rather of the practice of discipline the system inculcated. See Kennell 1995, 113–14; Ducat 2006b, 69–71.

¹⁷ In most detail recently see Ducat 2006b.

¹⁸ Xen. *Lac. Pol.* 2–4; Davidson 2007, 315–24. There are of course many uncertainties over how far later evidence for Spartan practices can be supposed to go back to the archaic period; a major, perhaps excessive, challenge to this strategy was mounted by Kennell 1995.

¹⁹ Cf. Link 2004.

²⁰ See Ducat 2006b, 253–4.

²¹ Cf. Frontisi-Ducroux 1984; Ducat 2006b, 259–60. The rites in the Roman period greatly enhanced the brutality, while losing the cheeses.

²² The idea that it was primarily a test of endurance in the heat is an unsafe inference from Plato (*Laws* 633c): see Ducat 2006b, 272–4; nevertheless, what was essentially a song-dance contest between the different classes of choruses was also a severe test of the capacity to perform in the hottest sun for a long time: Parker 1989, 150.

²³ Cf. Richer 2005, 244–8; Ducat 2006b, 265–74. That it was a sign of dishonour for those who have failed to marry to be excluded (Plut. *Lyc.* 15.1) suggests it was in some sense compulsory for those of the appropriate ages to participate.

²⁴ Sosibios *FGrHist* 595 F5 = Athen. 678b–c, cf. Ducat 2006b, 265–74.

²⁵ Cf. Parker 1989, 149–50.

²⁶ Cf. Pettersson 1992, 42–57.

²⁷ See Richer 2004, 80–1. Richer argues it may have lasted much longer in the classical period, based on an interpretation of the Spartan delays in 479 described by Herodotus (9.7–14).

²⁸ See Richer 2004, 84–5.

²⁹ Cf. Pettersson 1992, 21–41; Richer 2004; Ducat 2006b, 262–4.

- 30 Athena Poliouchos and Poseidon Gaiaochos at Sparta, Parparonia in the Thyreatis, Poseidon at Helos in southern Laconia and at Thouria in Messenia, Apollo Lithesios at Cape Malea, Apollo Maleatas probably at Kynouria, Eleusinian games perhaps at Demeter's sanctuary on Taygetos, and the Ariontia. Cf. Hodkinson 2000, 305–7; Makres 2009, 188–9; Christesen 2012b.
- 31 At 3.15.7 Pausanias claims he saw a temple (*naos*) to Hipposthenes the great wrestler (Moretti 1957, no. 61), where he received honours like those to Poseidon; see Hodkinson 2000, 309–10; Currie 2005, 122–3.
- 32 Cf. Pettersson 1992, 45–7; Kennell 1995, 38–43, 59–63, 110–11, 130–1; Crowther 2004, 351–6, 361–73; Christesen 2012b, 201–3.
- 33 The completion of the upbringing was in theory a necessary requirement in the archaic and classical period: Xen. *Lac. Pol.* 3.3, 10.7; Plut. *Ap. Lak.* 51, *Mor.* 235b, *Inst. Lak.* 21–2, *Mor.* 238e, and cf. Christesen 2012b, esp. 199–203. The consequences of various types of failure are not so clear, and may have involved demotion to different forms of 'inferior' status: see e.g. Ducat 2006b, 148–58.
- 34 See the convincing arguments of Lupi's chapter in this volume, chapter 6, sections 2–3.
- 35 See Christesen 2012b, 240–6.
- 36 See e.g. Shipley 1997; Eremin 2002, 267–82; Hodkinson 2009b, 423–5.
- 37 See on these groups especially Hodkinson 1997b; 2000, 354–6.
- 38 See Hodkinson 1997b, 66–8.
- 39 See Hodkinson 1997a, 93; 2000, 305–7; Morgan 2007, 215–16; Christesen 2012b, 203.
- 40 See Figueira 2006, 62–7; Christesen 2012b, 234.
- 41 See Bowie 1990, 222–9.
- 42 See Powell 1994, 294; Hodkinson 2000, 317–19; Kyle 2007, 185–8; Christesen 2012b, 227–8.
- 43 See Hodkinson 2000, 317–28.
- 44 As what is distinctive about Aristotle's criticisms of the Spartan state is that he saw the deficiencies as structural and long-established (Schütrumpf 1994; Hodkinson 2000, 33–5), it is likely that he imagined the time of 'the former kings' preceded the major changes he associated with Lycurgus.
- 45 Cf. Powell 2010, 92–5 on Herodotus' sources. Bicknell 1982b argued that the statement was so clearly false that it must be corrupt, since he argued that many other non-Spartans, notably the Athenian Isagoras, had been given Spartan citizenship. But his emendation of Herodotus' text, οὕτως for οὗτοι, gives unconvincing Greek and makes less sense of the run of the story; and the argument that Herodotus must have known that the Spartans did give citizenship to others rests on cases in the very distant past (the Minyans and Cadmeidai, 4.144–7, and the Talthibiadai 7.134), and the supposed non-Spartan origins of Alcman and Tyrtaeus which were probably post-Herodotean inventions.
- 46 On various Herodotean themes involving seers, Plataean and later campaigns, and claims for enhanced status, see also Munson 2001, 59–73; Bowie 2012, 282–6; Flower 2008.
- 47 Hdt. 9.33.1 presents a problem concerning different associations of seers at Olympia. According to the MSS Herodotus describes Teisamenos as 'Eleian, of the *genos* of the Iamidai, *Klytiaden*'; but the Klyti(a)dai seem a distinct and ancient association (as were also the Telleidai); a victor in the race in armour of the late fourth or early third century claimed in his epigram membership of this ancient *genos* which descended from Melampous (Paus. 6.17.6). On the argument that it is unlikely that Teisamenos belonged to both *genē*, Schachter's ingenious but speculative solution (2000) emended the Herodotean reference to *Kytaden*, on the basis of *IG* VII 1670, a dedication to Demeter related to the battle of Plataea, the

third line of which Τῆισαμένος Κυδάδας καὶ may be read as Teisamenos Kudadas, suggesting the Kudidai as a sub-branch of the Iamidai. See also Flower and Marincola 2002 *ad loc.* and Appendix B; and now Flower 2008, 198 who suggests that Teisamenos had one Iamid parent and one Klytiad; Wilson 2015, 179 suggests rather that Herodotus may not have been sure, and wrote ἡ Κλυτιάδην.

⁴⁸ Cf. Flower 2008, 205.

⁴⁹ See Hunt 1998, 56–62; Hodkinson 2000, 421–2; Millender 2006, 250–3; Duploux 2011, 96–9; Cartledge this volume, chapter 7, section 5.

⁵⁰ On Gylippos and his exiled father Cleandridas see also below, n. 142.

⁵¹ Lysander ‘having defeated the Athenians at sea was made a citizen because of his manly greatness (*andragathia*)’, Athen. 271f. See also Hodkinson 1997b; 2000, 354–6; Ducat 2006b, 150–3.

⁵² See Duploux 2011, 96–9.

⁵³ Teles the Cynic (Stob. 3.40.8) alleged that even foreigners or helots who participated in the *agōgē* were all honoured equally; this may confirm the basic principle that foreigners might participate, but the idealized picture of equality cannot be taken as reliable.

⁵⁴ See the discussions by Humble 2004 and Ducat 2006b, 148–59. On Xenophon at Skillus, see also Tuplin 2004.

⁵⁵ See e.g. Psouchontakis 1998.

⁵⁶ See Tzifopoulos 1998.

⁵⁷ Moretti 1957, nos. 224, 296, 367b, 390, 752, 906, 1987, 390, 752; Chaniotis 1996, 127 n. 781. Cf. the prominence of sixty Cretan runners in Xenophon’s account of the games organized by the Ten Thousand at Trapezous (Xen. An. 4.8.25–7). On Ergoteles, cf. also Whitley 2015, 301.

⁵⁸ See Perlman 1992; Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 1–5; Whitley this volume, chapter 9, section 3.

⁵⁹ See especially Whitley 2006a; Erickson 2010a.

⁶⁰ See e.g. Scanlon 2002, 74–7. On Cretan *andreia*, see Laurencic 1988; Chaniotis 1996, 21–2, 123–33; 2006, 184–5; Erickson 2010a, 309–45; 2011 who suggests also that more private *symposia* also occurred in archaic and classical Crete; Wallace 2010, 384–92 and Whitley this volume, chapter 9, section 4, who emphasizes the indications in the material record for variable patterns of the institution and of the buildings in which members may have sat and dined across the island; also Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 4, 93–5.

⁶¹ See Koehl 1986, who also argues for links further back to Minoan rituals at the site.

⁶² See Davidson 2007, 300–15; Link 2009. Arist. Pol. 2.1272a13–28 connects together regulations for the operations and funding of the *andreia* and the arrangements for male relationships, which he claims, implausibly, were designed, along with segregation of women, to control the birth rate.

⁶³ Cf. also Chaniotis 2006, 184–5; Gagarin and Perlman 2016 [hereafter GP], 78.

⁶⁴ In three places in the Gortyn code witnesses are described as ‘free *dromeis*’ (IC IV 72 = G72 GP, i.39–46, iii.17–24, v. 53–4), which may imply that that some non-free young adults might also compete in running contests and be called *dromeis*. Whether they might thereby gain freedom is not attested.

⁶⁵ Witnesses at Gortyn, IC IV 59 = *Nomima* I, no. 3, Code IV 72, i.39, iii. 17–24, v. 53–4, vii. 35–41; at treaties, Knossos and Hierapytna, IC I 8.13.8 = Chaniotis 1996, no. 50; Lato and Olous, IC I 16.5.44 = Chaniotis 1996, no. 61; I. 18.9 B 3–13 = Chaniotis 1996, no. 60; garrison at Eleutherna, *Nomima* II, no. 98 = Eleutherna I GP henceforth for Gagarin and Perlman 2016 the adult—*dromeis*—at the fort Dion Akron, who were (probably) being permitted to drink in company. In the Spensithios contract inscription of the Dataleis, the coming of age of his sons is expressed as

their becoming *dromeis* (*Nomima* I, no. 22, 5–10 = DA1 GP); cf. also Malla/Lyttos (*IC* I 19.1.17–26 = Chaniotis 1996, no. 11), where the board of *kosmoi* should lead the ‘herd’ (*agelā*) of youths to the temple. See Chaniotis 1996, 127–8, 313, 357; Tzifopoulos 1998, 154–7.

⁶⁶ Code vii.41 = *Nomima* II, no. 51 = G72 GP.

⁶⁷ A month *Dromeios* is attested at Priansos (*IC* III 3.4), which may suggest a festival there called the *Dromeia*; cult for Hermes *Dromaioi* is attested at Polyrrhēnia (*IC* II 23.10); according to Plutarch, Cretans as well as Spartans offered cult to Apollo *Dromaioi* (*Mor.* 724b–c). Cf. Tzifopoulos 1998, 159–60.

⁶⁸ Malla and Lyttos, *IC* I 19.1; Dreros, *IC* I 9.1.11–12, 140–1; Axos, *IC* II 5.24.7–9. See on the connections here between rites and myths Leitao 1995; Davidson 2007, 302–6; Chaniotis 1996, esp. 123–33; 2006.

⁶⁹ Here this probably implies gymnastic activities rather than access to specific buildings.

⁷⁰ Citizen women (*astai*) make an intriguing but obscure appearance in an inscription c.500 BC from Axos (A5–6 GP), perhaps in relation to rituals to do with dedications of war-booty; see Perlman 2010, who joined together two existing inscriptions, Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 165–7.

⁷¹ Cf. Jeffery and Morpurgo-Davies 1970, 147–9 (citizen), followed by Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 189; Van Effenterre 1973, 37–9 (foreigner); Viviers 1994, 242 (impossible to determine).

⁷² As supposed e.g. by Ismard 2010, 74; Wallace 2010, 364. See also Whitley this volume, chapter 9, section 3.

⁷³ This case, if not the *Dataleis* case, suggests that especially concerned subgroups might play a leading part in proposing a citizenship-type grant, as may have often been the case in pre-Cleisthenic Athens, cf. Ismard 2010, 74; Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 331.

⁷⁴ Cf. Chaniotis 2006, 186–8.

⁷⁵ See Whitley 2006a, and this volume, chapter 9, section 5.

⁷⁶ E.g. Wallace 2010, 360.

⁷⁷ The *xenios* is also mentioned at *IC* IV 14 = G14 GP; cf. Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 281.

⁷⁸ But see also the case for downdating Cylon made by Lévy 1978, whose suggestion of the 590s is based on Lenschau’s somewhat arbitrary view of a period of annual Olympiads, beginning in 632 (cf. also Shaw 2003, 60–3).

⁷⁹ See most recently Ismard 2010, 102–10, and this volume, chapter 5, section 7. He suggests ingeniously that this enables us to reconcile the statement at *Arist. Pol.* 6.1319b24–9, that Cleisthenes (like Demonax at Cyrene) made changes to the tribes and phratries with the statement at *Ath. Pol.* 21 that he allowed the *genē*, phratries, and priesthoods to maintain their own traditional privileges, and with Philochorus’ citation of a regulation at the time of Cleisthenes that the phratries should admit without question *orgeōnes* and *homogalactes/gennētai*, attributed to Cleisthenes’ reforms (Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 F35).

⁸⁰ Though in some cases, such as apparently the Gephyraioi (*Hdt.* 5.57), their citizenship was less than complete. Cf. Ismard 2010, 76–8, and this volume, chapter 5, section 3.

⁸¹ On the dates of the introduction of coinage into Greek cities see Price and Waggoner 1975.

⁸² Diogenes Laertius’ view that Solon cut back on earlier awards seems very unlikely.

⁸³ Cf. Davies this volume, chapter 2, section 2.1, on this mechanism as a means of rewarding athletic success, and thus harnessing and containing the potential danger from men such as Cylon.

⁸⁴ Cf. Fisher 2001 on Aeschin. 1.138.

⁸⁵ Regulations excluding slaves from *gymnasia* and *palaistrai* are also known from Beroea, Cyzicus, Miletus, Nisyros, Pergamum, and Teos: see Crowther 2004, 250–3.

⁸⁶ As argued by Robertson 2000.

⁸⁷ See e.g. Wilson 2000, 36–40, 44; Chankowski 2010, 90–114; Fisher 2011, 186–92. For the debates on the development of ephebic institutions in Athens and elsewhere, see now above all Chankowski 2010.

⁸⁸ Cf. Anderson 2003, 165–70.

⁸⁹ Cf. Parker 2005, 208–17.

⁹⁰ Cf. Rhodes (1981) [1993], *ad loc.*; Singor 2000. This may help to account for the great increase in the numbers of hoplites evidently available for the post-Cleisthenic campaigns from c.507 to 490. Seers and oracle-singers had useful *technai* and some supported the tyrants. One who may have acquired citizenship is the *chresmologos* Amphilytos who proffered encouraging oracles to Peisistratus before the battle of Pallene (Hdt. 1.62); Herodotus called him an Acarnanian, while Pseudo-Plato described him as a ‘native’ (*hemedapos*) (Ps-Pl. *Theages* 124d; Pritchett 1974–91, III, 53). On the creation of the formal *metoikia* some time after Cleisthenes see now Watson 2010, arguing that it occurred in 451–450 along with Pericles’ citizenship law, in response to the admission by demes and phratries of very many immigrants after 480.

⁹¹ See Hornblower 2004, 201–4; Morgan 2007.

⁹² See Morgan 2007, 235–49.

⁹³ See Salmon 2003; Ismard 2010, 101.

⁹⁴ Salmon 1984, 205–9; 2003, 225–6.

⁹⁵ Cf. Fisher 2010, 87–9.

⁹⁶ Cf. Wilson 2003, 171–80; Hornblower 2004, 201–2; Morgan 2007, 239.

⁹⁷ See Piérart 2000; Kritzas 2006. In comparison to Cleisthenes of Athens, note that here the phratry is the main new subgroup by which citizens are encouraged to be known: see Piérart 2000, 298–300.

⁹⁸ Cf. Lewis 1997, 9–21; Hornblower 2004, 263–5.

⁹⁹ Cf. Hornblower 2004, 204–5.

¹⁰⁰ E.g. de Ste. Croix 2004b; Nicholson 2005.

¹⁰¹ See Figueira 1981; Hubbard 2001.

¹⁰² See e.g. Burnett 2005, 239; Hubbard 2001.

¹⁰³ For a detailed study of Aeginetan elites along these lines, see Fisher 2015.

¹⁰⁴ See Keurentjes 1997; Duploux 2010.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. e.g. Mann 2001, 236–48; Miller 2004, 216–18.

¹⁰⁶ Moretti 1957, nos. 130–1, 212, 230, 238, 307, 397, 436, 457.

¹⁰⁷ See e.g. Antonaccio 2007, 266–85; Morgan 2007, 221–2; Morgan 2015, 52–86; Shepherd 2000, showing how they chose to display and dedicate at Olympia and Delphi, rather than at their supposed ‘mother-cities’.

¹⁰⁸ Lo Porto 1967; Loiacono 1985. My thanks to Gillian Shepherd for alerting me to these graves and their goods.

¹⁰⁹ Lo Porto notes that the details would fit well an Olympic career such as that of Anochos (Moretti 1957, nos. 130, 131) or of....kratidas (Moretti 1957, no. 230).

¹¹⁰ Loiacono 1985, 143–7.

¹¹¹ Cf. Moretti 1971; Mele 1991; Graepler 2002, 206–7.

¹¹² Cf. Osborne 1998a; Lomas 2000, 169–77; modifications in e.g. Malkin 2002; 2003.

¹¹³ E.g. the remarkable numeric phratry system introduced at some point at Camarina: see n. 117.

¹¹⁴ On all cases of *stasis*, depopulations, and resettlements, see Lomas 2006 (good analysis with a useful table); also Berger 1992; Lomas 2000, and relevant

entries in Hansen and Nielsen 2004.

¹¹⁵ Cf. also, in addition to Glaucos, Philippos, Praxiteles, Phormis, Hagesias, and Dorieus, other cases of athletes with impressive military careers in Herodotus: Eurybates of Argos (Hdt. 6.92), and Hermolykos of Athens (Hdt. 9.105). A good many of the successful competitors in certain contemporary Olympic events (e.g. biathlon and modern pentathlon), tend to be serving soldiers.

¹¹⁶ Cf. Young 1984, 155–7; Fisher 1998, 86–7.

¹¹⁷ Cf. Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 202–5. The mid-fifth-century *tesserae* revealing the new phratry system, whatever their purpose, probably reflect a radical organization of the citizen body made at the re-establishment of the city in 461. Cf. e.g. Cordano 1992; Murray 1997; Robinson 2002.

¹¹⁸ Pausanias (6.10.3) says that the Carystians honoured him after his death by naming an island after him, which may presuppose heroic cult: cf. Currie 2005, 152–3.

¹¹⁹ Cf. e.g. Jeffery 1990, 160, 211 (preferring c.475–465, partly on letter-forms); Asheri 1992, 158 n. 8; Morgan 2015, 53–4; Thonemann 2016, 163–4, who supports Jeffery's suggestion that Praxiteles may well have been dead when the dedication was inscribed.

¹²⁰ Van Effenterre and Ruzé (*Nomima* I, no. 20) suggest the terms *esthlos* and *aretē* indicate moral, social, or military qualities, and Nielsen 2002, 80 treats him as a mercenary, but the placing of the memorial statue, and Pindaric usage of such 'moral' terms, suggest the allusion may equally be to athletic achievement. On his double citizenship in Sicily, and other cases, see Hornblower 2004, 186.

¹²¹ Pind. *Ol.* 6.74–5 probably implies that Hagesias drove the mule-cart himself; cf. also Morgan 2015, 361, 408.

¹²² Luraghi 1997; Hornblower 2004, 186; Antonaccio 2007, 284–5; Morgan 2015. Cf. Hutchinson 2001, no. 18.

¹²³ Another successful and mobile Iamid in Herodotus was Callias, who switched sides from Sybaris to Croton, and was rewarded with large estates (and citizenship?) after their victory (Hdt. 5.44–5; Hornblower 2004, 299–306). The Elian seer who was found neglected at Polycrates' court and rescued by Democedes may also have been an Iamid (Hdt. 3.132).

¹²⁴ The complex birth story links Iamos and the Iamidai with Sparta (via the union of Poseidon and Pitane), Arcadia (via the union of their daughter Euadne, being fostered by Aipyros, and Apollo), and finally Olympia (including Apollo's gift of prophecy): see Hutchinson 2001, *ad loc.*

¹²⁵ See Luraghi 1997, 77–80; Hutchinson 2001, 371; Hornblower 2004, 184–5. There are onomastic arguments for supposing that the Stymphalian Aineas, trainer of the chorus (*Ol.* 6.87–94), was a relative of Hagesias, and also perhaps an Iamid (or related to Iamids): a Thrasyboulos, son of Aineas, an Elian Iamid, is said to have operated as a seer and a soldier with the Mantineans at a (doubtfully historical) Achaian victory over the Spartans c.250 (Paus. 6.2.4, 8.10.8): see Hutchinson 2001, 414–15 and Hornblower 2004, 182–4.

¹²⁶ See Malkin 1994a, 93–7; Luraghi 1997, 75–7; Hornblower 2004, 183–6; Morgan 2015, 401; Shepherd 2015, 355–7.

¹²⁷ On the ode in general, see now Morgan 2015, 408–12.

¹²⁸ See also Whitley 2015. See also above, section 3.

¹²⁹ On the fame of Himera's hot springs, also reflected in their coinage, see Rutter 2000, 76–8, with other examples of congruence between coin motifs and epinician praise.

¹³⁰ Cf. Malkin 1994a, 192–205; Hornblower 2004, 141, 303–4; Currie 2005, 120, 149–51 and ch. 8 on other cases of heroized athletes.

¹³¹ Cf. Hornblower 2004, 131–42.

¹³² Paus. 6.13.1–2; cf. Young 1984, 140–6.

¹³³ The history of the modern Olympics and other sports in the last four decades has seen many disputes over transfers of citizenship (complicated by the operation of different rules in different countries), and many controversies over methods of training and the use of steroids and other performance-enhancing drugs; some nations (e.g. some of those in the former Eastern Bloc) have been criticized for their excessive concern for athletic success.

¹³⁴ Shown already by the dedication by Cleombrotos of a tenth of his prize to Athena, above, section 1.

¹³⁵ See especially Young 1984, 140–6.

¹³⁶ Phayllos won three victories at Delphi (*IG* I³ 823), though none at Olympia; for his general fame cf. *Ar. Ach.* 214–18; *Vesp.* 1206–7, and for his command of his own ship at Salamis, *Hdt.* 8.47.

¹³⁷ Strabo reports the story that at one Olympiad Crotoniates filled the first seven places: hence ‘the last Crotoniate to finish is ahead of all the other Greeks’.

¹³⁸ Mann 2001, 171–91; cf. Dunbabin 1948, 369–70.

¹³⁹ Cf. e.g. Robinson 1997, 76–7. One could rephrase this in terms of the egalitarian atmosphere of the Pythagorean ‘aristocracy’.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. also Mele 1983, 44–52; Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 266–70.

¹⁴¹ Glaukos, governor of Camarina, was probably imposed there by Gelon tyrant of Syracuse, and Praxiteles was a citizen of both Camarina and Syracuse.

¹⁴² Cf. Hornblower 2004, 134–42, 182–90, who adds to the cases discussed above the Spartan *mothax* Gylippos, who ‘renewed’ his father Cleandridas’ citizenship at Thurii, when exiled in the 440s (*Thuc.* 6.104, with Hornblower 2004, *ad loc.*, and cf. *Plut. Per.* 22).

Citizenship and Commensality in Archaic Crete

Searching for the *Andreion*

James Whitley

1. Introduction

Citizenship and commensality may seem unlikely bedfellows. In the archaic, Greek-speaking Mediterranean we are dealing, after all, with ‘citizen-states’,¹ and from the time of Aristotle onwards citizenship has been associated with warfare. Historians of archaic Greece are familiar with the notion that participatory citizenship emerged in some way with the crystallization of hoplite tactics at some point between 650 and 550 BC.² In Crete, however, while some elements of hoplite armour were adopted, it is (to say the least) unclear whether hoplite warfare ever took place amongst Cretan political communities (who in other respects were no less warlike than mainland ones).³ Crete too presents another problem: Cretan political communities were both numerous and small (forty-nine are known). How could such communities maintain themselves as effective political power structures? In the absence of the kind of social and settlement hierarchies, and the administrative instruments characteristic of states, how could they function at all?

Here commensality may provide the key to explaining how Greek

political communities could make up through participation what they lacked in administration. To illustrate this point let us turn to the best-studied Greek political community of all, classical Athens. Towards the end of Plato's *Apology of Socrates* (36d), Socrates is asked to propose his own penalty for the crime of *asebeia* (usually translated as 'impiety') of which he has just been found guilty. In his speech, he flirts with the idea that as he has brought benefits to the city, he ought to be punished by being dined at public expense for the rest of his life in the city's *Prytaneion*.⁴ Such an honour was normally reserved for such persons as victors in the Olympic Games, or others who had brought glory to the city—not to those convicted of a crime. Perhaps understandably, the jury did not take kindly to Socrates' suggestion, and instead opted for the alternative proposed by his accusers (death by hemlock). One reason for this, perhaps, extreme reaction on the part of the jury was their keen awareness that Socrates was mocking Athens and its institutions. For dining at public expense, as he and everyone else knew, was one the privileges closely linked to the duties of citizenship in the Athenian democracy.

As all good anthropologists know, the way we choose to eat and drink together often determines how we act as social beings. Commensality is a major factor in defining both our society and our politics. It certainly helps to define social groups, institutions, and civil society. M. Dietler has made a useful distinction between two types of feasting (commensality), and how such groups are created.⁵ One is the 'patron role feast'—where the food is essentially the gift of the patron (or perhaps the god); the other is 'diacritical feasting', where persons are marked out as part of the 'in' group through their knowledge of, and participation in, certain *styles* of consumption, with distinctive material correlates such as feasting equipment, drinking vessels, etc. In the Greek world, we might like to think of the participatory rituals associated with major festivals to the gods, where the god, in a sense, acts as patron, as falling into the first category;⁶ and the symposium, as Dietler emphasizes, is the 'locus classicus' of diacritical feasting, marked out by particular styles of decorated pottery and particular styles of consumption.⁷

Commensality was at least as important in the ancient world as it is in the modern. Dietler's categories are then as applicable to classical Athens as they are to the Congo. The relationship between citizenship and commensality in Athens can be well illustrated by archaeological research in the Agora. Here, American excavators have identified three places associated with public dining. One is to be found in the South Stoa, where there are *andrones* (symposiastic spaces) reserved for the *metronomoi*;⁸ others are to be found associated with the Royal Stoa⁹ and the Tholos. The Tholos is, of course, where the fifty

members of the ‘executive committee’ of the *Boulē* (Council) met, and were able to dine at public expense.¹⁰ Here, diners could not have dined symposium-style on couches—fifty persons could only be accommodated in the building if the members dined ‘sitting up’ (quite how is unclear).¹¹ This identification (and function) has been confirmed by the discovery of a deposit of (used) drinking vessels marked ‘ΔΕ’ for *demosion* (public).¹² We can see both forms of feasting here as being diacritical, not so much in the display of certain lifestyles as in the way participation in such rituals marks out the citizen-on-duty from the non-citizen.

The *symposion* then was not the only form of diacritical feasting that existed in the ancient world. As far as citizenship is concerned, dining ‘sitting up’ and in round buildings is the form of commensality that defines citizen as against non-citizen—‘dining at public expense’ is part of the privileges that go with the duties of citizenship. This observation has profound implications for that peculiar form of Cretan commensality, the *andreion* (see sections 3 and 4 below). But, before we get on to that, some words of clarification are needed about some of the concepts we have come to use in ancient history, how the issue of citizenship relates to the issues of states, and what the wider implications of any discussion of ancient states, commensality, and citizens would be. In short, we have to look at ‘theory’.

2. States, Citizens, And Commensality

When we think of ancient Greek states we automatically think of the *polis*. As John Davies points out (this volume, [chapter 2](#)), the ‘*polis*’ was not the only kind of state in archaic and early classical Greece, and there were numerous regional variations in the size, nature, and power of *poleis*.¹³ In Crete *poleis* were very, very small, there being, at the very least, forty-nine named *poleis* known from literary and epigraphic sources in archaic and classical times.¹⁴ Not all of these can be considered states: some (like Malla) because they were simply too small, some (such as Dragmos) because they were not independent political entities but a πόλις υπήκοος, a dependent city.¹⁵ Archaic Crete raises in rather acute form the question of whether a *polis* could be a state in any definition that would satisfy political scientists. Some comparative anthropological archaeologists indeed might be inclined to classify ancient *poleis* as ‘chiefdoms’.¹⁶ A number of classical scholars have been equally critical of the equation between *polis* and state. While few would go so far as to call Corinth or Athens a ‘chiefdom’, many have argued that *poleis* were not states in the

modern sense. According to Berent, ‘the *polis* was not a state, but rather [...] an association or partnership’.¹⁷ The overall effect of this argument is to emphasize the uniqueness of the ‘*polis*’, and render the concept unfit for any kind of wider comparative purpose.

For the purposes of this essay I would assert that most larger archaic and classical *poleis* were indeed states, that is, power structures (and political communities) which had a monopoly of force, juridical authority, and political independence.¹⁸ My reasons are several: some classical *poleis* had a quite astonishing ability to mobilize military force quickly and use it effectively; others (particularly in Crete) had complex legal and economic structures, which are simply not compatible with any notion of ‘chiefdom’.¹⁹ But this still leaves us with a major question: in what sense might (some) *poleis* have been states? There are several possible answers, but these tend to focus on classical Athens, untypical as both *polis* and state.²⁰ One feature that seems to distinguish ‘*polis*-states’ from other kinds of ancient states was the *polis*’ dependence on citizenship: the *polis* was a citizen-state, a political community that could dispense with tiers of administration through its reliance on the active participation of its citizens.²¹ But what then was a citizen?

Definitions of the Greek citizen still owe much to Aristotle.²² A citizen is a free male, and his rights derive partly from descent, and partly from his participation in various duties (including military service). ‘Equality for men’ was the basis for these ancient states (or so this argument runs).²³ Josine Blok has questioned this definition: citizenship was defined, not simply by gender or by descent, but by participation in cult in what can only be described as a ‘covenant state’.²⁴ Women then could be citizens, and there is a name for them: ἄσται, a term which seems to have been used on Crete in late archaic/early classical times.²⁵ There is much to Blok’s argument, but it still seems to me that ‘female’ citizenship was extremely curtailed, and did not involve the exercise of any kind of political power. Military duty and office-holding were monopolized by men in all of the Greek oligarchies and democracies that we know of. Perhaps all free men and women could be citizens, but some were more citizens than others.

There is a further implication of Blok’s argument: participation in cult involved participation in the sacrificial meal. Citizenship was defined through commensality, at its widest level in the ritual meal that followed the act of sacrifice. But if there are degrees of citizenship, might there not be corresponding degrees of participation in various forms of commensality? In classical Athens (see section 1 above) the active citizen is defined partly by his participation in the public dining that took place in the Agora. In the study of archaic

Crete, the study of the politics of commensality is widely recognized to be central to our understanding of Crete's political communities.²⁶ For in Crete we have the *andreion*.

3. The Andreion And Archaic Crete: The Literary And Epigraphic Evidence

Crete looms large in the philosophical imagination of fourth-century Athens. For both Plato (in the *Laws*) and Aristotle (in the *Politics*), Crete plays the role of the third ideal type after Athens and Sparta. Despite being home to several cities (and therefore several constitutions), Crete is conceived as a unity, a single *politeia*, a picture which is clearly at odds with historical reality.²⁷ Both Plato and Aristotle tend to emphasize the similarity between Sparta and Crete, and downplay any Athenian/Cretan connection. Nowhere is this clearer than in Aristotle: 'For both [the Spartans and the Cretans] have *syssitia* [dining together], and in ancient times the Laconians did not call these *Phiditia* [friendly associations] but *andreia* [men's clubs], as do the Cretans, which is proof that they came from Crete.'²⁸ Similar views (probably based on the same source) are expressed by Plutarch (*Lyc.* 12.1), and by Strabo, quoting Alcman.²⁹

Strabo's (or Ephorus') account is by far the most extensive ancient literary source that sheds some light on the Cretan *andreion*, and one that goes beyond making the simple equation between Sparta and Crete.³⁰ Recently some scholars have tried to distance Ephoros' discussion from Cretan political institutions as such. Both Davidson and Osborne have interpreted the longest of Strabo's quotes from Ephoros (Strabo 10.4.20–1) as being largely and straightforwardly concerned with the peculiarities of Cretan homoeroticism, and so have cast doubt on the old idea that Ephoros is describing some kind of initiation ritual.³¹ There is no evidence (in their view) from the passage itself to support the notion that young males left home as boys and came back to the *andreion* as (citizen) men. Alternative readings that emphasize 'citizenship' are simply failing to acknowledge the erotics and aesthetics apparent in the passage, and so are 'reductive'.³² But Osborne's and Davidson's readings are precisely that—close philological readings of the text. Osborne in particular does not look at other literary and epigraphic sources that mention *andreia*, nor does he set much store by the iconographic and archaeological evidence. The iconography of the archaic bronze plaques from the sanctuary of Kato Symi show an exchange of love gifts (hares, bulls, and *agrimia*) between pairs of young men, and so

demonstrate the kind of male bonding that took place was a public event marked by deposition in sanctuaries.³³ Other historians have seen this ritual, not as an event marking a transition from boy to warrior citizen, but as part of a longer process of *paideia* whose end product was the male citizen.³⁴ The *andreion* was clearly central to this process.

Andreia, moreover, according to Ephoros,³⁵ served the purpose of diminishing gaps between rich and poor, since all had to eat communally; that is, *andreia* marked out citizens. Whatever view one takes of Ephoros on these details, it seems clear from Strabo/Ephoros' continued preference for the plural *andreia* over the singular *andreion* that there must have been more than one *andreion* per political community. Other sources, of a slightly later date but having the advantage of being Cretan, confirm this. Pyrgion emphasizes that meals in Cretan *syssitia* were taken sitting down (not lying on couches, symposium-style),³⁶ a view which finds support in the Aristotelian *Constitution of the Cretans*.³⁷ Dosiadas of Kydonia mentions two forms of *syssitia* practised by the citizens of Lyttos/Lyktos: the *andreion* proper and the *koimitirion*, a place where distinguished foreigners could be put up and fed.³⁸ So not only could there be more than one *andreion* for each community, there could also be different kinds of *syssitia*.

Epigraphy confirms that this institution had developed in Crete by late archaic times. The earliest mention of an *andreion* is in an inscription from the temple of Apollo Pythios at Gortyn, datable to just after 600 BC.³⁹ Later in the sixth century (around 500 BC), the *andreion* is attested on two inscriptions, one at Eltynia (near Knossos) and the other at Axos/Oaxos.⁴⁰ A later fifth-century inscription from Gortyn, found near the Odeion, attests to the importance of this institution at the time of the Great Code.⁴¹ The most informative inscription however is the contract of the scribe Spensithios.⁴² This contract is inscribed on two sides of a bronze *mitra*, whose provenance is probably the ancient site whose modern name is Afrati.⁴³ It dates to around 500 BC. On side A, Spensithios is granted the right of being the 'remembrancer and scribe [*poinikastas*]' of the Dataleis; on side B (line 11), further duties are outlined, as well as the privilege of belonging to, and contributing to, the *andreion*. The wording tends to confirm, if not the details, then the general tenor of Dosiadas' and Ephoros' accounts, where individual members of the *andreion* had to make contributions (Dosiadas mentions a tithe—δεκατὴν) to their own mess.⁴⁴

The literary and epigraphic sources, then, provide a fairly (though not wholly) consistent picture. *Andreia* were all-male institutions, closely connected to the privileges and duties of citizenship. Male

citizens had to contribute food (meat and *karpous*) to the communal mess, an amount which may, in some cases, have amounted to a tithe. The *andreion* represents a form of male citizen commensality, closely linked to the *polis*. But there are also a number of uncertainties. First, there is the difficulty of relating later sources (fourth century and Hellenistic) to the situation in archaic times—it is impossible to see how much the institution had changed over time. Second, we presume that, if food was eaten, then wine too was drunk, and the appropriate vessels (for pouring, mixing, and drinking) were used. Here however the epigraphic record provides only one clue as to which vessels, a mention of fifty *prochous* from the Spensithios inscription.⁴⁵ Third, it is very unclear how many males would participate in a single *andreion* (or [*h*]etaireia if they are the same thing).⁴⁶ A fourth (and related) issue is that the sources are very uncertain as to how many *andreia* there were per *polis*. Ephoros' (or Strabo's) use of the plural (*andreia*) suggests that there were more than one per political community.⁴⁷ The Spensithios inscription mentions a collective noun 'Dataleis', which could be interpreted as relating to the *andreion* mentioned on side B. Is the *andreion* in question that of the *polis* of Datalla (otherwise unknown)? Or is it a subset of the political community, a tribe of some kind?⁴⁸ If so, do we have one *andreion* for each political community, or several? This is a question that only archaeology can answer.

4. The Andreion: The Archaeological Evidence

The Spensithios *mitra* raises another issue that has much exercised scholars. If the *andreion* was an institution, where is the building that went with it? Where did the communal dining of male citizens take place? Several hypotheses have been put forward. One is that *andreia* were essentially armouries. The *mitra* on which the Spensithios contract is inscribed (see Fig. 9.1) is, after all, a piece of armour (to protect the groin). It may well have been found with a whole cache of armour in a small building about 10 m in length at Ai Lia in Afrati, a building that had been thoroughly looted before Angeliki Lebessi and Iannis Sakallarakis could excavate it.⁴⁹ A larger building with a smaller (if similar) cache of armour was excavated at Dreros by Xanthoudides in 1915,⁵⁰ and a similar deposit has come from Axos.⁵¹ But is it really likely that citizen males dined together in the same place where armour was kept? This may be in keeping with literary evidence for elsewhere in the Aegean (notably Alcaeus).⁵² But a building only 10 m by 5 m cannot accommodate more than twenty

diners.



Fig. 9.1. The Spensithios *mitra* (BM 1969.4-2.1), side B.

Photo author (courtesy British Museum).

The other principal candidate for a building that corresponds to an *andreion* is the Cretan hearth temple. The distribution of such temples is restricted to Central Crete. They are found (in pairs) at Prinias, Kommos, and (singly) at Dreros, and nowhere else on the island. The earliest phase of the temple at Kommos (see Fig. 9.2) is c.950 BC;⁵³ the temple of Apollo at Dreros is eighth century,⁵⁴ and both temples at Prinias date to the seventh century.⁵⁵ The architectural form therefore predates the first attestation of the word *andreion*. This does not really present an insuperable difficulty, as part of the argument for hearth temples serving as *andreia* is that they were multifunctional—sometimes they acted as temples to the gods, and sometimes as clubhouses for citizen males. Another point in favour of this hypothesis is that, in Kommos at least, deposits containing large numbers of drinking vessels and animal bones have been found—clearly this was a site for feasting.⁵⁶ Is there a reason, in principle, why feasting associated with sacrifice, and ‘diacritical feasting’ defining citizens, could not have taken place at the same location?



Fig. 9.2. The hearth temple at Kommos.

Photo author, taken with the permission of the excavator, Professor Joseph Shaw.

One possible difficulty here is that armouries and hearth temples are, in one case at least, to be found in the same city site. At Dreros,

Xanthoudides' first interpretation of the building on the north summit was that it was a temple; only later, after Marinatos had excavated the 'temple of Apollo' in the saddle, did Marinatos interpret the upper building as an *andreion* on the basis of the armour found there. But these conflicting interpretations raise a key problem in archaeological interpretation. The notion of a building being 'multifunctional' undermines one of the key assumptions in classical archaeology: that form follows function, and that we can therefore infer the purpose of a building largely from its architecture. For if, in Crete, hearth temples could be 'multifunctional', why not armouries? This problem perhaps explains the variety of building types that have been interpreted as *andreia* (and it sometimes seems that any large public building in Crete is interpreted as an *andreion*). This has been the case for the large (16 × 35 m) archaic structure with a central *eschara* excavated at Itanos;⁵⁷ the classical 'Almond Tree House' at Praisos;⁵⁸ and the large structure at Ayia Pelagia (probably ancient Apellonia) just west of Heraklion.⁵⁹ While these buildings are certainly too large to be Cretan houses (which were, in classical and Hellenistic and probably archaic times, generally very small and simple) it is far from certain that they are *andreia*.⁶⁰ They do not conform to any particular architectural template, for one thing. But the main problem is, I think, the expectation that a particular Cretan institution must take a particular architectural form. As Mieke Prent has repeatedly pointed out, the *andreion* is primarily an institution, not a building.⁶¹ The *andreion* is the occasion where citizen males come together to eat, which may not coincide with a particular structure, or even a particular place.

Cretans did not then appear to follow the mainland habit of creating building types to go with particular social or political institutions—one of the many ways in which Cretans differed from mainlanders.⁶² A more fruitful approach might be: first to look at drinking practices, to see how Cretan patterns differed from those of 'Central Greece'; and second, not to look at buildings as such, but at deposits, particularly deposits which contain large numbers of drinking vessels, which we might reasonably infer were related to occasions where large quantities of wine were consumed by large numbers of people (particularly men).

Here, Crete does really develop differently. Concentrating on Knossos, where the evidence from both tombs and domestic deposits has been extensively studied, certain trends can be observed as we move from Protogeometric times (tenth/early ninth centuries) to the late seventh century BC. In Protogeometric tomb assemblages, such as Teke tomb E, we often find a krater decorated with figure scenes accompanied by a number of drinking vessels—bell-skyphoi and one-

handled cups.⁶³ By the time we reach the seventh century, locally produced kraters are rarer, though the plain one-handled cups are as common as ever.⁶⁴ In domestic assemblages, there is a clear trend for kraters to occur less frequently through time, as we move from the tenth to the seventh and then (after the ‘gap’) the late sixth/early fifth century BC (see Table 9.1).⁶⁵ This trend is not unique to Knossos—it can be paralleled by an analysis of the composition of assemblages from the temple at Kommos (see Table 9.2). Another difference between Cretan and mainland trends is the almost total lack of decoration on drinking vessels. Whereas eighth-century Attic skyphoi would quite often be decorated with figure scenes, scenes which become more elaborate as we progress to the sixth century, Cretans remain wedded to their plain, one-handled vessels. They gradually develop a taste for plain kraters too—we know of only two decorated (figured) kraters from sixth-century Crete, both Attic imports.⁶⁶ Other kraters are either plain, black-glazed Laconian stirrup kraters, or locally produced imitations of this form. There is, in short, a marked trend towards austerity in drinking practices generally, at least in Central Crete.

Table 9.1. Proportion of kraters to drinking vessels in domestic assemblages from Knossos, tenth to sixth centuries bc

	Kraters	%	Drinking vessels	%	Total no. of vessels
10th/9th c.	96	23.5%	116	28.4%	409
8th c.	40	15.5%	73	28.3%	258
7th c.	55	12%	84	18%	445
525–480 bc	19	7%	74	29%	254
Total	210	15.4%	347	25.4%	1366

Information from: Callaghan 1992; Coldstream 1960; 1972; 1973; 1992; Coldstream and Macdonald 1997; Coldstream and Sackett 1978; Hatzaki et al. 2008.

Table 9.3. Buildings and deposits associated with the *andreion* and with particular known *poleis*. Archaeological finds are largely confined to the archaic (Ar) and early classical (Cl) periods (fifth century), with some reference to the Geometric (Geo) and Orientalizing (O) periods

Site	City/pole (with reference number)	Armon(s)	Heath temple	Other architecture	Cup deposit	Literary or epigraphic reference
Itranos	Itranos 965			Building with exchore		
Praisos	Praisos 764			Almond Tree House (CI)	Bedagistoxi CI cups	
Prophitis Ilias (site 14)	Praisos 984				Large (30+) deposit of Ar CI cups	
Azoria	Unknown	Ar 'Andreion Complex' helmet crest		Ar Monumental civic structure		
Priniatikos Pyrgos	Istron 984				'Ashy deposit' - 111 CI cups	
Deiros	Deiros 956	Ar structure on N. Acropolis	Geo. Temple of Apollo?			
Lytlos Afan	Lytlos 974 Daskali 95-4 or Arkades 948	Ar in armoury				Daskalis Spearhead inscription, side B lines 10-11 IC I 10.2
Ellynia Ayia Palagia	Ellynia 958 Apollonia 948			Large (CI-Hell) structure with Ar building beneath		
Prinias	Rhiteni or Rhitenia? 988	Find of helmet crest in building in agora	Temples A and B			
Gortyna	Gortyna 960					IC IV 4 line 4 (early 6th c.); IC IV 25 line B.9 (5th c.)
Kommos	Unknown (Phalatos?)		Two Geo. O temples			
Asas Oxythe Goulediana	Asas/Thouos 960 Unknown—possibly Osmida or Phalanna?	Armour deposit Helmet and possible <i>andreia</i>		'Houses' excavated by Platon		IC B 5.1

Table 9.2. Proportion of kraters to drinking vessels in deposits from the temple at Kommos: earlier (temple A) vs later (temple B) deposits compared

	Kraters	%	Drinking vessels	%	Total
Temple A deposits (10th–9th c.)	23	15%	76	50%	153
Temple B deposits (8th–7th c.)	8	3.8%	102	49%	210
Total	31	8.5%	178	49%	363

Information from Callaghan and Johnston 2000.

This leads us on to a consideration of deposits. By the early fifth century, Cretan ‘domestic’ and ‘ritual’ contexts are full of plain cups, both the short-necked and high-necked varieties, the type site being the ‘Shrine of Glaukos’ at Knossos.⁶⁷ Recent excavations at two sites in Eastern Crete give us a better idea of what activities such layers might represent. The ‘ashy deposit’ from Priniatikos Pyrgos, near Istron, now provides the best context for that peculiar Cretan drinking vessel, the necked cup.⁶⁸ Fragments of 111 of these were found in this deposit, which has many similarities to more disturbed contexts at Knossos and Afrati.⁶⁹ The most economical interpretation of this deposit is that it represents a succession of drinking (and so feasting) events, involving at least ten individuals over several decades. As such it bears an uncanny similarity to much earlier (MMII) cup deposits from Eastern Crete, in particular the Lakkos deposit from Petras.⁷⁰ Might such deposits represent the feasting we associate with an *andreion*? And are such drinking/feasting deposits associated with a known *polis* site? It

is not absolutely clear whether the classical settlement at Priniatikos Pyrgos formed part of a *polis* settlement. The neighbouring peninsula of Nisi Pandeimon has been identified as ancient Istron, a Cretan site which enjoyed the status of a *polis* in Hellenistic times.⁷¹ The male members of the settlement at Priniatikos Pyrgos may therefore have formed a subset of the wider political community, one with its own *andreion*. Like the Dataleis at Afrati, they may have formed a subgroup of a larger *polis*.

Similar problems of interpretation arise with the better-known excavations at Azoria, a site which is now recognized as being key to our understanding of archaic Cretan society and politics.⁷² The excavators, Donald Haggis and Peggy Mook, have built the study of commensality into their research design. A combination of shape studies, ceramic petrology, archaeobotanical and faunal analyses have been employed to studying late archaic consumption practices at this extensive (8–15 ha) Cretan settlement. Two principal areas of public spaces have been identified, either (or both) of which might have been locations for communal consumption. The first is a large space, possibly roofed, with benches, which certainly could have accommodated a considerable number of citizen males meeting and dining together—the so-called monumental civic building.⁷³ No deposits definitely associated with dining have been found here however—there are no deposits containing the quantity of cups found at Priniatikos Pyrgos. There are however a number of buildings nearby which may be related to the preparation of food for ‘feasting’. Another is a group of buildings Donald Haggis calls the ‘*Andreion* complex’, which includes a kitchen with an assemblage of drinking vessels and a krater stand (as well as storage pithoi).⁷⁴ Though the drinking vessels are pleasingly plain, this building is rather small—about the same size as the ‘armouries’ at Ai Lia (Afrati) and Dreros. And it is interesting that armour too (not much) was found in this building—the crest of a helmet very similar to one found at Afrati.⁷⁵

Even if Donald Haggis’ complex is an *andreion*, the case of Azoria presents difficulties if we want to relate commensality to citizenship. First, there is nothing to link the evidence for commensality at this site with men rather than women—it is perfectly possible (and equally consistent with the literary evidence) that men and women dined together in the ‘Monumental Civic Building’. Second, we do not know the ancient name of this settlement, which was abandoned around 470 BC. No coins were ever minted here, no public inscriptions (law codes and the like) have been found, and no state sanctuaries identified.⁷⁶ It is therefore unclear whether the settlement ever represented a political community or *polis*—a citizen-state in the full sense of the term. Certainly, it did not represent a political community that lasted

into classical and Hellenistic times, long enough to come to the attention of ancient authors. What then was the status of this site? Well, even if it never became a *polis*, it might have been some kind of political community—perhaps a smaller settlement, dependent on a larger, nearby centre (e.g. Hierapytna). Or it could be that *poleis* in this part of Crete comprised a number of settlements, each with its own *andreion*, on the model provided by the Spensithios inscription. Only time, and further research, will tell.

My last example comes from still further east, well away from Central Crete, that is, those political communities best known to fourth-century Athenian writers. It is taken from the ‘Eteocretan’ city of Praisos, which retained a distinctive ethnic as well as political identity down to the time of its destruction in 146–140 BC by its neighbour Hierapytna. Systematic investigation of this site and environs has resumed since 1992. In two locations in particular, light has been shed on practices of communal drinking and the *andreion*. First, both excavation and survey have revealed numerous examples of Cretan drinking vessels—in particular, late archaic and classical low- and high-necked cups. These are as austere (or plain) as any other on the island, but here at least they are finely made, well fired and with extraordinarily thin walls. Such vessels were found generally in the surface survey of the city, but also in huge concentrations in one location in the survey area. At site 14, Prophitis Ilias, the highest and most exposed location in our survey area, we found the greatest number of these vessels, datable to late archaic and early classical times (see [Fig. 9.3](#)).⁷⁷ Interpretations of this site have varied, from a possible location of a cult of Dictaeon Zeus (by Spratt) to a kiln (Brice Erickson).⁷⁸ But this location may equally have been a location for communal dining. Communal drinking in exposed locations is a practice that can be attested in East Crete in MMII times, and in LMIIIC. Here we may see a return to it. And what could be more manly, more *andriko* than communal drinking, in the air, with the wind blowing strongly in your face?




Fig. 9.3. Late archaic/early classical cup bases from site 14 (Prophitis Ilias) in the Praisos survey.

Photo author.

But Prophitis Ilias is not the only candidate for Praisos' *andreion*. When R.C. Bosanquet excavated here in 1901, one of the structures he concentrated on was the 'Almond Tree House', a large, multi-roomed building with a monumental façade. As Ruth Westgate has emphasized, this probably fourth-century building is very unusual for a Cretan house—it is too big and too complex. There is a *prima facie* case for its being some kind of public building, and this is indeed how Bosanquet interpreted it. He called it an *andreion*, indeed he identified it with Dosiadas' *koimitirion*.⁷⁹ When we came to re-excavate Praisos in 2007, the area we chose was directly in front of the 'Almond Tree House'. It soon became apparent that the upper layers we were excavating were Bosanquet's dump—full of pottery, and other material he did not consider interesting. Amongst the material he threw away were fragments of animal bone, drinking vessels (including identifiable fragments of classical necked cups), and two terracotta plaques. One, probably fourth century or early third, depicts a nude male; the other, which only came to light in cleaning in 2008, probably early to mid-fifth century, shows a warrior with a plumed helmet and a ram's head shield.⁸⁰

The iconography of this plaque has a long history (see Fig. 9.4). It derives from a Geometric type that emerged around 700 BC (type 10), replaced in turn by another (type 11), replaced in turn by the find

from 2007.⁸¹ Such iconographic conservatism at Praisos is also to be found in other ‘male’ plaques, such as those that depict a young male nude with his hand on his hip (types 12 then 25–7). One explanation for this conservatism in both series of plaques is continuity in the function of such plaques—perhaps again in an initiation event that in turn was part of a process of *paideia* that turns boys into male citizens.⁸²




Fig 9.4. Sequence of ‘warrior’ plaques at Praisos, showing underlying iconographic continuity (prepared by Kirsty Harding). The figure should be read ‘retrograde’ (right to left), with earlier plaques to the left and later (classical) ones to the right: far left a plaque in New York (Met Mus 35.5.9, after Halbherr 1901, 390 fig. 19); a composite picture of two fragments of the same type (10) in the British museum (BM 1907, 0119.64 above and BM 1907, 0119.60 below; Higgins 1954, nos. 575–76); a reconstructed drawing of another plaque (type 11), after Halbherr 1901, pl. XII no. 3; and at the far right a type recovered from excavations at Praisos in 2007 (plaque A 205.7 no. 6; Whitley 2011, 18–9, fig. 14).

The ‘Almond Tree House’ at Praisos is, of course, a classical construction, not an archaic one. But there were some (ambiguous) indications from our excavation that this structure may have overlain earlier archaic levels, which may have contained concentrations of cup deposits with animal bones. In this respect, the ‘*Andreion*’ at Praisos may be analogous with the large building at Ayia Pelagia (Apellonia), where an archaic structure underlay the large building that Alexiou identified as an *andreion*.⁸³

As more examples are added then, the picture becomes more, not less, complex. It may be useful to sum up. From the literary evidence,

the *andreion* appears to be a form of diacritical feasting that marked out the citizen body in Cretan cities. Such communal dining took place sitting down, not lying on couches symposium-style. The institution appears, in the epigraphic record in Central Crete, no earlier than 600 BC. Although hearth temples and ‘armouries’ are both plausible candidates for *andreia*, there is no building type which unambiguously relates to this institution. The equation between institution and building type, which works for other parts of Greece, may not work for Crete. There are nonetheless archaeological deposits that may relate to the *andreion*. These take the form of masses of drinking vessels, found at classical Priniatikos Pyrgos and Prophitis Ilias (Praisos). [Table 9.3](#) sums up the picture.

5. Discussion And Conclusions

Our most vivid and compelling sources for ancient Cretan society are the fourth-century, Athens-based philosophers Plato and Aristotle. The other historical sources we possess are late and fragmentary, and the literary sources present a static picture of Cretan institutions. Nothing like a historical narrative survives for ancient Crete, and certainly nothing for the archaic period. In this light, the *andreion* becomes a peculiar Cretan institution, common to all Cretan cities, an institution that changed little through time.⁸⁴ Only rarely does a source (Dosiadas) specify how this and other institutions relate to particular Cretan cities (in this case, Lyktos).⁸⁵ It is this literary picture that has been related to the Cretan epigraphic and archaeological record. How much sense does this picture make?

Well, it makes some sense: the appearance of the *andreion* in the epigraphic record in Central Crete coincides with a trend towards austerity in drinking practices in that part of the island. But when we try to pin down the *andreion* to a particular building in Central Crete, or to a particular kind of archaeological deposit, we are spoilt for choice: buildings containing armour and hearth temples are all plausible candidates that cannot be ruled out. If so, the commensality associated with the *andreion* must have taken place in buildings that could hold no more than fifty diners at any one sitting.

But as we move eastward, it becomes more and more difficult to reconcile the literary/epigraphic with the archaeological record. The evidence from Azoria indicates a much more extensive use of ‘symposium sets’ than we find in Central Crete⁸⁶ and raises the possibility that forms of commensality similar in function to the Central Cretan *andreia* might be associated with political communities

that were not *poleis*. The ‘ashy deposit’ from Priniatikos Pyrgos appears to be associated with a subset of the political community of ancient Istron. The case of Praisos presents possibilities—public dining in rough places, initiation rites involving the semi-votive deposition of plaques—that diverge still further from a Central Cretan norm.

The case of Praisos also seems to provide indirect confirmation for one of the other themes of this essay: it is highly likely that there was more than one *andreion* per *polis*. For one thing, if the free adult males of a community the size of Dreros, Praisos, and Afrati (let alone Gortyn) must have numbered at least five hundred, none of the buildings so far considered could (with the possible exception of the monumental civic building at Azoria) have seated all of them at once.⁸⁷ For another, since both hearth temples and armouries are plausible candidates for *andreia*, cities where such structures occur together (such as Dreros) are likely to have had at least two.

Where does this leave Cretan citizenship? Well, in many respects citizenship on Crete would not have been too different from citizenship in other ‘citizen’ (i.e. *polis*) states on the mainland. The citizen body would be smaller than most mainland *poleis* because Cretan cities were in general smaller. But in Crete, as elsewhere (see Blok this volume, [chapter 3](#)), archaic citizenship entailed a range of military and civic duties and required participation in cult, ritual, and forms of commensality. Similarly, the role of public dining would not have been much different from (say) that of the *prytaneis* of fifth-century Athens. The major difference stems from the number of *andreia* per *polis*. In classical Athens, there is only one tholos (for the *prytaneis*), and public service helped to reinforce a sense of civic identity that was the key to the citizen-state. But it is unclear how, if you were a member of a particular *andreion* in (say) Dreros or Gortyn, that contributed to your being a better, or more effective citizen, with your primary loyalty to your city, rather than your *andreion* or *hetaireia*. This potential conflict of loyalties may however have been a problem common to many archaic *poleis* (including Athens; see Ismard this volume, [chapter 5](#)), where the ‘centralization of commensality’ may be one feature that marks out the classical *polis* from the archaic one.⁸⁸

There remain three final problems. The first relates to gender. If Blok (this volume, [chapter 3](#)) is right, then citizenship was not an exclusively male preserve. There are hints in both the literary and epigraphic records that on Crete there was a term for female citizen—*ἄσθη*—and the Gortyn Code provides clear evidence that some women (presumably citizens) were more equal than others. But there is nothing in either the literary, epigraphic, or archaeological record to contradict the idea that *political* power (and office-holding) remained

entirely in men's hands. It could be however that we have too 'binary' a notion of gender. The mortuary record of archaic Greece is divided not so much on male/female as on adult/child lines. The idea that women could be citizens (albeit second-class ones) could support the notion, not of a binary male/female distinction, but a gendered polarity, with women in the middle between children and adult males.⁸⁹

Men then were 'first-class' citizens. In most parts of Greece, citizenship is predicated on certain kinds of *performance*, performance that was essentially masculine, competitive, and agonistic (see Duploux this volume, [chapter 10](#)). While I accept that citizenship must be defined first in behavioural terms, and while it is clear that Cretan citizenship required various kinds of participation not too different from those of mainland *poleis* (see Blok this volume, [chapter 3](#)), the scope that archaic Crete provided for its citizens for any kind of agonistic display seems to have been highly restricted. In archaic Crete we have neither the elaborate, expensive votives, nor the individualizing 'personal' inscriptions, that we find in Athens, Ionia, and the Cyclades.⁹⁰ We also have evidence, early on, from archaic Dreros that early Cretan polities attempted to place severe restrictions on agonistic competition, at least as it relates to competition for public office.⁹¹ Here, the demands of agonistic display and those of political and social harmony (that is, the demands of the *polis*) do genuinely seem to be at odds. So, while we may have good reason to doubt Morris' model of 'antithetical cultures', we still have a long way to go to explain the regional differences in political forms, elite competition, and its material expression.

And this leads me on to my last point. Resolution of these issues requires engagement with the material evidence, on the part of scholars who fully understand its potential. Material evidence is, after all, the only kind of evidence that steadily increases every year (see any volume of 'Archaeology in Greece').⁹² Its potential can only really be appreciated by those who have some degree of hands-on experience—it cannot be looked at simply from the vantage point of a library.⁹³ It is difficult to see how a closer scrutiny of the literary sources alone will much improve our understanding of not only the *andreion* but also other forms of political commensality. Reaching a better understanding of both the *polis* and the *andreion* forms one of the major challenges that remain for 'archaeological history'.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Alain Duploux and Roger Brock for comments on

earlier drafts of this essay (as well as OUP's anonymous referees). The British Museum (in particular Alexandra Villing) has also been helpful in allowing me to view and photograph both the Spensithios inscription (which is more than a text) and some of its plaques from Praisos. Joseph Shaw kindly allowed me to take photographs of the key site of Kommos. Studies of ritualized commensality in the Greek world and of archaic Crete were once neglected fields. They are now booming, and I am not sure I have managed to incorporate the insights of the most recent scholarship (Węcowski on commensality; Seelentag on archaic Crete) into this essay, first presented some time ago. Any remaining mistakes are mine and mine alone.

¹ This is Runciman's (1990) term for the *polis*.

² For the long history of this idea, see papers in Kagan and Viggiano 2013. For Aristotle, see *Pol.* 4.1297b16–26.

³ The evidence for hoplite equipment is provided by Hoffmann 1972. For warfare on Crete (and on Cretan mercenaries), see Whitley 2009, 284–8.

⁴ Though the fifty *prytaneis* dined there, the tholos in the classical Agora is not the *Prytaneion*. This has been plausibly identified with remains now visible in Agia Aikaterini square to the south-east of the Acropolis in the area of the archaic Agora (see Schmalz 2006; Pitt 2014–15, 50). There is a long-standing debate as to who in Athens held the lifelong privilege of *sitesis* in this building, detailed in *IG I*³ 313.

⁵ Dietler 2001, 82–8; cf. Dietler 1996.

⁶ Schmitt-Pantel 1990a; Bruit-Zaidman and Schmitt-Pantel 1992, 34–6; Ekroth 2008.

⁷ Dietler 2001, 85–8; for the *symposion*, see Murray 1990c; Lissarrague 1990a; 1990b; papers in Murray 1990a; Węcowski 2014. For the symposium in Athens, see now Lynch 2007; 2011.

⁸ Camp 1992, 122–8; on the *metronomoi*, see *Ath. Pol.* 51.2.

⁹ Camp 1992, 100–5.

¹⁰ Thompson 1940; Camp 1992, 94–7. Ann Steiner is currently reassessing the ceramic evidence from this building, with a view to better understanding the politics of commensality in fifth-century Athens.

¹¹ Cooper and Morris 1990.

¹² Rotroff and Oakley 1992.

¹³ To talk of 'the *polis*' in this way is also, of course, to engage in a process of reification, as Vlassopoulos 2007 has forcefully argued.

¹⁴ Perlman 2004a. By my calculations, the average territory of Cretan *poleis* was 170.12 km², as opposed to 770.83 km² for Cyprus and 467.42 km² for Sicily (information based partly on Hansen and Nielsen 2004); see discussion in Whitley 2014. Maria Iacovou has disputed the number of archaic *poleis* that existed on Cyprus; see discussion by Cadogan et al. 2012, 5 n. 13. If there were only ten and not eleven kingdoms on Cyprus this would make the disparity in the sizes of *poleis* on these two islands even greater than I have indicated here.

¹⁵ Perlman 1996.

¹⁶ Marcus 1998, *contra* Renfrew 1986; Snodgrass 1986a. For the flavour of the thinking of the 'Michigan school', see papers in Feinman and Marcus 1998; Flannery and Marcus 2012.

¹⁷ Berent 2000, 266. The idea that a state cannot be a partnership is based on the notion that states have to have a monopoly of the means of coercion, exercised by

some kind of elite. Naturally, I disagree.

¹⁸ An argument put forward elsewhere, in Whitley 2014. For a useful definition of ‘state’ that applies to both ancient and modern times, see Mann 1986, 37. I am of course not asserting that all the 1,035 *poleis* listed by Hansen and Nielsen 2004 could have been states.

¹⁹ Perlman 2002 (Gortyn); 2004b (Eleutherna).

²⁰ E.g. Anderson 2009; another is the notion of the ‘covenant state’, put forward by Josine Blok (this volume, chapter 3).

²¹ Runciman 1990; Hansen 2004.

²² Arist. *Pol.* 3.1275a22: πολίτης δ’ ἀπλῶς οὐδενί τῶν ἄλλων ὀρίζεται μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μετέχειν κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς; see discussion in Blok 2005. See also Vlassopoulos 2007, 68–96, who fruitfully reassesses Aristotle’s notion of ‘the polis’.

²³ Morris 2000, 109–54.

²⁴ Blok 2013; 2014; 2017; this volume, chapter 3.

²⁵ Hdt. 1.173.5; the term turns up on an inscription from Axos (*IC* II 5.5), see discussion by Perlman 2010; see now Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 164–7 (A5 + 6).

²⁶ For the most recent discussions, see Wallace 2010, 384–90; Whitley 2009, 289–90; Rabinowitz 2014.

²⁷ A point discussed by Perlman 1992; 2014. Seelentag 2015, 102–18 takes a very different view, arguing that ‘The Cretan Constitution’ is an historical reality, insofar as the constitutions of the major cities of Central Crete (Dreros to Eleutherna) were in fact very similar to one another.

²⁸ Arist. *Pol.* 2.1272a3: καὶ συσσίτια παρ’ ἀμφοτέροις ἔστιν, καὶ τό γε ἀρχαῖον ἐκαλοῦν οἱ Λάκωνες οὐ φιδίτια ἀλλὰ ἀνδρεῖα, καθάπερ οἱ Κρήτες, ἧ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἐκείθεν ἐλήλυθεν.

²⁹ Strabo 10.4.18, quoting Alcman (*PMG* 98) [= Ephoros *FGrHist* 70 F149]. I think it highly unlikely that Laconian institutions derive straightforwardly from Cretan ones, but this is not the place for the discussion of the ‘Cretan mirage’, or the myth of Spartan austerity.

³⁰ Strabo 10.4.16; 10.4.18; 10.4.20; 10.4.21 = Ephoros *FrGrHist* 70 F149.

³¹ Davidson 2007, 301–15; Osborne 2016, 265. See also Fisher this volume, chapter 8.

³² This is a term much used by the Neo-Bloomsbury tendency in Classical studies.

³³ Lebesse 1985.

³⁴ Seelentag 2015, 444–503.

³⁵ Strabo 10.4.16.

³⁶ Pyrgion *FGrHist* 467 F1 = Athenaios 4.143e.

³⁷ Arist. *fr.* 611.15.16 (Rose): διαιτῶνται δὲ Κρήτες πάντες καθήμενοι θρόνοις, ‘The Cretans dine sitting down on chairs.’

³⁸ Dosiadas *FGrHist* 458 F2 = Athenaios 4.143.a–d. The Cretans’ hospitality towards strangers is also emphasized by Aristotle, *ibid.*

³⁹ *IC* IV 4 line 4 = Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 270 G4. 4. For the date of the inscription, see Jeffery 1990, 311–15. For this set of laws, see Perlman 2002. The most recent discussion of ‘the *andreion*’ is by Seelentag 2015, 374–443; Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 92–5, where the relationships to the *agela* and *hetaireia* are examined.

⁴⁰ *IC* I 10.2 (Eltynia) = Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 255–60 Elt.2 6; *IC* II 5.1 lines 8 and 12 (Axos) = Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 151–5 A1.8; for this, see also *Nomima* I, no. 28.

⁴¹ *IC* IV 75. line B.9 = Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 430–3 G75.B9. This inscription is a near-contemporary to the Great Code; Willetts 1967, 11 and 77, which does not mention the *andreion* as such, though it does mention *hetaireiai* (*IC* IV 72.10.37–9). The most economical explanation of this term is that these are the clubs or associations linked to the *andreion*.

42 BM 1969.4–2.1: Jeffery and Morpurgo Davies 1970 = SEG 27.631; Jeffery 1990, 468 14b; also discussed by Raubitschek 1972; Van Effenterre 1973; *Nomima* I, no. 22; Gagarin and Perlman 2016, 181–96 Da1.

43 As argued by Viviers 1994, 230–4 and 240–1. For Afrati, see now Brisart 2011, 235–71.

44 Ephoros *FGrHist* 70 F149; Dosiadas *FGrHist* 458 F2. Arist. *Pol.* 2.1272a15–21 (cf. 1271a) of course states that all Cretan meals for free men, women, and children were taken in common (κοινοτέπως). One explanation for this anomaly is that Aristotle was relying almost exclusively on information from one Cretan *polis* (possibly Lyktos, see Perlman 1992), and that our sources confirm a wide variety of practices in classical and Hellenistic Crete. But it is interesting that the wording of the Spensithios inscription seems similar to Aristotle; see discussion in Jeffery and Morpurgo Davies 1970, 143–4 and 151–2; see now arguments put forward by Seelentag 2015, 374–443.

45 Discussed by Erickson 2010b, 333. Here Erickson follows Van Effenterre's (1973, 32) reading of side A line 12.

46 On the relationship between these two terms, see now Perlman 2014, 185–8; cf. Montecchi 2007; Seelentag 2015, 416–17.

47 A point emphasized recently by Montecchi 2007, esp. 95–108.

48 The wording (Jeffery and Morpurgo Davies 1970, 124–5 side A line 1) is: Θιοί: ἔφαδε Δαταλεῦσι καὶ ἐσπένασμεν πόλιν, 'Gods: the Dataleis resolved and the city pledged', which suggests that the Dataleis and the *polis* are separate entities.

49 Viviers 1994. For the original excavation reports, see Lebessi 1969a; 1969b; Sakallerakis 1965. For the armour, see Hoffmann 1972. The inscriptions (Raubitschek in Hoffmann 1972, 15–16) make it clear that these are not dedications to a particular god, but boasts about armour captured in battle. For the latest discussions of this structure, see Prent 2005, 279–80; Brisart 2011, 264–8. For archaic/classical pottery from Afrati, see Erickson 2002.

50 Xanthoudides 1918; for the armour see Hoffmann 1972, 25; see discussion in Prent 2005, 283–4. This building has recently been reinvestigated by a Greek/French team (Zographaki and Farnoux 2010, 597–8; 2014, 105–9).

51 Levi 1930–1; cf. Hoffmann 1972, 23–5; for the context, see now Prent 2005, 248–50 and 354–5; Tegou 2013; 2014a; 2014b. There is also at least one helmet from a possible cache of armour from Onythe Goulediana near Rethymnon (discussed by Hoffmann 1972, 22 pls 16–17), which may also be an armoury, and has been listed as such. The helmet however (Platon 1954, 377 and 379 fig. 1) does not have a good context, and is not unambiguously associated with the archaic houses (Platon 1955; 1956).

52 Alcaeus 357 [Z 34] Lobel-Page; see discussion in van Wees 1998, 363 and 377 n. 73.

53 Shaw 2000; see discussion in Prent 2005, 323–30.

54 Marinatos 1936; Beyer 1976; see discussion in Prent 2005, 284–9.

55 Pernier 1914; Beyer 1976; see discussion in Prent 2005, 253–9.

56 For the animal bones, see Reese 2000; for the pottery, see Callaghan and Johnston 2000; and discussion in Prent 2005, 323–30.

57 Greco et al. 2000, 551–5; Didier Viviers (pers. comm.) now informs me that he thinks this building must have been constructed around 600 BC. See now Viviers and Tsingarida 2014, 176–9.

58 Bosanquet 1901–2, 259–70; see discussion in Whitley 2011, 38–9.

59 On this structure, destroyed around 171/170 BC, see Alexiou 1972; 1975; Ioannidou-Karetsou 1973. This structure was thought to overlie an earlier archaic structure, thought to have a similar function; on the city and its identification, Alexiou 1984; Perlman 2004a, 1150–1, no. 946.

- 60 On Cretan houses, see Westgate 2007.
- 61 Prent 2005, 441–76; 2007. For lists of other possible *andreaia*, see also Viviers 1994, 244–9. See discussion in Erickson 2010a, 309–20.
- 62 Morris 1998; cf. Whitley 2009.
- 63 Sackett 1976; for a comprehensive overview see Rabinowitz 2014.
- 64 As for example in the seventh-century assemblages from tombs 34 and 56 in the Knossos North Cemetery; see Coldstream and Catling 1996, 82–9 and 94–8. See discussion in Whitley 2004. For criticisms and an alternative view see now Kotsonas 2011; according to Rabinowitz 2014, 100–3, figs 2 and 3, the deposition of kraters in tombs in Knossos peaks in the eighth century and declines thereafter.
- 65 But see now discussion of archaic/classical material in Erickson 2010a, 115–64.
- 66 One is the ‘Sophilan’ dinos from Gortyn (Johannowsky 1955–6), the other a black-figure column krater from well H by the Royal Road at Knossos (Coldstream 1973, 57–8 L76).
- 67 Callaghan 1978, who only provides ‘representative examples’ of types found, without quantification. See now Erickson 2010a, 115–75.
- 68 Erickson 2010b, 328–35; 2014.
- 69 Erickson 2010b, 329 table 2.
- 70 Haggis 2007; see discussion in Whitley 2014.
- 71 Perlman 2004a, 1167, no. 964. See Erickson 2010b, 305–7; 2014, 73–7.
- 72 See for example Small 2010.
- 73 Stefanakis et al. 2007; Haggis et al. 2011, 16–28.
- 74 Haggis et al. 2004, 387–90; 2011, 4–16.
- 75 Haggis et al. 2011, 15 fig. 7; compare Hoffmann 1972, 5–6 no. H5 and pl. 13.
- 76 The ‘hearth shrine’ near the monumental civic building (Haggis et al. 2011, 28–38) cannot be a major state sanctuary, and neither can the small extra-urban sanctuary at Pachlitzani Agriada nearby (Prent 2005, 299–300).
- 77 Whitley et al. 1999, 249–53; Whitley 2006c, 607–14.
- 78 Erickson 2000, 315–30; 2010a, 199–216; 2014, 78–9.
- 79 Bosanquet 1901–2, 259–70; see discussion in Westgate 2007, 434, 440–1 figs 14–15.
- 80 Whitley 2011, 18–19 fig. 14. It must be emphasized here that it is very unusual to find such plaques outside sanctuary/votive sites in Eastern Crete. See Erickson 2009; Forster 1901–2; 1904–5; Whitley 2008. An examination of the animal bones from the upper deposits of the 2007 excavations by Richard Madgwick in April 2013 and 2015 has revealed at least one deposit with unusually large numbers of bones of hare; see Madgwick and Whitley 2017. For commensality in archaic/classical Praisos generally see Whitley 2014.
- 81 Whitley 2016, 257–9. The ‘types’ are those of Forster (1904–5).
- 82 See again Seelentag 2015, 444–503; see discussion above, section 3.
- 83 Alexiou 1972; 1975; Ioannidou-Karetsou 1973.
- 84 As in Laurencic 1988.
- 85 A point that supports Perlman’s (1992) arguments.
- 86 Haggis 2014a; 2014b.
- 87 There are of course spaces which could have accommodated five hundred persons, one being the Agora in Dreros, recently re-examined by Alexandre Farnoux (École française d’Athènes), S. Apostolakou and V. Zographaki (KD/24th Ephoreia); see Farnoux in Morgan et al. 2009–10, 174–5; Zographaki and Farnoux 2014, 109–13.
- 88 Though Link (2014) has put forward interesting arguments to the effect that Cretan forms of commensality were more effective at integrating the citizen body-politic than Spartan ones.

⁸⁹ As argued in Whitley 1996.

⁹⁰ See Whitley 2009; 2015. For the notion of the ‘aristocratic’ individual, see in particular Duploux 2006a; 2015; papers in Fisher and van Wees 2015a. Duploux this volume, chapter 10 argues that this flamboyantly ‘aristocratic’ behaviour is not incompatible with a notion of citizenship (*contra* Morris 2000, 109–91). Whilst I would agree that Morris’ ‘antithetical cultures’ are overly schematic (see also Hammer 2004), there is still I think an inherent tension between the principle of equality and the requirement to display. The Cretan case represents a unique ‘solution’ to this problem.

⁹¹ For the Dreros code, see Demargne and Van Effenterre 1937; *Nomima* I, no. 81; Jeffery 1990, 315 no. 1a. On the absence of athletic display in Crete, see Fisher this volume, chapter 8, section 3.

⁹² For those who do not know, these are published every year in *Archaeological Reports* (a supplement to *JHS*), and now compiled by the directors of the British and French Schools in Athens.

⁹³ In this light, the decision by the Cambridge Classics Faculty not to employ any expert on the material culture of the Eastern Mediterranean for the period 1000–100 BC but instead to employ someone who works in the same field (literally) as the current Laurence Professor of Classical Archaeology must be viewed as little short of disastrous.

Citizenship as Performance

Alain Duplouy

Defining citizenship is a problem that was explicitly stated for the first time by Aristotle in the *Politics* (3.1275a–1278b). He answered it in a theoretical way by emphasizing the functions and role of the citizen in the political and judicial institutions of the city-state. According to Aristotle, the citizen is ‘a man who shares in the administration of justice and in the holding of office’ (μετέχειν κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς, 1275a23). By stating this, he explicitly links the duty of citizenship to the offices of judge in the courts and member of the assembly. As outlined in the introduction to this volume ([chapter 1](#)), the Aristotelian definition is the product of classical political thought. It arose more precisely in the context of late classical Athens and gave rise to a long scholarly tradition of legal and political studies, which has failed—in my opinion—to provide an accurate account of archaic communities.

Beyond the Aristotelian definition and other philosophical models, it has often been difficult to define archaic citizenship without having the final classical forms as a focal point. The various models of citizenship promoted in the politics of the Athenian classical era (the Cleisthenic, the Periclean, the fourth-century radical democratic, and the Lycurgan) are so detailed, indeed, that an independent concept of archaic citizenship has never truly emerged in the scholarship. In various aspects, archaic citizenship has therefore been defined in contrast to these classical models, supposed to be more complete, by pinpointing its shortcomings, not by stressing its peculiarities. Such a negative definition led to the idea of an ‘incomplete’ or ‘elementary’ citizen status in the archaic period that was still under elaboration. To

quote Philip Manville, Athenian citizenship was ‘a mere glimmer in the age of Drakon, born under Solon, nurtured by tyrants, and given full form by Cleisthenes’.¹ This kind of statement is actually not very useful in investigating the peculiarities of archaic history. What we are in search of—as inaccessible as it might initially appear—is a definition of archaic citizenship that will be elaborated on positive evidence.

1. Adopting an Approach

Resuming the enquiry where I left it in the introduction to this volume (chapter 1), I shall begin my essay by taking an alternative path arising from Émile Benveniste’s linguistic comparison between the two main possible historical accounts of the genesis of the *polis*.² In short, was the early city a theoretical entity gradually granting ‘membership’ to its affiliates or was it the empirical result of the ‘participation’ of individuals in a community in the making? For more than a decade now I have considered the fabric of ancient Greek societies as the product of multiple and continuous relations between individuals,³ much more than a process of reforms and revolutions of an institutional model leading from monarchy to democracy. ‘Men make the city’ (ἄνδρες γὰρ πόλις), wrote Alcaeus (*fr.* 112.10, 426) and Thucydides (7.77.7). Adopting such a sociological and practical approach also permits us to avoid diverting the issue of an early citizenship to that of the formation of the city-state, as explored by Philip Manville or John Davies.⁴ When asserting the value of individuals and their actions in the process of constructing the *polis*, I do not refer to the deeds of great men or exceptional individuals, actors of ‘History’, but to the everyday activities of people living together within a community. In this sense, citizenship should not be conceived as a one-way relation between an abstract entity and its members, but as a web of mutual relationships between individuals, including status recognition processes.

Accordingly, I strongly believe that our understanding of the archaic world could be greatly enhanced by valuing citizenship as a performance, rather than as a granted status enshrined in legal criteria. In the absence of a register certifying one’s legal status, the privileges and opportunities of a citizen had to be permanently demonstrated in order to be acknowledged and accepted by the others. Considering how deeply many aspects of the archaic institutions were embedded in social practices, we must lay great stress on the multiple behaviours through which citizenship could be

asserted or even claimed. When dealing with the creation and reproduction of the citizen body, Aristotle himself allows the possibility of such a definition: ἔστι δ' ἀπλοῦν' εἰ γὰρ μετεῖχον κατὰ τὸν ῥηθέντα διορισμὸν τῆς πολιτείας, ἦσαν πολῖται, 'but it is really a simple matter; for if they shared in the *politeia* in the manner stated in our definition, they were citizens' (3.1275b31–2). As a simple and practical fact, according to Aristotle, those participating in the administration of justice and in the holding of office (*metechein kriseōs kai archēs*) would be considered as citizens. Nothing more than performing justice and political authority are thus required to account for citizenship, well beyond any consideration of descent. In order to support this assertion, Aristotle brings up the case of the first inhabitants or founders of a city, who of course had no citizen ancestry to justify their own citizen status.

What kind of 'performances' could therefore reveal a citizen status or could be valued as worthy of a citizen? Both collective and individual practices were effective behaviours in asserting or even claiming a citizen status.

Pauline Schmitt-Pantel has long stressed the importance of collective activities such as banquets and hunting in the construction of the 'political' in archaic cities.⁵ She has insisted on the fact that all communal practices were equally significant in the shaping of a political society. More precisely, in archaic Greece, collective activities were not considered as less important than participation in the assembly, which only became the central aspect of citizenship in classical Athens, setting the stage for the Aristotelian model. Their function was to provide equal access to a shared experience, which in turn defined who was a citizen. This anthropological view of the archaic *polis* is shared by other members of the so-called 'École de Paris'. In placing the emphasis on common cults and religious activities François de Polignac, for example, seminally described the complex mechanism of state formation in early Greece.⁶ More recently, Paulin Ismard has showed that many associations of archaic Athens such as phratries or *genē* provided a relevant background as well as practical intermediary groups to the construction of an extended citizen community.⁷ Beyond the Parisian sphere Josine Blok has applied this approach to classical citizenship; as she writes: 'without a written administration, the system of recognizing one another as rightful members of a society depended on social connections, control by neighbours and relatives, and shared rites and festivities'.⁸ In sum, a wide range of group activities were important aspects of a genuinely archaic definition of citizenship.

As well as collective activities, individual behaviours were also meaningful in the performance of archaic citizenship, at least as far as

they complied with the community's shared values. By emphasizing individual behaviours alongside collective activities, I would like to stress that bringing people together in specific spaces (such as the agora, a sanctuary, a necropolis) or at particular times (funeral, sacrifice, meal) is actually not a prerequisite of citizen behaviours. The activities in which citizens participate in common simply do not exhaust the range of shared experiences nor the occasions for the performance of citizenship. The unity of time and space is not necessary to the unity of action in being aware of participating in the community. Repeated individual behaviours reinforce the common values and can therefore create the ties of social cohesion. The system is even self-reinforcing: when there is a growing consensus on specific behaviours among the whole community, they tend to be repeated, gradually creating a sensation of homogeneity and a more widespread acceptance. Swiftly, they become the very symbols of participation in the community and consequently constitute distinguishing features between citizens and non-citizens. In this perspective, the notion of *habitus*, popularized by Pierre Bourdieu's sociology, can be meaningful. *Habitus* refers to the lifestyle, values, dispositions, and expectations of social groups that are acquired through the activities and experiences of everyday life. According to Bourdieu's own words, they are 'structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures'.⁹ They are socially acquired schemata, sensibilities, dispositions, and tastes that are repeatedly reproduced through individual behaviours, therefore reinforcing the strength of the *habitus* itself. By adopting a particular lifestyle, valued by the whole citizen community, individuals behave in order to be accepted as fellow citizens. Beyond the passive reflection of a collective identity, individual behaviours could also have been efficient strategies to integrate the citizen body, allowing participating outsiders to become more and more recognized as acceptable citizens-to-be. Since participation in collective activities was a way to incorporate people into the group of citizens, adopting the normative behaviours of the citizens in all aspects of one's lifestyle perhaps provided the best means of being acknowledged as a fellow citizen. In short, in order to be accepted as a citizen, one had to behave like a citizen.

Various scholars have already emphasized performance as a key feature in the practice and ideology of the Greek city, and particularly of the Athenian democracy. As Simon Goldhill and Robin Osborne noted in the introductory paper to a stimulating volume, 'When the Athenian citizen speaks in the Assembly, exercises in the gymnasium, sings at the symposium, or courts a boy, each activity has its own regime of display and regulation; each activity forms an integral part of the exercise of citizenship.'¹⁰ Since the concept of performance

originates from theatre studies, most papers in the volume edited by Goldhill and Osborne deal with the performance of drama in the theatre or speeches in the assembly and public courts. Performing justice and the law is indeed another case in point, exemplified by Vincent Farenga's book on how citizenship and an individual self-awareness were enacted in archaic and classical Greece. To be specific, he defines a series of 'scripts' which enable individuals to negotiate with others for recognition of their personal and citizen status.¹¹ On a philosophical level too, performing citizenship has been valued recently in discussing Plato's *Laws*.¹² In emphasizing the moral character of the citizenry, Plato's utopian views often equate statecraft with soulcraft. But if knowing the nature and disposition of the souls are central to the political *technē* of the statesman, the Platonic ideal state also relates the 'cultivation of virtue' (ἡ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλεια, *Laws* 8.847a5–6) to the practice of a good citizen in the second-best city. Accordingly, Lucia Prauscello focuses on how the rhetoric of citizenship is implemented, on a practical level, through specific, ritualized forms of public discourse. In Plato's *Laws*, the citizens of Magnesia re-enact endlessly their very nature as citizens through collective choral performances. In this sense, Plato was probably promoting what Prauscello calls a 'model of *citizenship-as-practice*', which represented 'a powerful counter-hegemonic critique of the Athenian normative model of *citizenship-as-achievement*' grounded in the usual set of formal procedures leading from birth to full membership of the *polis*. She therefore concludes: 'In Magnesia, citizenship is not—or at least not only—a status or a possession, the once-for-all gained outcome of a given trajectory: it is instead a lifelong practice embedded in the every-day experience of people's lives, with all its changes and transformations through time.'¹³

Beyond law, theatre, and political utopia, the concept of performance can be extended to various extant behaviours that were clearly related to the assertion of citizenship. Funerals in classical Athens offer an enlightening example. The *dokimasia* of the magistrates elected by lot proceeds through the assessment by the Council of the required qualifications and expected behaviours of a citizen. In addition to a citizen ancestry from both parents and the affiliation with a deme and a phratry, the councillors check, among other things, 'whether the incumbent has family tombs and where they are' (*Ath. Pol.* 55.3). Having a family plot can be intended as common sense, even for foreigners. However, according to Ian Morris' stimulating assumption, in Geometric and archaic Greece burial rights were restricted to citizens alone. As it appears in most cities, only citizens had access to a formal burial (i.e. an archaeologically visible tomb), whereas the non-citizens were excluded from such ritual.¹⁴

Although an archaeology-based theory, the link between formal burial and citizen status is also documented through various episodes of Athenian history. In temporarily expelling the Alcmaeonidai and their supporters from the Athenian community, Cleomenes and Isagoras also paid attention to the tombs of their ancestors. As Thucydides (1.126.12) reports, ‘the living were driven out, and the bones of the dead were taken up’. And it must be remembered that if Themistocles’ children brought back their father’s bones from Magnesia and granted him a tomb in Piraeus, it was also (if not primarily) to establish their citizenship on their return in Athens.¹⁵ Stressing the importance of funeral matters in the appraisal of the good citizen, Aischines (3.77–8) blamed Demosthenes for not having mourned sufficiently and publicly his only child, violating all decency. In highlighting this misbehaviour, Aischines hoped to show that ‘the man who is wicked in his individual relations would never be found trustworthy in public affairs’. Examples of such links between funerals and citizen status are numerous in classical authors.¹⁶ This attention to family tombs or to public lamentation in Athenian politics of the classical era obviously rests on a conception of citizenship based on individual behaviours, which probably goes back to archaic times.

Beyond classical Athens, the performance of citizenship can be documented in archaic cities through specific behaviours. I will discuss here a few examples by strengthening their relation to the assertion or recognition of a citizen status. Despite some similarities, these behaviours were different in each city. Patterns of comportment greatly differ within the archaic world, and practices that were highly valued in some cities could have been deprecated in others. In other words, each city had its own citizen *habitus*, defining specific behaviours that allowed individuals to be identified as citizens. It should be added nevertheless that probably not all archaic cities complied with this model, whether fully or partially, and that even a performative citizen status could also have been supplemented in some cities with more formal criteria of citizenship. Defining archaic citizenship is definitely not tied to finding a unique and ever-valid standard such as the Aristotelian model of citizenship has promoted.

2. Horse-Breeding

One of the clearest pieces of evidence linking citizenship status with a particular behaviour in archaic Greece is to be found in Aeolian Cyme. In his epitome of the Aristotelian *Constitution of the Cymaians*, Heraclides Lembus (second century BC) states (39 Dilts = Arist. *fr.*

Φείδων ἀνὴρ δόκιμος πλείοσι μετέδωκε τῆς πολιτείας, νόμον θεὸς ἕκαστον ἐπάναγκες τρέφειν ἵππον. Προμηθεὺς δέ τις ἀνὴρ δραστήριος καὶ ἱκανὸς εἰπεῖν χιλίοις παρέδωκε τὴν πολιτείαν.

Pheidon, an esteemed man, gave more men a share in the citizenship, establishing a law which compelled everyone to raise a horse. A certain Prometheus, who was efficient and good at speaking, gave to a thousand a share in the citizenship.

In this epitome Heracleides apparently refers to a time immediately posterior to the Persian conquest of Aeolis by Cyrus the Great in the 540s. He reports that Pheidon legislated in order to enfranchise ‘more men’ (πλείοσι), who were required to breed a horse. Although the phrasing of the original idea has probably been biased by a fourth-century vocabulary (μετέδωκε τῆς πολιτείας, νόμον), there is no need to dismiss the primary information on the specificity of citizen status in archaic Cyme.

Before turning to Pheidon, Prometheus’ citizenship and its thousand men are worth discussing further. Since we do not know how many horse-breeders benefited from Pheidon’s citizenship law, Prometheus’ regulation has been variously interpreted: Bürchner originally interpreted it as a restriction, whereas Rubinstein sees it as the inclusion of ‘another thousand citizens in the constitution’.¹⁷ Whatever the number of Pheidonian horse-breeders, the constitution seems to have been fixed—extended or restricted—to a definite number of citizens. According to Clara Talamo, ‘ad un certo momento si passa da una costituzione a numero non determinato di cavalieri ad una costituzione a numero chiuso, chiaramente oligarchica’.¹⁸ Various other cities enjoyed a constitution with a fixed number of thousand men: Colophon, Opous, Croton, Rhegion, and Acragas. This round number has usually been associated with a restricted oligarchy of ‘full-citizens’. As Georg Busolt wrote, ‘Nur Versammlungen von Körperschaften, die einen Teil der Bürgerschaft umfaßten, nie Versammlungen des ganzen Volkes, werden mit einer bestimmten Zahl bezeichnet.’¹⁹ It is actually quite the opposite. As Maurizio Giangliulo demonstrates in this volume ([chapter 11](#)), such round numbers do not actually refer to a privileged subgroup of citizens, an oligarchy within the citizen body, but to the whole body of citizens.²⁰ Whether they were 950 or 1,100 at a time, the ‘thousand’ men probably constituted the quorum or ‘symbolic totality’ of all the Cymaean citizens.²¹ It is possible that Prometheus simply formalized this entity, giving a name and a simple figure to the citizen body of Cyme, so deserving his description as an ‘efficient man’. Such organization and composition of the Cymean citizen body does not rule out Herodotus’ reference

(1.158.2), in the context of the Persian conquest of Asia Minor, to an Aristodikos son of Herakleides as an ἀνὴρ τῶν ἀστῶν ἐὼν δόκιμος among the Cymeans, nor Herodotus' statement (5.37–8) that, in 499, Cyme was ruled by Aristagoras son of Herakleides, for the existence of a fixed-number citizen body is in no way at odds with the existence of an elite.

Whatever the exact purpose and content of Prometheus' subsequent reform, the most interesting feature in archaic Cyme is the link established by Pheidon between horse-breeding and citizenship. It is even likely that, complying with this behaviour, the 'thousand' men of Cyme were themselves horse-breeders. Of course, it is not possible to state which status or behaviour—citizenship or horse-breeding—had priority over the other, but in practice both were probably interrelated. To apply Bourdieu's own words to the performance of citizenship, the horse-breeding *habitus* of Aeolian Cyme was probably a 'structured structure predisposed to function as a structuring structure'. The reform would certainly have offered a simple (if not self-sufficient) criterion for enfranchisement: breeding at least one horse—but possibly much more—was the minimum condition to have a share in the Cymaean civic community, therefore strengthening its collective identity. On a very practical level, this behaviour allowed people in the community to identify visually who was a citizen and who was not.

Needless to say, horse-breeding is normally associated with the behaviour of an aristocratic leisure class. As Solon put it in his poetry: 'Happy is he who has dear boys, horse of uncloven hoof, hunting dogs, and a friend in foreign parts' (*fr.* 23 West). Oswyn Murray made it one of the characteristic features of the aristocratic lifestyle. Breeding and training horses are indeed valued in the context of chariot-racing, celebrated by poets such as Pindar or Bacchylides and thus defined as a 'rich man's sport'.²² Beyond any social prestige generally associated with horse-breeding in archaic societies, Heraclides Lembos' epitome of the Aristotelian constitution is however pretty much explicit on the civic value of horse-breeding in Cyme.

More than a social status symbol, horse-breeding was probably in Cyme as in various other archaic cities a military requirement for the citizen army. According to Aristotle's own reconstruction of the past, 'the earliest form of constitution among the Greeks after the kingships consisted of soldiers, and actually in the beginning of horsemen (ἐκ τῶν ἰππέων), for war had its strength and its superiority in horsemen (ἐν τοῖς ἰππεῦσιν)' (*Pol.* 4.1297b16–19). Although well attested for later periods, the existence of cavalry units in the history of archaic warfare is still much disputed.²³ Of course, the testimonia relating to the First Messenian War and the Lelantine War allude to the use of

cavalry as a specific force in early archaic Greece.²⁴ Later Greek sources provide, however, suspicious readings of archaic history and are indeed challenged by the total lack of contemporary iconographic evidence. In accordance with the Homeric epics, pictorial representations on Geometric and archaic vases clearly indicate that archaic warriors used their horses principally for transportation as a mounted infantry. Although the existence of fully-fledged cavalry units in archaic warfare remains an issue, horsemen were nevertheless a reality—and a very impressive one—on many battlefields. Horsemanship was undoubtedly related to the military performance of citizenship.

One of the clearest possible examples is provided by two Late Geometric amphoras discovered in Paros and published by Photini Zappeiropoulou. The two Parian vases depict a battle scene with horsemen fighting among chariots and infantrymen. These pots belong to a civic *polyandria* probably resulting from the casualties that occurred in a battle between Paros and Naxos during the late eighth century.²⁵ Unless we want to identify them with the depiction of a mythological event, these battle scenes probably allude to war casualties affecting the Parian community as a whole. Since the interment in the *polyandria* within the context of a public funeral probably did not coincide with the cremation of the dead bodies, which usually happened on the battlefield, these two amphoras could have been commissioned, that is manufactured and painted, *after* the battle that claimed the lives of the warriors. They were deliberately made to commemorate the deeds of two warriors intended to be honoured with their comrades by a public monument. The content and purpose of the Parian *polyandria* predate by at least 250 years the Athenian *dēmosion sema* of the classical era. Considering its strong civic tonality, this monument appears to have been the first celebration of the Parian community as a *polis*. In Geometric Paros horsemanship was thus acknowledged as a major military and citizen achievement.

In sum, what we have in Cyme is not only an elite strategy, but also an individual behaviour explicitly linked to the exercise of citizenship. The citizens of Cyme probably identified themselves as citizens and recognized the citizen status of their fellows through the shared practice of horse-breeding. Other cities in archaic Greece conform to this model.

East Greek cities in general were renowned for their horsemen, so that this model of citizen horse-breeding can perhaps be considered as an Ionian feature. According to Aristotle (*Pol.* 4.1289b39–40), Magnesia on the Meander belongs to the category of equestrian oligarchies. Aelian (*VH* 14.46) reports the pair comprising a horseman

and a servant carrying a javelin, with the addition of a hunting dog, as a typical Magnesians strategy. The reputation of the Colophonians horsemen was so well established too that, according to Strabo (14.1.28), 'in any obstinate engagement, on whichever side the Colophonians horsemen were auxiliaries, they decided it'. Even the Lydian king Alyattes stood in fear of the Colophonians horsemen, whom he tried to bribe and subsequently slaughtered (Polyaen. *Strat.* 7.2.2). All these traditions reveal an essential aspect of Ionian warfare. They might also allude to a specific criterion of citizenship, as documented for Cyme, although we lack for these other Ionian cities any explicit link between horsemanship and citizenship.

A more convincing case, where horse-breeding appears as a citizen performance, is offered by the Chalcidian Hippobotai. Although they have been repeatedly considered as an aristocracy,²⁶ the Hippobotai of Chalcis fit well into an archaic definition of citizenship through horse-breeding. There is indeed a strong association between the city of Chalcis and the Hippobotai. Herodotus (5.77), our most ancient evidence on the subject, equated the territory of Chalcis with the 'land of the Hippobotai' (ἐπὶ τῶν Ἱπποβοτέων τῇ χώρῃ), on which Athens settled four thousand klerouchs after defeating the Chalcidians in 506. A similar expression occurs in Aelian (*VH* 6.1), who refers to it as the 'Hippobotan land' (τὴν Ἱππόβοτον καλουμένην χώραν). It should be added that during the second half of the sixth century the Chalcidians struck silver coins bearing, respectively, on their obverse facing views of a quadriga (tridrachm), a horseman with a second horse (drachma), and a horseman alone (hemidrachm). These symbols disappeared on coins of the early fifth century, and were replaced on the reverse by a wheel, 'probably an abbreviation for the quadriga of the earlier issues'.²⁷

Despite this strong civic tonality, the ancient authors normally associated the Hippobotai with oligarchs, and not with the whole citizen body. According to Herodotus (5.77), 'Hippobotai' was the name given to the men of substance among the Chalcidians (οἱ δὲ Ἱπποβοταὶ ἐκαλέοντο οἱ παχέες τῶν Χαλκιδέων), therefore implying that the Athenian klerouchs were given the best lands in the Lelantine plain. This concurs with the (later) Aristotelian taxonomy of an equestrian oligarchy. Aristotle indeed classified Chalcis and Eretria among the *poleis* of archaic times whose strength lay in their horsemen, used for their wars against their neighbours. Both cities consequently belong to the sort of oligarchy based on wealth and property, such as horse-breeding, for 'it is not easy to rear horses without being rich' (*Pol.* 4.1289b33–9). This definition was then reproduced by later historians. Explicitly quoting Aristotle, Strabo (10.1.8) alludes to the 'rule of the Hippobotai' (ἡ τῶν Ἱπποβοτῶν

καλουμένη πολιτεία) in reference to the time when Chalcidians sent out colonies to Italy and Sicily in the eighth century. He even defines them as ‘a property class ruling aristocratically’ (ἀπὸ τιμημάτων ἄνδρες ἀριστοκρατικῶς ἄρχοντες), a qualification that is obviously an extrapolation based on the Solonian property class of the *Hippeis*. Finally, Plutarch (*Per.* 23.4) refers to the Hippobotai as ‘those among the Chalcidians who were pre-eminent for wealth and reputation’ (Χαλκιδέων μὲν τοὺς ἱπποβότας λεγομένους πλούτῳ καὶ δόξῃ διαφέροντας), explaining how these men were exiled by Pericles after the uprising of Euboean cities in 446 and the subsequent re-establishment of Athenian control over Chalcis.²⁸

Despite the recurrent classical and later association between Hippobotai and oligarchs, intended as a subgroup of the whole citizen body, it is tempting to see the Hippobotai as a group of horse-breeders who constituted the *whole* Chalcidian citizen body. This activity would have been a shared characteristic of the community, and perhaps a formal criterion for participating in it. It looks as if the Chalcidians had adapted the Homeric epithet ‘grazed by horses’, usually applied to the plain of Argos (Ἄργος ἱππόβοτον), to refer to their land, and by extension to the citizens. In precisely the same way Euripides (*Or.* 1000) named the Argive Atreus *hippobotēs*, ‘feeder of horses’, and Pindar (*Isthm.* 4.14) praised the Theban Cleonymidai for being *hippotrophoi*. Similarly, Bacchylides (11.114) describes the city of Metapontum as *hippotrophos* (ἱπποτρόφον πόλιν), ‘horse-nourishing’, leading Joseph Carter to allude to ‘a horse-breeding society’ for the sixth-century *polis*.²⁹

In classical times the word ‘Hippobotai’ still referred to the whole *polis* of Chalcis in expressions such as the ‘land of the Hippobotai’, but it became mostly associated with an elite of property holders. Do we have to infer that the Hippobotai had constituted by this time a privileged subgroup within the citizen body? It is, of course, possible that citizenship has come to be defined in different ways, so that ownership of horses represented merely a symbol of social status of the sole wealthy members within an enlarged Chalcidian community. But we have to keep in mind that the two major episodes associated with the Hippobotai are related to wars with Athens. In 506 the newly established Cleisthenic regime faced a joint attack by Boiotians and Chalcidians in northern Attica, whereas in 446 Pericles invaded Euboea in order to expel the Hippobotai. One wonders whether the oligarchical definition of the Hippobotai was not actually coined by the Athenians in contrast to their isonomic and democratic regime. As Giuseppe Nenci comments, the Herodotean definition as *παχέες* ‘è chiaramente di origine popolare e denigratoria’.³⁰ Such a stratagem recalls the analogous denigration of the Spartan *homoioi* in the context

of the Delian League, as well as the subsequent Spartan mirage that has long misled Spartan historiography.³¹ We have to be careful not to reproduce the same error for the Chalcidian Hippobotai. A fully citizen identity could have been turned into a hatred of an elite regime by the Athenians for the sake of political criticism and presented as the ideological justification of a war of subjugation. In archaic Chalcis, horse-breeding was thus probably associated with the performance of citizenship.³²

Despite Athenian propaganda, horse-breeding and equestrian duty were the price of citizenship in several archaic cities. They both appear as major elements of citizen behaviour. In these cities men who individually engaged in such activities could reasonably claim participation in the life and values of the civic community. By breeding a horse, the individual was accepted by other community members as a legitimate and honourable partner. Of course, horse-breeding was not necessarily intended as the only citizen requirement and even in these cities other criteria could probably validate the citizenship of an individual or lead to enfranchisement.

3. Performing Luxury

Another example of citizen performance in archaic cities is offered by the various attitudes linked to what we can term ‘luxury’. As we will see, performing luxury was not restricted to showing off one’s wealth during feasting or processions. In a citizen’s life, it was part of everyday experience, as the great diversity of trivial details recorded by ancient authors makes clear for various cities. Of course, we must first clarify the behaviours covered by the notion of ‘luxury’.

In modern languages, the word ‘luxury’ denotes a state of great comfort and extravagant living. It also applies to inessential but desirable objects that are expensive or difficult to obtain. Such a kind of luxury was not highly valued in the ancient world. A great majority of ancient sources portray it as a symptom of moral decadence, while others record a series of sumptuary laws, either in Greek cities or in Rome, designed to curb the display of wealth at funerals. The debate on the private display of wealth and its compatibility with collective interests finds particular resonance in Roman authors. It can be condensed in Cicero’s statement (*Mur.* 36): *odit populus Romanus privatam luxuriam, publicam magnificentiam diligit*, ‘the Roman people disapproves of private luxury, but admires public magnificence’. The same is true for the Greek world, and the critique of luxury, broadly encompassed in the notion of *truphē*, is a recurring topic in Greek

literature and politics.³³ Although luxury was commonly deprecated in the classical and Hellenistic world, its assessment was however completely different in archaic Greece. Throughout the archaic period, indeed, luxury was a positive quality that was highly prized by poets through the notion of *habrosunē*. As emphasized by Leslie Kurke, *habros* and its derivatives functioned as ‘positively charged markers’ throughout the sixth century, even if *habrosunē* had become a ‘dirty word’ in the fifth century.³⁴ Far away from the critics of later times, luxury was actually an accepted lifestyle in various archaic cities. In his seminal study on the legacy of the Eastern world to Greek cities, Santo Mazzarino was probably the first scholar to insist on luxury as an essential feature of the archaic world. According to the Italian historian, *habrotēs* typified a distinguishing lifestyle, which was learned by the Eastern Greeks from their Oriental neighbours, particularly the Lydians.³⁵ Although he then assimilated *habrosunē* with the behaviours of an (old-style) aristocracy, I will follow his path in exploring the topic anew in relation to the performance of citizenship.

A good example of how luxury pervaded the life of archaic citizens is provided by a poem of Xenophanes of Colophon (*fr.* 3 West).³⁶ Xenophanes despises his fellow Colophonians, ‘no less than a thousand in general’ (οὐ μείους ὥσπερ χίλιοι εἰς ἐπίπαν), for learning ‘useless luxuries’ (ἄβροσύνας ἀνωφελέας) from the Lydians and going around the agora in purple robes, exulting in the splendour of their hair, and drenched with the scent of the most refined unguents. All these features are commonly attributed to the lifestyle of an archaic aristocracy and Xenophanes’ critical tone has been interpreted to allude to the unpopular rule of a hated elite.³⁷ As classical and Hellenistic inscriptions show, Xenophanes’ allusion to a thousand men rather refers to citizens, and more precisely to *all* the citizens of Colophon. This group parading in the agora was not a restricted elite, conceived as a privileged subgroup of the citizenry. It represented the entire citizen body, at least on a symbolic level. As further exemplified by Maurizio Giangiulio in this volume ([chapter 11](#)), fixed-number communities were not oligarchies in the usual meaning of the word, as Busolt thought (see above, [section 2](#)), but political communities in the making. Whatever the reasons for Xenophanes’ lament and criticism (probably some bitterness due to his exile), these elaborate manners, sweet perfumes, and wealth were not primarily the symbols of an oligarchy, but key features in the definition of the Colophonian citizen body. Of course, we do not know if there were other criteria for participation in the Colophonian citizenry—without necessarily speaking of legal requirements, as we would expect in a fifth- or fourth-century *polis*. It is clear, nevertheless, that Xenophanes was

describing the standard performance of citizenship in archaic Colophon. These behaviours were probably expected from any individual with the intention of going to the agora, that is attending and speaking at the assembly of Colophon in the presence of his fellow citizens.

This prescriptive attitude is not a Colophonian peculiarity. A similar statement repeatedly occurs for various other *poleis*, mostly among the Ionian cities and the western colonies in South Italy. One of the best documented examples is the Achaian city of Sybaris, renowned throughout the ancient world for its wealth and the luxurious life of its citizens.³⁸ Sybaris ceased to exist in 510 BC, when it was razed to the ground by the rival city of Croton. In the search for archaic luxury, Sybaris offers a very interesting case.

Unfortunately, we lack the contemporary evidence of some local archaic poet, such as Xenophanes for Colophon, but the sources are numerous. A large collection of Sybarite stories (*logoi sybaritikoî*) is known in ancient authors from the fifth century on, and Aristophanes (*Wasps* 1259, 1427–36) already referred to Sybarite jokes. Sybarite stories were intended as funny and hence enjoyed a long popularity. Apart from a few sentences in historians (Herodotus, Strabo, and Diodoros), the bulk of our information comes from antiquarian literature, mainly from Athenaios. Book 12 of the *Deipnosophistai*, which is entirely devoted to luxury, includes a large section on the Sybarites (518c–522a) full of improbable and burlesque anecdotes. The sources are not easily interpreted, but they should not be dismissed as mere comical tales, even if few stories can be traced back to a classical author in order to assess the degree to which they have been modified by later writers. A notable exception is the story of Smindyrides of Sybaris, one of the wooers of Agariste of Sicyon. Herodotus (6.127) already presents him as ‘the most luxurious man of his day (ἐπὶ πλεῖστον δὲ χλιδῆς) at a time when Sybaris was at the height of its prosperity’. Other details were subsequently added by later authors (from Timaios to Aelian) who greatly exaggerated this story by having Smindyrides travel to Sicyon with a thousand cooks, and as many fowlers, fishermen, and slaves.³⁹ The basic elements of the story and the overall impression might be accurate, but the numbers were certainly inflated. If these anecdotes were amplified through time and if their perspective, as we will see, was re-elaborated by later authors, the opulence of archaic Sybaris and its citizens is certainly not an invention.

In order to extract with confidence a distinctive Sybarite lifestyle out of these folk tales, our sources have to be subjected to a strict criticism. Overall, two layers of further elaboration are clearly discernible: a Crotoniate hostile perspective (initially late archaic and

classical) and a moralizing disapproval of luxury (typical of Hellenistic and Roman times), both resulting in a strongly negative presentation of archaic Sybaris intended as a kind of 'sin city'.

A significant part of the tradition about Sybaris concerns the city's feud with its neighbour and enemy Croton, which eventually annihilated it in 510. Accordingly, our sources often reproduce a distorted vision of the events promoted by the victor. It is not the place here to survey the chain of events that led to the complete destruction of Sybaris.⁴⁰ It will be sufficient here to state that Pythagoras' move to Croton in about 530 had serious consequences for Crotoniate politics, leading to the establishment of a regime based on esoteric philosophy and radical austerity in citizen lifestyle, both promoted as conducive to good government and civic virtue. After the battle of the Sagra, which resulted in a severe defeat against the Locrians, Pythagoras invigorated the low morale of the Crotoniates by promoting an ascetic attitude to life and citizen duty. It could only be opposed to the luxurious Sybarite lifestyle which the Pythagoreans probably overstated and amplified.⁴¹ Many Sybarite stories hence establish a strong contrast between the two ways of life. For example, the Sybarites were said to be averse to any type of manual work, so that they could not understand why, in a city of such importance, Crotoniate athletes were supposed to prepare and dig up the ground of the palestra themselves (Athen. 12.518d). The opposition also extended to sacred matters. According to the Crotoniates, the Sybarites infuriated the gods by their repeated acts of impiety, such as murdering the thirty ambassadors from Croton or slaughtering the supporters of the tyrant Telys who had sought refuge at the steps of the gods' altars (Athen. 12.521e-f). From a religious point of view, a war against Sybaris was thus both necessary and justified, so that the complete destruction of a sinful city appeared as a legitimate divine and human retribution. If further elaboration by later Pythagoreans is not impossible, the core of the tradition on the rivalry between Sybaris and Croton certainly originated in the immediate aftermath of the war. The Crotoniate Pythagoreans had to substantiate their extreme deeds. Formulated to the disadvantage of the Sybarites, these *logoi* were mainly used by the Crotoniates for the purposes of propaganda.

This inverted mirror does not, however, preclude any plausibility as to the reported Sybarite lifestyle. Indeed, if the Pythagoreans elaborated an image of Sybaris as the ultimate anti-*polis*, Croton had itself become a kind of counter-model under their leadership. In rejecting a meat diet and the sacrifice as an essential link between the community and the gods, the Pythagoreans also turned their back on the cornerstone of the Greek *polis*. This also explains the unusual

severity of the defeat inflicted upon the Sybarites, which is unprecedented in Greek history: all prisoners were slaughtered, the city was razed to the ground, and the ruins were flooded by the diversion of the river Krathis. The extreme character of this type of war involving annihilation contradicts the more usual hoplite tactics with their moderate casualties.⁴² In every respect, the Pythagorean Croton itself appears as an anti-*polis*, and Sybaris is perhaps more the anti-Croton than an unusual archaic city.

Beyond the Pythagorean propaganda, the fate of Sybaris came to be regarded as the consequences of an excess of luxury. This principle of historical causation is well attested in Hellenistic historiography,⁴³ and as early perhaps as the classical period (see Hdt. 1.155). The concept of *truphē*, which arose during the fifth century as a characteristic feature of Oriental people, was perceived as having debilitating effects on both individuals and cities. It was a symbol of *hybris* and decadence.⁴⁴ It first offered a behavioural explanation for Persia's defeats in 490–479, but the perspective was subsequently extended to all Barbarians and to various Greek cities. Timaios of Tauromenion, who wrote extensively on Sybaris (according to the various quotations of his work in Athenaios), complied with this idea, as did Strabo: ὑπὸ μέντοι τρυφῆς καὶ ὕβρεως ἄπασαν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀφῆρέθησαν ὑπὸ Κροτωνιατῶν, 'by reason of luxury and insolence they were deprived of all their felicity by the Crotoniates' (6.1.13). From prosperity (*eudaimonia*) and unrestrained ostentation (*truphē*) to arrogance (*hubris*) and destruction, the story of Achaian Sybaris was supposed to illustrate a general scheme. An even stronger moral perspective then appeared in Athenaios' *Deipnosophistai*, who stamped *truphē* as a strongly negative and reprehensible behaviour. Again, Sybaris was castigated as a 'sin city' that deserved a place in the hall of fame of corrupted nations, which would be Book 12 of the *Deipnosophistai*.

However, the condemnation of luxury and the idea, whether historical or moral, that luxurious living brings on ruin are anachronistic conceptions when applied to the history of Sybaris. As already noted, throughout the archaic period, luxury then termed *habrosunē* was a positive quality. In this sense, the Sybarite way of life simply echoes Sappho's pragmatic and unashamed statement ἔγω δὲ φίλημι' ἄβροσύναν, 'I love luxury' (*fr.* 58.25 Lobel-Page) or Solon's verse which equates ἀβρὰ παθεῖν to riches and comforts in food and dress (*fr.* 24.4 West). It also echoes the luxurious lifestyle of the Lydians, praised by so many of the lyric poets: Sappho extols elaborate Lydian dress items (*fr.* 39, 98 Lobel-Page), while Alcman celebrates the luxury of a Lydian wimple (*fr.* 1.67–8 Campbell) and contrasts the country boors of Thessaly to a 'man of highest Sardis' (*fr.* 16

Campbell).

Overall, the critical tone that has subsequently shaped the whole tradition about Sybaris is therefore inappropriate for an approach to archaic behaviours. Despite the biased perspective of our sources, the luxurious lifestyle of the Sybarites is not to be challenged. Beyond the unavoidable historiographical discussion, Sybarite luxury has thus to be valued historically. According to the Sybarite stories, it probably extended to all aspects of individual and social life: elaborate purple dress, sophisticated food, endless feasting, much sought-after tranquillity and easy life, and so on. Even the most fanciful tale can allude to an existing although distorted behaviour.

Quoting Aristotle's lost *Constitution of the Sybarites*, Athenaios (12.520c) reports that 'they had carried their luxurious refinement to such a point that their horses were accustomed to dance to the flute even at their feasts'. The Deipnosophist then relates how their Crotoniate enemy took advantage of this custom by playing a tune on the battlefield and how the Sybarite horses danced away the battle. What seems to be a 'good after-dinner story'⁴⁵ reveals the existence of a highly skilled 'cavalry' trained to perform specific figures.⁴⁶ Selective breeds were developed in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe, such as the Lipizzaners of the Spanish Riding School of Vienna. Classical dressage movements and training, whose principles are based on the writings of Xenophon, were intended to prepare powerful and agile horses not only for parade, but also and more specifically for warfare. It was highly fashionable in the nobility of modern Europe, and kings and princes spent considerable resources to provide their army with such practised units. It is likely that dressage also existed in archaic Greece: we clearly see it, for example, on a Protoattic oinochoe.⁴⁷ Highly skilled horses suppose a collective involvement. Accordingly, the so-called refinement of the Sybarite behaviours probably refers to the existence of intensively trained horsemen, as it could be part of a citizen education. There is indeed more reference to such tutelage.

According to Athenaios (12.519c), 'the horsemen of the Sybarites, more than 5,000 strong, paraded with saffron-coloured coats over their breastplates, and in summer their young men (οἱ νεώτεροι) journeyed to the Caves of the Nymphs on the Lusias river and there spent time in every form of luxury'. The *neōteroi*'s summer retreat to a sanctuary of the Nymphs is strongly reminiscent of some kind of initiation rite for citizens-to-be. More specifically, the word νεώτεροι is probably a rephrasing of an actual age group within the archaic Sybarite society that was later equated with the late classical and Hellenistic ephebic institution. It becomes obvious indeed that some sort of citizen education is implied when considering this other story

reported by Athenaios (12.518e): ‘It was customary also among the Sybarites for the boys until they reached the age of young manhood (τοὺς παῖδας μέχρι τῆς τῶν ἐφήβων ἡλικίας) to wear purple cloaks and have their hair tied up in braids secured by gold ornaments.’ Athenaios’ source could be Timaios of Tauromenion, whose quotations are recurrent in his Sybarite account. Having spent most of his life in exile in Athens, Timaios probably applies to the Sybarite youth the names of the corresponding Athenian institutions. The words *paides* and *ephēboi* could therefore allude to the existence of age groups of young men trained as soldiers and destined to become citizens.

The two stories insist on the luxurious dress of these men, which is clearly defining of a Sybarite *habitus*. Incidentally, both the parading horsemen with their saffron-coloured coats and the young men with their purple cloaks are reminiscent of the Colophonian citizens going around the agora. Again, the citizen tone is nothing but explicit in this lavish and imposing performance. As has been insistently noted by various Italian historians,⁴⁸ it must be stressed that in the archaic period the idea of luxury (*habrosunē*) was not conceived as an individual eccentricity, but as a shared value, as a collective *ethos*. If several individuals, such as Smindyrides, are singled out for their manners, it is also as typical representatives of their city. We are thus not only dealing with an ethic of individual achievement allowing the establishment of ranks among the citizens, but with a general trend towards conspicuous consumption as the distinctive expression of a community lifestyle. *Sybarizein* (‘living like a Sybarite’), which is attested as early as Aristophanes (*Peace* 344), denotes a way of life associated with the city of Sybaris as a whole. As Mario Lombardo emphasizes, in archaic Greece, *habrosunē* was not a strictly elitist behaviour; it pertains rather to a large community. To what extent then could it be considered the foundation of a specific model of archaic citizenship?

According to Athenaios, there were ‘more than 5,000 horsemen’. If not exaggerated, this figure would represent a very large number of Sybarite horsemen. Considering the strong citizen connotation of horse-breeding and citizenship in Sybaris as in other archaic cities, this figure could also represent the entire citizen body of the Sybarites. Is it enough? Of course, by comparison with the 50 or 60,000 adult male Athenian citizens in 431,⁴⁹ this would appear as a very restricted and oligarchical citizenry, which is reminiscent of the Athenian regime of the Five Thousand called into being to replace the Four Hundred in 411 BC. Again, reading archaic history into the tracks of classical—and especially classical Athenian—history is misleading. Five thousand citizens, whether or not on a symbolic level, would nevertheless make Sybaris a very strong and populous archaic city,

five times for instance the size of Colophon. By the way, in Sybaris, horsemanship may have been only one among many other behaviours linked to a citizen status.

Other figures of the Sybarite citizen body are known from ancient authors. Diodoros of Sicily (12.9.1–2) gives the figure of 300,000 citizens, which corresponds to the number of men reportedly brought together against Croton in 510, as stated by both Strabo (6.1.13) and Diodoros (12.9.5). The latter adds that the Crotoniates were (only) 100,000. Pseudo-Skymnos (340) gives the figure at close to 100,000 *astoi* for Sybaris. Though probably overestimated, these numbers should not necessarily be dismissed as ‘inhabitants’ rather than ‘citizens’. However, it must be acknowledged that two levels of political affiliation are actually conflated in these figures: the Sybarite citizen status and the Achaian ethnic identity, both referred to in Diodoros by the word *politai*. As has been convincingly argued by Emanuele Greco and Carmine Ampolo, these figures should indeed be set against Strabo’s statement (6.1.13) on the large empire of the Sybarites, who exercised their hegemony over four tribes and twenty-five cities. The number of 300,000 citizens may therefore refer to the Sybarites *and* their allies.⁵⁰

Regarding the nature and extent of Sybarite citizenship, Diodoros’ text (12.9.1–2) is worth quoting in full, for it reveals a very unusual feature for a Greek archaic city:

Ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν χρόνοις Ἑλλήνων κτισάντων κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πόλιν Σύβαριν, συνέβη ταύτην λαβεῖν ταχεῖαν αὐξήσιν διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῆς χώρας. Κεμένης γὰρ ἀνὰ μέσον δυεῖν ποταμῶν, τοῦ τε Κράθιος καὶ τοῦ Συβάριος, ἀφ’ οὗ ταύτης ἔτυχε τῆς προσηγορίας, οἱ κατοικισθέντες νεμόμενοι πολλὰν καὶ καρποφόρον χώραν μεγάλους ἐκτήσαντο πλούτους. Πολλοὶς δὲ μεταδιδόντες τῆς πολιτείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο προέβησαν, ὥστε δόξαί ποτὶ πρόεχεν τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν οἰκούντων, πολυανθρωπία τε τοσοῦτο διήνεγκαν, ὥστε τὴν πόλιν ἔχειν πολιτῶν τριάκοντα μυριάδας.

When in former times the Greeks had founded Sybaris in Italy, the city had enjoyed a rapid growth because of the fertility of the land. For lying as the city did between two rivers, the Krathis and the Sybaris, from which it derived its name, its inhabitants, who tilled an extensive and fruitful countryside, came to possess great riches. And since they kept granting citizenship to many people, they increased to such an extent that they were considered to be by far the first among the inhabitants of Italy; indeed, they so excelled in population that the city possessed 300,000 citizens.

The ancient historian is highlighting three significant elements: a) the fertility of the Sybarite territory, in terms of both land and rivers; b) the ensuing prosperity of its inhabitants; and c) the large extent of the citizen body. The first two characteristics are common knowledge in Sybarite stories⁵¹ and are related to various other ancient states as well.⁵² The third and last point is an interesting statement of the

Sicilian historian. Although linked to the 300,000 citizens and allies within the Sybarite empire, the liberality of the Sybarites in granting citizenship appears to Diodoros as an essential feature of the Sybarite identity, worthy of being singled out. To say the least, this generosity was contrary to the usual restraint shown by most classical Greek *poleis*. To fully understand Diodoros' statement, we must indeed remember the contrast drawn by Philippe Gauthier between 'Roman generosity' and 'Greek avarice' in the granting of citizenship.⁵³ This behaviour was also contrary to most of the Greek colonies in the Western world (with the exception of course of Cyrene under the reign of Battos II, cf. Hdt. 4.159).

Focusing on the extent of the citizen body in the Greek cities of Southern Italy, Benedetto Bravo asks this simple question: what was the judicial status of those who, being free men, settled in a colony without being invited to do so after the initial stage of the foundation, that is after the original distribution of the land? In answering this question, he distinguishes two very different concepts of the citizen body in the Western colonies. In most of the Greek *poleis*, such as Syracuse, the original settlers and their descendants long remained a closed group that alone enjoyed citizenship, while many free men were simply denied the citizen status and all attendant rights such as the possession of land. On the contrary, the liberality of the Sybarites means that the city kept granting the citizen status not only to additional settlers coming from Greece but perhaps to some native Italians as well.⁵⁴

In linking this liberal citizenship policy with the great riches derived from the land, Diodoros is implicitly establishing a relationship between wealth and citizen status. This does not mean that the Sybarite citizenship was primarily based on property qualification. In a city renowned for its lavish level of expenditure in every aspect of individual and social life, the acknowledgement of a citizen status by the members of the community could rather be tied to the performance of luxury, which had become a prescriptive pattern of Sybarite lifestyle. Multiple behaviours modelled on the shared value of luxury would then be of primary importance in the admission into the Sybarite citizen body. The fact that great riches were the common fate of many Sybarite citizens can be paralleled with Aristotle's statement about Colophon. The Stagirite (*Pol.* 4.1290b) notes, as an unusual feature for a Greek city, whether a democracy or an oligarchy, that the wealthy Colophonians were in greater number than the poor. In both Sybaris and Colophon, the performance of citizenship was strongly related to the practice of *habrosunē*, which itself could be associated with what I term in the first chapter of this volume (chapter 1, section 3) an 'economy-driven

citizenship’.

Conversely, various behaviours were probably inconsistent with a citizen status, that is with the luxurious and quiet life of the Sybarites. As Athenaios (12.518c–d) reports, ‘the Sybarites were the first to forbid noise-producing crafts from being established within the city (ἐπιδημεῖν τῇ πόλει), such as blacksmiths, carpenters, and the like, their object being to have their sleep undisturbed in any way; it was not permitted even to keep a cock inside the city’. This banal Sybarite joke can probably be best interpreted in the light of Aristotle’s general theory (*Pol.* 3.1278a) of the occasional exclusion of craftsmen (*banausoi*) from citizenship.⁵⁵ Whereas Aristotle associates this exclusion with a lack of virtue (*aretē*), artisans having no knowledge or practice of the value of a good man, the Sybarites conceived it as a disturbance to their lifestyle, even if some details are clearly later ad hoc additions for the sake of the joke. Not only did they forbid them to reside in the city, but they probably also excluded them from citizenship on behavioural grounds. Note indeed that the verb ἐπιδημέω is commonly associated with foreigners, that is non-citizens.⁵⁶

In sum, luxury and its performance seem to offer a very sound model of archaic citizenship, although it might appear—at least by classical standards⁵⁷—as a singular one. But it was certainly no oddity. Let us remember that Thucydides (1.6) opposes two very different ways of life (*diatai*): an old one, *to habrodiaiton*, enshrined in luxury (such as linen undergarments and golden hair clips), which used to be common among Ionian people, and a more modest style of dressing, more in conformity with contemporary ideas, which was first adopted by the Lakedaimonians and then, after the Persian Wars, by the Athenians. Obviously, Sybaris belonged to the first category; hence the various Sybarite stories that stood in contrast to Spartan values.⁵⁸ Ultimately, this lifestyle can also be traced back to the enjoyable life of the Homeric Phaiakians (*Od.* 8.248–9), which has certainly offered to various Greek cities a desirable model to match.

As an alternative to the classical model of (Athenian) citizenship, as promoted by Aristotle and a long tradition of political and legal studies since the nineteenth century, a performative approach to citizenship, as exemplified through Colophon or Sybaris, certainly offers a stimulating pathway into archaic history. As Carmine Ampolo wrote, ‘in fin dei conti ripensare oggi Sibari vuol dire ripensare l’arcaismo e la polis arcaica’.⁵⁹

The examples discussed here show that in various archaic *poleis* citizenship appears to have been conceived as a performance, more perhaps than as a granted status enshrined in legal criteria. In searching for a shared experience, individuals established a set of common values and behaviours, whether collective or individual, that soon became patterns of civic identity allowing them to distinguish between insiders and outsiders.

This challenging model of archaic citizenship as a performed status entails a further analogy with the elite status. Of course, the behaviours discussed here (horse-breeding and luxury habits) can be stigmatized as (mere) elite behaviours. For sure also, archaic citizens were an elite vis-à-vis non-citizens. But, on a more fundamental level, the nature of citizenship and the structure of the citizen body were closely related in some archaic cities to the way the elite could be defined, without automatically equating one with the other.

As I demonstrated in my book *Le prestige des élites*, the old notion of a nobility ruling archaic cities and enjoying a life of pleasures thanks to their riches, as a kind of leisure class, is both obsolete and irrelevant so far as the extant sources are concerned.⁶⁰ Conversely, honour and social esteem were key patterns in the construction of a social hierarchy. In most ancient Greek cities, rather than being ascribed or inherited, the elite status was mostly achieved through a constant investment in time-, money-, and energy-consuming practices, such as stating a genealogy, negotiating a marriage, collecting world artefacts, erecting monumental offerings, and so on. Depending on the local circumstances, there were countless opportunities to show, maintain, enhance, or acquire an elite status in most archaic *poleis*.

As I argue here, behaviours were also of primary importance in achieving a citizen position within a community. Taking part in a public festival, feasting with fellows, training with a view to military engagements, but also breeding horses or complying with the global image of the *polis* through an ostentatiously lavish lifestyle were essential behaviours that could be expected from citizens or would-be citizens, and perhaps even from aspiring citizens. These 'citizen strategies', as I would term them, were not only demonstrative behaviours on the part of enfranchised citizens, but also potential tools used by candidates for a citizen status. They were part of a distinctive 'citizen *habitus*'. The essential points in this concept of archaic citizenship are the civic recognition and the social acceptance by fellow members of the community. Embracing the behaviours of the citizens was perhaps the best way to be acknowledged as a citizen.

This means that in some archaic cities, citizenship was defined—at least in part—as elite status was, that is through a constant investment in public strategies of recognition.

In this sense, both elite and citizen statuses would have been constructed through behaviours. Is there any difference, therefore, between what we would call ‘citizen strategies’, on the one hand, and ‘elite strategies’ on the other? And, if they are contrasting behaviours, what is the nature of their differences? How much would performing as a citizen be distinct from performing as an elite?

For the past two decades, Ian Morris has offered a simple answer to all these questions by promoting a dichotomous model of ancient societies.⁶¹ According to Morris, archaic history is best understood as a conflict between two antithetical cultures: the middling ideology and the elitist ideology. The elitist ideology reinforced solidarity within an international aristocracy through common values of excellence. It was the cement of a group that ‘wanted to fashion itself as a ruling class by claiming to monopolize a high culture beyond the reach of the masses’. The elitist tastes mainly include the heroic past and heavenly luxury, the east and Orientalizing goods, the symposium and interstate games, foreign friendship and hospitality, all symbols of undisguised superiority over the mass of moderate (and poor) citizens. It was a class phenomenon. Likewise, the middling ideology was ‘a class- and gender-based ideology, working in the interest of the less well-off men but leaving room for others to use it for their own ends’. Although theorized by educated men, this ideology was at the roots of what the American political theorist Robert Dahl terms the ‘Strong Principle of Equality’,⁶² which allegedly led to the establishment of democracies in the classical world. According to Morris, the salient features of the ideal middling men (*hoi metrioi* or *mesoi*) are already perceptible from the eighth century. Even if they were not constituent of a *Mittelschicht*, the middling men were nevertheless intended by archaic poets as self-sufficient farmers. More precisely, they were part of an ideological construct, allowing all citizens, regardless of their wealth, to locate themselves in the middle (*to meson*) if they chose to do so. In this sense, even the archaic authors can be distinguished according to their attitude: Homer would thus stand at the head of the elitist ideology, Hesiod in the middling. Around 500, however, elitism collapsed and the middling ideology eventually prevailed, steering for the democratic revolution of the classical city. Yet, these antithetical cultures remained a matter of political dissent between the *dēmos* and an elite of birth, wealth, or education throughout the classical period.

Such a reconstruction of the archaic world originates from two major biases: first, there is a backwards reading of the classical middling ideology into archaic texts; second, an extension to the

whole Greek world of a primarily Athenian construct regardless of historical developments in other cities. In Morris' work, the theorization of a middling ideology rests on a preliminary study of the speeches delivered in law courts, political assemblies, and public funerals in classical Athens, not to mention the dramas performed in state festivals and the philosophical treatises. It is then perhaps not a surprise that Morris' theoretical model of a dichotomous archaic culture is in fact extremely close to the perspective elaborated by Josiah Ober on classical Athenian society. Ober imagines Athenian political history as the product of a long-standing opposition between the mass of citizens and the elite, as a struggle arising from a conflict between aristocratic values and demotic sensibilities.⁶³ To put it briefly, Morris' view of the archaic world, explicitly and deliberately elaborated from a fourth-century perspective, offers a convincing prequel to Ober's historical account of classical Athens. Though perfectly coherent, this comprehensive model of Greek history, as reconstructed by various historians, nevertheless draws on a circular argument, for it fails to produce an independent and critical view of archaic history. Filling in earlier periods of cultural history by analogy to later literature almost always stresses formal continuities and reinforces a questionable picture of a historical linear development. Such a teleological approach is definitely not the best way, *pace* Morris, to pursue what Foucault castigated as the 'chimera of origins'.

Despite early and thorough critics,⁶⁴ such a model of the archaic world has flourished in recent scholarship. Yet the existence of a so-called 'middling ideology' in the archaic period is little more than a chimera. Besides methodological dissent on a backward-looking exegesis of archaic texts, I strongly argue in favour of a Greek society wholly nurtured by the culture of competition.⁶⁵ The agonistic mentality is certainly one of the most significant features of ancient Greek civilization: 'always be the best and be superior to others' is a Homeric principle (*Il.* 6.208; 11.784) that enjoyed a wide currency. The values of competition were treasured by many people throughout time regardless of one's position in the social spectrum. Both the elite and the 'common people' shared the same agonistic mentality, for it was an essential feature in the recognition of the former by the latter. According to Nicole Loraux, even the most distinctive performance of the Athenian democracy, the funeral speech (*epitaphios logos*), was deeply rooted in an agonistic culture.⁶⁶ Simply put, the ancient Greek city was not schizophrenic.

So, what could be the difference between 'citizen strategies' and 'elite strategies'? Rather than being juxtaposed, the two concepts are closely related. As concerns the nature of their discrepancy, it might be quantitative rather than qualitative. Even if no specific lower limit

can be established to both citizen and elite statuses in every case, the difference between them may be closer to successive degrees on a scale. ‘Citizen strategies’ and ‘elite strategies’ were thus not conflicting, but supplementing behaviours in the same process of an individual self-achievement. From a certain level of social investment, which varied from one city to another depending on the shared values, a citizen behaviour could turn into an elite strategy. The same practice could then embrace both dimensions. There has been a long discussion on the nature of the archaic *symposion* in order to decide whether it was an elite (Murray) or a citizen strategy (Schmitt-Pantel).⁶⁷ Depending on which aspect each city put the emphasis on, it helped to define either an elite within the citizen body or the citizen body itself—which was, as already noted, an elite vis-à-vis non-citizens. To return to Aeolian Cyme, breeding one horse was clearly a criterion for citizenship, whereas having several horses was probably a matter of pride among the citizens. And of course, having more than one horse was not necessarily considered as an anti-*polis* attitude. Elites were also—and primarily—citizens, while not all citizens belonged, of course, to the elite.

In communities that were probably not defined by any legal or institutional framework, participation in the group affairs and adhesion to the common values were of primary significance in the process of shaping the *polis* contour, in making the community. In these archaic cities behaviours allowed individuals to assert their status, whether social or political, and to have it acknowledged by other members of the group. In short, status performance was an essential part in the process of making a political community such as the archaic Greek *polis*.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I owe a particular debt to Roger Brock, whose invitation to Leeds in spring 2009 allowed me to start thinking on archaic citizenship thanks to a British Academy visiting fellowship. Sarah Morris and John Papadopoulos, who welcomed me to UCLA during spring 2011, spared me a lot of mistakes and greatly enhanced my thought. Although published after a long delay, this chapter has benefited from the writing of subsequent papers (some of them already published) in which I further explore various aspects of the question, but also thanks to the comments and critiques of other contributors to the volume, particularly Hans van Wees. As usual, any error remains mine, and I take full responsibility for the controversial or challenging opinions expressed here. Further thoughts on the subject will be

presented in a forthcoming book, *Construire la cité*.

- ¹ Manville 1990, 209.
- ² Benveniste 1970; cf. Duploux 2006b.
- ³ See the conclusion of Duploux 2006a, 289–92.
- ⁴ Manville 1990, 35; Davies 1996a and this volume (chapter 2) for a more detailed discussion.
- ⁵ Schmitt-Pantel 1990b; 1998; Schmitt-Pantel and Schnapp 1982. See also Duploux this volume (chapter 1, section 5).
- ⁶ Polignac 1995a.
- ⁷ Ismard 2010; this volume (chapter 5).
- ⁸ Blok 2005, 19.
- ⁹ Bourdieu 1977, 72; 1990, 53. See also Duploux 2014, 657.
- ¹⁰ Goldhill and Osborne 1999, 1.
- ¹¹ Farenga 2006. See my review in *AC* 79 (2010), 621–2.
- ¹² Prauscello 2014.
- ¹³ Prauscello 2014, 6 and 234–5.
- ¹⁴ Morris 1987. See also Duploux this volume, chapter 1, section 5.
- ¹⁵ Paus. 1.1.2. See Duploux 2006a, 69–70.
- ¹⁶ See also Dem. 57.67, Is. 6.65, Xen. *Mem.* 2.2.13.
- ¹⁷ Büchner 1921–2: ‘Prometheus beschränkte die Oligarchie auf 1 000 Männer’; L. Rubinstein in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1043–5.
- ¹⁸ Talamo 1973, 361.
- ¹⁹ Busolt 1920, 355 n. 1.
- ²⁰ For the ‘Thousand of Colophon’ mentioned by Xenophanes (*fr.* 3 West), see already Duploux 2013.
- ²¹ On the notions of quorum and ‘symbolic totality’, see Gauthier 1990.
- ²² Murray 1993a, 204.
- ²³ Burckhardt 2001.
- ²⁴ As emphasized by Worley 1994, 21–58.
- ²⁵ Zappeiropoulou 1999; 2006. See also Croissant 2008b. Amphora no. B3523 is reproduced on the cover by kind permission of P. Zappeiropoulou.
- ²⁶ See Thalheim 1913; Lazenby 1996; Osborne 1998b; Lubtchansky 2005, 23–6.
- ²⁷ Kraay 1976, 89–91.
- ²⁸ The identity of the new settlers, however, remains uncertain. K. Reber, M. H. Hansen, and P. Ducrey, in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 649 (Chalcis, no. 365) claim that the confiscated land was probably given to ‘the other Chalcidians and some foreigners’, the former therefore being intended to mean non-elite members of the citizen body in opposition to the Hippobotai. But the establishment of Athenian klerouchs is not unlikely, for at the same time the Hestiaians were removed from their country and supplanted by Athenian settlers (Plut. *Per.* 23.4).
- ²⁹ Carter 1994, 182.
- ³⁰ Nenci 1994, 271.
- ³¹ Cf. e.g. Hodkinson and Powell 1994.
- ³² Other examples of equestrian citizens could be developed (i.e. Eretria, Athens, Sybaris, and Corinth), see Duploux forthcoming.
- ³³ Bernhardt 2003.
- ³⁴ Kurke 1992.
- ³⁵ Mazzarino 1947. His book initiated a strong tradition in Italian scholarship on the discussion of archaic luxury, e.g. Cozzoli 1980; Nenci 1983; Lombardo 1983; Ampolo 1984a; 1984b.
- ³⁶ For full details of the argument, see Duploux 2013.

- 37 Most recently Morris 2000, 184–5.
- 38 See Callaway 1950.
- 39 See Athen. 6.273b; 12.541c (quoting Timaios); Ael. *VH* 12.24. Note that Plato (*Symp.* 197d) makes χλιδή a synonym of τροφή and ἀβρότης.
- 40 Dunbabin 1948, 359–65; De Sensi Sestito 1984, 32–51.
- 41 Talamo 1987; Ampolo 1993; Bernhardt 2003, 51–7.
- 42 Ellinger 1993, 187–95.
- 43 Passerini 1934; Schepens 2007, 258–61. *Contra* Gorman and Gorman 2007 and, more generally, Gorman and Gorman 2014, who ascribe the whole perspective to Greek authors of the Roman period, such as Athenaios.
- 44 Hall 1989.
- 45 So Rutter 1970, 170.
- 46 See Lubtchansky 1993; 2005, 43–69.
- 47 Papadopoulos 2006, 132–3, fig. 125 A–C.
- 48 See esp. Lombardo 1983; Nenci 1983.
- 49 Due to the plague, war casualties during the Peloponnesian War, and the siege of 405/4, the number of citizens dropped to some 25–30,000 in c.400. On the number of Athenian citizens, see Rhodes 1988, 271–7; Hansen 1988, 14–28.
- 50 Greco 1990; Ampolo 1993, 242–4. See also Papadopoulos 2002, 26.
- 51 For a comic version of the fertility of the rivers, for example, see the extract of Metagenes' play *The Thurio-Persians* as quoted by Athenaios (6.269f).
- 52 See Athen. 12.526f (Umbrians), 527e (Syrian cities), and 528a–b (Capua), quoting respectively Theopompos (*FGrHist* 115 F132), Poseidonios (*FGrHist* 87 F10), and Polybios (7.1.1–3). See Ampolo 1984b, 474.
- 53 See Gauthier 1974; Cartledge this volume, chapter 7.
- 54 Bravo 1992, esp. 44 and 82.
- 55 On the different cases, see Lévy 1979.
- 56 Cf. Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.61; Lys. 12.35; etc.
- 57 See, however, Miller 1997, 188–217 on the real place of 'luxury culture' in classical Athens. See also Villacèque 2008. Note also the request of the chorus of Aristophanes' *Knights* for tolerance of their lifestyle, though by this date it was only sectional.
- 58 Cf. Athen. 4.138d; 12.518e.
- 59 Ampolo 1993, 254.
- 60 Duplouy 2006a. Now Fisher and van Wees 2015b. *Contra* Stein-Hölkeskamp 1989.
- 61 Initially presented in Morris 1997 and fully developed in Morris 2000. Quoted hereafter is Morris 2000, 163 (elitist) and 119 (middling).
- 62 Cf. Dahl 1989; Morris 1996.
- 63 Ober 1989; 1998.
- 64 Hammer 2004; Kistler 2004. Hall 2014, 178–82 and Osborne 2009, 354 are also highly critical of Morris' decontextualized reading of archaic texts.
- 65 Duplouy 2006a, 271–82. There are of course strong regional and individual variations in the diffusion of this agonistic culture.
- 66 Loraux 1986, esp. 95–6.
- 67 The debate between Murray and Schmitt-Pantel is broadly synthesized in this volume (chapter 1, section 5).

Oligarchies of ‘Fixed Number’ or Citizen Bodies in the Making?

Maurizio Giangiulio

The model of the development of the state and of the idea of citizenship set out by Aristotle, though still influential among historians of political theory, tells us a great deal about Aristotle and about the activity of reflection about political practice which culminates in his work, but virtually nothing about the actual historical processes which engendered the Greek concept of citizenship.

(Davies 2004, 21)

1. Preliminary Remarks: Understanding The Early Greek POLIS

In archaic Greece social order came only gradually to be based on institutions. This required a long process of development and complex interactions.¹ This process cannot be simply explained with the dissolution and redistribution of pre-existing power, and with the emergence of a republic after the crisis of the monarchy; nor can we think that a valid explanatory model is that of the overthrow of the ruling elite which became subject to the people. By contrast, we can convincingly argue that a fundamental role in political history was played by the processes by which many societies of the Iron Age organized themselves at a local level, gradually becoming political communities with an emerging identity and a growing capacity of making common decisions.

If we look at things in this way, we should reject the idea that the

history of the archaic *polis* was defined by the succession of different constitutions, according to the interpretative model of Aristotelian origin which has strongly influenced the ancient and the modern perception of Greek political history.² It is essential to highlight the fact that the political and institutional space was not a pre-existing structure, but rather the result of a long process of definition. The archaic age did not produce any theoretical nor abstract model of constitution to the effect of organizing collective life and classifying its aspects, and no ‘constitutional thinking’ had developed before the fifth century.³ Categories such as ‘statehood’, ‘constitution’, ‘citizenship’, ‘political franchises’ are not attuned—to say the least—to the nature of political life in the archaic age.

Crucially, our analysis should stress the fact that in the archaic age neither aristocratic, nor oligarchic, timocratic, and democratic regimes existed. The vocabulary of constitutional history is one of the most significant and intriguing aspects of the impact that Aristotle’s *Politics* had on the nineteenth-century idea of ‘Greek state’. Both the idea of aristocratic and oligarchic constitutions emerging after the end of the ‘heroic monarchy’, and that of the ‘oligarchy of fixed number’, contributed to this impact.

The importance of Aristotle’s political theory in shaping the modern idea of a historical succession of constitutions (heroic monarchy, aristocracy, and oligarchy) is evident in the nineteenth-century works both of K.F. Hermann and of C. Thirwall, who were the first scholars acknowledging the fundamental role played by oligarchic regimes in the constitutional history of the Greek *poleis*.⁴ Neither Mitford nor Gillies discussed the historical value of oligarchy, and it was Thirwall who first identified aristocracy and oligarchy with the constitutional forms which followed the end of heroic monarchy. He described oligarchy as the constitution in which ‘the political rights [...] were reserved to the privileged few’,⁵ and argued that this constitution followed monarchy, and that, in turn, it was followed by timocracy and polity. More acutely, George Grote noted that together with oligarchy also ‘the community of citizens’ and therefore ‘the City’ as ‘collective sovereign’ were defined,⁶ despite the fact that ‘the first community of citizens comprised only a small proportion of the men personally free’. Among German scholars, W. Wachsmuth had already been reluctant in taking the archaic citizen bodies as oligarchic regimes, and he seemed to regard oligarchy as a constitutional form typical of the classical age.⁷ Nonetheless, Hermann’s handbook acquired strong authority,⁸ and in the 1880s Gilbert, followed by Busolt, further elaborated the historiographical views expounded there, based on Aristotle’s classification of the different types of oligarchy.⁹ Thus, a fourth-century theoretical construction came to be

accepted as a valid model for describing the historical development of the ancient Greek constitutions. However, still in the nineteenth century—in the 1820s—the time in which the scholarly debate on the Greek constitutional antiquities started—the citizen bodies of the Thousand and of the Six Hundred were explained—as already in the seventeenth century¹⁰—as Great Councils of ‘chosen citizens’.¹¹ The concept of ‘full citizens’—namely individuals with full political rights—seems to have been used for the first time by Wachsmuth in 1826.¹²

The ‘oligarchies of fixed number’, namely political regimes in which only a limited and fixed number of citizens had full political rights, are in fact a late nineteenth-century construction. It became largely accepted, took an important place in Gilbert’s and Busolt’s handbooks,¹³ and particularly Leonard Whibley discussed in detail the organization of this kind of oligarchy in his 1894 dissertation.¹⁴ But the role they have been given within political and constitutional history evidently presupposes the Aristotelian model of the development of the *polis*. For this reason, any attempt at understanding the political world of the archaic age must undertake the challenge of re-examining the evidence without preconceptions.

2. The Evidence Re-Examined

The sources on the so-called ‘oligarchies of fixed number’ on which we can base our investigation are scattered over several centuries, from the sixth BC until the fourth AD. Apart from fragment 3 of Xenophanes of Colophon, and a well-studied public inscription on bronze from Chaleion in Western Locris (probably dating to the early fifth century BC),¹⁵ all the remaining sources are not earlier than the Hellenistic age, even though they are ultimately related either to the research conducted by the Aristotelian school on the ancient constitutions (*politeiai*) or to Timaeus of Tauromenium.

As far as the institutions mentioned are concerned, a problem arises: we can hardly consider these sources as reliable information because the vocabulary they use belongs most probably to the post-classical age, and we can rightfully doubt that in the Late Hellenistic and Imperial age the socio-political assets of the archaic period were properly understood. Nonetheless, we must note that several onomastic, topographical, and institutional details attested by these sources derive either from local sources circulating in Athens between the fourth and the third century BC—and especially among the Pythagorean and Platonic circles—or from the fifth- and fourth-

2.1 The Thousand

2.1.1 Colophon (and Aeolian Cyme)

As we already know, the only reference to the Thousand in the literary record of the archaic age is found in a fragment of Xenophanes of Colophon (*fr.* 3 West, *ap.* Ath. 12.526a), in which the citizens of Colophon are said to be used to going to the agora with purple cloaks, refined perfumes, and elaborated hairstyles.¹⁶ According to Xenophanes they were ‘not less than a thousand on an average’;¹⁷ they had learned from the Lydians ‘the unuseful luxuries’, but, thereafter, they experienced ‘the hatred tyranny’. The entire community, blinded by luxury and by pride, had eventually surrendered to the Persian king.¹⁸

The problem here is to understand whether or not Xenophanes refers to a specific political regime. In 1821 Kortüm had argued that the Thousand were ‘selected citizens’,¹⁹ and Tittmann accepted this interpretation of the fragment.²⁰ Quite differently, Gilbert and Busolt understood the Thousand as a privileged citizen body, namely as the limited number of citizens with full political rights who were members of an oligarchy of fixed number.²¹

It is worth noting, however, that Xenophanes’ words ‘not less than a thousand on an average’ imply that more people could meet in the agora and sometimes did. Xenophanes, then, is probably thinking of the Colophonians as a group used to playing a public role as a whole.²² The Thousand were most probably the whole community of the citizens and the political body of the *polis*. This number, in this as in similar cases, is only a rough estimation.

More importantly, Aristotle himself in the *Politics* does not seem to consider the constitution of Colophon in the archaic age simply as ‘the government of the few’. Let us devote here a closer look at *Politics* 4.1290a30–b21. Aristotle tries to show that oligarchy is the constitutional form in which power is exerted not by a generic ‘restricted minority’, but rather by the minority of the rich. I quote from the text:

Suppose that the total population is 1,300, that 1,000 of the 1,300 are wealthy, and that these 1,000 assign no share in office to the remaining 300 poor, although they are men of free birth and like them in other respects. Nobody will say that these people are democratically governed. Or suppose, again, that

there are only a few poor men, but that they are stronger than the rich men who form the majority. Nobody would term such a constitution an oligarchy, if no share in official honours is given to the group that is rich. It is better, therefore, to say that democracy exists wherever the free-born are sovereign, and that oligarchy exists wherever the rich are sovereign, though it so happens that the former are many and the latter few—there are many who are free-born, but few who are rich. [...] Nor can we apply the term democracy to a constitution under which the rich are sovereign simply because they are more numerous than the poor. An example of such a constitution formerly existed at Colophon, where before the war with Lydia a majority of the citizens (*hoi pleious*) were the owners of large properties.²³

Not only does Aristotle describe the constitution of Colophon without mentioning the Thousand, but he also argues against the possibility that this *polis*, in which the rulers were the rich, was an oligarchy. It is unlikely that the rule of the rich in Colophon was earlier than the more restricted oligarchy of the Thousand, and it is more probable that Aristotle considered the Thousand as the majority of the citizens.²⁴

As we have seen, neither the fragment of Xenophanes, nor this passage of Aristotle's *Politics* fit in the late nineteenth-century model of the 'oligarchy of fixed number'. It is also worth noting that we have no grounds for arguing that 1,000 or more people were the minority of the free citizens of Colophon in the sixth century BC. And, as for the fifth century, the Athenian tribute lists have provided interesting evidence for the fact that in Colophon the number of citizens was probably not much larger than 1,000 or 1,200.²⁵ Moreover, a group of third- and second-century BC honorary decrees of 'Colophon by the sea' lead us to think that the citizen population of the early Hellenistic *polis* ranged from 900 to 1,350 units.²⁶ The population figure of sixth-century BC Colophon was likely to be more or less the same.

A similar situation was probably that of Aeolian Cyme, although this *polis* was even smaller than Colophon. The only scrap of evidence that we have is a brief excerpt of Heraclides Lembus.²⁷ Aristotle's original passage cannot be reconstructed, but it is likely that it was a discussion about whether or not the *politeia* of Cyme was in the hands of the majority of the citizens. Heraclides says that 'Pheidon gave more men (*pleious*) a share in the government having made a law which compelled everyone to raise a horse, and then a certain Prometheus entrusted the *politeia* to a thousand' (tr. Dilts). The information may be in general terms reliable, but it is impossible to determine whether the Thousand mentioned here were a larger number than the *hippeis*,²⁸ or, as it is perhaps more likely, we have here a reference to the institution of a fixed number for the *plethos* of the *hippeis*. In both cases it would be misguided to take the *politeia* of the Thousand as an oligarchy.

2.1.2 The Western Greeks

In the early nineteenth century there were only vague ideas, in scholarly debate, about who the Thousand of Croton, Locri, and Rhegion were. One of the first attempts at explaining the ancient Greek constitutions in terms of constitutional law—which was conducted in 1820—focused precisely on the Great Councils of these three *poleis* of Southern Italy,²⁹ but in Tittmann's view the Thousand were formed by a selection of citizens.³⁰ Some other scholars remained undecided,³¹ while George Grote argued in favour of Great Councils or Senates.³² Yet again, it was due to the contributions of Gilbert, Whibley, and Busolt that, at the end of the nineteenth century, the Thousand of Croton, Locri, Rhegion, and Colophon were understood as citizen bodies restricted to the number of 1,000 individuals holding full political rights. The possibility that the Thousand formed a council, however, remained an idea accepted by some, such as Dunbabin and Walbank.³³

Croton

The evidence regarding Croton is particularly problematic and it allows no straightforward reading. The sources are almost always part and parcel of the Pythagorean tradition, a notoriously slippery ground, and very careful examination is needed.

In the last chapters of his *Life of Pythagoras* (254–64), the third/fourth-century AD philosopher Iamblichus devoted much attention to the decline of Pythagoras' prestige in Croton after the victory against Sybaris, and to the last uprising against the Pythagoreans around the middle of the fifth century BC.³⁴ In those times the Thousand were still there. Iamblichus' account derives from Apollonius (of Tyana?),³⁵ but it has a strong historical approach, it is rich in details in some cases not elsewhere attested about the Crotonian local context, and it gives no space to doctrinal and ethical questions. For a long time, scholars have agreed on identifying Timaeus of Tauromenium as its primary source.³⁶ Timaeus knew very well the western historiography of the fifth and fourth centuries BC and he worked in Athens, where both Aristotle's Peripatos and Plato's Academy had been for a long time familiar with the Pythagorean traditions from Southern Italy.

Further, the intriguing reference to the *Hypomnēmata Krotōniatōn* suggests that Timaeus might have more sources than is commonly believed.³⁷

Now, the general historical context seems to be clear. When civil strife arose in Croton around the middle of the fifth century BC, the hostility against the Pythagoreans was deeply rooted and the demands of the *demos* had meanwhile also reached the elites: ‘everyone had to share in public offices and in the assembly’, and ‘office-holders had to render account to people selected by lot from all the citizens’.³⁸ Some among the Thousand agreed on these demands of democratic flavour, while many Pythagoreans strongly opposed them, for they claimed that the new measures would go against the ancestral constitution. The people, however, succeeded in legitimating their demands. *Hoi polloi* gathered in the Assembly and blamed their enemies because ‘they would never have come to the assembly at all had the Pythagoreans persuaded the Thousand to ratify their advice’.³⁹ From all this we can clearly see that the Thousand were well distinguished from the assembly of the citizens and that the assembly started playing a political role only after the middle of the fifth century, when the political order went through a major upheaval.

The Thousand are mentioned again in a passage belonging to the account of the arrival of Pythagoras in the city, where he is described as a charismatic leader addressing the following groups in his speeches: the youth of Croton (*neaniskoi, neoi*, 37–44), *hoi tēs politeias prokathēmenoi* (45–50), the *paides* (51–3), and the women (54–7). Like the previous one, this section of Iamblichus’ account too derives from Apollonius, but the core of this tradition, namely the addressees of Pythagoras’ speeches, was attested as early as the fourth century BC.⁴⁰ Based on the consideration of the similarities between the sections of Iamblichus’ *Life of Pythagoras* devoted to the philosopher’s speeches and to the uprising against the Pythagoreans on the one hand, and the accounts of Diodorus, Valerius Maximus, and Iustinus on the other, we can draw the conclusion that the source of Apollonius’ account of Pythagoras’ speeches is again Timaeus. Now, in Iamblichus’ *VP* 45 it is said that it was upon invitation of the Thousand that Pythagoras addressed a speech to *hoi tēs politeias prokathēmenoi*,⁴¹ who were likely to be the members of the *synedrion*, because Iamblichus clearly distinguishes them from the citizens (p. 26, 1–2, and 27, 27–8 Deubner-Klein), labelled as *Krotōniatai*. It follows that the Thousand are to be identified with them, and that the *synedrion*, which is described here as a governing body, did not overlap with the Thousand. The tradition, thus, does not provide any reference to a speech addressed by Pythagoras to the Thousand, and Valerius Maximus’ information on a *senatus* of one thousand members is most

probably derived from a misinterpretation of his Greek source.

Iamblichus' *VP* 45 provides therefore a valuable piece of evidence for the existence, together with the Thousand, also of another governing body, probably formed by the *gerontes*; further, as well as strengthening the well-attested tradition on Pythagoras' speeches to the population of Croton, this passage also attests that the Thousand already existed at the time of Pythagoras' arrival at Croton.

The last reference to the Thousand provided by Iamblichus concerns their function of judging cases of homicide.⁴² This should be viewed as anecdotal evidence, but there must have been a kernel of truth to it. Actually, legal functions are attested for the Thousand in Locri,⁴³ and in Massalia the Six Hundred could inflict *atimia*.⁴⁴

In the light of the above, it is plausible that in Croton the Thousand were the citizen body itself, namely the community of the *politai*. Since, as long as the Thousand ruled, there was no other Assembly, and when democracy was established in the middle of the fifth century the Assembly replaced this organ, the Thousand should not be understood as a Great Council.

Locri

We have good evidence pointing to the fact that the Locrian lawgiver Zaleucus assigned to the Thousand legal and judicial functions. The relevant passage is contained in a fragment of Polybius' book 12 (12.16),⁴⁵ which attests a legal dispute between two young Locrians contending about the ownership of a slave.⁴⁶ The two litigants initially reported to the *archontes*, who nonetheless did not make any decision and passed the case on to the *kosmopolis*. His verdict, however, was contested by the loser, who was invited by the *kosmopolis* himself to recur to the procedure introduced by Zaleucus. According to this procedure, both the *kosmopolis* and the citizen who intended to appeal against the verdict based on a different interpretation of the purpose of the lawgiver (*proairesis*), had to appear before the Thousand and argue their case with a loop on their neck. Whichever of the two was judged guilty by the Thousand was to be immediately hanged.

Thus, a law of Zaleucus had made the Thousand in Locri the highest court, empowered to judge a dispute over the interpretation of one of the laws of his own 'code'. This suggests either that the Thousand existed before Zaleucus or, less probably, that they were established by him. In this organ rested the supreme power of preserving the laws and, as a consequence, that of inflicting the death

penalty on whoever violated them—either in the event that this was a magistrate misinterpreting the law, or a citizen appealing against the magistrate's verdict.

But how reliable is this account? The content and the structure of Polybius' book 12 show that he most probably drew on fourth- and third-century BC sources. As for his account of the legal dispute in Locri, there are reasons to think that Polybius' information derives from Ephorus. We know that, according to Timaeus, Zaleucus had never existed, while Ephorus devoted part of his work to the lawgiver and made a thorough study of his laws. Now, the passage of book 12 discussed here is, from the linguistic and stylistic point of view, far from Polybius' language and style, and strong similarities have been highlighted between it and a fragment of Ephorus.⁴⁷ Moreover, in Polybius' account there are precise details on the political and legal organization of Locri Epizephyrii, the vocabulary he uses is a highly technical one, and the legal rationale on which the procedure is based seems to be typically archaic. We are led to admit that this passage is an integral part of the most reliable stratum of the literary tradition on Zaleucus.⁴⁸ In all probability, Polybius derived his information from Ephorus, although we have no grounds for arguing that he was literally quoting him.⁴⁹ It seems to be the case that Polybius was here rejecting in detail Timaeus' criticism of Ephorus' account of Zaleucus. Be that as it may, it is important to note that Polybius had at his disposal information on Zaleucus which was well attested as early as the fourth century BC.

Some indirect evidence for this possibility is provided by Demosthenes' *Against Timocrates* (353/2 BC). In this oration, Locri is presented as a well-ruled *polis*, committed to the preservation of the ancestral constitution and to the strict enforcement of the laws (24.139–41). We have a reference to a Locrian law prescribing the principle of talion (140–1), and to another forbidding the introduction of new laws (139); in both cases Demosthenes seems to refer to the laws of Zaleucus. The ban on introducing new laws recalls the procedure before the Thousand described by Polybius: in Demosthenes' account too, the proposer of a new law must carry a loop on his neck and, in the event his proposal is rejected, he shall be immediately hanged. We have here a less detailed account than that provided by Polybius, yet there are obvious similarities between the two. For these similarities only two explanations can be advanced: either Demosthenes draws on a source inaccurately reporting the same legal procedure described by Polybius, or he has some good knowledge of the Locrian laws, as is suggested by the reference to the talion law and to the ban on changing the existing laws.⁵⁰ Already R. Bentley spoke in favour of this second possibility, arguing that

Demosthenes knew Zaleucus' laws.⁵¹ In that case, we should argue that Zaleucus had introduced two procedures which prescribed the death penalty:⁵² one in the event a new law was proposed (Demosthenes), and a second one in the event of misinterpretation of an already existing law (Ephorus/Polybius).

In any event, it is clear that we cannot reject Polybius' account simply based on the absence of any reference to the Thousand in Demosthenes' speech.

As a result of this analysis, we can say that the Thousand in Locri were a fundamental organ of the institutional and judicial order set out by Zaleucus, but they might also have been earlier than the lawgiver. Now, according to Ephorus, Zaleucus was the first to make written laws, and the ancient chronographers assigned him 'some forty years'—as Adcock has it—'before their dates for Draco'.⁵³ No other ancient source contradicts this,⁵⁴ and one is led to think that Zaleucus belonged to the seventh century. Hence the Thousand, too, must have been a seventh-century institution.

2.1.3 A Gathering of the Opuntian Locrians?

An inscribed bronze plaque of the first half of the fifth century BC, found in the area of Chaleion in Western Locris (modern Galaxidi), bears witness to the existence of a gathering of a thousand people in Eastern Locrian Opous.⁵⁵ The inscription, referred to as a 'statute' (*thethmion*, l. 46), lays down a set of detailed regulations for the expedition of Eastern Locrian (*Lokroi hoi hypoknamidioi*) supplementary colonists to Western Locrian Naupaktos. The colonists are drawn from more than one of the *poleis* of the Eastern Locrians; nevertheless, they are under oath not to secede from the Opuntians (ll. 11–12), and it is in Opous (l. 33) that the colonists of Naupaktos are to submit to suits. As Eduard Meyer had already seen,⁵⁶ the people from which the colonists are drawn are called Hypocnemidian Locrians, while the Opountians are mentioned when it comes to political relations or judicial affairs, and they are to be taken as the political power behind the statute. It is not by chance, then, that the regulations may only be changed by mutual agreement between the colonists settled in Naupaktos and the political institution of the Opountians: 'Whoever subverts these decisions on any pretext or by any device whatsoever, save so far as is resolved by both parties, the assembly of the Opountian Thousand (*Hopountion te chilion plēthai*) and the assembly of the Naupaktian colonists (*kai NaEpaktion ton epiFoikon plēthai*), he shall be without rights and his property shall be

confiscated' (§ 9 ll. 38–41 tr. D. Lewis). Since the evidence shows clearly that *Hopountioi* can be taken only as the city-ethnic of Opous, it is clear that the Eastern Locrians were united in a political organization, and that Opous, which was the leading *polis* among the Eastern Locrian *poleis*, was the political and judicial centre. This is the reason for which any change in the regulations concerning the rights of the colonists may be only resolved by the colonists themselves or by the Assembly of the Opountians, that is the Thousand.⁵⁷

The problem is to understand whether the assembly of the Thousand was a political institution of Opous, or whether it was the assembly of the Eastern Locrian Confederacy, namely a 'confederal assembly'. The former possibility seems more plausible. Our record points clearly to the fact that Opous was the leading *polis* in that area and that the other Eastern Locrian *poleis* should probably be considered as 'dependent *poleis*'.⁵⁸ Further, we do not have any evidence for forms of federal organizations and federal institutions. Larsen's arguments are not valid, because in the inscription the Hypocnemidian Locrians are clearly distinguished from the Opountians, and Opous does not refer to Western Locris. Further, his argument against the idea that the Thousand were the assembly of the citizens of Opous cannot be accepted: he says that the number of 1,000 is too large for an oligarchic constitution such as the one of Opous.⁵⁹ But it is precisely the existence of an oligarchic regime in Opous, generally accepted among scholars,⁶⁰ that should be questioned.

Some further hints relevant to this problem are provided by demography. According to Diodorus (11.4.7), about 1,000 Eastern Locrians fought at Thermopylae.⁶¹ Recently, it has been argued that they represented about 80 per cent of the total number of hoplites between twenty-nine and forty-nine years of age. Since their overall figure was around 1,250 units, the overall figure of the Eastern Locrian hoplites was likely to be c.1,700 units (including the hoplites younger than twenty-nine and older than forty-nine), and 3,400 was arguably that of the overall Eastern Locrian male adult population (including thereby all the male adults of the Eastern Locrian *poleis*). At a rough estimation, we could set out a figure of 1,000/1,200 male adults of hoplites status for the city of Opous, and the remaining part for the other Eastern Locrian *poleis*.⁶² If these calculations—despite the degree of approximation—are correct, then the assembly of the Thousand in Opous was significantly close to the estimated figure of the *hopla parechomenoi* of the *polis*. Eduard Meyer reasonably doubted that the male adult population of Opous was larger than 1,000 units and he did not consider this figure as relevant to the existence of an oligarchy in Opous.⁶³ He was most probably right.

2.2 The Six Hundred of Massalia

As we know, Massalia was governed by the Six Hundred. In 196 BC the embassy of the Lampsacenes to the Romans first reached Massalia and went before the Six Hundred.⁶⁴ As W.L. Newman acutely remarked '[they] apparently received envoys, and may have had the right of concluding treaties of peace and alliance and of deciding questions of war and peace'.⁶⁵ Strabo provides valuable information on the Six Hundred: he says that they are called '*timouchoi*' and hold that office (*timen*) for life.⁶⁶ Fifteen of them carry on the business of the government; above them, three hold the chief power, and one is the supreme president; the *timouchoi* must have children or to be descendants of persons who have been citizens for three generations. For Strabo the Six Hundred were a *synedrion*, and for the Romans a senate.⁶⁷ Modern scholarship has often been prone to easily assume that they were a council.⁶⁸ In that event, would they have been an oligarchic organ, 'a small self-selecting and self-regulating council of the wealthiest citizens', as Paul Cartledge has it?⁶⁹ Whibley, however, noted that 'a council of 600 or 1,000 members would be out of place in an oligarchy'.⁷⁰ Further, both the power of making decisions about foreign policy and that of inflicting the death penalty and *atimia*,⁷¹ suggest that the Six Hundred were more likely to be the assembly of the citizens. As we have seen, the judicial functions of the numbered political bodies are attested also for Locri and Croton. The word *synedrion*, on the other hand, is largely deployed in Hellenistic and Roman sources, and it is not a valid criterion for ruling out the possibility that the Six Hundred were the citizen body of Massalia.

Nonetheless, Aristotle classifies the constitution of Massalia among the oligarchies and he seems to have much information on the internal organization of the city. Yet, he does not mention the Six Hundred. Should we think that the Six Hundred did not exist in the fourth century?⁷² According to Aristotle,⁷³ 'when the holders of office (*hoi en tais timais*) are a very limited number, as for example at Massalia, and at Heraclea [...]', those who are excluded 'caused disturbance till some share was finally given, first to the elder brothers in the family and then to the younger too [...] The final result was that the oligarchy at Massalia was turned into something more of the nature of a "constitutional government (*politeia*)"'.⁷⁴ At Istros the oligarchy ended up in a democracy, and at Heraclea it came into the hands of the Six Hundred. Later on, commenting on the ways in which 'an oligarchy may give the masses some place in the civic body',⁷⁵

Aristotle reports that at Massalia a list was compiled ‘of all who are worthy of a place, whether or not they are at the time members of the civic body (*politeuma*)’.⁷⁶ If in all this there is a grain of truth, we can argue that at Massalia the government was originally exclusive, and only in a later phase were the sons of the heads of the households given a share in it.⁷⁷ They too, then, were counted among *hoi en tais timais*. This may refer to the *timouchoi*, and this political development would have been the same as at Heraclea. In principle, the Six Hundred of Massalia might have been the male adults of a certain number of families. The second passage confirms that in Aristotle’s view the civic body of Massalia was a limited one. The choice of new members was not incompatible with the right to hold the office for life, and it may have occurred only when a member died.⁷⁸ One should admit, therefore, that Strabo’s and Aristotle’s accounts can be reconciled, and that the Six Hundred of Massalia are to be taken as an archaic or early classical institution. Moreover, if Aristotle had in mind the Six Hundred when commenting on the developments of the local oligarchy, the comparison with the developments at Heraclea makes clear that for him they were a *politeuma*, that is a citizen body, and not a council.⁷⁹ When the political body of the Six Hundred was put in place, the political community and the institutional framework began to take shape. From this point of view, the Six Hundred, at Massalia as at Heraclea, were not essentially different from the Thousand.

3. Citizen Bodies in the Making

The evidence discussed so far suggests that we cannot understand the Thousand as a council. At Colophon they are described as a gathering of well-off people in the agora, and Aristotle identifies them with a civic *plēthos*. At Locri, Croton, and Opous it is clear that they were the Assembly of the citizens (for Opous the term used is *plētha*), and that this institution had specific political and administrative functions. Similarly, we cannot argue that they were a council even in the case of Aeolian Cyme, where, according to the Aristotelian tradition, the *politeia* was entrusted to the Thousand. What we know about the Thousand in Rhegium leads us to think of an assembly of the citizens.⁸⁰ At Massalia we have clear hints, as we have seen, to the fact that the Six Hundred were the citizen body. On a general level, we can say that the sources either clearly show that the Thousand and the Six Hundred were assemblies of the citizens, or identify them—and this is after all the same thing—with the *politeia*, that is, with the

entire citizen body.

Further, both at Croton and at Locri the fact that the Thousand could exert judicial power and inflict the death penalty provides a further proof of their nature as citizen bodies, which gathered in the assembly with the function of a supreme court of justice. Similarly, at Massalia the Six Hundred were entitled to inflict *atimia*.

On the other hand, if the Thousand and the Six Hundred were councils it is rather surprising that we have no references to the assembly of the citizens in the literary record on these *poleis*. In fact, there is no solid evidence for the existence of such an assembly beside the numbered political bodies. It is worth stressing that the idea that in the archaic Greek *poleis* public affairs were administered exclusively by city-officers and magistrates, while no assembly was held, is yet again an obsolete nineteenth- and twentieth-century theory. Already V. Ehrenberg had rejected the idea of a *polis* without a civic assembly,⁸¹ and when we examine in detail the literary record on the so-called archaic oligarchies we are unavoidably led to acknowledge the importance of the citizen body in the decision-making process of the *polis*.⁸²

The collective bodies of the archaic age that we have discussed so far can be seen as political communities in which the participants in public life identify themselves as members of a numbered group. To put it differently, numbered political bodies should not be understood as the key element of an oligarchic regime, in which the majority of citizens was excluded from political participation. Nor can we speak, based on our evidence, of a distinction between citizens with full political rights and citizens with partial rights. This is an idea that modern scholarship has arbitrarily attributed to the Greek political practice.⁸³

The numbered political bodies are rather one of the modes in which the political communities started to be defined in the archaic age. Since the literary record on the Thousand and the Six Hundred suggests that their origin should be placed at some point between the seventh and the sixth centuries, and that in many cases this means three or four generations after the foundation of the *polis*, we should understand these political organizations as a crucial stage in the development of the institutional order.

Now, it is important to note that a numbered collective body is a group bound together by membership, in which the relationships between the individuals enhance cohesion and a sense of belonging. Through the gathering of the citizen body, the members of this group take part in public affairs (which in the Homeric poems are referred to as *ta dêmia*). All this suggests that the numbered collective bodies

played a fundamental role in the development of the concept of community both as a collective entity and as a cohesively exclusive group. As we know, the community we encounter in the Homeric poems is not clearly restricted nor does it have any self-definition. All the inhabitants of a given place seem to belong in it. The archaic *polis*, by contrast, starts being defined as a community one is either a part of, or is excluded from. The dimension of the citizen body is never set once and for all, and it often changes according to the boundaries and the criteria that the community sets out for itself. The problem of forming and defining a political community is, in fact, the major one that the *polis* faces in the archaic age.

In the light of the above, it is important to remember that the fixed number made the community more easily act as a closed unit. In this way, the boundaries of the community itself could be drawn, and people participating in public life got separated from the outsiders. Further, the members of the numbered political bodies, since they had decision-making power, could perceive themselves as *hoi en tois pragmasin* and thereby express their membership in the community by showing themselves active in public life. In this way, participation became the beginning of the ongoing process of definition of the civic identity. The numbered political bodies, thus, should be understood as citizen bodies in the making.

4. Social Prestige, Community, and Citizenship

If membership in the numbered bodies stimulated the sentiment of belonging to the civic community, then we should assume that these bodies contributed importantly to the development of the political life in the early *polis*. We can think that when they originated civic order was still at an early stage of definition and neither institution had been established, nor had the concept of citizenship been legally formalized. In these contexts, we can hardly believe that the numbered body of the Thousand or the Six Hundred originated out of a reduction (through limitation and selection) of the total number of citizens. In a few words, these organs were not the institutions through which oligarchy was founded: they were one of the modes through which the early *polis* came to a political definition. While in the Homeric world territory and community seem to overlap, in some historical communities of the eighth and seventh centuries BC a process of differentiation between a group of 'privileged' and one of 'outsiders' had already started. In some cases, this process generated serf-societies, in some others public life was administered by a limited

number of families, in others the male adults organized themselves in a group with a fixed number of members who held political power.

We do not know whether or not these were legally defined and formally instituted groups, but at least at an earlier stage they must have been not yet strongly formalized, in the same way as the other institutions of the 'pre-Aristotelian *polis*'. Certainly, the members of these numbered bodies distinguished themselves from the others, the outsiders: the parade of the 1,000 in the agora of Colophon shows this very well. The Thousand of Colophon exhibited in the centre of the public space their special relation with the *polis*, namely their participation in public life. In so doing, they affirmed their prestige in the eyes of everyone in the community, and this was enhanced by the public show of symbols marking social status (clothing). We have here a group which presents itself as the holder of a specific public identity. They were neither a clique of oligarchs ruling over a mass of people lacking political rights, nor 'a throng of perfumed dandies'.⁸⁴

From seventh-century Lesbos we have yet another source testifying that participation in public and political life was perceived as a privilege:

I, poor wretch, live with the lot of a rustic, longing to hear the assembly being summoned, Agesilaidas, and the council: the property in possession of which my father and my father's father have grown old among these mutually destructive citizens, from it I have been driven, an exile at the back of beyond.
(tr. Campbell)

This famous fragment of Alcaeus (*fr.* 130b Voigt), shows that to take part in the Assembly or in the council was perceived as a determining factor for the identity of an *astos* and of his family. One inherited this privilege from one's forefathers, hence it was a reason for personal pride and a trait of distinction from the inhabitants of the *agros*. The fact that public activity was a practice generating social prestige and distinguishing the 'insiders' from the 'outsiders' explains well why many of the words with which archaic sources refer to the members of the *polis* are also synonymous with people holding honour and prestige. Among the Eleans, the word indicating those who were active in public life without holding any office was *etas*,⁸⁵ a word of the epic language, which occurs also in Pindar and Aeschylus with reference to the citizen.⁸⁶ It evokes the Homeric world of the heroic warriors and of their *hetairoi*:⁸⁷ the Homeric *etai* are 'comrades', members of a group in which reciprocal relations and friendship were the rules. At Massalia the *timouchoi* were, as the etymology suggests, the holders of *timē*, that is, 'honour, and lasting prestige'; in the Homeric world this honour is granted to the gods by fate and to men, above all to the *basileis*, by Zeus.⁸⁸ While in the world of archaic Ionia

timouchoi was the name of important magistrates, in Massalia it indicated all the Six Hundred, that is, the members of the *politeuma*. It is unlikely that this was a later use of the word *timouchos*; the Six Hundred would not have been given the name of *timouchoi* in a time in which this word referred exclusively to the magistrates. It is more plausible that the name came only later to indicate public officers, due to the fact that the *timouchoi* members of the *politeuma* could in fact be appointed to civic magistracies. The *time* indicated both honour and privilege, and in Massalia the privilege was the exertion of public offices, which probably all the *timouchoi* were entitled to hold.

Significantly, when the legal concept of citizenship was defined and its formal criteria were set out in the Greek world, it remained related to the idea of *timē*, as it is shown by the terms *atimia* and *epitimos* (Thuc. 5.34).⁸⁹ In the archaic age participation in public life was, therefore, in the first place a practice generating prestige. Before becoming a legal status citizenship was a distinguished behaviour.

Prestige and privileged civic status strengthened the membership in the political community, and within the political bodies of fixed numbers membership could more easily become political identity, giving way to the formation of civic identity. The Thousand and the Six Hundred represented both themselves and the *polis*. If this is the case, they must have thought of themselves as a citizen body, that is, ‘*hoi pleious*’ and not ‘*hoi oligoi*’. We do not have here any ‘oligarchic rationale’, but rather the rationale of the *polis* that is in the process of defining itself. The oligarchic ‘numbers game’, as Roger Brock has it,⁹⁰ had not yet begun.

Nonetheless, in the classical age the numbered political bodies became more and more elitist and restricted. Only at that time did they become oligarchies.⁹¹ Almost all these regimes ended before the beginning of the Hellenistic age, with the sole exception of Massalia, whose constitution remained in the hands of *pauci et principes* and was paralleled by Cicero with the tyranny of the Thirty in Athens.⁹²

In sum, the archaic numbered political bodies acting as corporate units and understanding themselves as ‘the *polis*’ contributed to the development of the archaic political community. They should be seen much more as an integral part of the processes by which a notion of citizenship took shape than of the history of the Greek oligarchic regimes.

¹ I imply here and further on in this chapter the vast scholarly debate on the interpretative model that has been traditionally proposed to explain the political and institutional development of the archaic *polis*. Among the most important recent studies, I recall the following contributions, within the obvious limits imposed by selection: Meier 1969; Bourriot 1976; Roussel 1976; Gehrke 1983; Stahl 1987;

Manville 1990; Ober 1993b; Raaflaub 1993; Walter 1993; Berent 1994; Davies 1997; Hölkeskamp 1997; Donlan 1999; Giangiulio 2001a; Duploux 2005; Vlassopoulos 2007.

² It is sufficient to recall here Ryffel 1949; Bordes 1982; Murray 1993b.

³ See esp. Bleicken 1979.

⁴ See Hermann 1831, 107 ff.; Thirlwall 1835, 395–403.

⁵ Thirlwall 1835, 398.

⁶ Grote 1869, III, 17.

⁷ Wachsmuth 1844, 407 ff., esp. 410.

⁸ The handbook underwent many revisions over Hermann's lifetime (1836², 1841³, 1855⁴); the posthumous, widely enlarged 6th edition (1899–1913) by Thumser and Swoboda was especially influential on Busolt 1920–6. On Hermann and his handbook, see Gawantka 1985, 89–94.

⁹ See Gilbert 1881–5, II, 273 ff.; Busolt 1920–6, I, 352 ff.; Busolt 1893, 508.

¹⁰ Emmius 1626, 352.

¹¹ See Hüllmann 1820, 327; Körtüm 1821, 105, 122 n. 15; Tittmann 1822, 500.

¹² See Wachsmuth 1844, 414 n. 13.

¹³ See Gilbert 1881–5, II, 276; Busolt 1920–6, I, 354–8.

¹⁴ Whibley 1896, 134–8.

¹⁵ *Syll.*³ 47; *IG IX* 1² 3: 718; Buck 1955, no. 57; *ML* 20; Körner 1993, no. 49; *Nomima* I, no. 43. For the date (in the first three decades of the fifth century BC, before the Athenians conquered Naupaktos in 460 BC), see *IG IX* 1² 3: 718 p. 96 (Klaffenbach) and Jeffery 1990, 106.

¹⁶ Theopompus, in his close paraphrase of Xenophanes' verses (Ath. 12.526a = *FGrHist* 115 F117) uses the word *astypolein*, and Cicero (*Rep.* 6.2) understands *in forum* [...] *descenderent*. Thus, the meaning of agora in Xenophanes is probably to be seen as both topographical and civic, but not strictly institutional. Xenophanes did not refer to the Thousand gathered in the Assembly, as has been sometimes argued, but rather to their attendance and public show in the centre of civic life.

¹⁷ Bowra 1941, 122.

¹⁸ So I interpret the text, *pace* Bowra 1941, 119–20, 124–5; see Mazzarino 1947 [2007], 187–8, and Stein-Hölkeskamp 1989, 107. Leshner 2001 does not discuss the *locus*.

¹⁹ Körtüm 1821, 122 n. 15.

²⁰ Tittmann 1822, 432.

²¹ Gilbert 1881–5, II, 144; Busolt 1920–6, I, 355.

²² Bowra 1941, 123 grasped this aspect, but he interpreted the text too generically as a reference to a large number of rich people.

²³ See Barker 1998, 140–1 for the translation. The main textual problem of the passage ('oligarchy' in 1290b15 is Bojesen's conjecture for *dēmos* of the MSS) is well discussed in Schütrumpf and Gehrke 1996, 260.

²⁴ On this see Lombardo 1983, 1092.

²⁵ Ruschenbusch 1983; 1985.

²⁶ See on the decrees especially Gauthier 2003, 83–7 (and *Annexe* II, nos. v, vi, vii, viii, x, xii, xiii for the texts), and Duploux 2012b; a valuable discussion of the citizen population of Colophon from the archaic to the Hellenistic age is to be found in Duploux 2013.

²⁷ Heraclid. Lemb. 39 (Dilts). See also Duploux this volume, chapter 10, section 2.

²⁸ So Busolt 1920–6, I, 355.

²⁹ Hüllmann 1820, 327.

³⁰ Tittmann 1822, 432, 500; see also Hermann 1831, 164.

³¹ See for example Wachsmuth 1844, 414 n. 13; before him Heeren had already

taken the Thousand of Locri as a Senate and a 'selection of citizens' in the same time (Heeren 1821, 195).

³² Grote 1869, III, 379, 396, 398; see also Schoemann 1861, 145.

³³ Dunbabin 1948, 72; Walbank 1957–79, I, 363.

³⁴ Fritz's discussion of the chronological questions relating to the political history of Croton under the rule of the Pythagoreans remains unsurpassed: see Fritz 1940, 69 ff., especially 85–7, 92; see also Minar 1942, 77–8 and n. 96. Robinson 1997, 76–7 (followed in Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 268) wrongly takes the whole account given by Apollonius as referring to the first uprising against the Pythagoreans after the destruction of Sybaris.

³⁵ Iambl. VP 254 (p. 136, 14–16 Deubner-Klein).

³⁶ See Fritz 1940, 55–65; Minar 1942, 54–5 and n. 14; to my mind there are no cogent reasons to take Theopompus as the source of Apollonius' account, as Zhmud 2012, 99–101 does.

³⁷ Iambl. VP 262 p. 141, 7 Deubner-Klein, with Fritz 1940, 65–6; even if they were forged (Burkert 1972, 117 n. 50), they probably relied on local information.

³⁸ Iambl. VP 257, p. 139, 1–2 Deubner-Klein (tr. G. Clark).

³⁹ Iambl. VP 260, p. 140, 8–10 Deubner-Klein (tr. G. Clark).

⁴⁰ Dicaearch. fr. 33 Wehrli²; Diod. Sic. 10.3.2–3; Val. Max. 8.15 ext. 1; Just. Epit. 20.4.6–12. In Antisth. fr. 51 Decleva-Caizzi (Porph. *Quaest. hom. ap. Schol. L ad Il.* 9.308; *Schol. HMQR ad Od.* 1.1) *paidēs, gynaikeis, archontes*, and *ephēboi* are mentioned as addressees of Pythagoras' speeches, but we are probably faced here with a 'historical' detail added by Porphyrius (for a penetrating discussion see Patzer 1970, 179–82).

⁴¹ See p. 25, 13–18 Deubner-Klein.

⁴² VP 126.

⁴³ Polyb. 12.16.

⁴⁴ Lucian *Tox.* 24 p. 238, 22 ff. MacLeod.

⁴⁵ Attested in the *Excerpta antiqua* (the manuscript tradition consists of Codex F *Urbinas* gr. 102 and of the later family known as S).

⁴⁶ Maffi 1983, 43–5 provides a thorough discussion on this.

⁴⁷ See Ephorus *FGrHist* 70 F135, *ap.* Strabo 6.1.8; Wunderer 1894 is still essential reading.

⁴⁸ On 'primary' and 'secondary' tradition about early Greek code-makers, see Adcock 1927, and esp. on Zaleucus, Dunbabin 1948, 70–1.

⁴⁹ As Wunderer 1894 ventured to maintain.

⁵⁰ Both the laws are accepted as authentic by Mühl 1929, 110 ff.; see also, more recently, Hölkeskamp 1999, 195 ff.

⁵¹ Bentley 1697, 340.

⁵² Gilbert 1881–5, II, 240 n. 2; Busolt 1893, 426.

⁵³ See Adcock 1927, 101. Zaleucus is assigned to *Ol.* 29.2 = 663/62 by Eusebius (*V. arm.*) and to *Ol.* 29.4 = 662/61 by Hieronymus.

⁵⁴ Aristotle (*Pol.* 2.1274a25–30) knows of Zaleucus as a pupil of Thaletas (traditionally placed in the seventh century: Hellanic. *FGrHist* 4 F85; Sosib. *FGrHist* 595 F5). As for Dem. 24.141 (only one law has been changed in more than 200 years at Locri), this is not necessarily an indication of date for Zaleucus, and in any case c.550 BC (200 + 353/2) should be taken as no more than a very general *terminus ante quem*.

⁵⁵ *Syll.*³ 47; *IG IX* 1² 3: 718; Buck 1955, no. 57; ML 20; Körner 1993, no. 49; *Nomima* I, no. 43. See also Blok this volume, chapter 3, section 2.

⁵⁶ Meyer 1892b, 294.

⁵⁷ The two *plēthai* (the one of the colonists settled in Naupaktos and the other of the Hopountioi) are to be understood as two 'assemblies'. The meaning 'majority'

(see IG IX 12³ 3: 718 p. 95 [Dittenberger]; Busolt 1920–6, I, 355 n. 1; Ruzé 1984, 257) does not fit in the context (as already noted by Meyer 1892b, 304): if we translate ‘the majority of the colonists of Naupaktos’ we rule out the analogy between the organ assigned the power of decision-making among the colonists and that of the mother city.

⁵⁸ Nielsen 2000.

⁵⁹ Larsen 1968, 53.

⁶⁰ See Gilbert 1881–5, II, 39–41; Busolt 1920–6, I, 354–5; Whibley 1896, 134–5; Larsen 1968, 53.

⁶¹ According to Herodotus (7.203.1) the Opountian Locrians went to battle at Thermopylae *panstratiēi*, but this does not mean ‘every available man’ but ‘every fit hoplite’ (Nielsen 2000, 114 n. 141 based on Thuc. 2.31).

⁶² On these calculations and interpretation of sources I follow here Nielsen 2000, 114–15.

⁶³ Meyer 1892b, 305.

⁶⁴ Syll.³ 591, 45; 49 (*I.Lampsakos* 4), translated in Bagnall and Derow 2004, no. 35; on the inscription and his historical context, see Bickerman 1932; Ferrary 1988, 133–41; Curty 1995, 78–82.

⁶⁵ Newman 1897–1902, IV, 26.

⁶⁶ Strabo 4.1.5.

⁶⁷ See Cic. *Flac.* 26 (63); Val. Max. 2.6.7.

⁶⁸ See Heeren 1821, 207; Geisow 1865, 33–6; Gilbert 1881–5, II, 259–60; Busolt 1893, 435; Gottlieb 1967, 32; Glotz 1928, 84–5, more subtly, did not translate the Greek term *synedrion*.

⁶⁹ Cartledge 2009a, 65–6.

⁷⁰ Whibley 1896, 138 n. 26.

⁷¹ Val. Max. 2.6.7; Lucian *Tox.* 24.

⁷² According to Clavel-Lévêque 1973, 903 ff. the Six Hundred are not earlier than the third century BC.

⁷³ Arist. *Pol.* 5.1305b3–12.

⁷⁴ Barker 1998, 192.

⁷⁵ Arist. *Pol.* 6.1321a26–7.

⁷⁶ Arist. *Pol.* 6.1321a29–31 (Barker 1998, 244).

⁷⁷ On this development see Glotz 1928, 84–6.

⁷⁸ Schüttrumpf and Gehrke 1996, 492.

⁷⁹ For the Six Hundred of Heraclea as a *politeuma* see Arist. *Pol.* 5.1305b33ff., with Newman 1897–1902, IV, 353 ff.

⁸⁰ Heraclid. Lemb. 55 (Dilts). ‘At Rhegium [...] there was an assembly of the Thousand, chosen on a property qualification and controlling the whole administration’ (Whibley 1896, 135).

⁸¹ Ehrenberg 1969, 52, 265.

⁸² As most recently emphasized by Wallace 2013.

⁸³ Duploux 2011.

⁸⁴ Pace Anderson 2005, 178 n. 11.

⁸⁵ See ML 17.8–9.

⁸⁶ Pind. *Pae.* 6.10; Aesch. *Supp.* 247.

⁸⁷ See esp. Stagakis 1968.

⁸⁸ See esp. Benveniste 1969, II, 43 ff.

⁸⁹ Also *entimos* (in the East Locrian law for Naupaktos: ML 20.35) has to be taken into account: see Davies 2004, 22, 28; does it denote ‘whoever are in office’ (Meiggs and Lewis 1988, 39), or ‘men of full status’ (Davies 2004, 28)?

⁹⁰ Brock 1989.

⁹¹ For an overview of the main sources on oligarchy see Orsi 1981; Ostwald

2000a; 2000b.

⁹² Cic. *Rep.* 1.28.44.

12

Conclusion

Taking Stock and Looking Backward

Roger Brock

Beyond the diversity of approaches, the first and most obvious point that emerges from the essays collected here is the sheer range and diversity of criteria for citizenship that were current in the archaic period. Some of these, notably birth or descent, are formal criteria for qualification of a kind familiar from studies of citizenship in the classical period but many are more loosely framed in terms of acceptance: Josine Blok emphasizes the centrality of the citizen's role as a member of the worshipping community, while Paulin Ismard highlights the significance within the archaic *polis* of a number of types of association, which also have a prominent role in Marcello Lupi's account of the organization of archaic Sparta. Other authors point to the importance of contribution to the community through the possession of desirable personal characteristics such as the athletic prowess discussed by Nick Fisher, who notes the affinity between the cultivation of physical fitness and capacity for military service. Military service and the defence of the community is, like financial contribution, with which it is interlinked, an aspect of citizenship acknowledged for the classical period, but Hans van Wees argues that the obligation was more strictly applied in archaic *poleis* than it came to be later. Horse-rearing, an activity discussed here by Alain Duploux, had an obvious utility for the security of the *polis*, but it also belongs to a wider spectrum of typical civic behaviours of which appropriate participation in commensality, discussed here by James

Whitley, is the most conspicuous example, but which also embraced the need to conform to less firmly defined expectations of appropriate performances, such as the archaic *habrosunē* (or luxury behaviours) addressed in the latter part of Alain Duploux's chapter.

Underlying this diversity of potential qualifications is a distinctly divergent spread of conceptions of the communities of which they permitted membership. Ismard's Attica is a region in which associations of different kinds are unevenly integrated into a wider community, and the various discussions of Crete in the volume paint a similar picture of an ecosystem of relatively small and at least partially autonomous bodies; for van Wees, on the other hand, Athens in the same period has at least some overarching administrative mechanisms which enable it to regulate military (and related financial) matters and to impose a requirement of service on the leisured elite. Again, Blok's community is a maximal and inclusive one, which also incorporates women as well as men of all ages; on the other hand, communities which are defined by modes of performance are, though permeable, necessarily restricted by the requirement for resources and/or physical capability, most obviously in the case of warfare, and the elite groups described by Duploux and Maurizio Giangiulio in particular return us to the question of how to understand the relationship between them and the rest of the community's population. However, both conceptions have in common a sense of the community as largely organic and self-regulating, without requiring much in the way of formal structures; here again, however, the view of the *naukrariai* advanced by van Wees implies some kind of practically effective tribally based organization for the whole of Attica already in the sixth century, and Lupi's reconstruction of Spartan organization makes it a 'city of reason' (in Oswyn Murray's terms) even earlier than that—indeed, the effect of his chapter and that of Paul Cartledge is to highlight yet again the precocious sophistication of Sparta. One key challenge for future research is to explore how it might be possible to account for these different pictures: in some cases, it may be simply a matter of different paths taken or different speeds of development in response to differences in circumstance and environment; in others, it may be that a community could function differently in different regards: it is not surprising that a greater degree of organization and of differentiation is associated in a number of these studies with the key function of territorial defence, and that might be compatible with looser organization or greater accommodation in other regards. Certainly, there is a pressing need for further case studies to assist the teasing out of broader patterns.

The diversity of the studies presented here also calls into question both the usefulness of the term 'citizenship' in relation to the archaic

period and how archaic arrangements are to be related to citizenship in the classical period. Faced with this range of modes of affiliation to and/or participation in a community, which typically require or entail due performance of some kind, one might wonder whether the term ‘citizenship’, carrying as it does implications of a juridically defined status, as at classical Athens and in the modern world, is the right one. One might suggest that it is potentially limiting and tends to circumscribe the scope of the discourse, creating an expectation that the object of the investigation is the ‘origins’ of the classical norms.¹ It might be better perhaps to speak more neutrally in terms of something like ‘community membership’ or ‘community participation’—to keep open the alternative set by Alain Duplouy in his introduction ([chapter 1](#)). Nevertheless, since what has been at stake here is also the nature of these ‘communities’, that is, the nature of the archaic Greek city from its early stages on, one would have to concede that the language of ‘citizenship’ might be the appropriate terminology here too, provided that we are clear that the label is being applied to distinct entities performing the same basic function (i.e. defining community membership) but not necessarily related, just as the word ‘artillery’ can be applied to a Roman catapult, a medieval trebuchet, and the smooth-bore cannon of a modern main battle tank without implying any close resemblance or any direct or evolutionary relationship between them.²

The plurality of archaic citizenships articulated here makes it inherently implausible that one could trace an evolutionary process through which they came to be more or less standardized in the classical period. While it is the case that elements that already existed in the archaic period recur in the structures of classical citizenship, that does not mean that they are performing the same function: indeed, one striking feature of the later archaic and early classical landscape is widespread tribal reform, starting perhaps at Sicyon (even if Herodotus (5.68) may have garbled the details) and Cyrene (4.161), then at Corinth and Athens, as noted by Ismard (this volume, [chapter 5](#)), and extending to the 460s or 450s for Argos³ and the ongoing repercussions of the overthrow of the Sicilian tyrants. Where the initial impetus comes from is unclear, though tyrants or their removal are one recurrent theme (see further below); one might also wonder, bearing in mind Lupi’s and van Wees’ chapters, whether pressure for greater or more reliable military capability as pressure on territory increased might not also be a specific factor, alongside more general peer-polity interaction. This, surely, is the period in which the *polis* at large becomes a city of reason, and when pre-existing elements are dissolved and then artificially recombined to create a new order: as with an insect’s metamorphosis, the constituent matter is the same,

but has taken on a new form and is a different thing.

That is not to say that nothing of the old organism has survived, and indeed it would be salutary to reverse the normal process and look forward from the beginnings of citizenship collected here: that would highlight, and encourage us to give due weight to, the persistence in the classical period of non-juridical elements in classical citizenship. Spartan citizenship was quintessentially performative (in the sense emphasized in this volume by Duplouy), not only in its extreme focus on military service and maintenance of the necessary capability,⁴ but also in the requirement to participate in structured commensality and to make material contributions to that, failure to do so precipitating forfeiture of full citizen status (Cartledge, [chapter 7](#); Lupi, [chapter 6](#)). Even at Athens, physical excellence, though not a requirement of citizenship, was clearly valued: witness the physical scrutiny of new citizens at their *dokimasia* even in the 320s;⁵ the maintenance of contests of physical beauty such as the *Euandria* and of martial prowess such as pyrrhic dancing, races in armour, jumping on and off chariots by the *apobatēs*, and torch-racing attest to a concern for and appreciation of personal capability that perhaps dates back to the early days of Cleisthenic *isonomia*, when concern for the defence of Attica was at a high point.⁶ Again, classical Athenians clearly had to reckon with expectations of appropriate behaviour: if Pericles can make the proud claim that Athenians do not exercise themselves about each other's private behaviour (Thuc. 2.37.2), that in itself says something about expectations of tolerance, and we can see from the fact that litigants feel the need to apologize for walking fast and talking loudly (Dem. 37.52, 55; 45.77) that these were not always fulfilled in practice.⁷ At Sparta, too, social interaction and public opinion reinforced not only the central objectives of correct conduct in the military sphere, but also, for example, due deference to one's elders and betters.⁸ Indeed, performative expectations of this kind continue to be significant in modern times: witness the extended debate in the past decade or two about 'Britishness' and 'Frenchness' which culminated in the introduction of a formal examination which candidates for naturalization in the UK and in France are required to pass.⁹

Nevertheless, while we ought certainly to be alert to the implications of the studies collected here for the classical period, the thrust of this volume is naturally backwards in time, and if we have made progress in uncovering the earlier strata of Greek citizenship, there is still work to do as, like cosmologists today, we strive to look further back in time and catch sight of the earliest stages in the process of the conception and definition of a self-conscious community. Accounts of the development of the Greek *polis* frequently

scrutinize processes such as colonization or the codification of laws as both contributing to and throwing light on the emergence of the *polis*, but these are surely occurring long after the ‘Big Bang’ of community formation, which went back perhaps as far as the turn of the millennium BC, if not earlier, at the final stage of the Late Bronze Age, with the collapse of the Mycenaean palaces (see [chapter 1](#) above). After all, by the time we come to the activity of lawgivers such as Zaleucus and Draco from the mid-seventh century onwards, though thinly documented, it already implies communities with the coherence and organizational capacity to agree on the need for legislation, decide on the required course of action (codification of existing laws with or without supplementation, or else a whole new code), assign the task to responsible authority, and, above all, undertake in advance to abide by the laws passed or codified with an awareness of their operative extent (i.e. a definition of the community which will be bound by them) and a willingness to uphold them and decisions duly arrived at by means of them. That will have been even more the case if the process aimed at imposing some uniformity on disparate smaller groups, as seems to be the case with Solon’s law of associations.¹⁰

Furthermore, that kind of self-awareness and capacity for corporate action can only have been possible on the basis of a general agreement as to who was accepted as a participant and had a voice in the process: community membership can only have been meaningful with the emergence of some conception of a *dēmos*, presumably linked to a degree of consensus both on who is included and excluded, and as to who—whether all existing members or a defined subset—has the power to make that decision. Sadly, we cannot look far enough back in time to locate the origins of that consensus, and perhaps we never will, but the aspiration would be to catch glimpses of the practical dynamics of the processes modelled in John Davies’ chapter, and to gain some understanding of the way in which communities came to function as such. It is clear that there must have been a process of development: while models of the society of the early post-palatial period generally assume one, or a few, leaders exercising a dominant role (Davies’ ‘exceptional individual’), there is already in the earliest hexameter poetry a sense of a wider community of which some account must be taken, even if the assembly can only be convened by a *basileus*, and sometimes only for purposes of publicity;¹¹ furthermore, at least away from the Greek camp at Troy, that community has a spatial and institutional anchoring, rather than simply following after their leader. This shift would go hand in hand with the consolidation of the principle that Greek society would be largely organized on the basis of citizen-states, defined as much in human as in territorial terms, and whose identity came to be

expressed in terms of masculine plural ethnics, a development which points to some degree of community consensus as a functional requirement.¹² John Davies properly draws attention to an ecology of various types of community all of which emerged in Greece to some extent, so perhaps we should imagine some kind of process of natural selection by which the form of the *polis* emerged as the most successful option for community, in the sense that sanctuary communities tended to be absorbed by, or mimic the organization of a *polis*, and that *polis*-type organization was compatible with an overarching *ethnos* or monarchy.¹³ However, while the consolidation of a *dēmos* in a looser sense (for example as a religious community) would seem to be a necessary precondition for the more formal (i.e. political) definition of a *polis*, the process was clearly a contested one: if men constituted the city, as Alcaeus asserted (*fr.* 112.10, 426), the question remained whether this applied to all men alike. Giangiulio's discussion of the 'Thousand' in Southern Italy points to an attempt on the part of a subset of the population to identify themselves as the citizen body for political purposes. Likewise, Alcaeus in the passages just mentioned speaks of men who are warlike or able to defend themselves, and in his 'ship of state' imagery he appears at times to identify the ship with a community smaller than the *polis*, probably his own *hetaireia*.¹⁴

Like lawgiving, the process of colonization too, as reported in our sources, presumes a mechanism for choosing the colonists and, if necessary, coercing them into participating, identifying the *oikistēs*, and vesting him with the necessary authority, which foundation traditions of consultation at Delphi imply might entail agreement to accept the verdict of an institution beyond the community, while the taking of fire from a communal hearth and the export of the cults of the mother-city to the new foundation again point to a firmly established and self-conscious religious community. Genuine synoecisms (as opposed to coercive expansions given a veneer of legitimacy by retrospective relabelling) must have been more complex still, since they entailed negotiation between communities, albeit on a small and local scale for the most part.¹⁵

Clearly, the definition of community was a far more dynamic and fluid business than it had become by the classical period, as illustrated for example by the Ptolemaic (re)foundation charter of Cyrene (*SEG* 9.1); however, if there are indications that at times the definition of the *polis* could be contested, it is also worth bearing in mind the largely invisible but generally implied consensus which lies behind the capacity for common action and initiative like the election of Pittacus as *aisymnētēs* to deal with the *stasis* of Alcaeus (*Arist. Pol.* 3.1285a30–b1, citing *fr.* 348; cf. his reference to exclusion from the assembly and

council in *fr.* 130b). One aspect of this consensus which bears emphasis, and which calls for further investigation, is the effective collaboration of sub-*polis* entities—what Davies has called ‘segments’¹⁶—and their eventual incorporation in the structure of *poleis*.¹⁷ Cleisthenes’ reorganization of Athens was built from existing demes upwards, as the great disparity in their size plainly shows, with the rationalization overlaid on that natural foundation, and even in the classical period, citizenship at Athens was essentially a matter delegated to the individual deme, even if the *polis* sought to exercise some oversight. If the suggestion of Lupi is correct, the decision to accept newborn children (which is to say, citizens to be) was one for smaller civic subdivisions at Sparta too. Local knowledge was essential both to the oversight and for the initial and continuing acceptance of citizens in the community: in that sense it would be reasonable to suggest that civic subgroups were more important than individuals and perhaps even than the *polis* itself, since they mediated between individuals and the larger community which they also constituted. Indeed, it might be that more formal definitions of citizenship only became necessary as the size and complexity of a community came to exceed their capabilities (i.e. so that it was no longer a ‘face to face society’),¹⁸ or when events had so disrupted communal memory and the sense of community that it became necessary to reconstruct it, as the lead plates from Camarina perhaps suggest.¹⁹ It is worthy of note that, as I noted earlier, the major initiatives in political organization or reorganization attested for the archaic period come relatively late, and often at least reputedly linked to the activity of tyrants or autocrats.²⁰ The major exception is Sparta, where the very early political settlement must—like so much in the Spartan system—relate to the need for effective control of a large subordinate population; that particular agenda would also explain the peculiarity of the persistent testing of citizens to which Paul Cartledge draws attention in his contribution.²¹ However, it can no longer be maintained, as Christian Meier did (1980), that this process of institutionalization represents a late ‘politicization’ of communities and the emergence of a ‘true citizenship’: the making of Greek *poleis* and of a true sense of community membership went probably as far back as the ‘Big Bang’ of community formation in Early Iron Age Greece—hence the need to look backwards as far as possible.

Despite the importance of affiliation to a group, however, the sources for the archaic period also point to a high degree of mobility, which must indicate that there were significant numbers of individuals whose community membership was fluid at best and perhaps non-existent.²² Indeed, in the Homeric poems, though the concept of exile exists, it is no impediment to Patroclus, Phoenix, or Odysseus (in one

of his cover stories) making new lives for themselves elsewhere, while *dēmiourgoi* are itinerant experts, moving with their special skills from one place to another (*Od.* 17.382–6, 19.135). The impact of exile grew over the period, at least for elites,²³ but archaic *poleis* remained willing to accommodate and even recruit individuals with desirable talents: seers like the Iamid Teisamenos (*Hdt.* 9.33–5), granted Spartan citizenship (typically, for a militarily valuable skill), and Hagesias, who migrated to Sicily and won an Olympic victory as a Syracusan, the scribe Spensithios on Crete, or the craftsmen whom Solon sought to attract to Athens, according to Plutarch (*Sol.* 24.4). At times, the desideratum was basic manpower, as when Cyrene issued an invitation to fresh settlers (*Hdt.* 4.159); as late as the 470s, Thespiiai was recruiting new citizens to make up losses from the Persian Wars (*Hdt.* 8.75).²⁴ Indeed, the persistence of the concept of colonization indicates a continuing willingness on the part of substantial numbers of individuals to abandon their existing identity in favour of a new one: the anomalous classical Athenian institution of cleruchies, in which settlers retained their Athenian citizenship, perhaps reflects unusual attachment to a kind of citizenship which had become especially valuable.²⁵

This picture of greater mobility and somewhat looser attachment should in turn encourage us to give greater weight to the other affiliations of individuals in archaic Greece and to think of citizenship not as all-embracing, but as only one of a suite of identities, though doubtless for most the strongest of them. In particular, the emphasis placed by Josine Blok on a community's covenant with its gods must surely hold good for other organizations which constituted worshipping communities with a shared cult place, notably *ethnē* and amphictyonies: the common engagement with the divine constituted as substantial an expression of and stake in a community as the physical and administrative infrastructure and the support required for that in money and materials.²⁶ That individuals did indeed maintain multiple identities is clear from the practice of self-identification as a citizen within the *polis* itself, but in terms of a larger entity when dealing with outsiders in the wider world, as Catherine Morgan has observed for *ethnē* and Gary Reger has pointed out for multi-*polis* islands.²⁷ The same would seem to hold good for *emporia*, above all the boom town that was Naukratis:²⁸ either there was a community with no formal citizenship of its own until classical times, as the fact that the ethnic is not securely attested until the later fifth century suggests, or else the archaic inhabitants did think of themselves as Naukratites, but also maintained a link of identity to their *polis* of origin through their affiliation to the particular sanctuary it had founded. We ought also to bear in mind the ties between colony

and mother-city which sometimes came to be formalized as isopolity, and the strong attachment between commercial partners such as Miletus and Sybaris which in turn are only the most conspicuous examples of the networked Mediterranean world which has been illuminated by recent study.²⁹

Finally, there is still much work to be done in locating the evolution of Greek community membership in the context of developments in the wider Mediterranean world. There were certainly forms of citizenship in the ancient Near East, but of a rather different kind: in Babylonia, probably the best-documented culture, citizenship would seem to have been primarily defined juridically, and was principally concerned with rights and privileges in relation to the overarching power and authority of the king; it seems likely that not all citizens (themselves only a part of the city's population) participated in cult, and insofar as citizenship was dependent on landownership, that must largely have eliminated the fluidity characteristic of archaic Greece.³⁰ On the other hand, while the phrase *kurious Karchēdonious* in the treaty between Carthage and Philip V seems to imply some kind of legal definition of Carthaginian citizenship with political authority, and that aspect is the focus of the analyses of Aristotle and Polybius, the fact that the former draws attention to common messes analogous to those at Sparta suggests that commensality could have been a characteristic civic practice outside Greece as well.³¹ On the whole, though, citizenship in Near Eastern cultures is insufficiently clearly documented to allow much discussion of its character or evolution.³² A more promising comparison would be with the non-Greek cultures of the central Mediterranean and particularly Italy, where the fluidity of settlement and looseness of attachment to which Alcibiades drew attention (Thuc. 6.17.2) would seem to have been characteristic of the wider peninsula: the early history of Rome is marked by a continuing concern to increase the population and anecdotes of incoming settlers like the Sabine Attus Clausus (Livy 2.16) and indeed the Greek Demaratus of Corinth (Livy 1.34). One notable difference is the presence of private retainers loyal to a particular individual, analogous to the Homeric *laos*: Attus Clausus was accompanied in his migration to Rome by five thousand armed clients, while the followers of Cn. Marcius Coriolanus joined him in defecting from Rome to the Volsci. However, the underlying motive, the desire for valuable human resources, is the same, and so is the pragmatic flexibility to which it gives rise:³³ Rome is more consistently open, but at this stage there is no sharp contrast to be drawn between the Roman 'generosity' and Greek 'avarice' of Gauthier's influential formula.³⁴ Rather, the problem is to account for the gradual divergence between attitudes to community membership

¹ E.g. Manville 1990.

² Hence while I continue to use the word in this undifferentiated way in what follows, readers who prefer not to consider archaic communities as ‘legitimate’ *poleis* are encouraged to put it mentally in quotation marks when it refers to archaic Greece.

³ The four tribes are not attested before c.460, and it seems likely that the system of tribes and phratries post-dates the Persian Wars: Piérart (2000) 298, 307–8.

⁴ See Arist. *Pol.* 2.1271a41–b3 for military excellence as the exclusive focus of Spartan political organization.

⁵ On scrutiny see *Ath. Pol.* 42.1–2, Ar. *Vesp.* 578 with Robertson 2000, though the dole for invalids (*Lys.* 24; *Ath. Pol.* 49.4) shows that citizenship did not necessarily entail any expectation of physical capability, and Osborne 2011, 106–23 argues that citizens could not readily be identified as such by sight.

⁶ As argued by Rausch 1999. For the persistence of the ideal, note for example the ridicule of the unfit torch-racer in Ar. *Ran.* 1089–98 and the praise of Epicrates’ prowess as *apobatēs* in [Dem.] 61.22–9.

⁷ The *Characters* of Theophrastus, with their eye for the social *faux pas*, likewise point to considerable potential for backbiting and censoriousness, at least in some parts of Athenian society, and cf. Christ 2006 for norms of citizenship and their transgression.

⁸ On Spartan social sanctions see Ducat 2006a and note Hdt. 2.80.1 for Spartan deference to age, in contrast to Athens (*Xen. Mem.* 3.5.15).

⁹ Similar procedures regulate naturalization in the United States, and were deftly satirized for Switzerland in the 1978 film *Die Schweizermacher*.

¹⁰ Ismard 2010 and this volume, chapter 5; note also Blok’s comments on ‘the structuring role of law’ (chapter 3, section 4).

¹¹ Noted by Davies (this volume, chapter 2, sections 2.1 and 2.2), but Achilles’ convening of the assembly in *Iliad* 1 is striking testimony to its capacity to exert moral pressure on leaders in certain circumstances.

¹² Of course, the group making decisions about inclusion was not necessarily always a *dēmos* or *polis* to start with: the controversy over the identity of the Cretan Datalais who recruited the scribe Spensithios (*Nomima* I, no. 22) is instructive here.

¹³ Olympia strikingly goes from being a *polis* (as Pisa) to absorption by Elis: Hansen and Nielsen 2004, no. 262. Archibald 2000 discusses civic organization within larger political structures.

¹⁴ Since opponents could be identified with the natural forces threatening the figurative ship, ship of state imagery lent itself to non-inclusive usage: Brock 2013, 53–67, 85–6. For the Thousand at Colophon see Duplouy 2013.

¹⁵ Moggi 1976, nos. 1–18, though most of these belong to a more or less mythical period; see Reger 1997, 472–3 on multi-*polis* colonization and 476–7 on island synoecisms.

¹⁶ Davies 1996b; also Jones 1987, esp. 1–25.

¹⁷ For Athens see especially the work of Ismard 2010.

¹⁸ Note the detailed local knowledge at work in the reconstruction of fourth-century Dikaia through a process of reconciliation after *stasis*: SEG 57.576; Dikaia was not a particularly small *polis*—she paid half a talent tribute under the Athenian empire—but evidently compact enough for local knowledge to be accurate and effective.

¹⁹ See Robinson 2011, 96–100 for a convenient discussion; I would suggest that

the rationality which Murray 1997 sees at work there was a necessary consolidation rather than a natural evolution.

²⁰ Cf. the activity of Aleuas the Red in sixth-century Thessaly (Helly 1995).

²¹ And see also Fisher this volume, chapter 8, section 3 for similar phenomena in Crete, where conditions were analogous. One might wonder whether the use of the word *astos* to denote a citizen originally derived from a perception that these typically lived in the urban centre (see Hansen 2006, 67–72 for an overview of settlement patterns), whereas members of subordinate groups would not (other than domestic slaves); the expulsion of those excluded from the 3,000 by the Thirty at Athens (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.1) might be relevant here.

²² Purcell 1990; also Hordern and Purcell 2000, 263–70, 377–400; Broodbank 2013, ch. 10.

²³ Forsdyke 2005.

²⁴ For mobility of this kind among athletes see Fisher this volume, chapter 8, section 6; also, for the combination of athletics and politics underlying elite mobility at this time, Hornblower 2004, 182–96 and Antonaccio 2007. The phenomenon is most persistent in the West: see below, and see Herodotus' account of the doctor Democedes of Croton, plying for hire in the Aegean world (3.131). Concern for basic manpower may have been more widespread than is generally supposed: Hordern and Purcell 2000 argue that the pre-modern Mediterranean was predominantly underpopulated overall, and the inclusivity of partible inheritance noted by Blok (this volume, chapter 3) implies a low level of anxiety about exceeding the carrying capacity of *polis* territory.

²⁵ The explanation commonly posited for Pericles' citizenship law of 451/0; the lack of sufficient volunteers to give up Athenian citizenship was presumably one reason that Athens' fifth-century city-foundations at Thurii and Amphipolis were Panhellenic.

²⁶ On temple economies see Morgan 2003, ch. 3, esp. 149–55.

²⁷ Morgan 2003, 196–202, 208–10; Reger 1997, 474–7. That Athenians identified themselves internally by demotic arguably reflects a similar dynamic.

²⁸ Hansen and Nielsen 2004, no. 1023.

²⁹ Malkin 2011; Malkin, Constantakopoulou, and Panagopoulou 2009; Broodbank 2013; also Herman 1987 for the personal networks constituted by *xenia*.

³⁰ Kuhrt 1995, 610–21; Vlassopoulos 2007, 104–17, esp. 104–6; Davies this volume, chapter 2, notes at the end of his chapter the crucial importance of the absence of powerful monarchs for the development of Greek society.

³¹ Polyb. 7.9.5 with Walbank 1957–79, 6.51; Arist. *Pol.* 2.1272b24–1273b26 (messes at 2.1272b33–4: Aristotle is evidently seeking for points of comparison, but the analogy ought to be broadly valid).

³² See, for example, the surveys in Hansen 2000a.

³³ Cornell 1995, 143–5, 156–9; Smith 1997 argues from a comparison of archaic reforms of the civic structures of Rome and Athens for parallel social evolution in Greece and Italy, while d'Agostino 1990 suggests that gentilicial warrior bands were characteristic of archaic Etruria.

³⁴ Gauthier 1974.

³⁵ Cornell 2000, 220–1 remarks on the anomalous persistence of the openness of Latin rights at Rome.

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